The Rambam writes in the beginning of Hilchos Mamrim: בית דין הגדול שבירושלים הם עיקר תורה שבעל פה והם עמוד ההוראה ומהם חוק ומשפט יוצא לכל ישראל.
The Beis Din HaGadol who rightfully are located in Mikdash, so there they're the pillar, again in the sense of that which upholds, they're the pillar of Horaah ומהם חוק ומשפט יוצא לכל ישראל. And halacha pesuka emerges from the Beis Din HaGadol. Vaalehem hivticha Torah, the Torah relies on them. The Torah entrusted the Masorah and psak halacha to them, שנאמר על פי התורה אשר יורוך ועל המשפט אשר יאמרו לך תעשה זו מצות עשה. וכל המאמין במשה רבינו ובתורתו חייב לסמוך מעשה הדת עליהם ולהישען עליהם.
And in halacha daled the Rambam continues שהיה בית דין הגדול קיים, as long as we had a Beis Din HaGadol, לא הייתה שם מחלוקת בישראל. By that the Rambam means there were differences of opinion, but there were no enduring differences of opinion halacha lemaaseh because the question would make its way up to the Beis Din HaGadol and the Beis Din HaGadol would pasken, even if there was a difference of opinion within the Beis Din HaGadol, so based on rov there was a final authoritative psak. So in that sense, לא הייתה שם מחלוקת בישראל, meaning there was no abiding, no enduring machlokes. Then at the end of halacha daled the Rambam writes משבטל בית דין הגדול, but once Beis Din HaGadol ceased to exist, we no longer have a סנהדרין של ע"א, ravsah machlokes beyisrael. Then differences of opinion, meaning abiding, unresolved differences of opinion amongst chachmei yisrael began to proliferate. זה מטמא ונותן טעם לדבריו וזה מטהר ונותן טעם לדבריו. זה אוסר וזה מתיר.
An important element of our Masorah is that post-Beis Din HaGadol, Torah is not monolithic. Questions arise, חכמי ישראל שהגיעו להוראה, chachmei yisrael who are qualified to express an opinion, form their opinions. At times, on some questions, a consensus naturally emerges, and then at other times, no such consensus forms. And in those cases, there's no one individual, there's no one who has a final word. משבטל בית דין הגדול רבתה מחלוקת בישראל. There is legitimate difference of opinion amongst chachmei yisrael. There's a very forceful presentation on this in Igros Moshe in יורה דעה חלק ג סימן פח. So the teshuvah is addressed, Rav Moshe left out the name, legadol echad. בדבר שיש לך איזה חשש לקבוע מקומך בבני ברק. You're hesitant to move to Bnei Brak, תשל"ז. מצד שבתוך דברי תורה עיקר פעמים שאתה אומר שלא כדברי החזון איש זצ"ל.
Because in some of your divrei torah, in some of the shailos you deal with, you come to a conclusion that differs from that of the Chazon Ish. לא מובן שום חשש בזה. Rav Moshe says, I don't understand what the issue is. I don't understand why. because of that you think there's a concern in moving to Bnei Brak. V'aderaba. On the contrary. Zehu kevodo שמזכירים שיטתו בדברי תורה ומעיינים בדבריו אף שהמסקנה דהחכם המעיין הוא שלא כדבריו ולא עלה כלל על דעת החזון איש זצ"ל.
It never occurred to the Chazon Ish שלא ימצאו תלמידי חכמים שיפלגו עליו. It never occurred to him that there wouldn't be talmidei chachamim who would take issue with his views, with his positions. ולא שייך שיקפיד על זה. And it's inconceivable that he would have any hakpada, that he would that he would have any objection to that. Aderaba, ha-emes ve-ha-shalom ahavu כדאיתא ביבמות י"ד ע"ב על פלוגתא דבית שמאי ובית הלל.
The Baraita says in Masechet Yevamos, the point of departure is a machlokes about tzoros ervah. If a man had two wives, one of them let's say he marries his niece, and then he marries another woman, a non-relative, and then he dies without children. So then there's a mitzvas yibum. But his brother can't be meyavem his own daughter. So the question is, is there a mitzvas yibum in the other wife? The other wife is referred to as a tzoros ervah. That's a מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל. So Beis Shammai thinks that there is a mitzvas yibum and Beis Hillel thinks there's no mitzvas yibum and that it's an ervas eshes ach. So according to Beis Hillel, if Beis Shammai act on their opinion, so it's an incestuous relationship and the children would be mamzerim. And according to Beis Shammai, if Beis Hillel act on their opinion, so then they're being mevattel a mitzvas yibum and they're being machshil the isha in an issur lav of remarrying without the benefit of yibum o chalitza. And the Baraita says, nevertheless, היו נוהגים חיבה וריעות זה בזה, that Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel were very close and cherished each other's friendship. ולא נמנעו מלישא נשים. And they didn't hesitate to intermarry. They would say, Beis Shammai would tell Beis Hillel, no you don't want to marry, you don't want to marry here. This this is the product of a union that you would disapprove of. And the Gemara says l'kayem ma shene'emar, that on the one hand Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel each advocated forcefully their own opinions, on the other hand they were nohag chiba v'reiyus, that that was a kiyum of ha-emes ve-ha-shalom ahavu, to love both emes and shalom. Vaday, I'm skipping a line or so, צריך להגיד בדרך ארץ. Certainly if you disagree, it has to be done with derech eretz, it has to be done respectfully. אבל בלשון דרך ארץ וודאי דליכא שום קפידא לא על מה שמקשין על דברי החכם ואף לא על מי שחולקין עליו.
There can't be any objection, there can't be any objection to the fact that one chacham asks a kashya on another chacham or that one chacham disagrees halacha l'ma'aseh with a conclusion of another chacham. V'aderaba, on the contrary says Rav Moshe, meforash b'Bava Basra sof daf kuf lamed towards the bottom of amud aleph, שאמר רבא לתלמידיו Rav Pappa v'Rav Huna brei d'Rav Yehoshua דאם יהיה להם קושיות על פסקא שלו. If they'll have a kashya on his, on Rava's psak, אסור להו לדון כדבריו. It's assur for them to follow his psak if they have a kashya on it. דאין לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות. A hachacham is obligated to pasken based on what he understands. A dayan is, ve-hu hadin b'issur, the same for a chacham who's paskening shaylos. So there's no monolithic Da'as Torah in question. Questions that arise. It's true in call it pure Inyanei Halacha and it's certainly true in call it applied Halacha when it's a question of what the correct maybe communal course of action is in a certain context. The story is told during the Second World War. So at the beginning of the war, at one point, Hitler and Stalin, Yimach Shmom, made a pact and they divided Europe up between them. So the question arose for the Jews who found themselves in the Soviet-controlled lands whether they should just so they for the moment, depending upon one's foresight, maybe one saw that it was only for the moment or maybe one thought it was longer-term, longer-range, they were out of the clutches of the Nazis, Yimach Shmom. So the question was whether they should just lie low or whether they should try to make their way further east to get out of the Soviet-controlled lands to Japan, to China. So at the time, Rav Chaim Ozer was of the opinion that they should lie low, that they shouldn't by moving eastward, that that would perhaps provoke the Soviets and they should lie low. Rav Zelig Epstein, later known as the Rosh Yeshiva of Sha'ar HaTorah, who at the time was a young man, so he felt very strongly that that was dangerous and that you had to try to escape to Japan and China, as ultimately the Mir Yeshiva famously did. And he advocated that very strongly. So decades later, someone asked him, "How did you go against Daas Torah?" And he was a young man at the time, and Rav Chaim Ozer was Rav Chaim Ozer. And Rav Zelig answered, "That was before Daas Torah was invented." In the same vein as recognizing that there isn't a final word amongst חכמים שהגיעו להוראה amongst qualified Chachmei Yisrael, it's a very beautiful and certainly authentic part of our Mesorah that we're taught to recognize and respect and learn from Gedolim who are not our Moreh Derech. Rav Schachter in his Shiurim quotes everyone from Rav Kook to the Minchas Elazar. Sadly, both historical and contemporary experience attest that the fallout from the mistaken notion of a monolithic Daas Torah of that someone has a final word is that a party line emerges and Torah becomes politicized. Those Chachamim whose opinions happen to conform with a party line are recognized, and those Chachamim regardless of how great they are, regardless of what their stature may be, whose opinions don't conform are not recognized. It was approximately 40 years ago. I think it was more or less around Rav Kook's 50th yartzheit or approaching Rav Kook's 50th yartzheit. I think that's more or less around 40 years ago. There was a program in one of the shuls here in Manhattan marking, commemorating that yartzheit. And one of those who spoke was Rav Nissan Alpert zeicher livracha. He was one of the ramim here in yeshiva. He was a talmid muvhak of Rav Moshe Feinstein. He told me, I think it was after the fact, at the time he was very very sick, he was dying from his illness, that when the program was advertised, he got calls pressuring him to withdraw because haitachein? How can he participate in a program about Rav Kook? And he said that he answered as follows. He said it's true that on many issues Rav Kook was a daas yachid. It's true. But it's also true, he said, that on many issues the Satmar Rebbe, I don't remember if he was still alive then, I don't think so, the Satmar Rebbe was a daas yachid. He said no one writes the Satmar Rebbe, no one correctly, appropriately, no one writes the Satmar Rebbe out of Klal Yisrael, no one writes him out of the annals of gedolei Yisrael, and there's no reason that that should be done to Rav Kook either. Part of the beauty and the richness of Torah in our tekufa post the Beis Din Hagadol is that recognition that within the ranks of hachmei Yisrael that there is legitimate difference of opinion.