מאי שנא ראשונים דאתרחיש להו ניסא ומאי שנא אנן דלא מתרחיש לן ניסא
Why did the earlier generations merit miracles and we don't merit miracles? Im mishum tunaye, if it's because of the tinuye of learning, בשני דרב יהודה כולהו תנויי בנזיקין הוו, in the days of Rav Yehuda everything was concentrated in Seder Nezikin, ואנן קא מסיימינן שיתא סדרי, and our Sidrei Limud encompass all of Shas, Shisha Sidrei, so we would seem to be surpassing that generation. וכי הוה מטי רב יהודה בעוקצין האשה שכובשת ירק בקדירה ואמרי לה זיתים שכבשן בטרפיהן טהורים אמר הויות דרב ושמואל קא חזינא הכא ואנן קא מסיימינן בעוקצין תליסר מתיבתא.
When Rav Yehuda would get to the Mishnah in Ukzin, he'd say such schwer inyanim and we, we are ma'ayanos hamisgabrim even in even here in Seder Taharos. And nevertheless, ואילו רב יהודה כי הוה שלף חד מסאני אתא מיטרא.
Rav Yehuda, he would take off one shoe and already he would be answered and already if they had been a drought, right away rain would be forthcoming. ואנן קא מצערינן נפשין ומצוח קא צוחינן ולית דמשגח בן.
And we we m'tzar ourselves, we cry out and no one's paying any attention. So amar leh, so Abaye answers Rav Papa, קמאי הוו קא מסרי נפשייהו אקדושת השם אנן לא מסרינן נפשין אקדושת השם.
Those generations, you can't measure everything just by learning. They had mesiras nefesh for Kiddush Hashem, we don't have any comparable mesiras nefesh for Kiddush Hashem. How was what's an illustration of their mesiras nefesh for Kiddush Hashem? כי הא דרב אדא בר אהבה חזיא לההיא כותית דהוה לבישא כרבלתא בשוקא.
Rav Adda bar Ahava saw a gentile woman, he saw a Nochris, she was wearing the marginal note from the Aruch says that she was wearing a red garment deBnos Yisrael don't wear because the the loudness of the color represents a certain pritzus and can lead to Aveira. סבר דבת ישראל היא, so he mistakenly identified her as a Bas Yisrael. Rav Adda bar Ahava mistakenly misidentified this Kusis. So what did he do? Thinking that she was a Bas Yisrael, so how did he react to what he thought was pritzus on the part of a Bas Yisrael? kam kar'ei minah, so he ripped that beged off of her. איגלאי מילתא דכותית היא, it turned out again his mistake surfaced, שיימוה בארבע מאה זוזי and he had to pay a very hefty bill. Okay. עד כאן הנוגע לענייננו. So the question is, so the Gemara cites this as an illustration of the mesiras nefesh of the earlier generations for Kiddush Hashem. So the question is, so what's so terrible with spitting at someone who you think is not dressed properly? Maybe it's not even terrible, maybe it's the maybe it's the So you'll correctly say the woman in this story wasn't eight years old. That's 100% correct. So let's assume that one is spitting at a 28-year-old. So then is it mesiras nefesh for kiddush Hashem? So again you'll correctly say in this Gemara had his identification been correct so then it would have been unambiguous that she was dressed improperly. Ma she'ein kein if the woman is dressed in a way that many rabbanim say was perfectly appropriate, that's also true. So naniach that she's not eight she's 28 and naniach that lechol hadeios she's not dressed properly. So would it be an expression of mesiras nefesh for kiddush Hashem or would it be terrible unacceptable behavior? Last week's parsha right before sheni so the Torah says וידבר השם אל משה ואל אהרן ויצום אל בני ישראל ואל פרעה מלך מצרים להוציא את בני ישראל מארץ מצרים.
Rashi says ואל פרעה מלך מצרים צום עליו לחלוק לו כבוד בדבריהם
that Hakadosh Baruch Hu commanded Moshe with regard to Moshe and Aharon both with regard to Bnei Yisrael and Pharaoh it means the attitude that they should display to them and the attitude towards Pharaoh was to be cholek kavod. Pharaoh his rishus notwithstanding but the Torah accords respect to governmental authority even if the governmental authority is concentrated in the hands of a rasha of the magnitude of Pharaoh אף על פי כן. And we takeh see Moshe Rabbeinu Rashi follows through on this in Parshas Bo and Moshe Rabbeinu is giving Pharaoh the notification about makkas bechoros and he tells him וירדו כל עבדיך אלה אלי לאמר והשתחוו לי לאמר צא אתה וכל העם אשר ברגליך.
So Rashi says that really what he should have said is וירדת אלי והשתחוית לי לאמר but you yourself Pharaoh are going to come running after me and you're going to prostrate yourself and you're going to beg you're going to demand slash beg that we should leave but Moshe Rabbeinu says vayerdu kol avadecha. He's been cholek kavod lemalchus. Okay fine. So that keshelaatzmo is an important lesson in terms of how one has to maintain a certain attitude of respect towards governmental authority. But it's very interesting that already earlier at the end of Parshas Shemos when Moshe and Aharon first come to Pharaoh so they say to Pharaoh ויאמרו אלוהי העברים נקרא עלינו נלכה נא דרך שלשת ימים במדבר ונזבחה להשם אלוהינו פן יפגענו בדבר או בחרב.
So Rashi says פן יפגענו פן יפגעך היו צריכים לומר לו. Really what Moshe and Aharon should have said if they weren't being euphemistic is not pen yifga'enu Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not going to strike us if you don't let us go he's going to strike you pen yifga'acha. אלא שחלקו כבוד למלכות. So it's very interesting that over here before Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives that tzivui to be cholek kavod lemalchus so Rashi tells us that Moshe and Aharon are already acting that way. In Parshas Shmini, Rashi quotes two of the views in the Tannaim as to what the cheit of Nadav and Avihu was. So he quotes from Rabbi Eliezer that הורו הלכה לפני משה רבנו. Then he quotes from Rabbi Ishmael that shisuyei yayin, that they were shisuyei yayin when they were makriv the ketores. Rashi continues that Rabbi Ishmael says teida l'cha that that was the cheit that the very next parsha, the very next pesukim after the Torah records the death of Nadav and Avihu is יין ושכר אל תשת אתה ובניך. So you have that azhara about shisuyei yayin. So the Kli Yakar says, how was that support for the view of Rabbi Ishmael? It's a tshuvta to Rabbi Ishmael. You see that the tzivuy hasn't been communicated yet. The tzivuy is first given after the death of Nadav and Avihu. So then how can you say that that's the cheit for which they were punished? So says the Kli Yakar, Nadav and Avihu should have understood. Ein hachi nami. The tzivuy had not yet been communicated to Bnei Yisrael, but the expectation was let's frame it in terms of what we just saw, that just as Moshe and Aharon understood and intuited that they were supposed to be cholek kavod l'malchus, so Nadav and Avihu were expected to have understood that one doesn't perform avoda while shisuyei yayin. The Gemara in Berachos daf yud zayin says לעולם יהא אדם ערום ביראה. So what does that mean? That a person should be cunning in his yiras shamayim. So what does it mean to be cunning in his yiras shamayim? We think of temimus in one's yiras shamayim. What does it mean to be arum b'yira? So the Sefer Chassidim says that the Chok L'Yisrael quotes this Sefer Chassidim as well, that a person has to understand what Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants of him even if there's no explicit chapter and verse instructing him how to behave. And the Sefer Chassidim gives two examples of it. He gives an example in Parshas Matos, so ויקצף משה על פקודי החיל. When the generals come back from the milchama against Midian, so Moshe Rabbeinu accosts them and Moshe Rabbeinu says to them hachayishem kol nekeiva. Did you spare the womenfolk? And hein heina hayu, how could you think to do such a terrible thing? They were the source of sin. So the Sefer Chassidim says there's one little problem here. When Moshe Rabbeinu sent them out to war, no one ever told them that they were supposed to kill the women. The tzivuy in terms of milchemet Midian never included any mention of the fact that they were supposed to kill the women. So what does Moshe Rabbeinu want from them? So the Sefer Chassidim says no, לעולם יהא אדם ערום ביראה. It's not only Moshe Rabbeinu and Nadav and Avihu who were supposed to intuit and be attuned to ratzon Hashem to parts of Torah before they were given, but even once Torah has been given, a person has to understand what Torah is about, a person is supposed to be attuned to the rhythm of Torah to know how to apply Torah in all situations. The other example the Sefer Chassidim gives is from Parshas Balak on ויחר אף אלוהים כי הולך הוא that kavyachol Hakadosh Baruch Hu is angry at Bilaam for going. What do you mean he's angry at Bilaam for going? Bilaam asked, "Can I go?" and Hakadosh Baruch Hu said, "Go." So what do you have tainos? So the Sefer Chassidim says yeah, Hakadosh Baruch Hu says "Go", but משל למה הדבר דומה a child keeps... keeps pestering his parents can I go can I go can I go? So finally the parents relent say you want to go so go. So if the child has a modicum of orma bi-yirah, he understands that the parents don't want him to go. And if he goes, nevertheless, so then he doesn't have this this quality of לעולם יהא אדם ערום ביראה. But the emes is that this I think I think the context of the in which the Sefer Chassidim also quotes this Gemara in Berachos I believe, I'm not sure, I don't remember, but I think he juxtaposes it to another Ma'amar Chazal of גדולה שימושה של תורה יותר מלימודה that a talmid who not only learns from his rebbi, but is meshamaish his rebbi, he serves as an attendant, he's he's around the rebbi all the time, so he's going to surpass the talmid who only learns from the rebbi. What's he going to get? He he hears shiurim in ארבעה חלקי שולחן ערוך, in shishah sidrei Mishnah from the rebbi, so what more is he going to get from the shimushah shel Torah? So the answer is from the shimushah shel Torah he's going to see this orma bi-yirah. He's going to see the the application, the extrapolation, the understanding of what Torah is. But the emes is it's not only before mitzvos, particular mitzvos were given, be it mechaleik kavod le-malchus, be it the azharah of shesuyei yayin that a person has to be orum bi-yirah. And it's not only to apply and to extrapolate what Torah wants of us in every single situation, which obviously there's not going to be explicit chapter and verse, there's virtually infinite number of scenarios and the number of pesukim in Chumash has to be finite because we're finite. But it's not only for these reasons that there has to be orma bi-yirah, but even when you have things that are mefurash, in order to be able to properly apply and implement and fulfill what's mefurash, a person has to be orum bi-yirah. And if a person isn't orum bi-yirah, what perhaps in some circumstances could be a mesirus nefesh for kiddush Hashem can be a chillul Hashem. So what's the orma bi-yirah over here? What's the orma bi-yirah in terms of that Gemara in Berachos? Even when the Torah tells us that mitzvos are intended as a means to a certain end, Shabbos is supposed to remind us about ma'aseh bereishis. The melech is not supposed to marbeh susim so that לא ישיב את העם מצרימה. He's not supposed to marbeh nashim that lo yasir levavo. So even when the Torah tells us explicitly that mitzvos are intended as a means to a certain end, nevertheless, those means are absolute, and we have no right to rationalize them away. I can't say that, you know, I live too far from shul and there's no way I can get to shul, but if I'll drive to shul, so then the rabbi's going to give a knockout drashah and I'll have much more of I'll think about ma'aseh bereishis much more. No, it's true that the Torah often tells us that mitzvos are intended as means to a certain end, but those means are absolute means. It's not it's not given to us to again to to decide that that there were better means to achieve that end and that therefore these are dispensable. So that's true for let's say ninety-nine percent of Torah and ninety-nine percent of what we see again are means, but they're absolute means. Not means that are given to us to to weigh and assess whether or not they're appropriate in in my personal situation or in this specific context. But there are some there are some things in Halacha and the Gemara in Berachos of Adda bar Ahava is a prime example of it. There's no din which is an absolute means comparable to shmiras Shabbos, comparable to lo yilbash ish, that says what the reaction to what one perceives as pritzus is supposed to be. A person is supposed to act for kiddush Hashem. A person is supposed to act for kiddush Hashem. If a person lives in a time and a place where society, where the world understands what tzniyus is, and to to be dressed in a pritzus-dikke way is a brazen and even perverse type of rebelliousness, so then it can be a wonderful expression of mesiras nefesh for kiddush Hashem to get one's fingernails dirty and to be moche the way Adda bar Ahava did. If you live in a crazy, mixed-up, confused world that's been crazy and mixed-up and and confused for a long time now, where people, so many people just don't begin to understand, don't begin to have the the slightest hassaga of what's right, of what's appropriate, it's not mesiras nefesh for kiddush Hashem to respond that way. The lack of being oran beyira takes what in a different at a different time and place could be could be an act of kiddush Hashem and it makes it an act of chillul Hashem. Right, a a parallel which which obviously comes to everyone's mind and ke-medumeh it's a correct parallel. The the famous Chazon Ish at the beginning of Yoreh De'ah about the din of moridin ve-ein maalin. The there too, that's that's an expression of being oran beyira. That understanding, that insight of the Chazon Ish into the din of moridin ve-ein maalin, the same thing. Understanding that this is one of those rare exceptions that that the means are not absolute. It's a way of of upholding emunah. In our tekufah, the question that a person should be asking himself when he sees some breach, whether the breach is begidrei tzniyus or a different breach in chomas hadas, is not whether crude actions or crude language is gonna do anything to repair that breach. But if there's fault to be assigned, so maybe the question that we have to ask ourselves is, so whose fault is it? It's the fault of people who don't know any better, or maybe it's the fault of those who know better for not being better teachers and not being better role models and not figuring out how to project and how to inspire people to live according to the correct Torah standards. I don't mean to insinuate what the answer to that question is, but it's a far more productive question for us to reflect upon in terms of makom hinachnu in our representation and projection of the beauty and kedusha of a Torah lifestyle, to what degree that something lacking there and to what degree that's responsible for the, even when, not when what we're seeing is an imaginary breach, even if we'll be seeing a real breach, to know what should be done about it.