Because last time we spoke both about the mishpat and the chukim and I remember exactly where we left off so either machazir because it's good to do chazara or we assume that we've done chazara and we're going vaite and I'm not sure which of the two we're doing but whatever we're doing is oisgehalten. Zos Chukas HaTorah Para Aduma illustrates the class of mitzvos of chukim something which is is legislated something which which a person relates to as being binding because of the fact that it's been engraved because of the fact that it's been been legislated not because of its intuitive appeal as opposed to mishpat the Rashi explains the same shoreish as as judgment which is something which inherently intuitively appeals to a person. תנו רבנן משפטי תעשו דברים שלמלא נכתבו דין הוא שיכתבו ואלו הן עבודת כוכבים גילוי עריות שפיכות דמים וגזל וברכת השם את חוקותי תשמורו דברים שהשטן ואומות העולם משיבים עליהן ואלו הן אכילת חזיר ולבישת שעטנז וחליצת יבמה וטהרת מצורע ושעיר המשתלח.
The Rambam gives us a slightly different list of chukim that there is overlap but but there's also some some examples that the Gemara gives here that the Rambam doesn't give and and vice versa. החוקים הן המצוות שאין טעמן ידוע כגון איסור בשר חזיר ובשר בחלב ועגלה ערופה פרה אדומה ושעיר המשתלח.
Now neither Chazal nor the Rambam go through the entire minyan taryag and break down for us mitzvah by mitzvah that this is a mishpat that this is a chok. So one can't necessarily draw inferences from the fact that that a particular mitzvah is not mentioned so that's indicative that it's a mishpat that's indicative that it's a chok no it's not indicative of anything but presumably it is indicative of that at the very least it's not most representative of that category it's not prototypical it's not a prototypical mishpat it's not a prototypical chok and and presumably Chazal that the Rambam are listing those which are most obviously and and glaringly and conspicuously mishpatim and chukim relatively. And and in this context the the mitzvah of החרם לא תחיה כל נשמה by the zayin amamim the mitzvah of of mechiyas Amalek doesn't appear doesn't appear. Again how how would Chazal classify it I don't know but we do know lichora that that at the very least it wasn't a representative example of of a chok. Now when we think about chukim when we think about things that יצרו של אדם נוקף בהן so those are the first things that come to mind. So what that highlights is is something very very important to be cognizant of and something which is appropriately humbling and that is the how relative speaking now in terms of not not speaking about people in general b'meshech kol hadoros but speaking about us, our our dor in ה' תשע"ה again how much this should be extrapolated is a different a different shmuess which which we're not going into now. But it just shows how relative and how different our instinct and intuition is from that of Chazal. Again if we were compiling the list to hang up in the post office most wanted most wanted for for a reason for a ta'am for an ilah so I think the certainly very high in the list probably the top two on the list would be מחיית עמלק מעולל ועד יונק. לא תחיה כל נשמה would certainly also make the not only the top ten but but certainly the top five. Chazal don't have it, Rambam doesn't have it. When when you look in the in the Rambam when when he talks about ta'amei mitzvos and he gives ta'amim you don't have the impression that the Rambam thinks he's solving the world's biggest riddle when he when he suggests what he thinks the ta'am hamitzvah is for machiyas Amalek. Same thing when you look in the Sefer Hachinuch you also don't have the impression that that he's dispelling the the the the darkest cloud of of of ignorance and and lack of understanding. So what does it show? It shows that that that temptation that we have to assign and to ascribe universal validity to our own moral intuitions, it's not the case. It's not the case and veha'ra'ayah clearly clearly they they don't match up. Not only don't they not only don't our moral intuitions match up with with the Torah, but they don't match up with Chazal, they don't match up with the Rishonim. And the reaction that that should engender is not not not rachmana litzlan of of of hubris and but one of humility. And the emes is what what this does suggest lichora is that if a person wants to sort of take stock and a person wants to to measure measure himself you're closer to the age that when you went to the doctor, the doctor used to measure you to see how much you've grown. I'm at the age where the doctor measures me to see how much I'm shrinking, alright? But a person wants a person's always at a whatever stage you're at we're being we're being measured. A person wants to wants to engage in a spiritual measurement, so lichora a very one good barometer at least to a degree is to what extent he relates to what Chazal classify as mishpatim to what extent he relates to things that at least for Chazal are not prototypical chukim. Again maybe they're sort of lower grade chukim or maybe they weren't chukim at all. Maybe maybe maybe they're mishpatim for Chazal because ultimately when when we learn, so the goal is to think As the Torah would have us think and to react and to intuit as the Torah would have us react and as the Torah would have us intuit. So how do I, how do we know whether we're doing that? So one, one check and balance here is in the realm of mishpatim and chukim. To the degree that that that what what we're told are mishpatim are intuitive, so then we're, we're on the right page. And to the degree that that that we're troubled or at the very least stymied by what wasn't troubling to Chazal, what wasn't troubling to the Rishonim, so that sends a sobering, humbling message of the need to try to immerse ourselves more and more in Torah, in divrei Torah, in hashkafas ha-Torah that we should think and react and intuit as the Torah would have us. The Rambam begins again this halacha at the end of Hilchos Me'ilah that that that we're looking at when he talks about the the that it's part of talmud Torah to think about about ta'amei mitzvos. So the Rambam writes ראוי לו לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולידע סוף עניינם כפי כוחו.
So the Rambam says l'hisbonen b'mishpetei ha-Torah. So le-chora and again it's just the pshutam shel devarim and it doesn't really need to be correlated but let's take the same, the same verb with the same preposition: היכן הדרך לאהבתו ויראתו? בשעה שיתבונן האדם במעשיו וברואיו הנפלאים הגדולים ויראה מהם חוכמתו שאין לה ערך ולא קץ.
So what does l'hisbonen be mean? It means to reflect on something, to be discerning and to recognize what's contained within, the chochmah that a person appreciates that that that provides the impetus for the quest for ahavas Hashem is the chochmah that the person discerns from within by by delving into, by immersing himself. So that's what the l'hisbonen be. So similarly, ראוי לו לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה means that a person immerses himself in the mitzvos ha-Torah and from within, from within recognizes the the the values, the goals, etc. Itachen that what that what we're talking about that that one can take as a as a barometer for one's thinking to what degree one is on the same wavelength in terms of mishpatim and chukim as Chazal, as the Torah, itachen that that's what what underlies a very famous presentation of the Rambam halacha le-ma'aseh in Shmonah Perakim. The Rambam begins perek shishi here in Shmonah Perakim, he says, hakdamah—not begins, a few lines in—הסכמת הפילוסופים היא שהחסיד מעולה ושלם יותר מן הכובש את יצרו.
And the kovesh es yitzro is be-hechrech be-dargah pchusah, כיון שהוא מתאוה לעשות רע. So the person who whose instincts are in sync with what's right, so he's on a higher level than someone who has to suppress his desires, his inclinations in order to comply with what's right. That's what the Rambam says is the philosophical position. And he says it's not only the... And by contrast, שמחה לצדיק עשות משפט. Me'idach gisa, he quotes the Sifra: רבן שמעון בן גמליאל omer לא יאמר אדם אי אפשי לאכול בשר בחלב ואי אפשי ללבוש שעטנז ואי אפשי לבוא על הערווה אלא אפשי ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי.
And as you all know, so the Rambam says there's no stira, there's no contradiction and says that the first mode of observance is for mishpatim. When it comes to mishpatim, so there it should be שמחה לצדיק עשות משפט. And the chassid is נעלה ושלם יותר מן הכובש את יצרו. When it comes to the chukim, so then it should be that efshi, no, I'm interested in eating basar b'chalav. I'm interested in eating basar b'chalav. I would gladly wear shatnez. ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי. And here, let's just find the lines in the Rambam. Hinei nisba'er, it's not only that a person has a heter, it's not only that there's no chisaron if he says אפשי לאכול בשר בחלב. Rambam says it's better. Otom shekaru lahen, הנה נתבאר מכל מה שאמרנו אלו עבירות, one second, sorry, הנה נתבאר מכל מה שאמרנו שאלו העבירות שאילמלא התורה לא היו רעות כלל ולכן אמרו שצריך האדם להניח נפשו לחפוץ בהן ולא יהיה לו מונע מהן אלא התורה.
It's not only that there isn't a chisaron if a person says, you know, if it were left up to me I would go into McDonald's. Not only isn't that a chisaron, but it's davka better. It's better. That's the preferred mode, that the only thing that keeps me from going into McDonald's are the psukim in the Torah where the Torah tells us not to. So what's the pshat? So lechora, in light of what we're saying, the pshat is like this. Again, Hakadosh Baruch Hu divided mitzvos into mishpatim and chukim. We suggested that we can now use that division of mitzvos into mishpatim and chukim as a check and balance to what degree we think the way the Torah wants us to think, to what degree we intuit the way the Torah wants us to intuit, to what degree we react the way the Torah wants us to react. If a person says, no, his moral intuition says that he shouldn't be eating basar b'chalav. So that's a chisaron. It's a chisaron because the Torah says it isn't morally intuitive. And if a person says, no, he has a moral intuition that tells him that you shouldn't wear shatnez. So the Rambam says, no, that's a chisaron. The only reason you shouldn't wear shatnez is for historical reasons because the galochim of the ovdei avodah zarah used to wear it, so to distance us from avodah zarah, so that's why we don't wear it. But if a person, so then it means that his thinking isn't the Torah's way of thinking because the Torah says... And according to the Torahdik way of thinking, it's a chok. If if if I say that this resonates intuitively with me, I mean avada at a certain point I don't think the Rambam disagrees, I don't think רבן שמעון בן גמליאל disagrees, that that since since we we internalize the fact that something is assur because of that we do have a natural a natural retia, there is a natural abhorrence because we identify it as assur. I don't think either the Rambam nor רבן שמעון בן גמליאל is questioning that. But what they are saying is, but it shouldn't be that same sort of natural, moral intuition that you have for gezel, that you have for shefichas damim because what's the chisaron, what's so terrible if I takeh say that that I'm not interested in eating bossar becholov? Again, not just because it's ingrained in me that it's assur. What's the chisaron? No, that's exactly what we're saying. The chisaron is that clearly what it means is that that the person's thinking, the person's what's mistaber to him, what's a svara to him, what's morally intuitive to him is is not what the Torah says. And the goal is, the goal is that by by immersing ourselves in Torah that what the Torah calls a mishpat is something that should resonate with us intuitively and what the Torah says is a chok shouldn't resonate with us. It takeh it shouldn't resonate with us. If it if if it makes sense again the same way, if I say that bossar becholov and shatnez make sense to me the same way gezel and shefichas damim make sense to me, it's not it's not I'm not more of a tzaddik, I'm not more of a chasid, adaraba my thinking is is out of sync with that of the Torah. Sometimes without realizing it even when we when we seek to understand mitzvos hatorah better, ta'amei hatorah better, but sometimes without realizing it what we're really doing is we're we're trying to figure out how to come up with a perspective to be able to view it in in again moral terms that appeal to us. And the correct approach, and that's what the Rambam says, lehisbonen bemishpatei hatorah is is to try from within to discern what the Torah is telling us should be should be intuitive, not to try to figure out where there's an angle that that will that will allow me to see the mitzvos hatorah in terms of in terms of what my moral inclination in terms of what my moral inclination is. All right, so well maybe we'll continue. We'll stop here.