The typology of Teshuva, rabosai, the part of Ish HaHalacha that we're going to try to discuss tonight is probably the most difficult and ethereal part of the whole work. It's not really an appropriate selection for one's first foray into the Rav's ksavim in terms of its again etherealness, abstractness, it's not typical and if due to my inadequate or even inaccurate explanation it doesn't resonate, you shouldn't mistakenly take that as a representative reaction to the Rav's ksavim. The Rav begins his discussion of teshuva, I hope that many of you had a chance to learn these pages, with the Minchas Chinuch's famous kasha. The Rambam writes in the beginning of Hilchos Teshuva that viduy is me'akeiv. There's no kaparah without viduy. A person does teshuva but he isn't misvadeh, so he does not receive atonement. U'le'umas zeh in Kiddushin famously if a person is mekadesh a woman על מנת שאני צדיק גמור, so then the din is, and the Rambam paskens this in Hilchos Ishus, that אפילו רשע כל ימיו, even though we know he has an infamous track record, he's a rasha kol yamav and we're standing there, we know that just recently he engaged in a ma'aseh rishus and we didn't hear any viduy, but אף על פי כן she is safek mekudeshes, the woman will be safek mekudeshes שמא הרהר תשובה בלבו because maybe he had hirhur teshuva. But viduy is me'akeiv. So the Minchas Chinuch already answers, the Rav says it in his own way which by definition implies a certain degree of panim chadashos, that there are two different concepts. There's teshuva which affects in the Rav's words hafka'as shem rasha. It suspends if until this point because of his actions, his behavior, he was a rasha, so teshuva is mafki'a that, teshuva suspends that. It transforms him, his status from that of a rasha to a tzadik. And then there's also teshuva as a source of atonement. The din that viduy is me'akeiv is only in that second context of when teshuva is coming as a mechaper. But for teshuva per se is really independent of kaparah. Teshuva yields kaparah but teshuva itself is something which is not synonymous with kaparah. It's independent of kaparah. And that's what's reflected in the halacha in Kiddushin that the Rambam himself paskens that שמא הרהר בלבו תשובה because teshuva again is something distinct and independent from kaparah. It's not that the definition of teshuva is the attainment of kaparah. No, the definition of teshuva is the hafka'as shem rasha, is that change that's affected. There are, I think the Rav just felt that this raya itself was so compelling that he's not ma'arich with others, but there are other sort of reflections and indications of this as well. So for instance if you look in the Sefer HaChinuch in Parshas Naso for the mitzvah of viduy. the Sefer Hachinuch quotes the same pasuk as the Rambam from Parshas Naso vehisvadu, so when the Sefer Hachinuch tells us again what the formula for Viduy is, he includes bakashas slicha umechila within the nusach haviduy. And the truth is that in Sefer Hamitzvos the Rambam also does that, but in the Yad he doesn't. In the Yad the ikar hashel viduy is חטאתי עויתי פשעתי לפניך עשיתי כך וכך והריני ניחמתי ובושתי במעשי ולעולם איני חוזר לדבר הזה.
Ad kan, זהו עיקרו של וידוי. Where's the bakashas mechila? There isn't any bakashas mechila. How can that be? No, hem hem hadevarim that Teshuva is something distinct and independent from kappara. Yes, Teshuva is that which yields kappara. But it's not that that's the end-all and the be-all of what Teshuva is. No, the essence of Teshuva is independent of kappara. And that's why the Rambam doesn't include in the Yad within the ikar hashel viduy the bakashas slicha umechila. It's also interesting that on the level of Taamei Hamitzvos the Rambam's understanding of again this differentiation of Teshuva from kappara is also reflected. The Rambam says that all the mitzvos which he included in Sefer Hamadda are mitzvos which reflect, reinforce, inculcate fundamental beliefs. So of course the end of Sefer Hamadda is Hilchos Teshuva. So the Rambam in Hebrew translation says as follows: ברור שגם התשובה בקבוצה זאת כלומר שהיא מן הדעות שבלעדיה האמונה בהם לא תסתדר מציאותם של אנשים בני תורה.
The belief in the existence of Teshuva, the possibility of Teshuva is indispensable for religious life. You can't have religious life without belief in the possibility and efficacy of Teshuva. Why? מפני שבהכרח אדם טועה ונכשל. It's virtually inevitable that a person is going to err and stumble. או חליפין שמתוך בערותו out of ignorance הוא מעדיף דעה או מדה שבאמת אינם עדיפים או שתאוה וכעס גבר עליו
or he allows himself to be overwhelmed by a taava, by anger. ואילו האמין האדם ששבר זה לא ניתן לאיחוי לעולם. Let's pay especially closely attention to this sentence, Rabosai. I mean don't sleep for the rest of it, but special attention for this sentence. ואילו האמין האדם ששבר זה לא ניתן לאיחוי לעולם. Again, this is a contrapositive, right? If a person would have believed that this fracture, shever, right? This fracture, לא ניתן לאיחוי לעולם, could never heal, could never come back together, right? The bone could never heal and grow back together, haya masmid bitiyaso. So then he would just persist in his being off course. ואולי היה מוסיף על מריו and what's more he would probably compound what he'd done until now, שלא נותרה לו עצה. So notice the Rambam doesn't say that if a person would have thought that he can't be forgiven. Rambam says if a person would have thought he can't be healed. He didn't say anything about forgiveness. What what would have the the the depressing thought that understandably would have overwhelmed us all is if if the person can't heal from the fracture of chet, so we would have despaired. Didn't say anything about kappara. Didn't say anything about kappara. And this is what the mitzvos of be-inyan korbanos and saying viduy and telling us to to to fast on Yom Kippur and then all this is is to reinforce our belief in what the Torah tells us that there's the possibility and the efficacy of teshuva. But again that same differentiation of teshuva from kappara. Then then the Rav continues, again he refers to, he defines teshuva as an act of self-creation because of that transformation that is effected through the teshuva. וכאן מופיע ההבדל העיקרי בין מושג התשובה בהלכה לזה של איש הדת הכללי.
And and here's where the main difference emerges between the concept of teshuva in halacha to that of the general religious conception. Zeh ha'acharon, the latter, meaning the the general man of religion, right, homo religiosus, תופס את רעיון התשובה מבחינת כפרה. In general, outside of halacha, so this distinction is not recognized. They identify teshuva with kappara. Teshuva is a tris bifnei ha'onesh, it's a shield against punishment. אינה יוצרת ומחדשת כלום, it's not something creative. נפשו הוגה ומתאבלת על יום אתמול כי עבר על הזמן ששקע כבר בתהום הנשייה.
He's, he feels tortured and laments something which is a bygone. על מעשים שחלפו כצל that passed like like a shadow, על עובדות שאי אפשר לשנותן ולהמירן באחרות over facts which cannot be altered and replaced by others. מה שאין כן איש ההלכה. And and here it's very, very important to notice that in terms of the both the process of teshuva and the experience of teshuva, the Rav explains that that this chidush has very, very practical repercussions. This chidush of of understanding differentiating teshuva from kappara has very, very concrete practical implications. איש ההלכה איננו מתמכר לבכי ולתוגה. He doesn't give himself over to sort of unlimited and open-ended crying and sorrow. אינו נושך בבשרו ואינו חובל בעצמו. He doesn't engage in self-flagellation. אינו מתמכר לסיגופי הגוף ועינויי הנפש. Again, he doesn't give himself over to some kind of of Self-imposed suffering. Ish Halacha עסוק ביצירה עצמית ובבחירה ובבריאת אנוכי חדש. He's creating a new I, a new identity. And here comes, here's where it becomes ethereal, and here's where we have to, I don't know, try to try to get a little bit of a handle on this. Ein hu mitcharait, again the hu is the Ish Halacha. He doesn't regret, he doesn't have remorse על העבר שכבר עף ונעלם. He's not regretting a past that no longer exists, that has flown away and disappeared, אלא בעבר הקיים עדיין. No, a past that still exists, that lingers, umishterbayv, and it inserts itself, והנכנס לתוך ההווה והעתיד. It enters, it inserts itself into the present and future. I'm skipping a few lines. יש עבר חי ויש עבר מת. There's a past that remains alive, there's a past that's dead, that's gone. יש עתיד שלא נוצר עדיין, which has not yet been created, ויש עתיד הקיים כבר. There's a future which already exists. Says the Rav, as long as, and again let's just say the words first and then try to understand them be'ezrat Hashem, as long as one sees the past as he'avar ayin, that the past is gone, is nothing, veha'atid adayin is not yet, so minekudat mabat zo, from this vantage point, אין התשובה אלא מושג ריק ונבוב. It's empty and hollow. Ee efshar, now again let's try to understand this line. אי אפשר להתחרט על העבר שכבר מת ושקע בתהום הנשייה ואין מחליטים ביחס אל עתיד שלא נולד עדיין.
It's impossible to regret a past that no longer exists. It's meaningless to resolve about a future which has not, in quotation marks, nolad, close quotation marks, adayin. Why not? Why can't a person regret the past? I think we do it all the time without having this very novel understanding that the Rav is suggesting. What's I think axiomatic here and very intuitive, but I think the Rav doesn't spoon-feed it necessarily, but it's very intuitive, clearly teshuva means coming to terms with the past. Right? You can't really talk about teshuva without, it's a reckoning with the past, coming to terms of the past. So there's one way to come to terms with the past is to sort of beseech Hakadosh Baruch Hu that we should be forgiven for what happened in the past. That's sort of one way of coming to terms with the past. But that clearly isn't halacha's understanding of teshuva because again halacha differentiates teshuva from kapara. That's why that kasha the Rav begins with is so crucial and so fundamental. So if it's not just a question of asking for forgiveness, so how does teshuva function? You can't change facts. If a person is a rasha by virtue of having done A, B, and C, and you can't change the past because it's past, it's gone. So how does teshuva act? And how does charata impact the past? How can charata impact what's... I threw a ball wildly and broke my neighbor's window. The window's broken. So what does charata... what is the... again, so if charata is just the way, a basis for pleading for forgiveness, so we understand. But if it's something that we're differentiating from that, so what's the meaning? How is it meaningful as something which is independent and differentiated from kapara? And so too, how is a person forgiven in the present based on a commitment for the future if it hasn't happened yet? Let's say if you get in trouble in school, so they put you on probation and they say we'll see if you'll behave in the future, so then we'll forgive you. But you can't forgive when the person hasn't demonstrated it. And yet teshuva does work that way, right? So how does that work? So the Rav says and again here come the very challenging words to understand. Yesh avar chai, there's a past that's alive, and v'yesh avar meit, there's a past that's dead. יש עתיד שלא נוצר עדיין, there's a future which hasn't yet been created, ויש עתיד הקיים כבר. And there's also a future that exists already. The Rav then elaborates them. So kemedumeh what he means and what he's saying is the following. The past can be viewed in two ways or on two levels. You can look at sort of the facticity. You can look at what happened. So if a person ate breakfast this morning and didn't make a bracha rishona, that happened. The fact of the past happened. And in that sense it's... a person can't go back and relive that moment on a factual level. We need to stretch our minds here, rabosai. But he can go back and redefine the significance of that moment. And the reason he can do that is because a person carries his past with him. So the moment is not there but what happened is part of the person, is in the present. Maybe let's, I don't know if the following mashal helps. It's in two parts, so good if it does, if it doesn't, so sorry. Let's say the mashal is like this. Let's say you're taking a train from ich veis from New York to Boston. So as you go, so you pass New Haven and you pass Hartford and so when you go heading north from New Haven to Hartford, so you're no longer in New Haven but New Haven's still there, right? The fact that you're not there doesn't mean that the tracks behind you have disappeared or that New Haven disappeared. Let's now tweak that a little bit. Let's say that as you're traveling on the train, so when there was a farmer's market in New Haven and the train stopped in New Haven and you jumped out of the train and you went and you made some purchases in New Haven. So when you reach Hartford, you reach it, you can't change the fact that you took the train trip from New York to Boston via New Haven and Hartford. The facticity can't be changed, and in that sense, that's the way we always think of the past. But what the Rav is saying is, the past in terms of what a person lives on within the person, he carries his past actions and experiences with him, and in that sense, he can't change the facticity, he can't change the factualness, but he can change the significance. He can't relive, but he can redefine. Maybe one way to say it is that the time is gone, but all the events are very much alive. Similarly with regard to the future, the time of the future hasn't arrived. The tracks are there, you can still be in Hartford, the tracks going further north to Boston are already there. The time hasn't arrived, but the destiny, which the destiny is already in the present. I have no doubt that if we could be privy to the inner life of someone like Rav Kook, he experienced life, he personally experienced life as moving towards geulah. There's no question about that. He experienced the present in light of the future. I don't know if this mashal helps, all these meshalim, none of them are perfect, but they have these Shabbos lights. I think the way they work is there's a screen that you slide, it covers up the light. So you can have a light that's on and then you can turn the light off, then it's no longer on. Or you can have a light which is behind the screen. But there's a difference. Either way it's dark. Either way it's dark. But there's a difference. So the future is the future. But there's a difference between whether you think of it as the light is not on, or whether there's somewhat of a screen there. And that latter understanding is one that, again, the time of the future hasn't arrived, but the destiny of the future is present already. The Chofetz Chaim lived his life that Moshiach was around the corner. It was a present reality in his life. It was a present reality that he was hearing footsteps, and not that he was hallucinating, chas v'shalom. He heard footsteps. Ikvesa de-Meshicha, he heard footsteps. It was a future, the time of the future isn't arrived, but the future resonated and is present in the present. The Rav says ultimately that's what it is, this conception which underlies and makes If if the past, if if we carry within us our past, so no, we can't change the fact of the past, but we can change the significance of the past. You can change the past. And that's what the Rav says, what what when the Gemara in Yumas says that zdonos naasas k’zchuyos, that's what it means. It means that because the past lives on into the present, you can change the past. And that's what the Rav says is the basis for teshuva. It it, I don't, I mean I've been thinking about this for 40 years and it needs a lot of reflection. But it's what's just to sort of now maybe reiterate and and review and maybe understand better, the way all of this translates very practically into the experience and process of teshuva is the following. What the Rav depicts as the sort of general religious conception of teshuva that identifies teshuva with kappara but doesn't have this, doesn't operate with this chiddush of the past lingering into the present, that the moment is gone but the events live on in the person. So that basically means that teshuva is an impossible task, because at the end of the day what the person did wrong remains, which is why the extremes that the Rav describes are sort of a natural reaction. נפשו הוגה נכאים ומתאבלת על יום אתמול כעבר. He's mourning over a yesterday that has passed. על הזמן ששקע כבר בתהום הנשייה, right? It has set already in the depths. על מעשים שחלפו כצל על עובדות שאי אפשר לשנותן ולהמירן באחרות. לפיכך זקוק הוא לחסדים מרובים.
Because basically whatever he'll do will be inadequate, because at the end of the day he wants to sort of erase that blemish, but the blemish can't be erased because you can't rewrite the past. Which is why the extremes that later, just see if I can find it, sorry. There's another very powerful line where he describes that, but I'm sorry I'm not seeing it right now. Ma she-ein ken, given this understanding that, you know, whatever the person, again use the mashal of what the person, the acquisitions what a person purchased while he was on the first part of the train trip, as a mashal for how past actions endure in the present, so that allows a person to takke change the past. Because again, not the facticity of the past, but the significance of the past. He doesn't relive it, but he redefines it. And in that sense, so again teshuva... is not this impossible task which therefore plunges a person into the depths of despair but is this creative act and that's why אינו מתכפר הסיגוף הסיגופי הגוף ועינויי הנפש. You know, I maybe there's a mashal as follows. I think in physics I think there's a law of conservation of mass and and I think what that law says is that that matter is indestructible. It can undergo physical and any physics majors here? It can undergo physical change, it can undergo chemical change, but but you can't you can't destroy it. You can't destroy it. It's indestructible. That's what it means conservation. So the past you can't this past is indestructible, again because the moment is gone, the facts are there, but the fact that that there's indestructibility doesn't preclude change. And so in that sense a person can't destroy the past but he changes the past. It does undergo change because a person's past, it's true of us individually on a personal level and then it's true collectively on a national level of Knesses Yisrael as the Rav goes on to talk about here, because the past lives on into the present with a person. Think of the mashal maybe of the acquisitions of of that as the person was as the train was moving down the tracks. Okay, a good job rabboisai, gut yom tov, shavuah tov.