Before we start getting into the shiur, I just wanted to share one thought in terms of our mindset as we, beezrat Hashem, head over to be attending this rally. You know, human nature is such that when you have large crowds, there's something which generates usually simcha in being part of a large crowd. Sometimes it's seeing people that we haven't seen in a long time, which is a natural occasion for simcha, and sometimes it's just a certain sense of exhilaration or being part of something of an unusual and extraordinary magnitude. But I think we want to try very hard to maintain a frame of mind which is consistent with the need and impetus for this rally. The need and impetus was provided by, rachmana litzlan, the slaughter of Acheinu B'nai Yisrael and the mortal danger in which primarily the chayalim find themselves, but too, to an extent, the population in Eretz Yisrael as well. And the koved rosh that we should be feeling and experiencing should reflect the impetus of this occasion. We're living currently in a very, in a very extreme moment in history. And it's often the case that there are yesodos, there are fundamental principles which are relevant all the time, 24/7, which are highlighted and clarified in extreme moments. So we're going to talk about in terms of what the basic notion of morality is and ethics is such an example. It's something which is relevant 24/7, but it's spotlighted and it's magnified in the current eis tzara. Ultimately, the question meinyana d'yoma, which we want to address, is what should our reaction be, a. for ourselves and b. l'ma'an ha-hashkafa when the media bombards us with these images in the aftermath of Tzahal's bombings in Gaza. Surely, the media is not simply interested in documenting what's happening, that there is an agenda that's being pursued. So what is our reaction to those images supposed to be, of pulling bodies from rubble, of wailing and grieving parents? What reaction should that engender within us? Again, that we should know for ourselves and l'ma'an ha-hashkafa that we should be able to explain to others. So that's the question we're looking to answer, but we need to sort of provide the conceptual framework. If you take a look on page 3 of the sheets, so this is the Rambam in perek gimmel of hilchos de'os, presenting the mitzvah of halachta bidrachav, which is to chart the middle course. So the Rambam writes in halacha gimmel that ששתי קצוות הרחוקות זו מזו בכל דעה ודעה אינן דרך טובה ואין ראוי לו לאדם ללכת בהן ולא ללמדם לעצמו. אם מצא טבעו נוטה לאחת מהן או פוחת לאחת מהן או שכבר למד אחת מהן,
whether it's a natural predisposition, whether it's an acquired trait, and a person finds himself that he's not calibrated towards the middle, יחזיר עצמו למוטב וילך בדרך הטובים והיא הדרך הישרה. הדרך הישרה
the Rambam continues in Halacha Dalet is the middah beinonit. Is the middle point שבכל דעה ודעה מכל הדעות שיש לו לאדם. Right so if you imagine the extremes in terms of character traits and emotions, the Rambam doesn't distinguish between character traits and emotions. They're both referred to as de'ot. If you imagine the two extremes on a scale of zero to ten, where one is a zero, one is a ten, so a person is supposed to be a five. והיא הדעה שרחוקה משתי הקצוות בריחוק שווה ואינה קרובה לא לזו ולא לזו.
It's equidistant from the two extremes. לפיכך ציוו חכמים שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד. This is quite remarkable. A person has to constantly, constantly be assessing his middot. And the Rambam uses the lashon de'ot whereas we more colloquially would use the word middot. שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד. Something a person has to be making a constant cheshbon hanefesh on. umesha'er otam and a person has to be assessing and evaluating his middot ומכוין אותם בדרך האמצעית. So let's initially skip the first illustration and at the end of line four, the second illustration, וכן לא יהיה תאב אלא לדברים שהגוף צריך להם ואי אפשר לחיות בזולתם וכפי שנאמר צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו.
So a person shouldn't be an ascetic, so call that a zero. He shouldn't be a hedonist, that's a ten. But he should be a five. He should eat good, nurturing, nourishing meals so that he can function at maximum capacity. וכן לא יהיה עמל בעסקו אלא להשיג דבר שצריך לו לחיי שעה כעניין שנאמר טוב מעט לצדיק.
A person shouldn't be set out in life to become fabulously wealthy, that's a ten. He shouldn't be totally disinterested in money, that's a zero. But he should want to have and he should strive to have what he needs to live a dignified life. If Hashem gives him more, so then use it to do mitzvot. But in terms of what a person is striving for, that's what he's striving for. Okay, so the middah beinonit is the five, which is the midpoint between the two extremes, the zero and the ten. But the first example the Rambam gives is crucial and very, very illuminating. So going back to line three in Halacha Dalet, the first example the Rambam gives is כיצד לא יהיה בעל חמה נוח לכעוס. A person shouldn't be easily angered. On the other hand, ולא כמת שאינו מרגיש, he shouldn't be as apathetic as a met. ela beinoni. Again he should be in the middle. And what does that mean? לא יכעס אלא על דבר גדול שראוי לכעוס עליו כדי שלא יעשה כיוצא בו פעם אחרת.
He should only get angry when there's something which really warrants anger. It's something major which warrants anger. And even then, his anger is intended productively to ensure that this never happens again. So when you look at this illustration, so this isn't the same type of illustration as all the others. Here we would have thought that the midpoint between total apathy and being a hothead is that a person should react, but in a measured way. But the Rambam doesn't say that. The Rambam says the midpoint is that the person gets angry, but he does get angry, but he gets angry very infrequently. So that's not depicting the five between... the zero and the ten. So what this example shows, and it's megaleh on all the other examples, is that the real pshat in the Rambam's Derech Habeinonit is not that a person inwardly is a five. But rather, the real pshat on the middah beinonit is that inwardly the person has both the zero and the ten, and he has the self-control to exercise either of those capacities which the situation calls for. Right? So it's not that the goal of the Mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav is not to be a five. It's not that I should train myself that that's what I am, I'm a five. No, the goal of the Mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav is that I have the capacity for zero, I have the capacity to get angry. I have the capacity to be apathetic, to be a complete vattran and then to draw upon those capacities as the situation warrants. About 99.9% of the time, there's no practical nafka mina between whether or not the definition is that the person is a five or the person has the zero and ten within him. So in the two examples that we looked at, where the Rambam says about how much a person eats and how much money a person works to acquire. So practically, the fact that that should be a reflection of having the zero and the ten but what the situation calls for practically is a five. So I exercise my restraint by not seeking wealth, so that's how I exercise the zero. I exercise the ten by not being totally disinterested in money and pushing myself to have as much as I need. So practically we don't usually see the difference between whether or not the definition of the Mitzvah is to be a five or the definition of the Mitzvah is to have such a self-control and self-discipline that the person has both the zero and the ten within him. But conceptually, and we'll see soon the practical nafka mina as well, the Rambam says that conceptually it's a world of difference, right? Because if a person is a five, it means that one who's a zero, so he's sort of enslaved to his middah of being a zero. And one who's a ten, he's enslaved to his middah of being a ten. And one who's a five is enslaved to his middah of being a five. Now if you're going to be enslaved, better to be enslaved to a five than a zero or ten. But lema'aseh, here too a person is just acting out of what feels right to him. Mah she’ein kein if the person has the zero and the ten, so then he's not acting because of what it feels right, he's acting because of what is right. 99% of the time it doesn't make a difference. 99% of the time if a person is a five, so what feels right is right. But there are exceptional moments where the difference between these two definitions becomes clear. And let's try to illustrate. Let's just first make sure the distinction is clear. Rabbotai, thumbs up, thumbs down? Thumbs up. Okay. Let's maybe take a not-so-extreme example first and then proceed. Let's say sometimes rachmana litzlan in a difficult situation, so sometimes parents can be advised that they need to act with tough love vis-a-vis a child. Which means that basically they're being told in that highly unusual circumstance that they can't just sort of follow their natural parental instinct which is to be and loving and embracing, but they need to be tough with the child. If one is sort of enslaved, then one is not going to be able to do that. But if acting with the child is not just because I do what feels right to me, because that feels right, so then when the circumstance also, when the circumstance warrants and when the situation demands, so then the person will rise to the occasion and act exceptionally, as the exceptional circumstance requires. And that's the mitzvah, and that's the mitzvah. So again, before we begin, before I give another example just to explain conceptually why it's so compelling that this is the definition of the mitzvah, Rambam goes on if you take a look at the end of Halacha Hey, the last line in Halacha Hey, and he says ומצווין אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינונים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו.
So to follow the drachim habeynoynim is the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav, to go in the ways of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Now if you take a look at the Rambam at the end of perek aleph of Yesodei HaTorah which we have underneath here on page three, so the Rambam writes keivan shenitbaer, since earlier in perek aleph of Yesodei HaTorah it's been explained that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is eino guf u-geviyah. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not physical in any sense of the word. יתבאר שלא יארע לו אחד ממאורעות הגופות. Anything which is a function of physicality doesn't apply to Hakadosh Baruch Hu either. And part of that is if you take a look the last two lines of Halacha Yud Aleph, לא כעס ולא שחוק, and Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't get angry, He doesn't get hot under the collar. Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't have a high. ולא שמחה ולא עצבות, He's not in a good mood, He's not in a bad mood, He's not happy, He's not sad. All these things the Rambam says at the end of Halacha Yud Beis, וכל הדברים האלו אינם מצויין אלא לגופים האפלים השפלים. All these things are a function of physicality. Right, there's different hormones in a person's system which correlate with when he's happy, and there's different hormones in a person's system that correlate with when he's unhappy, when he's depressed. So all these, these fluctuations of moods, they're all a function of physicality. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not physical. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu isn't physical, so what determines when Hakadosh Baruch Hu acts with a middas hadin and what determines when Hakadosh Baruch Hu acts with a middas harachamim? Not what He's feeling. It's not that He's feeling angry, it's not that He's feeling outraged, it's not that He's feeling compassionate, it's not that He's in a good mood, it's not that someone is tugging at His heartstrings. When Hakadosh Baruch Hu acts with a middas hadin, it's because that's what's right and that's what should be. And when Hakadosh Baruch Hu acts with a middas harachamim, it's because that's what's right and that's what should be. So the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav is to emulate Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So that means to the extent that it's humanly possible. We're people, we're not divine. But to the extent that it's humanly possible, we too, our actions, and therefore it means all our morality, is supposed to be, yes, we're supposed to be passionate about it, but it's supposed to be intellectually driven passion. Yes, we should be emotional, but it should be intellectually driven and intellectually guided emotion. Not that the emotional reaction dictates what's right, but rather it should be intellectually driven and guided. determination of what's right. And that's why it's so compelling that the definition of the mitzva of halachta bidrachav is not to be a five. Because to be a five means, okay, so I've trained myself to be compassionate and now I always act in the same compassionate way. I've trained myself to be disciplined, so now when I eat, I always eat in the same disciplined way. No, that's not the mitzva. The mitzva is again not to be beholden to emotions, impulses, urges, desires, but to do what's right. To have the capacity for zero or ten. On Yom Kippur be a zero, on Yom Tov go more to the direction of a ten. You're gonna eat more than you do on a normal on a normal weekday because by Hakadosh Baruch Hu nothing is driven by emotion. Emotion is a is a human physical reality and and phenomenon. And the mitzva of halachta bidrachav is as much as possible, again, that's what the title of the Rambam calls of the Mishneh Torah, Sefer Hamada, is is that the morality, again, we should be passionate about it but the passion has to be rooted in, has to be anchored in, it has to be intellectually driven. Not that it's not that the emotion, not that the emotional reaction is what determines, is what dictates. In halacha, turn the page, on page four. Turn to page four. So there are two dinim by rodef. One of the one towards the bottom of page four, on the second to last source, דאמר רבא רודף שהיה רודף אחר חברו ושיבר את הכלים בין של נרדף בין של כל אדם פטור מאי טעמא משום דהוי ליה מתחייב בנפשו.
So a rodef while he is in pursuit of the person he's trying to kill, so he's mazik. So the so Rava says that קים ליה בדרבה מיניה applies. Since while he's engaged in the redifa, he's chayav misa, so the din of קים ליה בדרבה מיניה says that a person doesn't get two onshin for the same act. קים ליה בדרבה מיניה, he only he's only liable b'yadei adam, b'yadei shamayim is a different story, he's only liable b'yadei adam for the more severe for the more serious consequence. So over here regardless of whether or not that is meted out. Right, if he's chayav misa shogeg where you don't actually get misa, we also say קים ליה בדרבה מיניה. So the fact that the rodef may not have been killed while he was in pursuit is not relevant. Since he was chayav misa for what he was doing, he's not chayav mammon. So one din by a rodef is that a rodef is chayav misa. Then there's another din by rodef, the top source on page four, אמר רב הונא קטן הרודף ניתן להצילו בנפשו. At the very top source of page four, rabosai, if you have a katan who's a rodef, so then you save the nerdaf by killing the the katan. Now a katan is not bar onshin. So let's say, rachmana litzlan, you have a two-year-old who's playing with a gun. He doesn't know what he's doing. But he's playing with a gun and it's barur that in a second he's about to squeeze the trigger and the gun is pointed at someone and it's gonna kill someone. So the din is that that katan has a din of a rodef and nitan lehatzilo benafsho, which means that the second din of rodef has got nothing to do with liability, it has nothing to do with culpability, it's a din hatzala. That the Torah says if there's a rodef and a nerdaf, they may be in theory equally innocent. The two-year-old who's playing with a gun is is as innocent as as can be, they may be equally innocent, but the halacha is that there's a din hatzala and the Torah says that even without any din of liability or or culpability, so you save the nerdaf b'chayav shel ha-rodef. That would be true again even if it's even in a situation where it's sort of a one-on-one. There's one rodef, there's one nirdaf. But the redifa, and you don't even need this Gemorah, this din, when when the redifa is against millions of people. When when the the individuals in Gaza, the innocent civilians, לא כולם חפים מפשע. ישנם שחפים מפשע. הרבה מהם אי אפשר לכנות כ-innocent
civilians. אבל נניח, נייחד את הדיבור אודות אלה שהם באמת חפים מפשע, תינוקות למשל.
The individuals, the innocent individuals, the innocent civilians in in Gaza are part of a redifa. I, it's not them? No one says it's them. But there's a there's a din hatzala of קטן הרודף ניתן להצילו בנפשו. And again that would be even if it was one against one. In in our halacha l'maaseh case where where it's it's a redifa against, again initially, every Jew in Eretz Yisrael and then beyond that, every Jew all over the world, אומר הבא להורגך השכם להורגו, you don't even need this Gemorah. But even if you sort of threw it on a microscopic level, and that's what the din of rodef is. That that there doesn't have to be culpability. The rodef can be as innocent as as a tinok. And that's what the din is, nitan l'hatzilo b'nafsho. Now how how are we supposed to react when when we see when we see the pictures? So we absolutely are not celebrating. We absolutely don't don't take, don't no one wants any part of it. And yes, it does bother us. But it can't bother us to the point where it interferes with our 100% unmitigated, unstinting support for what Tzahal is doing and what Tzahal needs to do. Because if that's the case, so then it turns out that really my my rachmanus is not proper rachmanus. It's just because we trained ourselves to be a rach. It's not because we have the zero and the ten and we're doing what's right in the situation, no, it's because that's what feels good to me. There's a there's a moradike vort from the Vilna Gaon. Vilna Gaon says it's a pshat in Chazal. It's it's in a couple of places in the kisvei HaGra. One of the places, I'm sorry I forgot to put it on the sheet, one of the places actually in the chidushim u'be'urim on Masechet Brachos. The Gaon, I think he's commenting on a Yerushalmi. Yerushalmi says something peladike. You find two mitzvos in the Torah where the Torah promises arichus yamim. The Torah promises arichus yamim for kibbud av v'em. כבד את אביך ואת אמך למען יאריכון ימיך. And the Torah also promises arichus yamim for shiluach haken. כי יקרא קן ציפור לפניך, שלח תשלח את האם ואת הבנים תקח לך למען ייטב לך והארכת ימים.
So it's interesting. Those are the two mitzvos in the Torah where the Torah promises arichus yamim. So what what's the pshat? So the Gaon again, the the Gaon shows how this is what Chazal are saying. Says something ayom v'nora. He says, let's say you see a person who's very, very makpid on kibbud av v'em. Really extraordinary. And you wonder, he's doing it because Hakadosh Baruch Hu says it's the right thing to do? No, maybe it's because a child naturally feels love for his parents, a child naturally feels a bond. And then combine that with the fact that when parents get older, so they rachmanus litzlan become needy. So just he's doing it because that's what feels good to him. That's what feels right. Is he doing it because it is right, or is he doing it because it feels right? So says the Torah, let's see how this same individual acts with regard to Shiluach HaKein. Shiluach HaKein, שלח תשלח את האם ואת הבנים תקח לך. And then what happens? The mother bird comes back. The mother bird comes back and and the and the and the children are no longer there. Under- so to the human mind, to the human moral instinct, that's achzariyus. Leave it alone! So what if שלח תשלח את האם? So the mother's not there when you take them. But the mother knows to come back. And when she comes back, she's going to see that they're not there. So that seems like an achzariyus. But, says the Torah, you want to know if this Kibbud Av V'eim he was doing was what feels right or what is right? See what happens when he encounters the mitzvah of Shiluach HaKein. So the Torah conversely, let's say you see a person performing the mitzvah of Shiluach HaKein. So he's a tzaddik? He's a ohev mitzvos? No, he's an achzar. He's an achzar. Just so happens that his achzariyus seems to converge with the mitzvos of the Torah. So go see how that same individual treats his parents. If you want to understand what he was doing in Shiluach HaKein, go look and see how he treats his parents. Again, it's the difference between doing what feels right and what is right. Now 99% of the time, if a person you know ingrains noble traits within himself, so what feels right is right. But there is that 1% of the time where what is right doesn't necessarily feel right because it's not what we're accustomed to doing. It's not what the Torah wants us to do רוב דרוב דרוב דרוב of the time. רוב דרוב דרוב דרוב of the time, we're not accustomed to achzariyus. But when there's a redifah against millions of innocent people and the only way to repel that redifah is is to bomb and because of the rishus of the primary rodef, there are secondary rodfim who are being employed as human shields and it's impossible to save the millions and millions of nefashos, so maybe based on our daily lives, it doesn't feel right. The mitzvah of Ahavas Yisrael is to have the capacity to do what is right. Not to be not to be slavishly driven even by what most of the time is a very noble and correct instinct of rachmanus. The Rambam has a line where he says that sometimes misplaced rachmanus on one individual is achzariyus on others. Let's say a person who will have rachmanus on a rotzeach. So the Rambam says that rachmanus, that misplaced rachmanus is achzariyus on everyone else that he's going to that's going to be adversely affected, that's going to be destroyed by him. So we mentioned at the outset that sometimes in extreme moments, middos which are relevant 24/7 are clarified, they're highlighted, they're spotlighted. And the emes is, if a person can't, if a person doesn't muster the strength to recognize the complete justice and justice of what Tzahal is doing in our national self-defense and if a person is out there criticizing or clamoring or even maybe silencing himself, but he's questioning what they're doing, it's a question it it's maybe perhaps it undermines to a certain degree all this chessed, because it means that all this chessed is like the Gomlei Chassadim of the Tovei HaRasha. It means that all the chessed he does is because it feels good, because it feels right, not because it is good. A person is supposed to do chessed 99.999 percent of the time, not the extreme moment that the Nefesh HaChaya finds itself in now. A person is supposed to do chessed 99.999 percent of the time, not just because it feels good and I act in accordance with what feels good, because it is good. And the .001 situation where a person again does what is right even though it goes against the grain of the way we live our lives in virtually every other context, but that shows that a person's morality is that he does what is right, not just what feels right. If you take a look, there's further, further proof. It's a long, long passage. We're not going to read it all, but if you take a look at the Rambam on page two. The Rambam is describing how a manhig hamedina, a king, a president, a manhig hamedina sometimes has to emulate Hakadosh Baruch Hu's midas hadin. Just going to try and find where it is in the text here. Sorry, sorry about that. Yeah, thank you. Around 10 lines, 12 lines from the bottom. The line begins v'tzorech l'manhig hamedina. Around a dozen lines, v'tzorech l'manhig hamedina. Do you see it at the bottom? v'tzorech l'manhig hamedina. וצורך למנהיג המדינה שיהא נביא. Ideally, the manhig hamedina should be a navi. The greatest person available. sheyehei domeh. He should... his character should be molded b'eileh hatoarim, by the yud gimmel middos, ויבוא ממנו אלו הפעולות, and he should engage in actions of rachamanus, of chanina, etc., keshiur u'kfi hadin, as is warranted, לא מרדיפת ההתפעלות לבד. Not because again that's what he's emotionally aroused to do. No, the emotion is supposed to be guided by what is right. The passion is supposed to be rooted, anchored, in the determination of what is right, not that passion gets ahead of what is right. And therefore he says, and I'm skipping a line or two, וקצתם ברחמנות וקצתם בנקמה וגמול וגמול כפי הראוי. Sometimes the manhig hamedina has to punish, sometimes the manhig hamedina has to give capital punishment, has to be harsh with people. Says the Rambam, והוא בלתי כעס ולא קנאה ולא נקמה ולא מאוס. Not because again he's emotionally aroused to do that, but because he recognizes that that's what's needed. So what should our reaction be? We should feel badly. We should feel badly that this Chamas Yemach Shmo imposed this defensive war on Tzahal. And we should feel badly that an inevitable part of the defensive war on Tzahal are the casualties. But, but, it needs to be, it can't, that feeling bad, that feeling bad, it can't be allowed to rise to a level where in any way it detracts from the support, no way, that it's right and that this is what has to happen. Maybe a little bit of a mashal of how the davar domeh is. Right, we all know let's say you have a doctor who's... oncologist. So unfortunately an oncologist, as much as he would like to, does not succeed in saving all his patients. And if the oncologist or any doctor who deals with, you know, chayei sha'ah, deals with nefashos, if he'll be as emotionally affected by the death of a patient as we non-doctors are in our lives, then he won't be able to function. He'll be too broken by the constant exposure to and encounter with death. So it's understood that there has to be enough detachment, enough detachment that allows the oncologist to after losing one patient to be there 100% to be treating the next patient and doing his best to save the next patient. And if he'll, in quotation marks, have so much rachmanus on this patient that it'll be so devastated that it will prevent him, it will then spill over and affect his ability to function, so that's not rachmanus anymore, that's achzarius. For that's achzarius, all his other patients are going to suffer because of his the degree of his emotional involvement. How much emotional involvement can he have? He should be, a doctor should be empathetic, he should be emotionally involved. How much emotional involvement, how much empathy? As much as he can afford without compromising his ability to do what's right, what he needs to do. Because at the moment that it compromises his ability to do what's right, what he needs to do, so then it's rachmanus on this person and misplaced rachmanus on this person becomes achzarius on others. And if a person just thinks of it in those terms, if a person isn't so short-sighted, a person realizes that all this the so-called rachmanus that the world, it's not really rachmanus, it's just sinas yisrael. But that the alleged rachmanus is really achzarius. Ruba de-ruba de-ruba as Chazal says, but every now and then, every now and then they tell the truth. So recently, I'm sure you all saw it reported also, so one of their spokesmen said that מה שעשו בשבעה באוקטובר נעשה עוד הפעם ועוד הפעם ועוד הפעם עד שנשמיד את כולם.
So the rachmanus in quotation marks that people demand in seeing these images is an achzarius. It's an achzarius because that rachmanus leads to all the atrocities that happened on shemini atzeres. And if they had their way, if they'll be on the receiving end, if the human shields will generate rachmanus which will protect them, so it's achzarius on others. And if a person isn't just guided by his instinctive feeling but it's rather, again, he's a tzir hamateh, it's not that he's enslaved to the panim, so then a person will demonstrate what's genuine rachmanus. And the genuine rachmanus is sometimes, again, as the Rambam says, sometimes midas hadin, sometimes midas hadin has to give, has to give missah. That's what's called rachmanus. Okay, there's another makom, so maybe we'll leave it at this for this.