מי שמדקדק על עצמו ביותר ויתרחק מדעה בינונית מעט לצד זה או לצד זה נקרא חסיד.
Keitzad? מי שיתרחק מגובה הלב עד הקצה האחרון ויהיה שפל רוח ביותר נקרא חסיד וזוהי מידת חסידות. ואם נתרחק עד האמצע בלבד ויהיה עניו נקרא חכם וזוהי מידת חכמה. ועל דרך זו שאר כל הדעות. וחסידים הראשונים היו מטין דעות שלהם מדרך האמצעית כנגד שני הקצוות. יש דעה שמטין אותה כנגד הקצה האחרון ויש דעה שמטין אותה כנגד הקצה הראשון וזהו לפנים משורת הדין.
Okay, and then the Avodas HaMelech says Halacha Vav begins with that next line: ומצווין אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינונים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו.
The question that clearly arises, the Rambam seems to describe that as an alternative to the deah beinonis is to veer slightly somewhat towards one of the extremes. And that not only is this acceptable, legitimate, but it's a middas chasidus. It's a middas chasidus. Now clearly it can't be that this middas chasidus is in conflict with the basic approach of deah beinonis because the Rambam says that it's not just that that's the basic chiyuv a person has, but on the contrary, a person, it's an absolute chiyuv that a person should maintain the derachim ha'elu habeinonim and not veer to either extreme. So why is this type of middas chasidus acceptable? Meila, middas chasidus, a person is patur from hashavas aveidah, but nevertheless he undertakes to be mekayeim hashavas aveidah, you understand? The basic chiyuv is this is all you're obligated to do. A person goes beyond that, so that's a middas chasidus. But over here, in terms of the deah beinonis, so it's not that the Torah said this is all you're obligated to do in cultivating this middah, but on the contrary, you're supposed to do this and you're not supposed to veer to either extreme. So what does the Rambam mean by saying that even though, even though they mitrachek from deah beinonis, that this is apparently totally consistent with vehalachta bidrachav and again is harei zeh meshubach because it's a middas chasidus. If you take a look at the Avodas HaMelech, I think what we're discussing is just an elaboration of what he says. The Rambam writes in Shemonah Perakim that even though the Torah rejects both extremes, let's say the Torah rejects the extreme of being a baal taavah, the Rambam describes in Halacha Aleph, on the other hand the Torah rejects the extreme of an ascetic who doesn't even eat as much as he's supposed to to maintain his health, but nevertheless, it's not that the Torah equates the two extremes. Even though the Torah rejects both extremes, the Torah doesn't equate both extremes, and clearly the extreme the Rambam says of baal taavah, of being a hedonist, is... That's what the Rambam explains in Shmona Perakim. So again, even though both are unacceptable, they both violate the chiyuv of v’halachta bidrachav of maintaining the balance, but nevertheless, you can't equate the two. But the Rambam actually means, he means more than that as well, and that is as follows. When you, again using that example, let's say, of one person who's a baal taiva, לא תספה נפשו מהלוך בתאוה, and the other person is בעל לב טהור מאוד ולא יתאוה אפילו לדברים מעטים שהגוף צריך להם,
right? So both are wrong, one's more wrong than the other, but in what sense? What does the Rambam mean by saying one's more wrong than the other? Clearly we recognize that we're more prone to one than we are to the other, but what does it mean that one's more wrong than the other? So l’chora is as follows. If you wanted to try to formulate what's wrong with the extreme of baal taiva, לא תספה נפשו מהלוך בתאוה, so clearly it's not simply that he has lost the balance which v’halachta bidrachav obligates us to maintain, but to be a baal taiva itself is a flaw. That is antithetical to Torah. So it's not just because it's not the mean, because it's not the deiya habeinonit, but because that mida, the mida of being a baal taiva, the mida of hedonism and the like, itself is a mida ra’ah, is a mida ra’ah which is antithetical to Torah. So it's wrong basically for two reasons. Number one, it's wrong because it doesn't represent the derech hamemutza’as in this area. Number two, it's also wrong because the mida which a person has itself is inherently, intrinsically wrong, okay? So it's wrong for those two reasons. Mah she’ein kein the other extreme, let's say a person who's an ascetic, he doesn't want anything, doesn't want to partake in materialistic matters of olam hazeh at all. So that's also wrong, but not because again it's intrinsically wrong because he's lacking a desire for hana’ah in olam hazeh, not that that's intrinsically wrong, but that's wrong only because it's an extreme. Okay, is that clear? In one case, in either of the two extremes, one of them is always wrong, again, intrinsically, inherently wrong, because the mida which that extreme represents is a mida ra’ah, is a mida ra’ah. A person who's a baal cheima, who's ko’eis tamid, so it's not just, again, forgetting the stir between perek aleph and perek beis, just assuming perek aleph now. It's not just that because it doesn't represent the balance, no, but the mida of ka’as is מידה רעה עד מאוד, is מידה רעה עד מאוד. Mah she’ein kein the other extreme, the other extreme of a person who's never ever ko’eis, so what's wrong with that is that it's not the derech hamemutza’as, not the derech hamemutza’as. L’chora that's what the Rambam means when he tells you that one extreme is worse than the other extreme. So now let's again let's come back to the example of the baal taiva. So the Rambam says what's the derech hamemutza’as? He says וכן לא יתאוה אלא לדברים שהגוף צריך להם, ואי אפשר לחיות להיות בזולתם, כעניין שנאמר צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו.
So let's say you would, you go to a doctor, right? You tell the doctor this is the Rambam's prescription, that I'm supposed to eat דברים שהגוף צריך להם. So I don't know exactly how much to eat. So clearly the doctor's going to tell you that there's a certain range, right? There's a certain range. He's not going to tell you that it's precisely 1,243.67 calories a day. He's going to tell you that there's a range, but there's a range again that there's an absolute, there's an absolute minimum, an absolute minimum which is necessary, but on the other hand, the fact that a person is slightly exceeding that minimum, so you wouldn't say that he's already going beyond דברים שהגוף צריך להם. Or in other words, the lashon haRambam is is very meduyak, is very meduyak that he speaks about derech habeinonit, derech habeinonit and again this is what I believe the Avodat haMelech discusses. So derech habeinonit isn't the point. Derech habeinonit is a certain range, not a large range necessarily, but it's a range, it's not a single point. And what the middot chasidut represents is this, the middot chasidut represents is this. So again, now keep in mind that distinction between the two extremes, between the two extremes. So there's a range within the derech habeinonit. So chasidim always go to the to the to the end of that range, right? If you imagine the the entire desktop as as the entire spectrum, and then there's a small part in the middle which is the range of derech habeinonit, so the middot chasidut will always, means that one will always be positioned over here at the very end, the end of that range. Why? Because again since again a person who's veers towards perishut, right? That in the derech habeinonit between the two the two extremes, he inclines again יתרחק מדי הבינונית מעט לצד זה או לצד זה, so basically what what he's saying is this. Were it the case and again that both extremes were inherently or intrinsically wrong, so then there wouldn't be room for a midat chasidut here. But in light of the fact again that it's one of the two extremes which is inherently wrong, the other extreme is wrong just because it because a person loses that sense of balance, so then naniach naniach again that the range for eating דברים שהגוף צריך להן ואי אפשר לחיות בזולתן, there's a certain range, so the chasidim will always go again to the outer limit of that range towards accentuating the perishut, accentuating the perishut. You mean that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is also or Hakadosh Baruch Hu can be in the middle but humans have to go to one end of the extreme? That's an excellent question. So I think the answer to that would have to be, so the answer to that is what we're trying to explain and again I think this is just, I think this is... the way the Avodas HaMelech approaches it as well is that both of these are forms of halachta b'drachav. Again when halachta b'drachav says that there has to be balance, so you have to balance those two extremes. You have to balance those two extremes. There's a certain range which is considered balanced. It's not a point, there's a certain range. And again you think about these examples, so it certainly makes sense as a certain range. Exactly, I mean can you say to the to the penny exactly how much how much money a person needs? You can't say to the penny, but there's a certain range. Can you say to the most minute detail in terms of a person's living accommodations exactly how much room he needs for harchavas da'as? You can say there's a certain range and beyond that range a person is beginning to go to one of those two extremes. So as long as a person is within that range, so then a person is being mekayem v'halachta b'drachav. Within that range it's a midas chasidus that a person should be noteh within that range. Right again if you if you have that that if you sort of visualize it, within that range that a person should be noteh to the extreme of the two extremes, the one which is not inherently bad. Again there's no it's not that the Torah says that it's a maylah that a person should have an appetite. It's not that that's intrinsically a maylah, but rather in order to lead a balanced and proper life, so a person has to maintain himself. But it's not that that's a maylah whereas it is intrinsically a flaw that a person should have again a a hedonistic tendency. So within that range it's it's the answer is yes, it is v'halachta b'drachav because it's the what the Rambam presumably would say is a type of mitzvah min hamuvchar within v'halachta b'drachav. It's the midas chasidus within v'halachta b'drachav that within that range one goes to the outer limit towards that extreme which is not intrinsically wrong, but is only wrong because it represent because it constitutes an extreme. So l'chora that's how the how the Rambam should be understood here. Halacha vav we we we learned already, we studied the diyuk of mahu nikra chacham. Halacha zayin the Rambam continues: כיצד ירגיל אדם עצמו בדעות אלו עד שיקבעו בנפשו. Again so clearly the Rambam indicates that derech habeinonis is not only one which should be manifest in one's actions, but it's one to be internalized also. It's not enough that one is kovesh es yitzro and acts moderately, but it has to be it has to be something which is internalized. So how does a person accomplish this? יעשה וישנה וישלש במעשים שעושה על פי הדעות האמצעיות ויחזור בהם תמיד עד שיהיו מעשיהם קלים עליו ולא יהיה בהם טורח עליו ויקבעו הדעות בנפשו.
So Rambam says simply by constantly reinforcing these deos. By habitually acting in accordance with these deos, so that's the way a person ultimately internalizes these deos, right? יעשה וישנה וישלש במעשים שעושה על פי הדעות האמצעיות so then yikavu hadeos b'nafsho. The few words that the Rambam inserts there in the middle are also very significant. The Rambam says עד שיהיו מעשיהם קלים עליו ולא יהיה בהם טורח עליו.
Rambam here it's a very very important point to understand. The Rambam says as follows: He says it's true that at times we experience Torah or the demands of Torah as being a burden. The Rambam is clearly acknowledging that. When he describes what you say to a ger in פרק י"ג הלכה י"ד שהמצוה הנכונה כשיבא הגר או הגיורת להתגייר בודקין אחריו שמא בגלל ממון שיטול או בשביל שררה שיזכה לה או מפני הפחד בא להכנס לדת ואם איש הוא בודקין אחריו שמא עיניו נתן באשה יהודית ואם אשה היא בודקין שמא עיניה נתנה בבחור מבחורי ישראל אם לא נמצא להם עילה
if there's no ulterior motive which seems to be propelling a prospective ger, so the Rambam writes modian osan to inform them koved ol hatorah, the heaviness, the weight of the yoke of Torah וטורח שיש בעשייתה על עמי הארץ כדי שיפרשו and the burden involved in implementing Torah, right? So clearly, clearly at times we do experience Torah, again, as a tircha. But what the Rambam says here is the reason that happens is, he continues here in Issurei Biah and it really parallels what we're studying in Hilchos De'os is וטורח שיש בעשייתה על עמי הארץ כדי שיפרשו meaning that if a person's character is not refined in any sense, in any sense, in when it comes to the moral middos, when it comes to the religious middos, so then the demands of Torah are burdensome to us, because a burden is always something which has a subjective overtone to it. Meaning that relative to me, to my abilities, or to my predispositions, or to my capacities, so this is a burden, right? If you take the same 100 pounds weight and you give it to someone for whom 50 pounds is what he can handle easily, so that represents a burden. You give the 100 pounds to someone who's a weightlifter, so then those 100 pounds don't represent a burden. So the Rambam says the torach which we experience in Torah and mitzvos is not a reflection on Torah, but is perhaps, not perhaps, but is a reflection on the gap between what we're supposed to be and what we actually are. And that when a person refines himself, again, to give in terms of the examples which the Rambam deals with in Hilchos De'os, so let's say that the derech habeinonis of tzedaka is ma'aser kesafim, whatever, maybe it is, maybe it isn't. So the derech habeinonis. So if a person is not accustomed to giving tzedaka, if a person has a teva whereby he's very tight-fisted and stingy, so then he'll experience that demand of giving tzedaka and giving generously as being very burdensome. Whereas the Rambam says when a person refines himself and a person molds his character in accordance with what it's supposed to be, so then kol mitzvos hatorah are natural. Kol mitzvos hatorah a person takes to naturally. At least in the realm of middos and such, a person takes to those mitzvos naturally. And that's what the Rambam says that initially, when a person's training himself to cultivate the de'a habeinonis, so it's not going to be ma'aseihem kalim alav and there will be torach involved in observing Torah and mitzvos. However, as a person further refines himself and develops his character in accordance with Torah, so then ultimately it becomes ma'aseihem kalim alav. And there will be torach involved in observing Torah and mitzvos. However, as a person further refines himself and develops his character in accordance with Torah, so then ultimately it becomes מעשיהם קלים עליהם ולא יהא בהם טורח עליהם. And that's the same thing, the same point which he makes here in Issurei Biah that טורח שיש בעשייתה על עמי הארץ. That there is a torach in Torah in mitzvos, but again, that torach is only if my character is such that I enjoy watching TV more than I enjoy studying Torah, and then you come and tell me והגית בו יומם ולילה, that you have to sit and study Torah and you're not supposed to be doing that, so then that's a tremendous torach, that's a tremendous burden, and it is experienced as such at the beginning stages of a person's avodas Hashem. But what the Rambam says is as a person pushes himself, forces himself, so then his character is molded, and then a person again in terms of that example, he tastes Torah and then he understands, he experiences what Torah is, so then it becomes natural that a person wants to study, that they want to spend as much time as possible involved with Talmud Torah and there's no torach ba'asiyasa. And that's what the Rambam is saying here also, that cultivating the correct and balanced Torah personality can involve tircha. However, it's not because the mitzvos themselves again are out of sync with who we should be, but rather that we are deficient in these areas and that's why we initially experience them as torach. In perek beis, we already mentioned the two stiros which the Lechem Mishneh already asks with regard to ka'as and anava, that in perek aleph, even here in perek beis, the Rambam gives these as examples of where one follows the de'ah habinonis and then in halacha gimmel he turns around and says no, that ירחיק מן הקצה האחד עד הקצה האחר. So we suggested last time a possible teretz that again, given that the chiuv of de'ah habinonis is on two levels. It's practically the way one acts, but then it's also in terms of one's personality, that one has to internalize it. So we suggested that in terms of ka'as and anava, practically there is a de'ah habinonis. For instance, the extreme which the Rambam describes as an extreme of anava that a person walks around in tattered clothing is wrong, even according to פרק ב הלכה ג. What the Rambam is saying is, however, a person unlike the other midos where a person is supposed to practice the midah habinonis and also internalize it, when it comes to anava a person is supposed to practice a certain degree of moderation. He's not supposed to walk around in tattered, torn clothing where he's being mevazeh himself, but on the other hand he's not supposed to experience, in terms of what he internalizes, he's not supposed to experience any of that midah of ga'avah. That's what we spoke about. Okay. The question is why should it be אם כן כדברינו אלה, so why should it be that midas ha'anava then is an exception to the rule which governs all other midos and at least in terms of how one internalizes it, in terms of how one internalizes it, it's not subject to the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav and that in this respect a person is supposed to go to an extreme. So lichora as follows, and this we've discussed on other occasions. The Rambam here, so today we're just going to try to understand anava versus ga'avah and we'll leave outstanding the question of ka'as. The Rambam here quote. The Rambam here quotes, perhaps it was his girsa in the Gemara in Sotah, ועוד אמרו שכל המגביה לבו כפר בעיקר שנאמר ורם לבבך ושכחת את ה' אלהיך.
A person who is haughty, arrogant, kofer be-ikar. He's a kofer, that's what the words say. A person who is haughty, who is arrogant, he's a kofer, שנאמר ורם לבבך ושכחת את ה' אלהיך. So what's so amazing about the formulation here is that it doesn't say כאילו כפר בעיקר. There's no disclaimer here. It's ועוד אמרו שכל המגביה לבו כפר בעיקר without any kind of disclaimer. Further on in the same halakha when the Rambam is disparaging ka'as and telling us what a mida ra'ah it is, so the Rambam quotes from Chazal, אמרו חכמים הראשונים כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה זרה. So there the Rambam says it as we expected, ke-ilu. It's not that growing angry is literally avoda zara. It's not. So too, we would have thought a person who's haughty, who's arrogant, it's not literally kfira, he's not denying that the Ribono shel Olam created the world, rachmana litzlan, it's not. He's arrogant, he's arrogant, and there's a little bit of ga'ava in him, there's a little bit of ga'ava in him. What does the Rambam mean כל המגביה לבו כפר בעיקר? So the answer is as follows. That the manifestations of ga'ava are that a person is boastful, a person wants kavod, all these are manifestations of ga'ava. If a person can talk to other people in a demeaning fashion, so that often bespeaks arrogance, haughtiness. These are all manifestations. And on the other hand, if a person is self-effacing, so that's a manifestation and an expression of anava. But what is the essence of anava, what is the essence of ga'ava, is as follows. The essence of ga'ava is a sense of כחי ועוצם ידי עשה לי את החיל הזה. A person has a sense of autonomy. A person takes pride in what he feels he accomplished. A person doesn't take pride in good luck. A person doesn't take pride in what was given him. Right, when people win the lottery, so you usually don't detect any kind of arrogance or any kind of pride, because they know it was luck, or they think it was luck. They think it was luck, they don't ascribe it to themselves. When are people boastful, when are people arrogant, when they credit themselves with being smarter than other people, being richer than other people, being stronger than other people, being better looking than other people, whatever it is that they feel that they are superior, they are better. But that's only if they attribute it to themselves. If they recognize that they're not responsible for it, people don't develop a sense of arrogance. People do not, again, attribute winning the lottery to their own brilliance, because they know that it wasn't their brilliance. So the essence of ga'ava again is this sense of self-sufficiency and a sense that a person feels responsible for his own accomplishments, totally responsible. An anav, on the other hand, realizes, realizes that our obligation to work and exert ourselves to the fullest, notwithstanding that ultimately we function with abilities granted to us by the Ribono shel Olam and we respond to opportunities given us by the Ribono shel Olam and whatever success is only because the Ribono shel Olam crowns our efforts with success. So an anav recognizes that he's totally dependent upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu. In order for a person to experience any ga'avah, he certainly has to feel this sense of independence, this sense of autonomy. If ultimately, if everything comes from the Ribbono Shel Olam, so how can a person be misgae be-osher, how can a person be misgae in his his innate the his his IQ, a person can't be misgae in any of these things if ultimately everything comes from the Ribbono Shel Olam. So says the Rambam, kol hamagbia libo is kofir ba-ikar. It's not כאילו כופר בעיקר, but that sense of of, again, independence or autonomy, so the Rambam says that's literally kefira. It's not tantamount to kefira, but it's literally kefira because that's the Rambam's emphasis in Yesodei HaTorah that יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל נמצא.
So the Rav used to underscore the fact that the Rambam talks in the present tense that הוא ממציא כל נמצא, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu every instant, every millisecond infuses us with existence. He causes us to exist. It's not that once upon a time, so many thousands of years ago, the world was created and now it exists on its own momentum and that we within this are independent. No, הוא ממציא כל נמצא. הוא ממציא כל נמצא means that every second a person is totally dependent upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu for everything, for everything. If a person is misgae, if a person is losing sight of that, so the Rambam says, kol hamagbia libo is kofir ba-ikar. Good. And lichora that's clearly, clearly the pshat here. That having been said, again, the definition of the middah of anavah is an an awareness of absolute dependence and that we have no autonomy in the in that sense. And that the definition of ga'avah to varying degrees is losing sight of that. So then what follows from that is you can't really talk about when we talk about העוז והענווה וההדס והאמונה of שם אתה מוצא ענוותנותו, when you talk about anavah with regard to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, it doesn't mean the same thing as when you talk about anavah with regard to bnei adam. When you talk about anavah with regard to bnei adam, again, the definition of anavah is this sense of absolute sense of dependence, of vulnerability. So that obviously, obviously doesn't exist by the Ribbono Shel Olam. So when you talk about a person has to cultivate rachmanus, so then we discussed this in light of the Rambam there in perek nun daled, but that that we can say that we are emulating the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu's actions are described. And therefore since ve-halachta bi-drachav tells us that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's actions are always balanced, everything is balanced within the yud-gimmel middos, there's din, there's rachamim, everything in a state of perfect harmony and balance, that's what we have to do as well. But when you talk about our cultivating anavah, anavah not in the practical sense, not in the sense of whether a person wears tattered clothing, whether he wears five thousand dollar suits, whether he wears decent clothing. But if you talk about anavah in, again, in the internal sense of what a person feels, so that can't, that isn't a part of ve-halachta bi-drachav, because that doesn't exist by Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Again, the definition, the essence of anavah is our sense of dependence upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu, our awareness of total, complete vulnerability, so that can't be modeled after the Ribbono Shel Olam. Fact, you can say, oh, but we do talk about anavah with the Ribbono Shel Olam. We do, but we talk about in terms of not not on the level of, only on the practical level. So there takeh we do have the ve-halachta bi-drachav. So a person is supposed to be moderate, he's not supposed to walk around in tattered clothing, but in terms of internalizing it, that can't be included in v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha because the nature of the middah isn't one that even al derech ha'sheilah you can't ascribe that to Hakadosh Baruch Hu because of the nature of middas ha'anavah. So bli neder that we have to discuss next time why it is that ka'as is also an exception. Why it is that ka'as is also an exception and why that shouldn't be included in v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha of the middah... So then conceivably you could have an optional case of pikuach nefesh. So again if the din of pikuach nefesh is chaviva nafshaih d'yisrael more than an issur and the din of pikuach nefesh itself is m'chadesh an issur, but if you don't save you over on v'chai bahem, so that's mamash divrei ha'kol. It's very hard to even imagine it, but maybe, I don't know, maybe you can't imagine it under any certain circumstances. But maybe, maybe if you don't say like Rashi, maybe if you don't say like Rashi, so maybe you can begin to imagine it. Maybe if the pshat in pikuach nefesh is hutra versus no, no value judgments as to whether Shabbos is more important or a life is more important. We don't know, not davka, the same way עשה דוחה לא תעשה doesn't imply any such thing. So then maybe there's room to understand the Tosafos kasavar. But clearly if the pshat in pikuach nefesh is as Rashi says and the Rambam says, and when all is said and done it remains very hard to sleep at night with that combination of you can be m'chalel Shabbos but there's no chiyuv to do so. When all is said and done it doesn't make for a good night's sleep. But according to Rashi and the Rambam it's absolutely, it's absolutely lo nitan l'hei'amer. Maybe according to that other side which Rashi is dismissing, which Rashi is rejecting, so I don't know, so maybe it is nitan l'hei'amer. Maybe it's again, maybe it's no more paradoxical than the Rishonim who say that a kiyum asei can be docheh lo sa'asei, even though you don't have to do it and if you want you can sit it out, nevertheless if you do it you can override an issur. So maybe it's no more paradoxical. Maybe. Okay, that's what I just wanted to he'irah, ha'ir on the Rashi we discussed the other day. Okay, so maybe bli neder tomorrow we'll go back.