Okay last time we spoke about what the Nefesh HaChaim had in mind in referring to those who devote too much time to Sifrei Yira, what type of Sifrei Yira he was talking about. Well let's now get to the, I guess, most prominent and famous theme here of Sha'ar Daled: the Nefesh HaChaim's definition of Torah Lishmah. So let's begin here at the end of Perek Aleph on page Reish Tet. Basically in order to discuss it we need to familiarize ourselves minimally till the end of Perek Gimmel, then we need to look at some other mekoros. I'm not sure if we'll really get to the punchline tonight but it may take two weeks to get to the punchline. We'll see. Okay so here at the end of Perek Aleph, utchila, the first paragraph begins here on page Reish Tet. So the Nefesh HaChaim says, ותחילה אשים דברים בעניין עסק התורה לשמה, מה הוא עניין לשמה? כי גם זה פרי חטאת,
literally the fruit of error, לחסום המונים עצמם מעסק התורה הקדושה, that they hold themselves back from Talmud Torah, bechoshvam, because they have this erroneous understanding ki inyan lishmah, when Chazal said that a person should learn lishmah, פירושו בדביקות גדול בלי הפסק. Okay so this is the view with which the Nefesh HaChaim is going to polemicize. That when Chazal say that a person has to learn lishmah, it means he has to learn פירושו בדביקות גדול בלי הפסק, an uninterrupted dveikus. And that's what it means to be learning Torah Lishmah. Now if that's your, and what's more, וגם יחול יותר מזה, what's more, even worse than feeling that this is the ideal is that they feel ששופים דעתם שעסק התורה בלא דביקות אין כלום. And that otherwise Talmud Torah is worthless, ולא שום תועלת חס ושלום. Lozos, consequently, כשירואין עצמן שאין לבם הולך לזו המדרגה, when they feel that they're not going to be or that they're not learning פירושו בדביקות גדול בלי הפסק, שיהיה לימודם בדביקות תמידי, an uninterrupted dveikus, דהא לא התחילו כלל, they don't even begin learning, ועל כן תפוג תורה חס ושלום, and this weakens Torah. And that's where he's going to come to rebut and to show the error of this opinion. So let's begin now in Perek Beis. עניין עסק התורה לשמה האמת הברור, כי לשמה אין פירושו דביקות כמו שסוברים עתה רוב העולם,
right it's interesting just how widespread this view was that learning lishmah means dveikus. שהרי אמרו רבותינו ז"ל במדרש, שביקש דוד המלך עליו השלום לפניו יתברך, שהעוסק בתהילים ייחשב אצלו יתברך כאילו היה עוסק בנגעים ואהלות. הרי שהעוסק בהלכות הש"ס בעיון ויגיעה הוא עניין יותר נעלה ואהוב לפניו יתברך מאמירת תהילים.
So from the fact that David Hamelech wanted to validate, as it were, saying Tehillim, that saying Tehillim should be validated. How would it be validated? It would be validated if Hakadosh Baruch Hu would say, I will accept saying Tehillim as the equivalent of learning gufei halachos. So you see, you see that again, that the standard is not dveikus. V'im nomar, says Rav Chaim, שלשמה פירושו דביקות דווקא, that learning lishmah means learning in a state of dveikus, ורק בזה תלוי כל עיקר עניין עסק התורה, and that's what learning Torah is all about, says the Nefesh HaChaim, הלא אין דביקות יותר נפלא מאמירת תהילים כראוי כל היום?
There's nothing more conducive, there's no experience more replete with a feeling and experience of dveikus than to say Tehillim, right? Say Tehillim when addressing Hakadosh Baruch Hu, crying out in such a personal way to Hakadosh Baruch Hu is much more of a dveikus-dikke activity than nega'im v'oholos. וגם מי יודע אם הסכים הקדוש ברוך הוא ידו בזה?
Again the proof is regardless, independent of what Hakadosh Baruch Hu's response to David Hamelech was, just the fact that David Hamelech is looking to validate saying Tehillim by having it be the equivalent of learning nega'im v'oholos, that in and of itself is a proof, and what's more Rav Chaim Volozhiner says we don't even know that Hakadosh Baruch Hu acceded to his request. כי לא מצינו בדבריהם ז"ל מה תשובה השיב הוא יתברך על שאלתו.
We don't even know what HaKadosh Baruch Hu responded. We don't know if HaKadosh Baruch Hu acquiesced. I don't understand the point of what HaKadosh Baruch Hu... the relevancy of what the point of whether HaKadosh Baruch Hu... Well it just, again, the proof, I think the Nefesh HaChaim's proof is independent. Even if HaKadosh Baruch Hu agreed with, even if HaKadosh Baruch Hu did acquiesce to Dovid HaMelech's request, the very fact that the standard is Negoim V'Ohalos proves his point, right? The fact that Tehillim is validated by saying it's the equal of Negoim V'Ohalos shows that Negoim V'Ohalos is the standard and clearly that means that the standard in terms of Torah is not dveikus because when a person is trying to figure out what the various negoim look like, he's certainly not experiencing the type of dveikus he is when he's saying Tehillim. The point gets even magnified, says the Nefesh HaChaim, if HaKadosh Baruch Hu didn't agree to Dovid HaMelech's request. But even if he did, the very fact that Tehillim is being validated by letting it be the equal of Negoim V'Ohalos is his proof. That's the point that I'm having difficulty. Why does it validate even more if HaKadosh Baruch Hu didn't respond to Dovid HaMelech's request? Because then not only would we not only would we have established that the standard for learning isn't dveikus, we would have even established that the dveikus you feel when saying Tehillim is inferior to the Talmud Torah experience which doesn't have dveikus. But then that means that... See, either there were two issues here. One issue is what Torah Lishmah is. So the fact that Tehillim Dovid HaMelech sought to validate Tehillim by letting it be the equal of Torah Lishmah clearly means that Torah Lishmah doesn't mean that it it it generates and it arouses a sense of a feeling of dveikus because were that the case, Tehillim wouldn't need to be validated, aderaba, Torah would have to be validated by being the equivalent of Tehillim. The fact that Tehillim is being validated as the equivalent of Torah says that the the ideal of Torah Lishmah isn't that Torah is arousing and generating this sense of dveikus. Now, maybe, but maybe saying Tehillim, okay, so maybe what we'll concede a partial defeat or a partial victory for the Nefesh HaChaim and say you're right, Torah Lishmah doesn't have to generate dveikus but Tehillim which generates dveikus is the equivalent. He says no, maybe that's not true either, because it could be that HaKadosh Baruch Hu didn't agree to Dovid HaMelech's request, in which case not only have we have we proven that the the again, that the highest value is a Talmud Torah, again, not Talmud Torah which is arousing dveikus necessarily, he'll define it in Perek Gimmel in a minute im yirtzeh Hashem, but not only have we established what the ideal of Torah Lishmah isn't dveikus, but we would have also established that that ideal of Torah Lishmah is even greater than the dveikus that you experience of Tehillim. Right? This is reminiscent of the famous story the Rav tells in Ish HaHalacha how Rosh Hashanah night after davening he sat down in shul with a Sefer Tehillim to say Tehillim and his father took the Tehillim away from him and gave him a Gemara Rosh Hashanah and told him you want to be oved Hashem, so here, take the Gemara. Okay, now, V'gam, yet another rayah, כי היה די לענין הדביקות if the ultimate accomplishment of Talmud Torah is arousing and generating this feeling, this experience, this emotional experience of dveikus, כי היה די לענין הדביקות במסכת אחת או פרק או משנה אחת שיעסוק בה כל ימיו בדביקות.
It would be enough to learn one masechta, not even one masechta, maybe one perek, one mishna, and presumably what else it means is and it would also be easier, right, because the more you learn, so every time you learn a new blatt, so we have to break our teeth over the perush hamilos on a new blatt, which certainly wouldn't help for dveikus, you know, having to figure out just what the simple translation is. So aderaba, take Daf Beis in Berachos and make that your life's work and that would be more conducive to dveikus ולא מצינו כן לרבותינו ז"ל and Clearly that isn't the the goal of Talmud Torah which which Chazal established שאמר רבי יוחנן בן זכאי שלא הניח מקרא משנה הלכות ואגדות.
There's nothing which which escaped Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai. Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai's knowledge encompassed everything: Mikra, Mishnah, Halachos, Aggados, everything. והיינו כי מהעלאתו על לבו תמיד, he always took to heart כי עדיין לא יצא ידי חובת עסק התורה לשמה במה שלמד עד עתה.
He was never complacent, he never felt that he had fulfilled the mitzvah. לזאת היה שוקד כל ימיו להוסיף לקח תמיד מיום ליום ומשעה לשעה,
which is why Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai was constantly trying to increase his base of knowledge. So clearly again if Torah lishmah is just to is just to that Talmud Torah is is a vehicle that that while learning a person has a a sense, a feeling, an experience of of dveykus, a conscious experience of dveykus, so then there's no reason why why Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai would have been obligated to encompass the the totality of Torah. And similarly Bemidrash Raboteinu, the Midrash also says אמר רבי בוא וראה כמה קשה יום הדין. Look how how strict, how severe the Yom HaDin is לעתיד לבוא שיעשה הקדוש ברוך הוא לדון את כל העולם כולו.
And HaKadosh Baruch Hu in the future will will judge the whole world. בא מי שיש בידו מקרא ואין בידו משנה. A person comes and he's a baki in Tanach. הקדוש ברוך הוא הופך את פניו ממנו ומצרי גיהינום מתגברים בו
because he contented himself with Tanach. Obviously again this is a a sobering Midrash, which not to not to deflect its or dull its force, but obviously it means that whenever the Midrash is is describing the the kitrug against the person, it means that the person could have done more, right? We're not talking about that he only had the capacity to be a Baal Mikra, it means he had a capacity to be more but he was content, he was complacent without realizing his potential. והם נוטלין אותו ומשליכין אותו לגיהינום. בא מי שיש בידו שני סדרים או שלושה.
So a person comes, he's a baki in two or three Sidrei Mishnah. הקדוש ברוך הוא אומר לו בני כל ההלכות למה לא שנית אותם?
Again, if if this person had the the ability and opportunity to know more, so HaKadosh Baruch Hu says, so why did you neglect all the other Halachos? בא מי שיש בידו הלכות. He knows the Halachos of the Mishnayos. So omer lo, HaKadosh Baruch Hu says to him בני תורת כהנים למה לא שנית שיש בה וכולי. It's interesting, right? He doesn't become bni until there's some Torah she-be'al peh, right? The the person who was only the Baal Mikra, so HaKadosh Baruch Hu was strict with him without without the bni. But once the person at least entered the realm of Torah she-be'al peh, so again, again, if the person didn't didn't seek to to recognize his his potential, so again there is a Middas HaDin but it's bni, right? So omer lo, HaKadosh Baruch Hu says to him בני תורת כהנים למה לא שנית שיש בה וכולי. בא מי שיש בידו תורת כהנים. הקדוש ברוך הוא אומר לו בני חמישה חומשי תורה למה לא שנית שיש בהם קריאת שמע תפילין ומזוזה? בא מי שיש בידו חמישה חומשי תורה.
All all the drashos, not just in Toras Kohanim but on all Chamisha Chumshei Torah. אמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא למה לא למדת אגדה? Why didn't you learn Aggada? בא מי שיש בידו אגדה הקדוש ברוך הוא אומר לו תלמוד למה לא למדת?
Why didn't you learn Gemara? בא מי שיש בידו תלמוד הקדוש ברוך הוא אומר לו בני הואיל ונתעסקת בתלמוד צפית במרכבה?
Did you study Maaseh Merkavah? כיסא כבודי היכן הוא עומד? חשמל היכן הוא עומד? All all the the details of of the mareh of Yechezkel? ובכמה פנים הוא מתהפך עיין שם באורך. Okay, now let's look, this last paragraph is very important for again, I think from the questions which he poses against the view of dveykus, it will help us try to figure out what what his opinion is. Umistabra nami hachi. Meaning that it doesn't mean dveykus. Umistabra nami hachi that Torah lishmah doesn't mean Talmud Torah bidveykus, שהרי כמה הלכות מרובות יש בש"ס שבעת שהאדם עוסק בהם הוא צריך לעיין ולהעמיק מחשבתו ושכלו בענייני הגשמיות שבהן.
Right? There's so many things, so many topics in Shas, so many topics in Halacha where a person has to be thinking about the... about physicality so much, about the physical metzius which the halacha treats כגון קנין ופתחי נדה, so the the the chacham has to figure out whether whether the the the dam is min hamakom, whether the dam is not min hamakom, so lichora there's nothing which is less conducive to a dveikus-dik experience than that kind of intellectual focus. Or המשא ומתן בש"ס וכללי דיני מיגו של רמאות שהיה הרמאי יכול לטעון,
and when you're learning, when you're learning Chezkas Habatim and you're learning migo, so what are you doing? So you're figuring, so you spend your time how to cheat? Exactly, how to how to cheat, right? Preparations for doing your taxes, right? You're figuring out how to how to cheat. וכמעט בלתי אפשר שתהיה אצלו אז גם הדבקות בשלימות כראוי.
How is it possible that that a person is going to exert himself fully as he has to to understand it properly and and simultaneously again be aroused by the Talmud Torah to this sense of dveikus? Okay. So, are we sort of dealing with yiras Hashem and chochmas Hashem here? Let's, I'm sort of purposely holding off. Let's read a little bit here of what he says and then and then we'll we'll try to tackle your question. Aval ha'emes ki inyan lishma, okay, this is, I don't know, maybe the most famous perek now or or lines in which we're about we're about to read now from Nefesh Hachaim. כי ענין לשמה פירוש לשם התורה. To learn Talmud Torah lishma means literally for the sake of Torah. To learn lishma means that you learn Torah lishma l'shem shelo, for its sake, right? For its sake. והענין כמו שפירש הרא"ש ז"ל על מאמר ר' אלעזר ב"ר צדוק נדרים ס"ב עשה דברים לשם פעלם,
right? When you do mitzvos, so you do it what's the lishma of mitzvos? לשם פעלם לשמו של הקדוש ברוך הוא שפעל הכל למענהו.
You do it for the sake of Hakadosh Baruch Hu who who created everything for His sake. Vedaber bahem, right? This continues with what Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said. Vedaber bahem, meaning תלמוד תורה לשמן כל דיבורך ומשאך בדברי תורה. Whenever you're speaking, whenever you're you're deliberating about divrei Torah, yehei l'shem hatorah, right? Not l'shem po'alan. It's not l'shem Hashem, but it's l'shem hatorah. K'gon leida u'lehavin, that means to to know, to understand, lehosif lekach u'pilpul and and to to probe deeply, obviously לא לקנטר ולהתגאות חס ושלום, not not to simply for self-aggrandizement. Now, dikdek the subject being the Rosh, right? The the Rosh pays careful attention לבאר שינוי לשון דרבי אלעזר בר צדוק שבעשיה, when it comes to doing mitzvos, what does Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok say? אמר לשם פעלם ובדיבור, when it comes to Talmud Torah, when it comes to speech, amar lishman. Lachen, accordingly, be'inyan ha'asiyah with regard to doing mitzvos, netilas lulav and the like, peirush ha'Rosh explains that the lishma is לשמו של הקדוש ברוך הוא שפעל הכל למענהו ובענין הלימוד פירש לשם התורה.
And when it comes to learning, he says the lishma is not l'shem Hashem, it's l'shem Torah. וכוונתו ז"ל מבואר היינו כי עשיית המצוה וודאי שצריכה להיות למצוה מן המובחר בדביקות ומחשבה טהורה שבטהורות כפי שכלו והשגתו כדי שיתעלה עילאה לגרום תיקוני העולמות וכחות הסתרים העליונים זהו לשם פעלם כי כל פעל ה' למענהו ואמרו רז"ל לקילוסו.
Of course the the optimal form of the mitzvah is a person does it with dveikus, with the most pure of machshavos and his intention is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu should be praised through through his doing this mitzvah and that he should cause perfection of of all the worlds above. Now, ve'im ki vadai, right? The Nefesh Hachaim never loses a chance to to reinforce this point, שגם במצות העיקר בהם לעיכובא הוא העשייה בפועל. Again the Torah is indeed... is action-oriented. What's indispensable is not this lishma, even this, even by mitzvos, it's not this lishma, which is the mainstay, but it's the actual mitzvah והכוונה היתירה וטוהר המחשבה אינה מעכבת כלל כמו שנתבאר לעיל סוף שער א' על נכון בעזרת השם.
Again, don't be misled to think, well, if I can't take a lulav b'dveikus, I shouldn't take it. Im kol zeh, he says, even though again the mainstay and what's indispensable is the action itself, but nevertheless im kol zeh מצטרף קדושת וטוהר המחשבה לעיקר העשייה בפועל, but this type of pure thought does join together with the action itself לעורר ולהאיר ולפעול תיקונים יותר גדולים בעולמות משהיתה המצוה נעשית בלא דביקות וקדושת המחשבה.
It definitely enhances and increases the effect and potency of the mitzvah. Aval על הנהגת האדם בשעת עסק התורה בדיני המצוות והלכותיה, but with regard to a person's conduct when learning Torah, אמר רבי אלעזר בן צדוק ודבר בהם רצונו לומר הדיבור בענייני המצוות והלכותיה יהא לשמן לא לשמו אלא לשמן פירוש לשם דברי תורה.
So what's the lishma of Talmud Torah? L'sheim haTorah, היינו לידע ולהבין ולהוסיף לקח ופלפול, to know, to understand, and to generate more and more understanding. Now let's just try at least one more paragraph, maybe to the end of the perek and then try to process this. ורש"י ז"ל גירסא אחרת היתה לו שם ודבר בהם לשם שמים.
Right? Not v'dabeir bahem lishmon, which is the girsa of the Rosh, but Rashi had a girsa v'dabeir bahem that when you learn it should be l'sheim shamayim. לכן פירש שתהא כל כוונתך לשם שמים אולם ענין ופירוש לשמה שאמרו חז"ל בכל מקום ודאי שגם רש"י ז"ל יפרש כפירוש הראש ז"ל כאן לפי גירסתו.
Don't think, Reb Chaim Volozhiner says, that what I'm telling you is a machlokes. Don't think that my definition of Torah lishma is a subject of a machlokes Rashi and the Rosh. No, the only reason Rashi says differently in that Gemara in the Daf—this is going to be very, very important for what we're about to discuss. The only reason Rashi says differently than the Rosh in that Gemara is because according to Rashi, the Gemara there is not describing what Torah lishma is, it's talking about what Torah l'sheim shamayim is. Torah l'sheim shamayim means that you should be doing it, again, what l'sheim shamayim means. But when Rashi does have the phrase Torah lishma, ודאי שגם רש"י ז"ל יפרש כפירוש הראש ז"ל כאן לפי גירסתו וגם רש"י ז"ל כאן אין כוונתו דביקות.
And even Rashi in talking about l'sheim shamayim doesn't say that l'sheim shamayim means dveikus, אלא דאתי לאפוקי שלא יהא לימודו לשם קנטור וגאות כמו שכתב הראש ז"ל כדמוכח מסיום דברי רבי אלעזר בן צדוק אל תעשם עטרה להתגדל בהם.
Even according to Rashi, the l'sheim shamayim is that it shouldn't be for self-aggrandizement as Rebbi Elazar ben Tzadok concludes that you shouldn't use divrei Torah to make them into a crown for self-glorification. וזה שמסיים הש"ס גבי רבי יוחנן בן זכאי שלא הניח לקיים מה שנאמר להנחיל אוהבי יש שמבואר ענין שם בכל אותה הפרשה שהוא מאמר התורה הקדושה עצמה אשר בחוץ תרונה שיש לאל ידה להנחיל וליתן שכר טוב לכל ההוגה ועוסק בה מחמת אהבתה עצמה ממש היינו להוסיף בה לקח ופלפול וזהו אוהבי,
those who love my lovers with the Torah being personified speaking. Okay, so Reb Chaim Volozhiner bekitzer, Reb Chaim Volozhiner's definition here of Torah lishma means l'sheim Torah. L'sheim Torah for the sake of knowing, understanding, deepening one's understanding of Torah. That's what it means to learn Torah lishma. It means to learn Torah lishma for us to be mkayeim the mitzvah of learning Torah lishma now means that we're learning to try to understand and learn and understand as deeply as possible perek gimmel in sha'ar daled of Nefesh HaChaim. That's what it means to learn Torah lishmah. It doesn't mean that we're learning b'dveikus, doesn't mean anything else. It means that we're learning, that we're learning l'shem haTorah to understand, to understand this line in the Gemara of u'ledabeir bahem lishmon as well as deeply as we can. That's what the Nefesh HaChaim says. And he seems, it's quite clear the Nefesh HaChaim is insistent that this is the definition. It's not a definition, it's not a mahalach, this is the definition. Okay. Now let's take a look. Let's take a look. There are many many sefarim, but we'll take a look just at a couple of them. Maybe we'll begin with the Rambam at the end of Hilchos Teshuvah. So in Perek yud, Halacha hey, in Perek yud, כל העוסק בתורה כדי לקבל שכר או כדי שלא תגיע אליו פורענות הרי זה עוסק בה שלא לשמה.
If a person's motivated by reward, he's concerned with sachar v'onesh. He wants the sachar of Talmud Torah, he doesn't want, rachmana litzlan, the onesh of bittul Torah. That's shelo lishmah. וכל העוסק בה לא ליראה ולא לקבל שכר אלא מפני אהבת אדון כל הארץ שציווה בה הרי זה עוסק בה לשמה.
So what does the Rambam here also seems to be giving us a definition of Talmud Torah lishmah, right? And what's the Rambam's definition of Talmud Torah lishmah? The Rambam's definition of Talmud Torah lishmah is that a person learns out of love of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, right? He's learning out of love of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. ואמרו חכמים לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.
But Talmud Torah lishmah means out of love for Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So how does that square with the Nefesh HaChaim? How does that square with the Nefesh HaChaim? It's not the same definition. I'm sorry? Any limud Torah can be a vehicle, lav davka dinim and halachos, could be learning Tehillim. Right, and what's more, there's no there's certainly no mention of this lishaim haTorah here, right? There certainly isn't any trace of that. Maybe lishman, maybe he had the girsa lishaim shamayim. Maybe... No, but clearly whatever girsa... I don't know offhand if if we know what the Rambam's girsa there was in Nedarim, but either way the Rambam clearly applies this to the phrase lishmah in Chazal. So whatever girsa he had there, the Rambam clearly is telling you this is a definition of lishmah. Lishmah means... so now the question we asked before, what does it mean that we're learning lishmah in Sha'ar daled, Perek gimmel? So the Rambam would say that learning lishmah means that we're learning it out of ahavas Hashem. That's what it means. That we're learning it מאהבת אדון הכל כל הארץ שצוה בה. That's what it means that we're learning it lishmah. So this wouldn't be so terrible, that there was something in Nefesh HaChaim which which had a different emphasis or was even at odds with a halacha in the Rambam. It wouldn't be the end of the world. The reason this is so noteworthy is because you get the impression here, you get the impression here that Rav Chaim Volozhiner is telling you what I'm telling you is the definition. I'm telling you what I'm telling you is the view in Chazal. There's no other view, right? And that's why he goes out of his way to say don't be misled by what Rashi says there in Nedarim, it's because Rashi's not defining lishmah. The reason Rashi gives a different definition is because he's defining a different term. And yet clearly, lich'ora, this isn't the definition. Now even more striking, if you take a look here, it's a little bit easier than... Do we have any idea what the Rambam considers kol ha'osek baTorah? What's he referring to? Presumably it means learning. I mean the Rambam in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah of course has very novel and radical definitions in terms of parameters of Talmud Torah, but osek baTorah means like we say la'asok b'divrei Torah in Birchas HaTorah in the morning. Now if you take a look here, this is a Xerox from from this sefer over here. There's a whole there's a whole section about lomeid Torah lishmah. I'm sorry? You want more? Oh this? Yeah sure, sorry. So let's just look at a couple of the sources themselves. The way just, I guess, the editorial device here, what's in bold is direct quote, is verbatim, and what he's interpolating by way of explication is what's in the regular print. So limmud lishmah כתב רש"י. This is especially striking, right? Because again, Rav Chaim Volozhiner was so insistent to tell us to bring Rashi in line with what the Rosh is saying. But Rashi in Taanit says לימוד לשמה כתב רש"י תענית דף ז דהיינו שלא משום שכך ציווה השם.
You know, very similar to what the Rambam says. Okay, he's, Rashi doesn't underscore the ahavah, אהבת אדון כל הארץ שציווה בו, but what does it mean again? So according to Rashi in Taanit, if for us to be learning lishmah now, we're learning because kach tziva Hashem ולא כדי להיקרא רבי as opposed to again some kind of looking for some kind of aggrandizement. ונראה, okay, this is by way of explanation, שרש"י סמך דבריו על הנאמר בעבודה זרה י"ז שכששאלו את ר' חנינא בן תרדיון למה עסקת בתורה.
Why'd you risk your life and you're about to lose your life for your learning Torah? ענה להם כאשר ציווני ה' אלקי. והחפץ חיים בשם עולם כתב צריך ללמוד לשמה דהיינו למלאות רצון השם שרצונו שנדע תורתו.
Okay, and then goes on. So how can the Nefesh HaChaim here, how can he be so adamant and monopolistic, as it were, in his definition of Torah lishmah? And again, there's several more pages here in this section, maybe next time we'll xerox some more of them. So what I think, and you know, maybe when you go home tonight over the next few days, you know, read more in Sha'ar Dalet, re-read what we did, read more in Sha'ar Dalet and let's, you know, test and see if this is oizgehaltn. Is that when you ask about lishmah, so let's define exactly what question we're trying to answer. You can ask when a person learns Torah, what is he thinking about while learning Torah? What is he thinking about? You can ask when learning Torah, so what is he doing? What's the immediate goal that he's trying to achieve? Or you can ask what's the ultimate goal or what's the motivation? Right? So there are different questions what we can ask. Again, you can ask what is he thinking about bishas maaseh? What is he doing, what's his immediate goal? Or you can ask what's his ultimate goal, what's the motivation? Let me just give a mashal. Let's say during the Second World War when the scientists were working on the Manhattan Project, it was called. Okay, so if you asked what they were thinking about bishas maaseh, they were thinking about the physics, the relevant physics of splitting the atom, right? That's what they were thinking about bishas maaseh. If you ask again, what were they doing, what was their immediate goal? Again, their immediate goal was to create the most powerful weapon ever. What was the ultimate goal, what was the motivation? The ultimate goal and motivation wasn't to create such a weapon. The ultimate goal and motivation was to win the war, right? Was to make sure that America got the bomb before the Nazis yimach shemam. So there's a difference between what you're thinking about bishas maaseh isn't necessarily what your ultimate goal is, and for that matter, your immediate goal isn't necessarily the same as your ultimate goal because your immediate goal can be a means, a means to an end. So now I think what Rav Chaim Volozhiner is insisting on, that everyone is in line with, is that the view that he's criticizing says that while learning Torah, it's not just that that view said that the ultimate goal of learning Torah is deveikut. No, Reb Chaim Volozhiner is not critiquing that. He's not critiquing what the ultimate goal or motivation of learning Torah is. Why? Because the fact that, the fact that let's say one of his kashas, one of his kashas was that what you're learning migu, so your mind is busy with all again how to cheat. So what does that, what does that tell me about what the ultimate goal or motivation of learning Torah is? It doesn't tell me anything about what the ultimate goal or motivation is, but it does tell me a what I am thinking about b'shas ma'aseh. What I'm, am I thinking about deveikus right now when I'm learning Torah? Am I supposed to be thinking about deveikus? So says Reb Chaim Volozhiner, how can it be? If a person's learning Masechet Niddah and or a person's learning Chazakas Habatim and he's busy with all the sevaros of an Amora, how can it be? He's not thinking about deveikus simultaneously. He isn't. And what's more, even the second question of what is he doing b'shas ma'aseh also again he's not arousing deveikus. He's neither thinking deveikusdik thoughts nor is he arousing deveikus. Again, the first two questions again as in the Manhattan project. So what are they thinking about? They're thinking about the science. What are they doing? What's the immediate goal? They're trying to achieve this result of splitting the atom, of creating the weapon. So what Reb Chaim Volozhiner is criticizing is if lishmah as what's the lishmah in terms of what you're thinking about b'shas ma'aseh. What's the lishmah of the immediate goal in terms of what are you doing when you're learning. Reb Chaim Volozhiner says when you're learning, when you're learning he says you're not thinking about deveikus, you're not even using the Torah as an instrument that while learning that you should be able to feel this emotional deveikus and have this emotional deveikusdik experience. And that's what all the rayos are. Reb Chaim Volozhiner says if that's what you were trying to do, so say Tehillim. Say Tehillim. If that's what you were trying to do, so then you have to avoid so many sugyos in Shas which which if anything seem antithetical to it. If that's what you were trying to do, so there's no need for Hakadosh Baruch Hu to demand that everyone learn as much and have as great a hekef in Talmud Torah as he's capable of. So Reb Chaim Volozhiner is not commenting on the ultimate goal or the ultimate motivation of learning, which is why this Rambam is addressing a different question. This Rambam is not talking about the lishmah, or in other words another way maybe to paraphrase what we're saying is you can talk about the lishmah of the ma'aseh of Talmud Torah or you can sort of talk about the lishmah again in terms of the motivation and ultimate goal. The Rambam is talking about the lishmah of the ultimate goal or motivation. The Nefesh Hachaim is talking about the lishmah of of what you're thinking b'shas ma'aseh. For instance, for instance, let's say when the Mishna says in Zevachim that לשם ששה דברים הזבח נזבח, that when the kohen does the avodah on a korban, so he has to have six lishmas in mind. So one of them is he has to have in mind the lishmah for the ba'alim. For the ba'alim, whoever the ba'al hakorban is. So if this is olaso shel Reuven, he has to have in mind the lishmah that he's shachting olaso shel Reuven. So that's not, that's not the ultimate goal, right? That lishmah is not the ultimate goal. It's saying what is he supposed to be thinking about b'shas ma'aseh? What he's thinking about b'shas ma'aseh is this korban that I'm shachting, it's an olah l'shem kodesh and it's olaso shel Reuven l'shem ba'alim. Those are two of the six lishmas he's supposed to have. So lishmah there is defining what he's thinking b'shas ma'aseh. That's the lishmah which Reb Chaim Volozhiner is defining. That's the lishmah which the Gemara in Nedarim is talking about, which is why he's so insistent that everyone, all the Rishonim he thinks peh echad will agree to what the Rosh says. When you want to discuss what lishmah means again in terms of the third of the list of questions that we gave of the ultimate goal or motivation of learning, he's not commenting on that. He's not commenting on that. I think further proof of this Is that I think now if let's maybe let's just take a look at the first paragraph in Perek Vav. Just skip and then we'll stop with what that what that has to say. Now, but l'chora, there's one question which l'chora the Nefesh Hachayim is vulnerable to, which the this presumably chassidishe view, which he's critiquing, probably marshals as an argument, which is that according to Nefesh Hachayim, comes out that when a person is learning, he's not thinking about the Ribbono Shel Olam. How can that be? How can it be that there's a time when the Torah tells you don't think about Hashem? How can it be? What about שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד, right? And presumably that's marshaled as an argument that adaraba, that's why the lishmah of Torah has to be the dveykus. It can't be that when a person's learning, he's not thinking about the Ribbono Shel Olam. So now let's read the first paragraph in Perek Vav. לזאת אמת שזו היא הדרך האמיתית אשר בה בחר הוא יתברך שמו שבכל עת שיכין האדם עצמו ללמוד.
When a person's preparing to learn, ראוי לו להתישב קודם שיחל. A person should should think for a moment exactly what he's about to embark upon. על כל פנים זמן מועט, a little bit, ביראת ה' טהורה בטהרת הלב. This is amazing: להתוודות על חטאו מעומקא דליבא. Before before sitting down to learn, a person has to do teshuvah. A person has to do teshuvah before sitting down, before sitting down to learn, a person has to be mesvadeh, he has to do teshuvah, כדי שתהא תורתו קדושה וטהורה ויכוין להדבק בלימודו בו בתורה בו בהקדוש ברוך הוא. היינו להדבק בכל כחותיו לדבר ה' זו הלכה, ובזה הוא דבוק בו יתברך, כי הוא יתברך ורצונו אחד.
So it says in Nefesh Hachayim, so what's the answer to to this question, right? To this question to which I'm vulnerable, right? In my definition of lishmah, again, what is he thinking about b'shas ma'aseh? What's he trying to do b'shas ma'aseh? What's his immediate goal? So I said nothing to do with dveykus. He's thinking about the sugya, and what he's trying to do is understand the sugya as clearly and as deeply as possible, even to the at the cost of not thinking about Hashem. How can it be that there's a that there's a moment when the Torah says don't think about Hashem? So that's what he says. No, but since a person, how can it be, how can it be that if Talmud Torah isn't dveykus, if I'm if I'm critiquing that, how can it be that there's a moment when a person should be devoid of dveykus, when when we're tearing him away from the dveykus? So that's what Rav Chayim Volozhin answers with the with the equation, with the the unity, the identification between Hashem and his ratzon, Hashem and divrei torah. So he is daveik. So since he is daveik, that's why what he can be thinking about is the is the ultimate goal. No, but he keeps at the beginning same thing as l'shem yichud, to remember the ultimate goal, right? And on the contrary, if anything, exactly. If anything, what he's saying here is that ultimately what he wants to accomplish is להדבק בהקדוש ברוך הוא, but that's not what he's going to be thinking about b'shas ma'aseh. What he's going to be thinking about b'shas ma'aseh is is what the characteristics of borer are, and what the characteristics of shor are, and what the characteristics of of of esh, of esh are. Okay, bli neder, we'll continue.