I'm not sure exactly where we left off here in the Hakdomas Perush Hamishnayos, but let's pick up in the section where the Rambam is talking about the that a novi al pi nevuah can give a hora'ah to temporarily override a mitzvah such as Eliyahu b'Har HaCarmel. How does the paragraph start? So if you look with for I think these words are the Rambam has in the original so they'll be in all the translations that k'Shmuel v'Eliyahu in this translation is כאשר התאמתה נבואת הנביא על פי הכללים שאמרנו ונתפרסם עניינו כשמואל ואליהו.
Shmuel v'Eliyahu is in the original so it should be in every translation. Okay, yeah, everything? No? Yeah, okay. כאשר התאמתה נבואת הנביא על פי הכללים שאמרנו ונתפרסם עניינו כשמואל ואליהו וזולתם יש לנביא ההוא לעשות בענייני המצוות מעשים שאי אפשר לאדם זולתו לעשותם והיינו כפי שאפרש והוא שאם ציווה לבטל איזו מצווה מן המצוות מכל מצוות עשה או ציווה לעבור על איסור מן האיסורים מכל מצוות לא תעשה חוב ולקים ציוויו בכל זה והעובר על כך חייב מיתה בידי שמים חוץ מעבודה זרה וזה לשון חכמים בתלמוד והוא אמרם בכל אם יאמר לך נביא עבור על דברי תורה שמע לו חוץ מעבודה זרה אבל בתנאי שלא יקבע לעולם ציווי זה ויאמר שהשם ציווה זאת לעשות כך לעולם ועד אלא יצווה בזאת לפי הצורך ולפי שעה בלבד והנביא עצמו נשאל על כך בעת שיצווה לעבור על מצווה מן המצוות שציוונו השם בה על ידי משה ומשיב שעבירה זו אינה לתמיד אלא עושים כך עתה בלבד כעין מה שעושים בית דין בהוראת שעה כמו מה שעשה אליהו בהר הכרמל שהקריב.
So the Rambam begins by saying that this koach is unique to the navi, right? יש לנביא לעשות בענייני המצוות מעשים שאי אפשר לאדם זולתו לעשותם.
And then besof devarav of the excerpt we just looked at, so the Rambam compares it to the בית דין והוראת שעה. But ella mai, there's obviously no stirah, meaning that's a prerogative of Beis din, but as a yachid, no yachid has the authority to authorize a temporary suspension of a mitzvah, be it aseh or lo sa'aseh. It's true that Beis din has such a, does have such a koach, but no yachid, and that's what the Rambam is saying, but the only yachid who can do so is a navi al pi nevuah. Then skipping to where the Rambam says אני אביא לך כאן משל. It's around, skipping around 10, 15 lines. אני אביא לך כאן משל. Again, that's in translation, so I don't know if it's going to be verbatim that way. אני אביא לך כאן משל על פיו נוהג היסוד הזה בכל המצוות. אילו נביא שכבר נתאמתה נבואתו אצלנו כפי שאמרנו.
So his credentials have already been established as a navi time and time again, he's made predictions and to the last detail everything that he predicts comes to pass. יאמר לנו ביום השבת שנקום כולנו נשים ואנשים ונבער אש ונתקין בכלי מלחמה ונחגור אותם ונלחם עם אנשי מקום פלוני היום שהוא שבת ונבזוז את ממונם ונכבוש את נשיהם והיינו חייבים אנחנו המצווים בתורת משה לקום מיד בלי להשתהות במה שציוונו ונעשה כל מה שציווה בזריזות וחשק בלי חשש ובלי רתייה ונאמין בכל מה שאנו עושים באותו היום שהוא שבת הבערת אש ועשיית מלאכות והמלחמה וההרג שהם מצווה שנקבל בעבורה גמול מהשם כיוון שקיימנו את דבר הנביא שזו מצוות עשה לקיים דברו כמו שציוונו השם על ידי משה אליו תשמעון.
Right, so one can't help but be struck by the Rambam's arichos halashonos. The Rambam's not content just to tell us that we're mechuyav to carry out the divrei hanavi, but בזריזות וחשק בלי חשש ובלי רתייה. And the few words before that, לקום מיד מבלי להשתהות. There's a very big, in context it's about the navi giving a hora'as sha'ah, but it's a yesod which is applicable outside of context of nevuah as well. The Rambam goes on further to reinforce the point. אדם הבוחר את עצמו לפי דמיונו צדיק ודגול והוא זקן בא בימים ויאמר הריני זקן מופלג וימי חיי הם כך וכך ולא עברתי מעודי על מצווה מן המצוות כלל איך אקום היום שהוא יום שבת ואעבור על איסור סקילה ואלך להילחם.
So the Rambam says that this person is חייב מיתה בידי שמים for being over al divrei hanavi כי מי שציווה לשבות הוא שציווה לקיים ציווי כל נביא.
So sometimes we have a tendency to allow, understandably but very erroneously, to allow mitzvos to sort of take on a life, mitzvos, midos to take on a life of their own. And what becomes instinctive is not to be meshubad to devar Hashem and ratzon Hashem, but what becomes instinctive, the instinct that we develop is to keep Shabbos. The instinct we develop is to go to shul and daven. The instinct we develop is not to talk loshon hora. So 99.999% of the time, you know, those instincts will serve us very well. But l'mayseh that's not what the instinct is supposed to be. The instinct is supposed to be to do whatever devar Hashem commands at this moment, whatever ratzon Hashem is at this moment. If it's one of those situations where one is supposed to share negative information, it can't be that there's an instinct of loshon hora that impedes us from doing so. If it's a case again, we don't have nevi'im coming to tell us to go to war on Shabbos, but we can have a case of pikuach nefesh. It can't be that there's an instinct for Shabbos which is going to impede or interfere with overriding Shabbos when that's what the halacha says. I think in the Hakdama to Perush Hamishnayos, so he recounts a maiseh shehoyoh of someone who became a choleh mesukan or there was a sofek sakana, whatever the case was on Shabbos, and the person didn't want that there should be chilul Shabbos for him. And Rav Chaim gave exactly this mussar, maybe he had in mind the Hakdama to Perush Hamishnayos, I don't know, Rav Chaim gave him exactly this mussar, like what are you upset about? The one who said to keep Shabbos said וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם. It happens in the realm of midos also. There are at times highly, highly exceptional circumstances when a person is required al pi din to be taking a position that a lot of people are not going to like and people are going to get upset about and again 99.999% of the time, you know, an instinct for sholom serves one well. But the exceptional cases and circumstances do exist when a person has to at times do something, enforce a policy, say something which people for whatever due to whatever blind spots that they have, you know, are going to rail against. But it can't be that the instinct is for sholom, the instinct for Shabbos, the instinct for tefilla betzibur, the instinct has to be for devar Hashem, ratzon Hashem at that moment. 99.99% of the time there's not going to be any practical difference between those two, but l'mayseh 100% of the time it's the right thing. the instinct would be the fact that it only chapps a nafka mina in point one percent that doesn't mean that that's not the right mindset and the right frame of mind all the time. And it's clear from the Rambam when the Rambam says נעשה כל מה שציווה בזריזות, is that what the other translations have also? See where that line is and he says that chayavim when the Rambam's giving his illustration, היינו חייבים אנחנו המצווים בתורת משה לקום מיד מבלי להשתהות במה שציוונו ונעשה כל מה שציווה בזריזות.
You have the same translation. So lechora in the Rambam it's clear that the Rambam's not just reminding us of zrizim makdimim lemitzvot. That וישכם אברהם בבוקר זריזים מקדימים למצוות. And so since tehillat hashabbos is a mitzvah, you have to do it bezrizut. Well, and it's klar that that's not the pshat. But the zrizus points to what we're talking about, that the person is not sort of not a some kind of internal struggle, that there's no the person is not conflicted over what he's doing. No, he's doing it, he's doing it wholeheartedly, he's doing it wholeheartedly. Again, we don't have, obviously we don't have such an application bizman hazeh, although maybe I guess chayalei Tzahal and the police in Eretz Yisrael do. Shmuel takes the sword and he kills Agag. So Shmuel was mkayem the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav. Shmuel Hanavi is מה רחום אף אתה תהא רחום מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה תהא חנון,
and yet he does to Agag what he was supposed to do to Agag and he does it immediately as soon as Agag is brought to him. Sometimes you have a case where there's, unfortunately these things happen, where there's a, not in terms of, not with a gun, but there's a rodef and a nirdof in terms of, I don't know, someone being attacked, someone being maligned and then there are some who support the rodef, some support the nirdof, and then you have people who say I believe in shalom, so I'm neutral. So that's a distortion. That's not being an אוהב שלום ורודף שלום. That's a distortion. That's the right, practically that would be the right instinct 99.9 percent of the time, but 100 percent of the time the instinct is supposed to be for whatever dvar Hashem, whatever ratzon Hashem is at that moment in that situation. And that's what the Rambam is emphasizing, and that should be instinctive, because if it's not instinctive, that's what the Rambam is demanding here, right? It's not just that we comply. It has to be instinctive. Otherwise it won't be miyad. It's not going to be miyad and it's not going to be becheshek and it's not going to be bli reti'a, without recoiling at all, unless it's something which is instinctive. It's an avodah, an avodah to work on. The Rambam here in the hemshech has a funny, it's not clear why he needs to make this point. The Rambam says achen right after where he quotes the pasuk of והיה האיש אשר לא ישמע אל דברי אשר ידבר בשמי אנוכי אדרוש מעמו.
Right after that quote ending anochi edrosh me'imo, so the Rambam again, continuing this illustration where a navi gives a hora'at sha'ah which involves doing melacha in Shabbos, אכן מי שקשר קשר של קיימא ביום השבת הזה בעת עשותו אותן המלאכות באופן שאינו זלזול כלל במאומה להזהר בקיום הציווי שציווה בו הנביא חייב סקילה.
The question is what Why the Rambam feels it's necessary to make that point? So the navi comes and says you have to go attack Yericho on Shabbos. And and you have to what's more you even have to make the klei milchama on Shabbos and then go attack on Shabbos and and go kill on Shabbos. But but he doesn't say that but that charge of the navi's got nothing to do with the kesher shekayama the person makes. So obviously that's going to be chayav. But what's the Rambam what what's he coming to to clarify here? I don't know I don't have I don't have anything entirely satisfactory. The Rambam continues after after he finishes with this illustration about the chilul Shabbos ובזה בלבד נבדל הנביא משאר בני האדם בתורה. This this is the only instance the only case where where a navi b'Toras navi is different than anyone else when it comes to divrei Torah. אבל בעיון ובלימודים ובהבנה בתורה הרי הוא כשאר החכמים שהם שווים לו ואינם נביאים שאם יאמר סברא ויאמר גם מי שאינו נביא סברא ויאמר הנביא השם אמר לי שביאורי הוא הנכון אין שומעים לו אלא אלף נביאים שכולם כאליהו ואלישע שאמרו סברא
v'elef chachamim v'chacham one thousand and one on the other side bi'aru heipech mizeh acharei rabim l'hatos. והלכה למעשה כדעת אלף חכמים וחכם לא כדעת אלף הנביאים הנכבדים
v'kach omrim chachamim. So the Rambam he has it the same in Rambam doesn't allow for let's continue a little bit more. וכך אומרים חכמים האלוקים אילו אמר לי יהושע בן נון בפומיה לא הוה צייתנא ליה
if I heard it directly from Yehoshua bin Nun I wouldn't I wouldn't obey him v'lo sham'ina minei. כמו כן אמרו אם יבוא אליהו ויאמר חולצין ממנעל שומעין לו בסנדל אין שומעין לו כוונתם בזה שאין להוסיף ולא לגרוע בתורה מצד הנבואה בשום פנים או אם טען נביא שהשם אמר לו שהדין במצוה פלונית הוא כך ושסברת פלוני היא הנכונה הרי הנביא הוא נביא שקר לפי היסוד שאמרנו.
So the Rambam doesn't allow for there to be any any involvement min hashamayim. Not only not only an an allegation that that Hakadosh Baruch Hu said to add or subtract a mitzvah but even a hachra'ah even a hachra'ah in a machlokes that even that is lo bashamayim hi. There's no involvement min hashamayim in in the halachic process. No involvement. There is a very very yafah passage actually two passages in the Smag once in the Hakdama and then in the guf of the sefer where the Smag says that he had finished writing his Sefer HaMitzvos and he had a dream. And in the dream he was told that ha'ikar shachachta. He he had his list of Taryag Mitzvos and then he was told in the dream ha'ikar shachachta that he didn't include the issur ga'avah. The Smag recounts this twice once in the Hakdama and and then again in the mitzvah that he counts counts it. And then he said he got up in the morning and and as a result he ends up and he has in his Minyan Taryag based on the Gemara in Sotah daf hey ורם לבבך ושכחת את השם אלקיך about that it's an issur for magbi'ah libo an issur ga'avah. So l'pum rihata the Smag seems to be disagreeing disagreeing that you can have some kind of clarification. But the emes is, but when you look, and that’s why I’m sorry I don’t have the lashon here, but you’ll look up the Smag, rabosai, so it’s actually very, very maduyak. He says he woke up in the morning and I don’t remember whether he quotes this phrase from Navi, binosi basefarim and ra’isi shekakhu. It seems to be maduyak in the Smag that he didn’t just defer to his dream, but based on the dream, he was me’ayen and he re-thought, and then when he reminded himself of the Gemara in Sotah daf Hey, so then based on that he amended his minyan hamitzvos. But it’s maduyak that the Smag didn’t simply defer to the chalom that he had. The Rambam quotes kach omru chachamim, ha-Elokim, right, Elokim is a lashon shvuah, אילו אמר לי יהושע בן נון בפומי לא הוה צייתנא ליה ולא שמענא מיניה.
Even if Yehoshua bin Nun would have told me. So it’s clear that the pshat in the Gemara is that you can't go back one generation and say אילו אמר משה רבינו. Yehoshua bin Nun, once you have the din of lo bashamayim hi, which means that what he says doesn’t carry extra weight besoras navi, so then besoras chacham he’s echad min haminiyan. And therefore, if one is in a position al pi chochmah to debate and disagree with Yehoshua bin Nun, one could. And that’s what the Gemara is saying, no, if Yehoshua bin Nun would have told me, so I would have, again, besoras navi he has no standing, and besoras chacham I don’t hear the sevara, so I would push back even against Yehoshua bin Nun. Moshe Rabbeinu, even if Moshe Rabbeinu doesn’t say it besoras nevuah, משה אמת ותורתו אמת. You can't disagree with Moshe Rabbeinu even on the level of chochmah, which is why lichora the Gemara illustrates it bedafka, again, the diyuk is not in the Rambam, it’s in the lashon Chazal, which is why the Gemara illustrates this yesod dafka with Yehoshua not with Moshe Rabbeinu. The Rav used to tell the story that in some of the pilpul sefarim, it was once a certain style to look into Tanach and say that machlokos Rishonim were already machlokos between different figures in Chumash, different figures in Nach. So someone once came to Rav Chaim with a sefer and he had such a mahalach where he said that a certain machlokes was a machlokes between Moshe Rabbeinu and Aharon or something. And Rav Chaim told him it’s kfira, you’re not allowed to say such a thing. And he told him if you take this out, I’ll give you a haskamah on the rest of the sefer, but this is kfira. So the way printing worked in those days, it wasn’t so simple to rearrange the printing. So the mechaber writes in the hakdamah, he says, you know, when I went to Rav Chaim to ask him for a haskamah, so he told me that when I wrote in such and such a siman, this is kfira, so you should know that. So what’s the pshat in that? So lichora this is somewhat abstract, a little bit, have to... משה קיבל תורה מסיני ומסרה ליהושע ויהושע לזקנים וכולי. So there were two very blatant questions. Number one, the shift from kibel to masar, right, משה קיבל תורה ומסרה ליהושע ויהושע לזקנים. So the hand-off as it were from Hakadosh Baruch Hu to Moshe Rabbeinu. Also, why the lashon miSinai, why not from Hakadosh Baruch Hu? Mehashem Elokei Yisrael. But why why why the lashon miSinai? So we're all familiar with also the Gemorah in Sotah that we see Hakadosh Baruch Hu's anavah in the fact that he passes up on all the majestic mountain chains and gave Torah on lowly Har Sinai. So lichora, a little bit of the omek hadvarim is like this. Hakadosh Baruch Hu created Torah. Torah is chochmas Hashem. Chochmas Hashem is not a davar hanivra. But Torah, the fact that Torah is some chochmas Hashem in a form that's accessible to us, Torah is a davar hanivra. Right? So Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the Torah so that we, like Bnei Adam, should be able to understand and comprehend and internalize something from chochmas Hashem. Without having created Torah, so we wouldn't be able to do that. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is infinite and thereby hu vedaato echad, his chochma is infinite, so we can't grasp what's infinite. Right? The same way in your hand there's only so much you can put your hand around. If you would have some physical object that were physically infinite, you wouldn't be able to get your hand around that. So we can't get our minds around something that's infinite either. So Torah is a davar hanivra. Torah is Hakadosh Baruch Hu created Torah so that chochmas Hashem is available to sechel ha'enoshi. That's what it means when it says that Mattan Torah illustrates ענוותנותו של הקדוש ברוך הוא, משל למה הדבר דומה. Imagine, imagine after Einstein gets the Nobel Prize for his theory of relativity, special relativity. Imagine a preschool teacher sends him a letter, Professor Einstein, I heard you have this really intriguing theory, I would love to share it with my pupils. They're really very sweet three and four year olds. Could you please send me a condensed, age-appropriate version of your new theory for me to teach to my class? So what you gonna do? You're gonna say a chutzpah, mocking the scientific discovery, something so abstract and something so great to make fun of it by trying to lower it to a level that the three year olds can understand. So you throw it in the garbage. But the nimshal is Hakadosh Baruch Hu does again elef alfei havdalos. That's what Hakadosh Baruch Hu did in taking chochmas Hashem and making it accessible to us. That's what it means that the humility of Hakadosh Baruch Hu was evident b'shas Mattan Torah. The very fact that there's a Torah that we're receiving. Now, let's go another step. So Torah is again, it's chochmas Hashem in a form that we can understand. We don't need this next step, but it's easier. The Nefesh Hachaim... explains that what Torah means, right, that there are all in addition to our physical visible world creation unfolded gradually incrementally. It didn't make the jump from the purely spiritual to this Olom Ha'asse, this very physical world, but but it happened very slowly incrementally so there are all these invisible again in a spiritual sense not a literal special sense but from top down gradually increasingly less spiritual more physical worlds. So Nefesh Hachayim says what Torah means as Torah comes down, what it means in each world is a function of it it translates into the reality and the level and the categories of that world. And and what was the havamane when the malachim wanted to keep Torah, right? So Moshe Rabbeinu says right do you have parents do you do you get into fights that you have to have an issur of of hitting. So what what was the what the malachim have have they're all they're all crooked? So what was the what was the havamane of the malachim? No the teretz is no but Torah meant something in their world also. It it meant different things in their world. Whatever whatever av v'eimo means but it means something different in in on the level of malachim than it does in this world. So it says no Torah has its has its pshat in our world. And Moshe Rabbeinu says no the Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants it to mean this as well and therefore it has to come down to has to come down to Earth. So what the Torah means it's sort of if you imagine let's say a mashal a little bit of a mashal to this that let's say you have what what do they call those photo lenses what are they called that that change when you go into the sunlight it sort of becomes like sunglasses transition transition lenses? Okay thought it was something else alana's eyes. So you have these you have these transition lenses. So the way they translate the way they appear differs depending depending upon the situation depending upon where you are. So so which is it are they are they clear are they dark? So the answer is well it depends. It depends. So so Torah also what it means in in the higher olamos is something different than what it means in in olam hazeh. Okay so Torah is A a davar nivra and B and B what it means it's sort of okay so maybe that maybe that that mashal with the with the with the lens. If the Mishna would have said that that Hakadosh Baruch Hu mossar Torah to Moshe Rabbeinu so then the image that would have evoked for us is so we would have imagined right Hakadosh Baruch Hu sort of in the olamos elyonim right kaveyakhol he's holding onto Torah and that Torah he gives to Moshe Rabbeinu. But that's not right correct because again the Torah as as Reb Chaim Volozhin explains it it crystallizes in terms of what it means when it comes into olam hazeh. Right it doesn't mean that outside of olam hazeh let's say another mashal perhaps is as follows. I I think the explanation that they give when you have the freezing rain so if it's cold enough for freezing rain so what why don't you have snow? So I think the explanation they give is that in the higher atmosphere so therefore it was warmer so therefore it's in liquid form and then when it enters our atmosphere it's colder so it it freezes immediately. So again it changes as it enters The different atmosphere. It's going from one atmosphere to a different atmosphere and it changes. So that's also a little bit of for those who don't like transition lenses you go in this moshel. A different moshel again for again Torah as it entered Olam Hazeh it took on the form in which we know Torah, the form in which it's normative for us, in which it commands us in Mitzvos Aseh and Mitzvos Lo Sa'aseh vechulu in which it addresses physical reality in which it tells us to do physical engage in physical actions. The moment Torah entered Olam Hazeh as it was nitpas על ידי משה רבינו. That was the landing pad. That's when Torah enters Olam Hazeh since Moshe Rabbeinu is HaKadosh Baruch Hu's conduit for giving Torah. So the way Torah entered Olam Hazeh where it took on the form in which it's again normative for us, in which we learn and study it, it took on that form in as it was nitpas בשכלו של משה רבינו. So how can you disagree with Moshe Rabbeinu? Moshe Rabbeinu's understanding is the definition of Torah. That's not true of any other human being. That's not true of Yehoshua bin Nun. Even Yehoshua bin Nun it's not true of his understanding isn't the definition of Torah which is why once we negate the relevance of nevuah so then Yehoshua bin Nun is a chacham like like others. Could this be why when Rambam writes Ani Ma'amin that in the 12th he says that שכל דברי נביאים אמת and after he has to also say that Moshe Rabbeinu's nevuah was also emes? So lechora he needs to say it again by Moshe like it's something different. You're putting your finger on a very, very yesodostike point, but I'm not sure if it's this or or if it's a different one. But this I think is that even if Moshe Rabbeinu would say something not mipi hashemuah, not that he heard from HaKadosh Baruch Hu but would say this is my havannah. If Moshe Rabbeinu would say this is what HaKadosh Baruch Hu told me verbatim and this is my understanding of what it means, so I think that the Rambam is talking about number one and I think we're talking about number two now. How according to this do we explain like ma'amarei Chazal about Moshe forgetting halachos or being wrong or like the idea that there were halachos that were restored by other people that Moshe had forgotten? So let's say for a moment, so nisalma mimenu halachah of הבא על ארמית קנאין פוגעין בו and then Pinchas says halo limadtanu Rabbeinu. Or ויקצוף משה על פקודי החיל and then so temporarily he forgets hagalas keilim, the dinim and Elazar HaKohen has to teach. So משל למה הדבר דומה as follows. Let's say one day the rav, Reb Chaim, would walk in to give the shiur and been sick for the past 48 hours and with fever and chills and terrible headache and the shiur ends up being by their standards subpar. So what's pshat? So the pshat is that yes, others will be able to recognize that because they'll recognize that then... But they still remain the standard. Now, the standard for seeing that Rav Chaim's shiur is sub-par is what the shiur was two days ago, and three days ago, and four days ago, and what it's going to be tomorrow and the day after. That's the same thing here, what Pinchas is saying, but am I correct, Moshe Rabbeinu, that this is what you said? And Moshe Rabbeinu says yes. So Moshe Rabbeinu wasn't himself. Moshe Rabbeinu wasn't himself. But when Moshe Rabbeinu is himself, so then there's no such thing as this disagreeing. If Moshe Rabbeinu says, "No, I don't have a headache," and Moshe Rabbeinu says, "No, I'm not upset," and this is be-yishuv ha-da'as, there's no such thing as disagreeing. What about the story? How did somebody come up with the halachos that Hashem told Moshe if it was not transmitted to them? What do you mean? The Gemara in Temurah about the נשתכחו בימי אבלו של משה and החזירן עתניאל בן קנז? Is that what you mean? So what's the... if the definition of Torah is the way that is dependent on sechel of Moshe Rabbeinu, so then how could it be kind of derived independently? But how do we, how do the chachamim bemeshech kol hadoros, how do they do anything misvara? So the answer is that by learning everything which Moshe Rabbeinu transmitted, which we have, so a person seeks to mold his שכל כפי שכל התורה. And then mimaileh, you can say things in sevara also. What would the Rambam do with the Gemara that says chacham adif minavi? In this context, you seem to be equating the two of them, but seemingly there's a premise to say that chacham actually is the flip side, is better. So what's the Gemara in Bava Basra? Or what's the...? I think that's because everyone... yeah. You set it off. If I go over time, it would start... start beep-beeping. He's got your back. He's got your back, for sure. Yeah. You said that Moshe Rabbeinu is above other nevi'im, and we're saying that when it comes to other nevi'im, they have their level of nevuah, but when it comes to actually going with other chachamim in the shakla v'tarya in an area of halacha and learning... I mean, a navi has no... when a navi steps into the beis medrash, he has no... he's not a yachsan based on the fact that he's a navi. So why would the Gemara say that a chacham is even better than a navi then? I could understand if you're going to say they're equal, but how would the Rambam...? I think the Ramban in the Chiddushei Bava Basra talks about it. He has two de'os. According to those shitos that disagree with the Rambam, that you could have someone Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives nevuah to anyone, so then one possible pshat in that Gemara is... I think the Ramban himself doesn't go with this pshat, and it certainly isn't how the Rambam learns pshat, that the navi who's not a chacham. And then the other pshat is that there are times when the chacham acting al pi chochmaso is greater than the navi acting al pi nevuaso. But it's not... Okay, we'll stop here for this evening. Thank you.