Transcript

Let's begin with the opening Mishna in Pirkei Avot. Someone read the Mishna please.

משה קיבל תורה מסיני ומסרה ליהושע ויהושע לזקנים וזקנים לנביאים ונביאים מסרוה לאנשי כנסת הגדולה הם אמרו שלושה דברים הוו מתונים בדין והעמידו תלמידים הרבה ועשו סייג לתורה.

So the question that many meforshim address here, rabbosai, is that the Mishna begins by detailing for us the shalsheles hamsorah, right, the chain of transmission of Torah Sheba'al Peh. So seemingly what's the natural position for Rabbeinu Hakadosh? Rabbeinu Hakadosh is the one who organized the Shisha Sidrei Mishna. So if we had been consulted as editors on Shisha Sidrei Mishna, where would we have put this Mishna of משה קיבל תורה מסיני? First. First. It functions as an introduction to Torah Sheba'al Peh. So clearly everyone's answer is going to somehow or other accomplish the following: that there's something that Rabbeinu Hakadosh achieves by placing it here that he wouldn't have achieved by just having this as a general introduction to Shas or Mishnayos. Do you hear that? That makes sense, right? There's something, clearly he held this in reserve, right? Rabbeinu Hakadosh held on on presenting the shalsheles hamsorah because there's something added in addition to our learning what the links, who the links are in the masorah, in the chain of masorah, there's something additional that's accomplished here. So the way the Bartenura, right, the Rav, Rabbeinu Ovadiah Bartenura explains is as follows. Someone read, volunteer please. Omer ani, let's see, rabbosai, it's the first source you have underneath the Mishna. Omer ani:

לפי שמסכת זו אינה מיוסדת על פירוש מצוה ממצוות התורה כשאר מסכתות שבמשנה.

I translate it or... Yes, please. Because this masechta is not miyusedes... like ordered? Yes, it's not founded upon, right? Yesod is a foundation, so miyusedes means it's not founded upon... founded upon the perush of a mitzvah from the mitzvos of the Torah like all other masechtos of the Mishnayos. Ella kullah... maseches Shabbos deals with hilchos Shabbos, maseches Psachim with chametz, matzah, Pesach Rishon, Pesach Sheni. Pirkei Avot is not darshining pesukim, it's not really honing in on one particular mitzvah or mitzvos in the Torah. Ella kullah... what is the subject matter of Pirkei Avot? אלא כולה מוסרים ומידות. It's mussar and its midos, so all of it is mussar and its midos. It's philosophy, it's ethics, it's morals, right? It's a different area, totally different area. Please continue.

וחכמי אומות העולם גם כן חיברו ספרים כמו שבדו מליבם בדרכי המוסר כיצד יתנהג אדם עם חברו.

And the non-Jewish chachamim, the chachmei umos ha'olam, they also compiled sefarim about again this philosophy, this idea of philosophy, how a person should act with his chavero, how they beina l'chavero. Good, excellent. לפיכך התחיל התנא מסכת זו משה קיבל תורה מסיני. So therefore Rabbeinu Hakadosh started this masechta with

משה קיבל תורה מסיני. לומר לך שהמידות והמוסרים שבזו המסכתא לא בדו אותם חכמי המשנה מליבם אלא אף אלו נאמרו בסיני.

It's to teach you that these morals, the Jewish moral code that we have, isn't ideas that we have on our own, rather even our morals are also from nemru miSinai. Excellent. So you hear that rabbosai? So Bartenura says what Rabbeinu Hakadosh is communicating by... presenting the Shalsheles Ha-Mesorah here is Pirkei Avos is philosophy. That there is the חכמי אומות העולם, there's a vast literature of general philosophy. But Rabbeinu Hakadosh wants us to understand that even though sometimes the certainly in general the subject matter is the same but don't think that Pirkei Avos like general philosophy is human wisdom. That's what it says כמו שבדו מליבם and Badu Mi-Libam literally means they invented. It's human wisdom but don't think that when we'll learn what Hillel and Shammai say and and Yosei ben Yoezer and and all the all the Tanna'im that what they're presenting is also just human wisdom. So no this too is part of the Mesorah Mi-Sinai. It's divine wisdom. You hear that Rabosai? And and that's what Rabbeinu Hakadosh accomplishes by presenting the Shalsheles Ha-Mesorah here and not where we otherwise would have placed it as a general introduction to Shisha Sidrei Mishnah. So what we want to discuss a little bit tonight is to recognize in what respect Chochmas Ha-Torah in these areas of philosophy of ethics of morality differs from that of human wisdom, of the חכמי אומות העולם. We're not going to go into the details, we'll mention some details by way of illustration but we want to understand more broadly more in terms of what the scheme is, more schematically. So first of all there are some things which Hakadosh Baruch Hu's morality and ethics teach that the חכמי אומות העולם based on human wisdom don't recognize or don't understand at all. And and a good illustration of that is Rav Soloveitchik Zecher Tzaddik Livracha used to say you know in in western society the idea of Tzedakah right? In western society they refer to as charity is something which is not an obligation. A person is not obligated to oh it's something which is again it will be described as very noble but entirely voluntary. What what do you mean that I'm not obligated to give money to the to the poor? I can be a trillionaire and I'm not obligated to give a a penny of Tzedakah necessarily. Right? That's the sort in terms of western western morality. In the Torah Tzedakah's a Chiyuv. And Beis Din if a person didn't give Tzedakah kefi matnas yado according to his resources so Beis Din used to be Kofin. Exactly what form the coercion would take is is a machlokes in Rishonim but everyone agrees that there was some the Gemara says אכפייה רבא לרב נתן Rav Nasan I don't remember whom because he thought that he hadn't given Tzedakah according to his means. So that's one type of difference between between the middos and mussarim which come from Sinai and and that which are a product of human wisdom is that there are certain values certain concepts that that don't even exist in general philosophy which Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells us are cornerstones of of morality. And and case in point an illustration of that is is that for us Tzedakah's an obligation. Now but there is a more subtle type of difference as well. And and that's the one we'll we'd like to spend the the bulk of our time tonight on בעזרת השם בלי נדר. And that is that there are some areas where general philosophy, where svara, where human wisdom does have what seems to be approximately the same values as the Torah teaches, and what we want to discover is where the difference lies even then. Okay? When it comes to something like tzedakah, something big, the difference is not subtle. The difference is as glaring as can be, again, that in the Torah, in Hakadosh Baruch Hu's morality, so it's a chiyuv, it's an obligation, an obligation that Beis Din enforces. And in general philosophy, it's something which is, if they would use our terminology to express their view, it would be something that would be described as lifnim mishuras hadin, something voluntary, something going beyond what you have to do. But there's another type of difference which is more subtle. And that's where again, approximately, it seems like svara, human wisdom, general philosophy, is mechaven to the correct values, but even there, what we want to discover is where the difference lies. So let's begin as follows. The next source that you have in front of you is from Perek Vov in the Rambam Hilchos Deos, halachos alef and beis. The two paragraphs, halachos alef and beis. Okay, who's reading? Please.

דרך בריאתו של אדם להיות נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחרי ריעיו וחבריו ונוהג כמנהג אנשי מדינתו.

We're going to, we're going to, let's say, we're going to read a lot, Rabbosai, so we'll try to, we'll read and translate without commenting and then we'll try to reflect a little bit on what's here.

דרך בריאתו של אדם להיות נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחרי ריעיו וחבריו ונוהג כמנהג אנשי מדינתו.

What does that mean? It's the way of a human being to follow after the opinions and the actions of his friends, his neighbors, and the people that live in the same country. We're very susceptible to peer influence, societal influence. We imitate the behaviors, we cultivate the same character traits as our friends, as our peer group, and as broader society. That's human nature, that there is such a tendency. It's not pre-ordained, but there's such a tendency. Lefichach, says the Rambam,

צריך אדם להתחבר לצדיקים ולישב אצל חכמים תמיד כדי שילמד ממעשיהם.

So you have to, a person has to stick with tzaddikim, to sit with chachamim constantly so they can learn from their ways, their actions. ויתרחק מן הרשעים ההולכים בחושך כדי שלא ילמד ממעשיהם. And he should distance himself from evil-doers, from wrongdoers that walk in the darkness and in order to not learn from their actions. Hu she'shlomo omer הולך את חכמים יחכם ורועה כסילים ירוע. This is what the posuk in Mishlei says, that one who walks with chachamim will be wiser and one who walks with idiots, well, will not do so well.

ואומר אשרי האיש וכן אם היה במדינה שמנהגותיה רעים ואין אנשיה הולכים בדרך ישרה ילך למקום שאנשיה צדיקים ונוהגים בדרך טובים.

If for some reason, in a country where their minhagim are bad, they're evil, and the people do, their people do bad things, then what you should do is you should go to a place where the people there are tzaddikim and they do the correct things, they walk in the right ways.

ואם היו כל המדינות שהוא יודע ושומע שמועתן נוהגים בדרך לא טובה כמו זמננו.

But if every single country in the world is known, it's heard, everybody knows that they don't do the right thing, like bizmanenu, bizman hazeh. או שאינו יכול ללכת למדינה... Wait, so that was the Rambam reflecting on 12th century, right? The Rambam lived in the 12th century in the 1100s. The Rambam says in my day, the Rambam says, I'm not aware of any country, any society that behaves properly, that lived the way they were supposed to live. Wow. Okay.

או שאינו יכול ללכת למדינה שמנהגותיה טובים מפני הלסטים או מפני החולי.

So but if somebody can't go to somewhere where it's good, where their minhagim are good because of some sort of external factors, he's forced to stay even if it's dangerous, the travel is dangerous and and it's it would be life-threatening because of the the the dangers on the road or because he's too ill to withstand the stress, the strain of the journey. What should he do?

ישב לבד יחידי כעניין שנאמר ישב בדד וידום כי נטל עליו. והם היו הרעים והחטאים שאין מניחים אותו לישב במדינה אלא אם כן נתערב עמהם ונוהג במנהגם הרע.

But if the reiyim and the sinners there, they won't let you be there, they won't let you stay in that that country unless you do you join in with their their their evil their bad minhagim, יצא למערות ולחוחים ולמדברות. Should go in the middle of the wilderness, go to the forests, go to the caves. He should be a hermit. Yes, caves, the desert.

ואל ינהיג עצמו בדרך חטאים כעניין שנאמר מי יתנני במדבר מלון אורחים.

Okay, and don't do their way. That's halacha alef. So just this is not why we're here. Everyone agrees that bazman hazeh even though we don't necessarily give straight A's to all the societies in which we live in terms of their morality and their behavior, that we're not capable of this type of solitary existence in a to live in a cave and the takeaway from listening to the news and hearing that not such good things happen in society doesn't mean that we're packing our bags and and heading for the for the caves. We we don't know how to how to live in in that fashion. Now, okay that's halacha alef. Now halacha beis. מצוות עשה להדבק בחכמים ותלמידיהם. It's a mitzvat asei to cling to the chachamim and their students kedei lilmod mima'aseihem so so you can learn from their their ways כעניין שנאמר ובו תדבק. וכי אפשר לאדם להדבק בשכינה? And it's impossible is it possible for somebody to to cling to the shechinah?

אלא כך אמרו חכמים בפירוש מצווה זו הדבק בחכמים ותלמידיהם.

So when the chachamim explain the mitzvah of dveikus hashechinah they said that that that is regards to chachamim and you should you should cling to the chachamim and their students.

לפיכך צריך אדם להשתדל שישא בת תלמיד חכם וישיא בתו לתלמיד חכם ולאכול ולשתות עם תלמידי חכמים ולעשות פרקמטיא לתלמיד חכם ולהתחבר להם בכל מיני חיבור.

So therefore a person needs to try his absolute best to marry bat talmid chacham and marry his daughter to a talmid chacham and to eat and drink with talmidei chachamim and to do prakmatia business business with talmidei chachamim and to to really be with them and and to cling to them and have relationships with them shene'emar uledavkah bo.

וכן ציוו חכמים ואמרו הוי מתאבק בעפר רגליהם ושותה בצמא את דבריהם.

What that mishna in Avot means is that you should cling to the chachamim and follow after the dust of their feet and drink from the water to drink from their words. Excellent. So there are probably lots of questions that that we could that that that jump out but there's one maybe most fundamental and very glaring question here. Again think sort of globally, think more macro about halacha alef and halacha beis. Not a word here a word there, but more more macro, globally, about halachos alef and beis. What's the question that jumps out at us? How does it relate to our mishna? Okay that's 100 percent correct, that's where we're going. But before we get to that, let's say let's say we had begun the shiur with with this Rambam. So what what question just jumps out? Why don't all the other medinos have have good midos, why don't they have their own mishnaos? Okay, okay. Why aren't there siddurim? Why is this not like a halacha, it's more like a good thing to do? What does it have to do with our mishna? Again so let's forget our context, let's say we were just learning hilchos deos. What what's the question, the glaring question, fundamental question? You could say why did you skip over all of the other medinos and and not settle in that own city and and and and and not. All these questions are are good. But there's something more fundamental than that. Halachos Aleph Beis, isn't there repetition? What does Rambam say in Halacha Aleph? At the end of the first line in Halacha Aleph,

צריך אדם להתחבר לצדיקים וליישב אצל החכמים תמיד כדי שילמד ממעשיהם.

Right? What does a person's supposed to do? Connect to tzaddikim, right? Chibur means connection. He should connect to tzaddikim and he should spend time with chachamim so that he'll learn from their behavior. That's what Rambam said in Halacha Aleph, correct? And he explained it and said, then he begins Halacha Beis, which we've never heard of this idea, and tells us מצות עשה להדבק בחכמים ותלמידיהם כדי ללמוד ממעשיהם. Such a glaring repetition. Do you see that, Rabbosai? Okay, so that's the fundamental question that should, you know, that should be recognized, right? It jumps off the page. Now, having seen that, so let's reflect on something remarkable in Halacha Aleph. I'm just going to reread most of the first two lines.

דרכו של אדם להיות נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחר ריעיו וחבריו ונוהג כמנהג אנשי מדינתו.

Human nature is such that a person is influenced, literally he's drawn after the character traits, the behavior of his colleagues, of his peer group, of the broader society. לפיכך צריך אדם להתחבר לצדיקים וליישב אצל החכמים תמיד. And that's why he has to connect to tzaddikim and spend serious time with chachamim. What's the pasuk for this rule? Does Rambam have a pasuk for this rule in Halacha Aleph? He quotes one in Halacha Beis. He does, exactly, exactly. But already in Halacha Aleph, he tells us what we're supposed to be doing. But is it based on a pasuk? No, right? What's it based on? It's based on the fact that look, we all know this, it's a basic fact of human nature, Rabbosai. We all know it, that we're susceptible to being influenced, again, by our peer group, by our colleagues, by our classmates, by societal behaviors, mores. And that fact, again, it's just self-evident in sevara that if we're susceptible to be influenced, that we should expose ourselves to the right influences and we should avoid the wrong influences, right? So that, it doesn't need a pasuk. If it's self-evident in sevara that something is correct, that something is true, that something is necessary, so then we have to do it. It doesn't need a pasuk. Now, when Rambam goes on and quotes the pasuk in Mishlei, is that contradicting what we're saying now? No. Why not? The second one he's trying to prove it's a mitzvas asei. But when he says vehu she-Shlomo omer in Halacha Aleph, line three, does that contradict what we just said? It's to say that when it's bad, then where should he go, and should he leave or not. That's way more than just a simple decision. Good, good. How does Rambam introduce the pasuk in Mishlei? vehu she-Shlomo omer, it's not shene'emar. How, when you're quoting a pasuk as a source for something, how do you introduce the pasuk? Shene'emar. Shene'emar, right. You have to do the shene'emar because it says, right? vehu she-Shlomo omer. Rambam is not telling us that this is the pasuk, that it's a chiyuv midivrei kabbalah based on this pasuk in Mishlei. Rambam is saying this idea, which we know in sevara, is also reflected in what Shlomo HaMelech says. But he's clearly not hanging his hand on that, right? He's not invoking that as a source. What's the source? Sevara is the source. Sevara, sevara that we're capable of, that people are capable of. What we know in sevara is mechayav us. Now, let's look a little bit more carefully at halachos aleph and beis. On the one hand, we noticed the repetition, or the apparent repetition, the overlap. But now let's try to notice some differences. How does the Rambam define the chiyuv in halacha aleph? What are the two crucial verbs, Rabbotai? Lehitchaber and layshev. Excellent. What's the crucial verb in halacha beis? Lehidabek. Is there a difference, and what is the difference? Are they synonymous, interchangeable? You could plug lehidabek in instead of lehitchaber and it would mean the same thing? You could plug lehitchaber in instead of lehidabek and it would mean the same thing, or is there a difference in meaning? Yes? It could be that in halacha aleph, lehitchaber and layshev is almost subconsciously, it's not intentional, rather you're being brought in that area subconsciously it does it, whereas lehidabek is a conscious and purposeful effort, connection. I hear that, I hear that. Yes? Maybe lehidabek is more immersive? Oh! What does lehidabek mean literally? To cling. To cling, like something is adhesive. The standard in halacha beis is much higher than it is in halacha aleph. It's true that it's the same chiyuv, it's the same value, right? It's responding to the fact that we're susceptible to influence by the company we keep. But in halacha aleph, the Rambam says lehitchaber is a strong lashon. To connect, that's a strong lashon. Layshev is even stronger because layshev means you're spending extended periods of time. There's a certain kevius associated with yeshiva, and that's why it has that sense. But neither lehitchaber nor layshev approach the type of, again, that was an excellent word, the type of immersion that lehidabek, that davka those words express. Do you hear that, Rabbotai? Yes? Oh! So now, circling back to our sugya, that the Rav tells us that we should understand that even though the subject matter of Pirkei Avos is not unique to Torah, the subject matter of Pirkei Avos is also dealt with in general philosophy, but you should know that in Pirkei Avos the chochmah that's being taught, that's being transmitted, is m'Sinai. It's from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. It's not only the chochmah that human wisdom discovers. And we said that that also means even when sevara gets it right to a degree. In sevara, sevara also recognizes that the company we keep is very important. But in sevara alone, the only thing we would know on our own is lehitchaber and layshev. In sevara alone, we wouldn't have understood that it's to go, that the degree of connection should be lehidabek. So even when chochmah enoshit, even when human wisdom is mechaven to truth, and halacha aleph is initially presenting chochmah enoshit, when the Torah deals with the same issue, the Torah raises it to an even higher level. Do you hear that and see how halachos aleph and beis here illustrate that, Rabbotai? Shouldn't the Rambam be quoting the posuk first before the svara meaning though? Does it not make more sense to say that we take what the Torah says first and then the what we use as svara? Maybe, but you can also argue the other side of it and I think have two arguments for it. Number one, svara as you know sort of comes even before the Torah. This is what we know. And number two, I think this way of doing it highlights exactly the point that we're talking about that it really shines a spotlight on how Torah takes the same value that is known from human wisdom and the Torah says yeah but really what Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells us is no that it's something that the morality should go even higher and further. That contrast is sharper when it's done this way. Aren't we trying to make the point that svara doesn't always take us in the perfect direction meaning we always follow exactly what the Torah says? The svara takes us in the right direction but it doesn't take us all the way there. The svara is a source of truth. Many of the rishonim say that. Svara is a source of truth. Okay so we'll go to Rambam. Yes? Okay now let's we're going to try to trace a second example of this. The second example is a little bit more complicated. We have to see a few Rambams for it. we're going to begin again the bottom source here inside one פרק א הלכה א-ג. Who's reading? Someone who hasn't read yet. Thank you. דעות הרבה יש לכל אדם ואדם מהן משונות. The Rambam uses deios in sense of character traits and dispositions. Okay. There are many character traits for each and every person. וזו משונה מזו ורחוקה הימנה עד הקצה. And this is different from one another person and the whole range could be varied. The Rambam is going to present now pairs of opposites. Each of these pairs that the Rambam is going to present they're opposite ends of the spectrum. ויש אדם שהוא בעל חמה כועס תמיד. There's somebody who's a very angry person gets angry easily. ויש אדם שדעתו מיושבת עליו ואינו כועס כלל. Somebody who's mind is at peace and doesn't get angry at all. And if he's so you can't it seems almost impossible to upset his equilibrium, right? Everything is nothing seems to affect him, nothing seems to evoke any kind of strong reaction. ואם כעס יכעס כעס מעט אחת לכמה שנים. Meaning if he will get angry it will only be a little anger if once in many years. ויש אדם שהוא גבה לב ביותר. And then there's somebody who's very haughty and the opposite is ויש שהוא שפל רוח ביותר. And then there's somebody who has much anava much humility that he lifts himself he puts himself lower than everyone. ויש שהוא בעל תאוה לא תשבע נפשו מהלוך בתאוה. And there's somebody who's a baal tayva or loves his pleasure and where he can't he doesn't he can't satisfy his thirst he doesn't satisfy his thirst l'haloch b'tayva just walking in desire.

ויש שהוא טהור לב ביותר שלא יתאוה אפילו לדברים מעט שהגוף צריך להן.

He doesn't desire even small things which his body needs. He doesn't even eat enough to maintain his health. He's so disconnected from physicality and tayva that he doesn't even doesn't even maintain his health.

ויש בעל נפש רחבה שלא תשבע נפשו מכל ממון העולם.

Then there's somebody who has a baal nefesh rechava that can't really get satisfied from all the money in the world want more and more. כענין שנאמר אוהב כסף לא ישבע כסף. Who loves money will not be satisfied by money. Ve'yeish m'katzer nafsho. And there's somebody that m'katzer nafsho he doesn't want a lot. Yes so m'katzer means to make small. He's so self-constricted, right? That he's so self-limiting.

ויש ששדיו אפילו דבר מעט שלא יעשירהו שלא ירדוף בהשג כל דבר.

He's so disinterested in money that he's not even interested in having money to pay the rent, to be able to buy groceries. He is just totally detached.

ויש שהוא מסגף עצמו ברעב ובכובס על ידו ואינו אוכל משלו אלא בצער גדול.

Then there's a person who'll torture himself and will deprive himself because he doesn't want to spend any money. He may be wealthy, but he can't bring himself to spend money that he won't even allow himself to buy food. So that's one extreme, and who's at the other end of the spectrum? ויש המאבד כל ממונו בידו לדעתו. And someone who loses all their money beyado ledaato with his daas intense, meaning he knows he's spending all his money and he wastes all his money. ואל דרך זה שאר כל הדעות. So again, everything that the Rambam is presenting are extremes, right? Right? Each of these pairs have been extremes, right Rabosai? Good. Okay. And now the Rambam says without elaboration, I'll mention a few other extremes, kegon meholel veonen. Meholel someone who's so light-headed and onen is he walks around morose and the small D depressed. Kili veshua. Again very stingy, gives away everything. Achzari verachman. אכזרי ורחמן. Someone who's achzari, gets upset at everything. And achzar I think maybe we'll translate as, how do we translate achzar Rabosai? Heartless? Cruel. Exactly, right? Someone who's cruel, rachman, someone who's compassionate. Rach levav, he's a coward. Amitz lev, he's reckless. Vechayotze bahem. Right. Then the Rambam Halacha Dalet goes on to say, maybe we'll read all of Halacha Dalet, but the Rambam goes on to say that all of these extremes are not good, right? And the Rambam and a person is supposed to go in the middle. Maybe we'll read part of Halacha Dalet.

הדרך הישרה היא מידה בינונית שבכל דעה ודעה מכל הדעות שיש לו לאדם.

So the derech hayeshara, the proper path to go, is to go in between all these extremes.

והיא הדעה שהיא רחוקה משתי הקצוות ריחוק שווה ואינה קרובה לא לזו ולא לזו.

It's like going like a big step. So the correct mida is neither of the extremes, but the one that's in the middle, equidistant from both extremes, right? רחוקה משתי הקצוות ריחוק שווה. It's equidistant from both extremes. Keitzad? We're skipping one line to the middle of line three Rabosai. Do you see it? Keitzad?

כיצד לא יהיה בעל חמה נוח לכעוס ולא כמת שאינו מרגיש אלא בינוני.

So he shouldn't be wrathful so easily angered. He shouldn't be apathetic, right? Literally like a dead person who doesn't react to anything. He shouldn't be so apathetic. What should he do?

לא יכעס אלא על דבר גדול שראוי לכעוס עליו כדי שלא יעשה כיוצא בו פעם אחרת.

Just enough anger that a person won't do what they did to him again. Right. Okay. Perfect. Okay. So in Halacha Aleph, again just to sum up, again we haven't gotten into the questions yet, but just to sum up what we've seen so far. In Halacha Aleph, the Rambam describes extremes. Right? Extremes. People who are such big baalei taiva that they can't no matter what they do, they can't satisfy their taivos. People who are so disconnected that they don't even are not even interested in eating enough to sustain their health, etc. In Halacha Dalet, the Rambam says that's not the right way. The extremes is not the right way, it should be the person should be in the middle. Good. Great. Now Halachos Heh and Vav. Halacha Heh, please. So I'm just wondering because I know there are a lot of tzaddikim in the past who tried going kind of to the extreme of like disconnecting from earthly pleasures and wants and like trying to do the extreme opposite. Maybe that's just for them, but aren't we supposed to try and emulate Hashem which is the extreme of almost good? So I don't know. Which is what? I'm sorry, I didn't catch the last thing that you said. Oh, we're supposed to emulate Hashem's character traits, right? In a way. And Hashem completely is just giving. He doesn't take at all. So I think Hashem is probably the extreme in the positive for all these things. If we're supposed to emulate him, then why how can we say that we're supposed to stay in the middle? I don't know. So the Rambam is going to say that that דרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא, that's actually in halacha zayin which we're going to reach, that דרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא are the drachim beinoniyim. So for instance, let's say Hakadosh Baruch Hu we know He's not pure din, He's not pure rachamim, but He blends the two, right? Right, but just for... So unmitigated din is sort of one extreme and unmitigated rachamim is the other extreme, and Hakadosh Baruch Hu's not that way, right? It's a blending. That makes sense for most of these things, but for example, like giving, right? Hashem is most giving, I would assume, I don't know how, I mean, yeah, He's mostly giving. So why should the person give away all his money to tzedaka? I'm not saying all, but I mean, tzaddikim probably give more tzedaka, probably give a lot of tzedaka, more tzedaka. So you're asking a great question. So the halacha is, we always need to figure out, you're asking a great question, we always need to figure out which traits of Hashem can be emulated by people and which cannot. Hashem doesn't eat, right? But the fact that that there is a mitzvah halachta bidrachav doesn't mean that we shouldn't eat because Hashem is Hashem and He's not physical and we're human and we're physical, so we can't. Right? Right? To hold on one sec, right? Now Hashem is not going to go get, not going to end up in the poorhouse by giving and giving and giving. If a person gives away all his money to tzedaka, so Chazal say המבזבז אל יבזבז יותר מחומש שמא יצטרך לבריות so then he can end up poor. So a person always has to know which traits of Hashem are intended to be emulated and which are only possible for Hashem. So when it comes to the fact, yes, Hashem is 100% on the giving side and He's 0% on the receiving side, and but but one can't say that that means we should give away all our money to tzedaka because Hashem doesn't get poor. So that's the difference. Yeah, and what about the tzaddikim where I've heard of tzaddikim put themselves, I don't know, for a huge period of staying in kind of like the freezing water to learn, or they won't eat for they'll fast for unhealthy amounts of times? So the Rambam didn't agree with that lifestyle. In the beginning of Perek daled in Masechet Taanis, there's a machlokes whether a yoshev betaanis, a person, not the fast days that the Torah or Chazal ordained, but if a person voluntarily fasts in addition, so the Gemara has a machlokes whether יושב בתענית נקרא קדוש or nikra choteh. Is a person a holy person for voluntary fasting, or is a person a choteh? The Rambam says we pasken he's nikra choteh. That a person is not supposed to because when he's fasting, he's not going to learn as well, he's not going to function as well, he's not going to be as productive, he's not going to engage in as much chessed because he's going to be so enervated by the taanis. Right, those are which traits to emulate from Hashem and which traits not to. So many of them in the halacha, so let's actually read now halacha hey. Do you want to read maybe? Halacha hey and vov? Or you don't have it? You can pass it off. Okay, so who's reading halacha hey and vov? It will provide some of the answer to the question, please.

ומצווין אנו ללכת בדרכים האלו הבינונים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים.

Like we're commanded, right? Yeah, to walk in... ways and the middle path, right? The middle paths, right? Always the middle path between not being, again, not being a hedonist but not being an ascetic, not being, not chasing after wealth but not you know living in self-imposed poverty and deprivation, etc.

מצוונין אנו ללכת בדרכים האלו והן הן הדרכים הטובות והישרות.

These are the and the yashar like the just ways. Shenemar Vehallachta Bidrachav. As the pasuk says that you should walk in His ways. וכך למדו בפירוש מצווה זו. So we're gonna we learn from the explanation of this mitzvah. מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון. Just like Hashem is called chanon so too you should be called chanon. מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום. Just like Hashem is called rachum so too you should be called rachum. מה הוא נקרא קדוש אף אתה היה קדוש. Just like Hashem is called kadosh so too you should be called kadosh. Ve'al derech zeh. So here here you see the answers to your questions here. It's those descriptions which the nevi'im or the Torah or the nevi'im give us of Hakadosh Baruch Hu they're intended to tell us what we should emulate. Okay. Okay. So mah hu, again, let's review again line one of Halacha Vav, mah hu nikra. One more time, please. מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון. Just like Hashem is called chanon so too you should be called chanon. מה הוא נקרא רחום, just like Hashem is called rachum, אף אתה היה רחום, so too you should be called rachum. Now let's stop there. Everyone should be jumping out of their seat right now. There's an unbelievable question here. Isn't it the middle path? Oh, but didn't the, wait, in Halacha Aleph when the Rambam, you want to jump up? When the, when the, when the Rambam was was telling us about extremes, right? So Rambam says there's an extreme of a person who's so wrathful, he's always getting angry. And then there's another extreme of a person who's so apathetic that that you tell him the nuclear bomb was dropped somewhere and he says okay and what was the second, what was the second leading story in in the headlines today? And the Rambam gives us all those extremes, right? Which are rejected. And one example of two extremes the Rambam said was achzari and rachman. Now the Rambam turns around and tells us in telling us about the mitzvah, וכך למדו בפירוש מצווה זו. Skip to the second example. מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום. Is there a difference between rachum and rachman? So if that would occur to us, so then we know that that's not true. There's a famous Gemara in Yevamos which the Rambam alludes to in Hilchos Avodah, but but you know this Gemara in Yevamos? The Gemara in Yevamos says ג' סימנים יש באומה זו. There are three identifying character traits for the Jewish people. What are those three identifying character traits? Anyone ever come across that Gemara before? Rachmanim, bayshanim, go ahead, go ahead, go ahead. I know two of three I think. Rachmanim, bayshanim and gomlei chasadim. Excellent. Rachmanim, bayshanim and gomlei chasadim. So rachmanim, right? So being a rachman is an identifying Jewish characteristic. Ad kedei kach, this is not only mussar and aggadah, ad kedei kach, it says in the Gemara and the Rambam quotes this lehalacha that if you see someone, you see a family that are achzarim, you have to check into their yichus. You have to check into their yichus. It's not, it's not a Jewish trait. So it's not that rachman means something wrong and rachum is is more moderate and correct. So how in the world do you understand that? Again, just to repeat the question rabosai, so in Halacha Aleph the Rambam tells us again, he's depicting extremes, right? Then there's an extreme of mehullal va'oneg, someone who's so lightheaded, someone who's maros. And in that context the Rambam says achzari and rachman. Achzari, cruel, is one, but then rachman is is the opposite extreme. And then the Rambam turns around in Halacha Vav and tells us again the derech habeinonit is a mitzvah and vechach lamdu beferush. מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום. Everyone hears the question? So maybe we should stop now so that when everyone comes back tomorrow night, but I'm not going to torture you. We'll try to get the answer by. Could it be shown in the failure of like only using like human understanding because by using human understanding we get in the extremes, but when you look up to Hakadosh Baruch Hu you see the true example. So, something like this, excellent, what's your name? Ari. Ari. So Ari says like this, I'm just going to I'm going to elaborate a little bit, okay? Ari says like this. In halacha aleph, the Rambam was depicting things al pi sevara. Al pi sevara, rachmanus is an extreme. Let's say a person who has had a perfect record until now. He appears before the judge and he clearly did something wrong. And the judge says, you know, since you have such a good track record I'm going to have rachmanus. In sevara, that's an extreme. It's the opposite of achzariyus. If we only had human wisdom, human wisdom is mechaveh, human wisdom goes in the right direction here, the same way it did by Perek Beis de-Deios, of להתחבר לצדיקים ולהתחבר אצל החכמים. Human wisdom recognizes a person's supposed to be balanced. He's not supposed to be controlled by any extreme. But in terms of identifying what's an extreme and therefore what the right thing is, so human wisdom isn't able to go all the way. Based on sechel enoshi, based on human reasoning, rachmanus is an extreme, achzariyus is an extreme. It's an extreme. Comes the Torah and says there is such a thing as misplaced rachmanus, there is such a thing. If you have someone who's being machti acherim, right? If you have someone who's leading others to sin and you have rachmanus and say no I can't I can't discipline him. So that's misplaced rachmanus. It's not that the Torah thinks that we go to the extreme, but where the middle is, the Torah takes again it takes the morality to a higher level and it tells us differently where the middle is when it comes to achzariyus and rachmanus. What sechel enoshi thinks is already an extreme, in most cases for the Torah is מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום. The Torah is still saying you have to go in the middle, but where the middle is, the Torah defines differently. Do you hear what I'm saying? And you see how that again illustrates the the idea that we've been trying to trace. So just to summarize, there's a third example here on the sheet, but we don't have enough time for it. So just to summarize, again point number one, the Bartenura says that Rabbeinu Hakadosh didn't list the shalsheles hamesorah as a general introduction to Shas Mishnayos, instead he held off until Pirkei Avos so we should know that Pirkei Avos, it's not only Berachos, Shabbos, Eruvin, Pesachim, etc., that are based on Mesorah miSinai, but Pirkei Avos, whose subject matter is also dealt with in general philosophy, that's also miSinai. Now, how does mussar and middos which come from Sinai, what types of differences do you find from mussar and middos which human wisdom can discover? So we said there are two types of difference. One difference is where human wisdom misses the boat entirely, case in point Tzedakah. Right? Human wisdom does... doesn't understand on our own, without the Torah, we wouldn't have understood that Shatnez is a Chiyuv. The Torah tells us it's not just a very noble, voluntary thing to do, it's a Chiyuv. But there's another type of difference where human wisdom is on the right track. Human wisdom understands and tells us that we have to carefully guard the company that we keep because we're gonna because we're susceptible to influence. Human wisdom knows that we should reject the extremes and go in the middle, but even in these areas, the Torah morality, Torah elevates it to an even higher level. That's what we tried to understand tonight. Farshtanen? Thank you, have a wonderful night.