I had the following observation that is really awe-striking. Myself, Rabbi Elson, Rabbi Rossman, Rabbi Green, Rabbi Werblowsky, Rabbi Zinkin, Rabbi Paleof, Rabbi Abergel, and I'm probably missing a few more, Rabbi Benevitz, have all been deeply touched and inspired by the Torah of a rebbe of ours, from the hashkafa of a rebbe of ours, and by the incredible middos of a rebbe of ours, Rabbi Mayer Twersky. And I was just thinking that besides for Bo Berkowitz, who has had a tremendous hashpa on all of your rebbeim, I'm not sure if there is a single person in the world that has had such an impact on so many of your rebbeim. That's a wild thing to think about, both from a perspective of masora and to appreciate now that you're going to be hearing someone who's a rebbe to your rebbeim, and also from the perspective of understanding where you guys are being inspired by your rebbeim, where is that inspiration coming from? The reason for that, with mechila, is Rav Twersky, first and foremost, is a grandson of the Rav, Rav Yosef Soloveitchik, and continuing his masora both as a tremendous talmid chacham of the highest caliber, as well as someone who is able to articulate and present on hashkafa in ways that are nuanced and complex and able to bring it down relevant to contemporary issues. Some of Rabbi Twersky's articles and shmoozes on hashkafa and bringing it down to tough issues are renowned across the Modern Orthodox world for sure as real authentic inspiring Torah perspectives. Because of, there's Chazal say that a person should seek to yearn to learn from a rebbe who's domeh to a malach. And your rosh yeshiva for sure qualifies for that, and in my perspective, there's not such a long list of people that really qualify for that, that are all at the same time tremendous talmidei chachamim and also tremendous, tremendous, tremendous ba'alei middos of the highest caliber. Rabbi Twersky is on that list, and it's a tremendous zchus that you have to hear from him today. Thank you very much. I think we should skip the shiur and just believe how things can only go downhill from there. If I leave now, you'll just have Rabbi Elson's hakdama and you won't have to compare it to any reality. So the topic suggested was simcha. We'll begin אם ירצה השם בלי נדר by trying to present two different, seemingly different understandings of simcha and then try to proceed from there. The mishna in the last perek of Masechet Brachos presents a halacha חייב אדם לברך על הרעה כשם שמברך על הטובה that one is obligated to say a bracha, to thank HaKadosh Baruch Hu for what we experience as bad tidings, the same way we make a bracha on good tidings. Just parenthetically, this is not our focus. My father, zichrono livracha, used to quote from his father, there's an asymmetry in the mishna, right? The mishna should have, we would have expected the mishna to say חייב אדם לברך על הרעה כשם שחייב לברך על הטובה
or מברך אדם על הרעה כשם שמברך על הטובה, right? That would have been symmetrical. But חייב אדם לברך על הרעה כשם שמברך על הטובה. אז מען בלייבט א חיוב,
one remains obligated. Okay, parenthetical, but it's a beautiful, it's a beautiful comment. So the Gemara follows up on this line in the Mishna, it's the second source you have, rabosai. מאי חייב לברך על הרע כשם שמברך על הטוב? What's this equation? Right? The Mishna's equating. אילימא כשם שמברך על הטוב הטוב והמטיב? Does it mean to say the same bracha? If a person has good tidings that affect him and others, he makes an act decision that that that betters his state and that of his family, so then he makes the bracha hatov vehameitiv. ברוך אתה ה' אלקינו מלך העולם הטוב והמטיב. כך מברך על הרע הטוב והמטיב?
Is that what it means? No. But the Mishna itself says, והתנן על בשורות טובות אומר הטוב והמטיב, whereas al besoros ra'os, on bad tidings, rachmana litzlan, אומר ברוך דיין האמת. אמר רבא לא נצרכה אלא לקבולינהו בשמחה.
It doesn't mean the Mishna, the equation in the Mishna doesn't mean that one recites the same bracha, but it means it's with the same mindset. The same mindset that one has when making hatov vehameitiv, so too one, rachmana litzlan, makes the bracha of dayan ha'emes. And the phrase here in the Gemara is that one receives and processes the besoros ra'os, the bad tidings, besimcha. What does that mean, besimcha? What, one is joyous and time to break out the guitar and strum a few, a few notes while making the dayan ha'emes? So Rashi comments: לקבולינהו בשמחה לברך על מדת פורענות בלב שלם. To if a person wins the lottery and he hears that what the winning numbers were, he compares it to his ticket, so a person doesn't have any kashyas on the Ribbono shel olam, Ribbono shel olam, like, why did you let me win the lottery? No, there's so many more people in this world deserving than me. No, when a person wins the lottery, he accepts it. He has no kashyas on Divine Providence. When a person gets the job offer he wants, whatever the case may be, so a person is bleiv shaleim, a person is wholeheartedly receives. He doesn't have any questions, no complaints, no grievances. So too when rachmana litzlan a person is called upon to make the bracha of baruch dayan ha'emes, it's supposed to be bleiv shaleim. So then simcha, the way Rashi understands it in this context, means that there is this very deep sense of serenity that things are as they should be. And in the context of a besorah ra'ah, one of the seven immediate relatives, say, passes away, as excruciatingly painful as that is, but simultaneously a person has a sense that הצור תמים פעלו כי כל דרכיו משפט, that what Hakadosh Baruch Hu does is just, and because of that there is this profound, deep sense of serenity. And that, for Rashi, is what simcha means, at least in this context. Interestingly, we find similar, even identical definition of simcha in the Magid Mishneh. Maggid Mishneh's commenting on the Rambam's famous concluding Halakha in Hilchos Lulav. This comes in the context the Rambam is describing the ecstatic celebration of Simchas Beis HaShoeivah in the Beis HaMikdash and in that context the Rambam writes Simcha, I think Frankel prints from all the manuscripts it's supposed to say ShehaSimcha: שישמח אדם בעשיית המצוה ובאהבת האל שצוה בהן עבודה גדולה היא.
It's a very great Avodah that a person should experience Simcha in fulfilling Mitzvos. לכל המונע עצמו משמחה זו ראוי להיפרע ממנו. If a person consciously, intentionally holds back, the Rambam, rauy lehipara mimenu, so then the person is accountable for that. Shenemar, תחת אשר לא עבדת את ה' אלהיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב.
It's not if the person isn't on the Madreiga to experience the Simcha, if he's deliberately holding back, he's deliberately being moneiah atzmo. So what does it mean? Let's unpack a little bit that feeling, experience, mindset, it's not really so much, it's more of a mindset of Simcha. So the Maggid Mishneh comments as follows: השמחה שישמח אדם בעשיית המצוה דברי רבנו מבוארים בכמה מקומות בגמרא. וב-Bameh
Madlikin amru: ושבחתי אני את השמחה. Shlomo HaMelech writes in Koheles, I praise Simcha and Chazal explains זו שמחה של מצוה. This is the Simcha which is associated with a Mitzvah. Ve-ikar hadavar hu, and here's the, here's the fundamental principle, rabosai, שאין ראוי לו לאדם לעשות המצוות מצד שהן חובה עליו והוא מוכרח ואנוס בעשייתן.
A person shouldn't have an attitude, a mindset when he fulfills Mitzvos of being coerced, of someone's twisting, twisting, twisting his arm and forcing him, compelling him to fulfill Mitzvos. אלא חייב לעשותן והוא שמח בעשייתן. Again let's not translate someiach yet, but he experiences Simcha in fulfilling Mitzvos. ויעשה הטוב מצד שהוא טוב. He's doing what's good because it's good. ויבחר באמת מצד שהוא אמת. And as such, ועל כן יקל בעיניו טרחן. Any exertion that he needs to make, so whether or not an exertion is onerous depends upon what a person is accomplishing, right? If you have to go do some yard work, you have to go clean up the yard and you have to rake leaves and you have to mow the grass and you're not really interested in doing it, so then it requires effort, so then it's going to be very onerous. If someone's giving away, someone's moving and they have to downsize their library and they're giving away Sefarim and they're telling you you can take whatever you want and you go in and you're shlepping boxes and boxes of Sefarim, so you're exerting yourself but it's not onerous. It's not onerous. So the same exertion, whether it's onerous, whether it's something that's experienced as onerous depends upon whether or not the person thinks it's a windfall or whether a person thinks that it's unwelcome, it's a burden. ועל כן יקל בעיניו טרחן ויבין כי לכך נוצר לשמש את קונו. וכשהוא עושה מה שנברא בשבילו ישמח ויגיל.
Then he'll rejoice. So here again this aligns perfectly with what Rashi says in Berachos, right? Rashi in Masechet Berachos is talking about a person's attitude. itude towards Hakadosh Baruch Hu's hashgacha and a person has the sense of blev shalem that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is giving me what should happen and that the Gemara refers to as simcha and the Magid Mishnah says what generates the simcha shel mitzvah is that a person recognizes that what I'm doing is tov, what I'm doing is emes, what I'm doing is what I'm supposed to be doing, what I'm doing is what I was created for and that's what generates the simcha. So you juxtapose these two sources, so what emerges is that the source of simcha is this awareness, this understanding, this feeling that a person is living authentically. He's doing what he's supposed to be doing, he's shouldering those obligations that he should be, he's receiving the blessings from Hakadosh Baruch Hu that he should be receiving. And that awareness, that outlook is what instills simcha within a person. So that's one perspective on simcha. But let's leave that to the side for the moment and pursue seemingly a different perspective on simcha. The halacha is, it's the bottom source that you have here on the first side in Moed Katan יד עמוד ב, אבל אינו נוהג אבילות ברגל. If a person is observing or should otherwise be observing aveilus, so aveilus shiva is not operative on Yom Tov, shene'emar vesamachta bechagecha because the mitzvah of simchas haregel overrides the chiyuv, the obligation of aveilus. Says the Gemara, אי אבילות דמעיקרא הוא, if the person was in shiva rachmana litzlan going into Yom Tov, the aveilus preceded Yom Tov but hasn't been completed, so אתי עשה דרבים ודחי עשה דיחיד, the asei of simcha which is incumbent upon the many which is fulfilled collectively and it overrides the individual obligation of aveilus. ואי אבילות דהשתא הוא, let's say the person rachmana litzlan passes away over the course of Yom Tov and is buried on Yom Tov, so then aveilus can't begin because לא אתי עשה דיחיד ודחי עשה דרבים, the individual obligation of aveilus can't come and encroach upon the asei derabbim of simcha. So there's an assumption here in the Gemara, rabosai, that aveilus and simcha are incompatible, that aveilus of shiva rachmana litzlan and Yom Tov and simchas Yom Tov are incompatible. The Gemara just assumes that and then the Gemara tells us which prevails, that simcha prevails over aveilus. But why they're incompatible, that's just axiomatic. But when you think about it, why is it taka? How does simchas haregel, let's say for men, how does simchas haregel express itself? What do we do? What do we partake of, rabosai? Why? Wine and basar veyayin, primarily basar veyayin, basar veyayin. And then ovel is or is not allowed to partake of basar veyayin? An ovel post-burial, no. I think while he's an onein, rachmana litzlan, after the person passes away before burial, but then one is proscribed from basar veyayin. But immediately with kevurah, so then the ovel is muttar be'basar ve'yayin. So if that's the case, why do we have to choose? The Gemara is assuming we have to choose either the aveilus or the simcha, so we choose the simcha. Why do we have to choose? Have both. The ovel is supposed to not be wearing leather shoes and he's not supposed to get a haircut and he's not supposed to engage in Talmud Torah and he's not supposed to wash and he's not supposed to cut his hair and he's not supposed to apply oils. Okay. So he won't do any of that. Simchas Yom Tov is to partake of a sumptuous meal, bassar veyayin etc. The ovel can do that. So let's do both. Let's do both. So Rav Soloveitchik has a very very famous explanation. It's written in his essay Uvekashtem Misham. It was also the topic of one of his yortzait shiurim which was published and he explains as follows. The Gemara on in in Moed Katan daf tes vav, it's the top source that you have on side two, speaks of an ovel as being menudeh lashamayim. It speaks of an ovel rachmana litzlan when one is in mourning for one of the seven immediate relatives, that as it were Hakadosh Baruch Hu has excommunicated the person. Not vis-à-vis other people, but the person has been distanced from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Niddui means excommunication. So נדוי מצד בני אדם, so no one's allowed to come within dalet amos of the person and there are other restrictions in terms of interaction with the person. And the Gemara here has this fascinating concept that an ovel rachmana litzlan should be viewed as a menudeh lashamayim. He's not menudeh, he's not excommunicated in terms of interpersonal connections, but in terms of his connection with Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so he's a menudeh. Why is that? We understand, let's say the Gemara in Shabbos says, that אחד מן האחים שמת, if you have several siblings and rachmana litzlan one of them passes away, yidagu kol haachim. All the other brothers should be overwhelmed with a sense of fear because of a middas hadin. אחד מן החבורה שמת, if you have a chaburah, a group of friends, of people who learn together or some other thing binds them together, אחד מן החבורה שמת, ידאגו כל בני החבורה. Why is that? One brother died, Reuven died, so what's that got to do with Shimon, Levi, and Yehuda? So clearly what the Gemara is telling us is that with Hakadosh Baruch Hu there's no collateral damage. When people do things, we can't it's impossible to avoid collateral damage. It's impossible to avoid collateral damage. It's impossible to have a war where there aren't civilian casualties. A war is ugly, and part of the ugly reality of war is that there are civilian casualties. It's impossible to do things with such pinpoint precision that there isn't collateral damage. But with Hakadosh Baruch Hu there's no collateral damage. Now Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows that if Reuven dies, he knows that that affects Shimon, Levi, and Yehuda so deeply, but clearly that's part of his cheshbon. Hence, אחד מן האחים שמת is yidagu kol haachim. אחד מן החבורה שמת, it affects all the rest of the bnei chaburah, but that's not accidental fallout. It's not collateral damage. It's part of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's cheshbon. And that's what the underlying providential assumption is in this Gemara as well, that the ovel has been distanced from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. What the Gemara depicts as being menudeh lashamayim. He's not menudeh, he's not excommunicated in terms of interpersonal connections, but in terms of his connection with Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so he's a menudeh. Why is that? Simcha on the other hand, the Rav says, we find consistently, I just put one token pasuk here on the first page before the Gemara in Moed Katan, is associated with a sense of closeness to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. ושמחת לפני ה' אלהיך. Oz vechedva, chedva also more or less a synonym of simcha bimkomo. Proximity to Hakadosh Baruch Hu engenders simcha and the Rav said the clash, the irreconcilable conflict between aveilus on the one hand, simcha on the other hand is not in terms of the practical expressions, but rather the inner experience, the kiyum shebelev, which is supposed to either be reflected or engendered by that. The mitzvas simcha, it expresses itself as basar v'yayin, but it's supposed to express and if it doesn't express it's supposed to engender this sense of a kiyum shebelev of simcha and that simcha is of lifnei Hashem. But the ovel is the polar opposite. The ovel is menuda lashamayim. Those two can't coexist. A person can't simultaneously be lifnei Hashem and be menuda lashamayim and be distanced from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. It's one or the other. Either he's lifnei Hashem which engenders simcha or he's menuda lashamayim or he's as it were excommunicated by Hakadosh Baruch Hu and he's distanced from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. It's one or the other. It can't coexist and hence that's what the Gemara says axiomatically we're going to have to figure out which one prevails because they can't coexist. So what emerges from this sugya is sort of a different take seemingly, a different understanding of simcha that closeness to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, a sense of being lifnei Hashem, a sense of being near to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, that engenders simcha and again distance from Hakadosh Baruch Hu leaves a person bereft, devoid of simcha. So seemingly those are two sort of different approaches to simcha, right? The first one that we developed based on Rashi and the Maggid Mishneh, what was that first step rabosai? What was the first definition of simcha? Yayin, yayin v'basar. The first definition based on Rashi and the Maggid Mishneh was a sense that when a person is living authentically, עשה הטוב מצד שהוא טוב, he's doing what's good because it's good and he's בוחר באמת מפני שהוא אמת and he's choosing the emes because it's emes and he's doing what he was created for and his attitude towards what happens to him is belev shalem that when Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives the person what's supposed to be, that authenticity, that sense of living as one should, that life is as it should be, that's what engenders simcha, that's the kiyum of simcha. And now based on the Rav's beautiful insight into the Gemara Moed Katan, we have a different definition of simcha, that simcha is an equation with lifnei Hashem. So these are sort of two different approaches or understandings. So maybe the pshat is as follows and with this we'll start. There's a passage here, it's a little at points it's a little heavy in the Kabbalah that we don't understand, but we'll even detouring the Kabbalah I think enough will come away with enough for our purposes. So if you take a look here on the second side on the heading under the Tanya. So the Ba'al HaTanya writes as follows: ואין הקדוש ברוך הוא שורה אלא על דבר שבוטל אצלו יתברך.
Hakadosh Baruch Hu's presence is only felt when the individual, the creature recognizes its hisbattlus, its total... בין בפועל ממש כמלאכים עליונים, whether this is the the understanding that the angels on high have, בין בכוח ככל איש ישראל למטה שבכוחו להיות בטל ממש לגמרי להקדוש ברוך הוא במסירות נפש על קידוש השם,
or whether it's a person down here on earth who again recognizes that everything is from Hakadosh Baruch Hu and that he is nothing, his very existence isn't his own. ולכן אמרו רבותינו זכרונם לברכה שאפילו אחד שיושב ועוסק בתורה,
you have a person solitary but he's osek batorah, Shechina shraya. Aval kol ma, line four, take a look at this rabosei, aval kol ma שאינו בטל אצלו יתברך, something which doesn't recognize, acknowledge its dependence upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu, אלא הוא דבר נפרד בפני עצמו, it, it, in terms of one's perception, in terms of one's mindset, not in terms of reality, but in terms of one's mindset, in terms of one's perception, no, he is something separate and distinct from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, he feels autonomous. אינו מקבל חיות מקדושתו של הקדוש ברוך הוא, here it gets a little, little said at a faster rate here, אינו מקבל חיות מקדושתו של הקדוש ברוך הוא מבחינה פנימית הקדושה ומהותה ועצמותה
bichvodo uve'atzmo אלא מבחינת אחוריים שיורדים ממדרגה למדרגה ריבוא מדרגות והשתלשלות עולמות דרך עילה ועלול וצמצומים רבים עד שנתמעט כל כך האור והחיות מיעוט אחר מיעוט עד שיכול להצטמצם ולהתלבש בבחינת גלות תוך אותו הדבר הנפרד להחיותו ולקיימו מאין ליש.
What does the Baal HaTanya say? Baal HaTanya says as follows, and again, this much is I think exoteric, and a little bit, and maybe we can understand it a little bit. When a person is in touch, the reality is that everything derives its existence from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. That's the reality. The reality is that we all exist from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, through Hakadosh Baruch Hu, etc. That's the reality. A person can be attuned to the reality or not attuned to the reality. Either way that is the reality. That's the reality, right, as the Rambam writes, הקדוש ברוך הוא הוא ממציא כל נמצא. Hakadosh Baruch Hu in the present tense, the Rav used to underscore, mamtzi is the present tense, Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives existence to everything that exists. Everything exists from Hashem, through Hashem, etc. Person can be attuned to that or not attuned to that. Either way that is the reality. But when, hear this rabosei, when a person is attuned to that, so then he experiences that connection. When a person is not attuned to it, so then he doesn't feel and experience that connection. That's the, that's what the Baal HaTanya is describing, that that's what he calls bechina achorayim, that it's sort of backhanded, backhanded, that it's camouflaged. If the person doesn't recognize his hisbatlus to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, he doesn't experience that connection to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Either way the reality is that all existence is derived from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but when a person has the hisbatlus, he has that sense of being totally dependent upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu, everything is His, that he's a nothing, so then he experiences it. Otherwise he doesn't. Does a little bit of that resonate, rabosei? Now with that, so let's come back to the two again seemingly disparate. different perspectives, understandings on Simcha. The Rav showed based on the Gemara in Moed Katan that the definition of Simcha, the source of Simcha, what generates Simcha is that the person is lifnei Hashem. In Rashi and the Maggid Mishneh, so we reconstructed a different understanding that the Simcha comes when everything is authentic. The person is בוחר בטוב מצד שהוא טוב, he's choosing the good because this is good. He's בוחר אמת מצד שהוא אמת. Why did he put on tefillin this morning? Because Hakadosh Baruch Hu said to put on tefillin, it's emes, so that's why I'm doing it. There doesn't need to be any other consideration, no other calculus. And that he recognizes that לא נברא אלא לשמש קונו, that he was created to serve his creator. That's when a person has Simcha. So in other words, what Rashi and the Maggid Mishneh are talking about is when a person has this sense, he subordinates himself to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. He has that sense of hisbatlus, of hisbatlus. That lets him experience the connection to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, which is the lifnei Hashem, and the two different perspectives on Simcha at that point converge. Thank you very, very much, Rav Soloveitchik. Good to do that.