I think where we left off after the Rambam summarizes the five types of Dinim that we find in the Mishnah, and then the Rambam continues to explain why there's machloket in the Mishnah. Vehineh hataam shehezikikahu לקבוע המחלוקת שאירעו בין שתי דעות בעניינים שנפלה בהם המחלוקת הוא כפי שאפרש. והיינו שאילו קבע מימרות מקובלות על הכל שאין בהם מחלוקת והיה משמיט דברי מי שאין הלכה כמותו היה בא בזמן שלאחר מכאן מי שקיבל להפך מן ההלכה שנוהגים למעשה על פיה מן האדם שחלק על אותה הסברה או ממי שסבר כקבלה זו והיה חל פקפוק בינינו ובין עצמנו ונאמר איך קיבל זה שהוא אדם נאמן שדבר פלוני אסור ועל תורת המשנה אמרו בו שהוא מותר או להפך. אך אם יהיו ידועות לנו כל הדעות תפסק המבוכה הזאת כי כשיאמר המקבל שמעתי שכך וכך אסור נאמר לו צדקת אכן היא דעת פלוני ורבים חולקים עליו או פלוני חלק עליו והלכה למעשה כדעת החולק עליו או מפני שסברתו טובה יותר או מפני שמצאנו עניין אחר שמסייעו.
Amar Rabbi Yehuda משנה פרק א' משנה ו' בעדיות אמר רבי יהודה אם כן למה מזכירין דברי היחיד בין המרובין לבטלן שאם יאמר האדם כך אני מקובל יאמרו לו כדברי איש פלוני שמעת.
So Rabbi Yehuda says if you have a yachid and it's not that the later consensus was what at the time was a daat yachid, no, he's a yachid and remains a yachid, so why is he in the Mishnah? So then Rabbi Yehuda proceeds to exactly give this explanation that the Rambam gives, it's to forestall confusion lest someone say, no, I'm mekubal that this is asur, so we'll tell him yeah, because you're mekubal like Rabbi Elazar, but Rabbi Elazar shemutar and the Mishnah reflects the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. And I don't understand, so why didn't the Rambam, I don't know, why wasn't the Rambam metzayein the Mishnah? Again, so the Rambam is not necessarily literally talking about the same case of yachid verabbim, he's talking at first about a machloket of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Akiva whether מכשירין שאפשר לעשותן מערב שבת דוחים מילה, but it's an identical svara. I'm not sure why the Rambam doesn't, I'm not sure why the Rambam does not reference the Mishnah. I feel like the question's like this. The famous Gemara in Eruvin that for three years there was kind of a stalemate between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel that הללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו והללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו and there was no clear klal hachraah to be applied because even though Beis Hillel were the rov but Beis Shammai were mechadedey tfei so Beis Shammai... Finally the bas kol breaks the stalemate that אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים והלכה כדברי בית הלל. So what we generally assume that אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים means is that both opinions are equally valid in terms of being a cheftza shel torah. So to take the first מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל from masechet brachos about this b'shochbecha u'vkumecha also means that when you say krias shema in the evening you should lie down and when you say krias shema in the morning you should stand up which is what beis shammai think and beis hillel say no it only refers to זמן שכיבה וזמן קימה. The pasuk doesn't refer to the posture. So in terms of pshat in the psukim so beis shammai is equally cogent. Beis shammai is equally valid. It's as much a cheftza shel torah as beis hillel. That's what it means that אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים. Divrei elokim chayim. It's as much a cheftza shel torah as beis hillel. But זכו בית הלל לקבוע הלכה כמותן for the reasons that the bas kol enumerates. So why is it again it's not really ayin l'eil it's not really the rambam it's basically the mishna in eduyos but we're asking the same question basically on the mishna why is it what does rabbeinu hakadosh need to apologize for mentioning views that we don't pasken like given that אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים? It's not that we assume that the view which is shelo k'halacha is wrong. No shelo k'halacha יחיד ורבים הלכה כרבים doesn't mean that the yachid is wrong but it means that the rabim is normative and lav davka that that normative has a monopoly on being true that normative has a monopoly on being a cheftza shel torah. So it seems clear l'chora that there is at least one question here but it seems clear l'chora that the answer is as follows that what rabbeinu hakadosh intended shisha sidrei mishna to be basically is a type of kitzur shulchan aruch. It was supposed to be a compendium of halacha. Supposed to be a compendium of halacha. That's the way the rambam presents it because the rambam describes that rabbeinu hakadosh collected everything וחיבר מהכל ספר המשנה כדי שלא תשתכח תורה שבעל פה מישראל.
So rabbeinu hakadosh composing the mishna was to ensure that torah she'baal peh not be forgotten. Now torah she'baal peh in the rambam's vocabulary as we've seen has a more narrow meaning than the way we use it. For the rambam torah she'baal peh means halacha right as we had in the beginning that perush hamishnayos when the rambam illustrates that moshe rabbeinu came down and taught us the pasuk of בסוכות תשבו שבעת ימים and he told us how high the mechitzas have to be of the sukka v'chulu. So mishna is intended to be a kitzur shulchan aruch. It's not intended to encompass everything that we call torah she'baal peh right we use the term torah she'baal peh much much in a much broader sense than the rambam does. The rambam uses it more narrowly and he calls those other things talmud he doesn't call them torah she'baal peh. But heyos she'hadavar kein l'chora that's what underlies the mishna eduyos's question which the rambam here is paralleling so in kitzur shulchan aruch you don't expect to find machlokes. In kitzur shulchan aruch you don't expect to find deios which are shelo k'halacha. You only expect to find the view that's halacha l'maaseh. Now when we talk about this focus, this concentration on halacha, so it’s not just a question of pragmatism, of to know halacha l'maaseh. The Rambam has in Perek Aleph of Hilchos Talmud Torah based upon the Gemara in Kiddushin that חייב לשלש זמן למידתו שליש בתורה שבכתב שליש בתורה שבעל פה ושליש יבין וישכיל אחרית דבר מראשיתו ויוציא דבר מדבר וידמה דבר לדבר וידע במידות שהתורה נדרשת בהן עד שידע היאך הוא עיקר המידות והיאך יוציא האסור והמותר וכיוצא בהן מדברים שלמד מפי השמועה ועניין זה הוא הנקרא תלמוד.
So all the havana, the iyun, the knowing the mekoros of halacha, Maaseh Bereishis, Maaseh Merkava, all that the Rambam subsumes under the heading of Talmud, and Torah she-ba'al peh means halacha. But part of yedias HaTorah, not just mitzad to know what to do halacha l'maaseh. For the Rambam, knowing halacha is an intrinsic part of yedias HaTorah. And that explains the following. Right, in Sefer Avoda and Sefer Korbanos, in Sefer Tahara, in so many places, the Rambam paskens what the Gemara calls Hilcheta L'meshicha. The Rambam paskens things which are not nogea bazman hazeh and which will only be nogea l'yemos hamashiach. So Tosafos actually points out, it’s a machlokus hasugyas as to whether or not, Tosafos in a couple of places, in Sanhedrin and Menachos, that some places the Gemara asks a kasha Hilcheta L'meshicha, and Tosafos has different deios as to, but at the very least it seems to be a machlokus hasugyas on that question as to whether or not there is an inyan now to pasken Hilcheta L'meshicha. At the very least it’s a machlokus hasugyas. And what’s axiomatic in the Rambam is that the psak halacha is crucial, not only because should that situation arise to know what to do halacha l'maaseh, but that’s part of yedias HaTorah. And that’s why the Rambam paskens, that’s why we have to know the halacha l'maaseh of pigul, even though it’s not halacha l'maaseh bazman hazeh, even though when it will be halacha l'maaseh, so Moshe Rabbeinu will come and the shaylos will go to Moshe Rabbeinu. But right now, baasher hu sham, no, we in our generation, every generation, betor yedias HaTorah is supposed to know the halacha of the three chelkei HaTorah, Torah she-bichtav, one, and the other end, skipping the middle for a minute, number three, Talmud, the middle chelek of Torah is basically halacha and that betor yedias HaTorah necessitates having psak halacha, not only the need for directive when a situation arises, which is why the Rambam says. We can't wait for Mashiach to come to fulfill mitzvas talmud torah. So mimaila the Rambam paskens everything in Sefer Avodah and everything in Sefer Korbanos. Lichora the mokor for that when the Gemara says veshinantam levanecha, Gemara in Kiddushin daf lamed aleph or something, when it says veshinantam levanecha שיהיו דברי תורה מחודדים בפיך שאם ישאלך אדם דבר אל תגמגם ואלא אמור לו מיד.
So the Rambam apparently understands that Gemara not just if a person comes to a rav with a sheila halacha lema'aseh and he wants to know as the tipas chalav fell into the chicken soup, can I eat the chicken soup or not? But he's coming and he's asking about anything in Torah. שיהיו דברי תורה מחודדים בפיך. He's coming, he's asking about anything in divrei Torah. So אל תגמגם ותאמר אלא אמור לו מיד שיהיו מחודדים בפיך
means you have to be able to give him an answer. Answer: it's muttar, it's assur, it's tamei, it's tahor, it's chayav, it's pattur. And that's an intrinsic part of mitzvas talmud torah, not only again the practicality of translating it and implementing it halacha lema'aseh but even purely in the domain of mitzvas talmud torah. The knowing the halacha is so important. All of which again, all of which then therefore begs the question: so why do we have machlokes in Mishnah? If Mishnah is intended to focus on that chelek of talmud torah, that area of Torah, so why is the machlokes? And that's what the Mishnah Ediyos and the Rambam explain: to forestall confusion so we should know when to correlate someone's kabbala with an opinion that has not been accepted. The Ra'avad is massig in the Rambam's hakdama. There's a famous hassagas haRa'avad. The Rambam basically describes Mishneh Torah as that he's setting out—he doesn't say it this way for obvious reasons—but he's setting out to do the same thing that Rabbeinu HaKadosh did in terms of providing us with a sefer that allows us to fulfill that second chelek of mitzvas talmud torah. So the Ra'avad is massig as follows. Amar Avraham, the Rambam says as follows. He says to know what the halacha is on one's own, so you have to know all Shas and you have to know all the Sifrei HaGeonim and how many people can make their way through that? He says so because of that נערתי חצני אני משה בר מימון הספרדי ונשענתי על הצור ברוך הוא בינותי בכל אלו הספרים וראיתי לחבר דברים המבוארים מכל אלו החיבורים.
I'm skipping a couple of lines, עד שתהיה תורה שבעל פה כולה סדורה בפי הכל בלא קשיא בלא קושיא בלא פירוק לא זה אומר בכה וזה אומר בכה אלא דברים ברורים קרובים נכונים על פי המשפט אשר יתבאר מכל אלו החיבורים והפירושים הנמצאים מימות משה רבינו ועד עכשיו עד שיהיו כל הדינים גלויים לקטן ולגדול בדין כל מצווה ומצווה.
Amar Avraham: אמר אברהם זה המחבר סבר לצעוק ולא תיקן כי הוא עזב דרך דרך כל המחברים שהיו לפניו כי הם הביאו ראיה לדבריהם וכתבו הדברים בשם אומר והועילו בזה תועלת גדולה.
So the Ra'avad says the Rambam didn't give us mekoros. When the Rambam this... with with with the Geonim, with others, the Rambam didn't make his case. He just wrote the psak halacha. He said others always presented what their reasons and what their argument was. V’hoilu bazeh, and what the other mechabrim did, says the Ra’avad, was very effective and very productive. והועילו בזה תועלת גדולה כי פעמים רבות יעלה על לב הדיין או העוסק והמורה להורות או להתיר מראייתו ממקום אחר ולא ידע כי יש גדול ממנו נראה לו דעת אחרת ממקום אחר. ואם ידע שגדול ממנו הפליג שמועה לדעת אחרת היה חוזר בו. ועתה לא אדע למה אחזור מקבלתי ומראייתי בשביל חיבורו של זה המחבר אם החולק עלי גדול ממני או אני גדול ממנו ולמה אבטל דעתי מפני דעתו. ועוד כי יש דברים שהגאונים חולקים זה על זה וזה המחבר בירר דברי האחד וכתבם בחיבורו ולמה אסמוך אני על ברירתו והיא לא נראית בעיני.
The Ra’avad says if if I came to a different conclusion from the Rambam and then I just see that the Rambam wrote differently and the Rambam doesn't tell me his reasons, he doesn't tell me why he thinks the pshat in the Gemara is like this, why he thinks this is the conclusion that emerges from the Gemara, so why should I be mevattel my de’ah to the Rambam's de’ah? Doesn't doesn't make any sense, right? When mechabrim write sheilos u'teshuvos, so they write what their reason for the psak is, they don't just write the psak halacha. They write a long teshuvah explaining what the basis for the psak halacha is. So and and the Rambam, the Ra’avad says, is just giving a klap a klap on tish and he's saying the halacha is like this. But it's clear that that I don't know the hassagos haRa’avad is tzricha iyun. It's clear that that the Rambam as he presents in the hakdamah, the point of Mishneh Torah was not to allow the Rambam to register his disagreement with this view of Rav Hai Gaon or that view of the Rif or if he had known of it, that view of the Ra’avad. That's not what the Rambam's goal in Mishneh Torah was. The Rambam's goal in Mishneh Torah was that again part of mitztvas talmud torah is to know torah shebal peh, which means to know as much as possible, to have yedios מותר אסור טמא טהור in all of Torah. And the Rambam again following in the footsteps of Rabbeinu Hakadosh sought to allow all of us who can't gain that clarity on our own to fulfill that aspect of mitztvas talmud torah. So the Rambam's answer to the Ra’avad would be kushta hi, you want to do it on your own and and I wasn't writing Mishneh Torah for you necessarily. I was writing Mishneh Torah that, he says, עד שיהיו כל הדינים גלויים לקטן ולגדול. That that a katon can also know kol haTorah kullah by in quotation marks simply studying Mishneh Torah. So ein hachi nami, if the Rambam's goal had been my goal in Mishneh Torah is that there's so many wrong piskei halacha out there and I'm looking to set the record straight, so then the Ra’avad’s right, meheicha taysay to to just advocate a different opinion without explaining what your reason is. But that's not what the Rambam set out to do. What the Rambam set out to do was to facilitate our being mekayem mitztvas talmud torah. Mitztvas talmud torah requires this again to the best of our ability, encyclopedic yedios of מותר ואסור טמא וטהור חייב ופטור and the Rambam says that that's what what I set out to do. So ein hachi nami, he doesn't need to, that service doesn't require the Rambam to explain where he got the psak halacha from. It is true for other reasons the Rambam said he has charata that he didn't write sort of a companion work where he gave his mekoros. The Rambam writes in a teshuvah that he had the charata about that later and sometimes he says he doesn't remember where what what the basis for certain psak was. But not that it belonged in Mishneh Torah. Because Mishneh Torah again is that you it's it's one major aspect of yedias HaTorah there's three aspects of yedias HaTorah. One's Torah Shebiksav, the other is Talmud which is the iyun vahavana, and the other is Torah Sheba'al Peh which is the halacha. Mishneh Torah the Rambam authored just as Rabbeinu Hakadosh had a millennium earlier, the Rambam authored Mishneh Torah to make possible for us to be mekayem that major part of mitzvas talmud torah. So memaila the Hasagos HaRa'avad it is sort of it just falls by the wayside it's not it's not so much that it's answered but it's just not it's not relevant to what the Rambam was trying to do here. I don't know it's tzaruch iyun what what I don't know I guess maybe the Ra'avad's being medayek lakatan ulagadol that if you intend Mishneh Torah for the gadol also so then maybe that's where Hasagos HaRa'avad is coming from. The Rambam continues ומה שקבע דעת אחד וחזרתו מאותו דעה right? we'll have this is a mishnah right? famously a little bit later in our perek: כגון אמרו בית שמאי אומרים כך ובית הלל אומרים כך וחזרו בית הלל להורות כדברי בית שמאי הוא כדי להודיעך בקשת האמת ורדיפת הצדק.
It's to show you the intellectual honesty and the humility that the haileger tannaim had: שהרי אלו האנשים הגדולים החסידים המשכילים המופלגים בחכמה השלמה בדעת כשראו דברי החולק עליהם שהם טובים מדבריהם ומסתברים יותר הודו לו וחזרו לדעתו.
They were interested not in being right they were interested in the emes. And when Beis Hillel saw the emes was like Beis Shammai so they so then they then adopted Beis Shammai's opinion. And again here too the emes is the basic idea is in an earlier mishnah in Edios which again the Rambam for some reason is not referencing. Again it's said a little bit differently: ולמה מזכירין את דברי שמאי והלל לבטלה ללמד לדורות הבאים שלא יהיה אדם עומד על דבריו שהרי אבות העולם לא עמדו על דבריהם.
A person shouldn't be stubborn and and dig in to to what his original view was. No if your bar plugta shows you that he's right so then a person should be modeh al ha'emes. So again obviously the the mussar's so true and so beautiful but the question is I think the notes here raise this question as well why isn't this question already preempted by what the Rambam said earlier that the reason we need to record machlokes and even deyos which we don't accept l'halacha is to prevent confusion down the road? Right so we need to preserve the deyos which are not halacha l'maiseh because if someone will come and say no a sukkah has to be dalas amos by dalas amos not zayin tphachim by zayin tphachim so it won't make us question our kabbalah because we'll say yeah we know there's such an opinion but that's an opinion that wasn't accepted. So maybe the same thing is over here someone will come and say that Beis Hillel hold that if you have a חצי עבד וחצי בן חורין he should be עובד את רבו יום אחד ועובד את עצמו יום אחד
and that will run contrary to what others will say no that Beis Hillel think כופין את רבו לשחררו so when you have this mishnah which says that originally Beis Hillel said one way and then later they said the other way so then we'll be able to to reconstruct and and it won't create that confusion. So why does this need a separate explanation? Why isn't why isn't that that initial explanation what that there was no chance that there were no talmidim who were only exposed to the To the mishnah rishonah of Beis Hillel and there was no chashash of that of mishnah rishonah being perpetuated in the name of Beis Hillel? Everyone knew. I don't know the question is what when you have let's say when you have in our perek that the Beis Shammai say to Beis Hillel that תיקנתם את רבו אבל את עצמו לא תיקנתם, so I don't know maybe you have to check each of the cases but maybe what it means is that when Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai it's not that it took Beis Hillel 20 years to come around to Beis Shammai's opinion. One day in the Beis Medrash Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai were talking about what do you do with a חצי עבד וחצי בן חורין. So b'oso ma'amad Beis Hillel initially said such and such and within 30 seconds they pivoted when they heard Beis Shammai's objection. So then maybe just the metzius is such that it wasn't sometimes you have sometimes you have the Rambam thought one thing and 20 years later he thought something else. Okay so there hachi nami he may have had a talmid 20 years earlier who would have been exposed to his mishnah rishonah and he would have had another talmid who was exposed to his mishnah acharonah. So it's important that we know there was a mishnah rishonah and mishnah acharonah. But what if each of these cases means no they pivoted as it were almost toch k'dei dibbur? So then you don't really have this chashash of Beis Hillel's mishnah rishonah ever being perpetuated b'shem Beis Hillel. So if that's the case why does it have to be recorded? The mishnah just should have said that everyone agrees it just should have been a stam mishnah הכופין את רבו לשחררו. The answer is no it's to show you the honesty of Beis Hillel. I don't know you have to check all the cases and see if that works. But why is there this discussion of mishnah rishonah and mishnah acharonah? If they really pivoted back in 30 seconds then why is it necessary to mention mishnah rishonah at all? Because again they did they did say it initially definitively. Maybe I was overemphasizing the point. They did come out and say עובד את עצמו יום אחד עובד את רבו יום אחד
right? But what's the din in such a case? So Beis Hillel said this is the din. Not mistama maybe they said it definitively and then when Beis Shammai pushed back so then they pivoted. But maybe again at least in our perek the I think the teretz does work because mashma the taka is that it's within a conversation between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel. So maybe in each of these cases Beis Hillel pivoted so quickly that you didn't really have a chashash that someone was going to be exposed to mishnah rishonah of Beis Hillel and not mishnah acharonah of Beis Hillel. You were either there or not during that conversation. Ayin sham. One of the Rav's favorite stories was when there was a panel of gedolei Yisrael were convened to decide the structure in Volozhin had been that there were two Roshei Yeshiva. And the question was who was going to be the second Rosh Yeshiva at a certain point alongside the Netziv. There had been a succession of gedolei Yisrael in that position and then the question was the position was vacant. So in the case of Volozhin the sense was that it wasn't private property and it wasn't that it was family property to decide who's going to be the Rosh Yeshiva. So there was a panel of gedolei Yisrael who were convened to decide. So Reb Chaim was invited to give a shiur. So he said the shiur k'darko and then in the middle of the shiur he reminded himself of a Rambam that he thought contradicted what he had said. No one caught him on it but he reminded himself. And at which point the Gedolim who had been convened said, so that’s what we need to be the Rosh Yeshiva, someone who can not only say a shiur like that lechatchila, but then can have exactly this quality that the Rambam here is talking about. A person has to have a devotion to emes and no ego. When a person has those two, and those two combined, so that's what generates Reb Chaim's reaction. I think the Rav said that he was saying on the sugya of מתוך שאינו ראוי ליבום אינו ראוי לחליצה. And whatever the chiddush, whatever the yesod was that he wanted to say, he reminded himself was contradicted by a Rambam in Hilchos Melachim. The Rambam in Hilchos Melachim inverts the klal. The Gemara has the klal מתוך שאינו ראוי ליבום אינו ראוי לחליצה. Let’s say you have, if a man was married to his niece, so then when he dies, so the yevamah to the yavam are now father and daughter. So if you don’t have yibbum in such a case, the only ervah that the Torah suspends for yibbum is eshes ach. The Torah doesn’t suspend any other ervah. Okay, so that’s why there’s no yibbum. So let there be chalitzah. What’s the problem with there being chalitzah between the father and a daughter? What’s the problem? So there’s a klal of מתוך שאינו ראוי ליבום אינו ראוי לחליצה. If they can’t be yibbum, if there can’t be a zikas yibbum, if there can’t be a bond between yavam and yevamah to allow for the possibility of yibbum, so then there’s no bond for chalitzah either and therefore the whole din doesn’t apply, and the almanah is free to remarry, and there is, not only is there no yibbum, there’s no chalitzah either. So there is a mechudashdike Rambam where the Rambam inverts that klal. The Rambam says that the reason the Mishna says that the din is, let’s say the Melech has a brother who dies childless. The Melech has a brother who dies childless. So the din is that there’s neither yibbum nor chalitzah between the Melech and the sister-in-law. Again, she’s free to remarry. So chalitzah because it’s a gnai, it can’t be that ve-yarkah be-fanav. You can’t have that vis-a-vis the Melech Yisrael. But why can't there be yibbum? So Rashi says no, yibbum also has its own reason because גנאי הוא שיקים שם אחר. No, the Melech is not supposed to be subservient to anyone else. And in a certain sense, mitzvas yibbum, so the surviving brother in a certain sense is machnia himself to the brother who died to do hakamas shem. And Rashi says that’s a gnai for the Melech that he should be sort of in that secondary position. A Melech is only supposed to be in a primary position. So Rashi has two independent reasons: one for why the Melech can’t be involved in chalitzah, one for why the Melech can’t be involved in yibbum. And the Rambam says no, מתוך שאינו חולץ אינו מיבם. And the Rambam says no, the klal can be inverted also, the same way the klal in Chazal of מתוך שאינו ראוי ליבום אינו ראוי לחליצה, but it works in the opposite direction as well. If you have a reason why there can’t be chalitzah, so then mimaila you never have one without the other. I mean, there’s one case the Gemara says there’s a gezeiras hakasuv, there’s one exception. But other than that, you never have a case where you have one without the other. So whatever Reb Chaim's yesod was going to be in מתוך שאינו ראוי ליבום אינו ראוי לחליצה, so he reminded himself of this Rambam in Hilchos Melachim and decided that that contradicted it, so he just closed the Gemara and sat down, and said, everything I said was wrong, forget it, and sat down. That’s this Rambam. Then the Rambam talks a little bit here about, a little bit talks at length about Rabbeinu Hakadosh dividing Mishna into Shisha Sidrei Mishna. He talks about the sequence within each of the sedarim. Maybe just to highlight, not really commenting, just highlight what the Rambam has to say about Pirkei Avos. So if you fast forward again into the parts where he’s talking about, he goes through all of Seder Zeraim, Moed. towards the end of Seder Nezikin he says וכשהשלים כל מה שעדיין זקוק לו התחיל באבות. If you look for the word Avos, that's in the original, so it's in all the translations. וכשהשלים כל מה שעדיין זקוק לו התחיל באבות ועשה זאת משני טעמים.
So famously the Bartenura asks the kasha why is the shalsheles hamsora משה קיבל תורה מסיני ומסרה ליהושע so we would have thought it should be the first mishna in Shas instead of being the first mishna in Pirkei Avos, should be the first mishna in Shas? That would seem to be an appropriate introduction to Mishna. So the Bartenura famously answers that we might have thought that what all the meimras in Pirkei Avos from the Tannaim was sort of their own philosophy. So the same way, lehavdil lehavdil, the Greek philosophers have their wisdom, so lehavdil our chachamim had their wisdom as well. And that's what Rabbeinu Hakadosh wanted us to know, that no, that this isn't just another book of philosophy, no, this is rooted in Torah. What the Tannaim said is not just rooted in chochma enoshis, but what the Tannaim said is rooted in Torah. If you look at the Gra's peirush in Pirkei Avos, so the Gra's peirush in Pirkei Avos is he quotes pesukim. Every mishna he quotes a pasuk. That's the Gra's peirush on Pirkei Avos exactly this same point of the Bartenura that Pirkei Avos is not chochma enoshis but it's chochmas haTorah. And to deliver that message, to clarify that point, that's why Rabbeinu Hakadosh put the shalsheles hamsora at the beginning of Pirkei Avos. That's the famous explanation the Bartenura gives. The Rambam actually has already asked the kasha earlier and gave a different answer here. ואחד כדי להודיעך אמיתות המסורה המסורת והקבלה שהן אמת קט מקט ולכן צריך לכבד את האיש החכם ולהחשיבו ברום המעלה מחמת שהקבלה בידו לפי שהוא בדורו כאותם שהיו בדורותיהם וכך אמרו אם באנו לחקור אחר בית דינו של רבן גמליאל ואמרו שמשון בדורו כשמואל בדורו ויש בזה מוסר לבני אדם שלא יאמר וכי דין פלוני נקבל או תקנת פלוני נסבור ואין הדבר כן לפי שהדין אינו לפלוני הדיין אלא הוא להשם אשר ציוונו בו כמו שאמר כי המשפט לאלוקים הוא שאינו אלא משפט אחד שעובר מאיש לאיש במעלה הדורות.
So the Rambam says the positioning of the shalsheles hamsora at the beginning of Pirkei Avos or at the end of Seder Nezikin is to tell us that the respect and therefore deference that's due to the Sanhedrin is not just a function of who they are as individuals but rather because of the tradition that they bear. And in that sense, when you have the Sanhedrin who have received the tradition, so the respect and deference due them is not just the respect and deference due that person. It's the respect and deference due to the entire tradition which ultimately goes back to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. כי המשפט לאלוקים הוא. Again, not only does it go back to Yehoshua, to Moshe Rabbeinu, but ultimately it goes back to Sinai, goes back to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And that's what's being emphasized by putting the shalsheles hamsora here, that that's why we need to have this, the utmost respect and deference to the Sanhedrin and what they do because of given the tradition that they bear, so the respect and deference is not only to them, but ultimately it's to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The one thing that seems to be sort of not covered by this explanation of the Rambam is what happens if the Sanhedrin is making a new takkana. When they're making a new takkana, so lechora that's takeh on their authority. So I don't know, ayn li bo exactly, how's the Rambam sort of, is he addressing that? And if not, why not? If so, how? Ayn li bo. Okay, maybe we'll stop.