אבית מקדש שני שהיו עוסקים בתורה ובמצוות ובגמילות חסדים מפני מה חרב מפני שהייתה בו שנאת חינם וללמדך ששקולה שנאת חינם כנגד שלש עבירות עבודה זרה גילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים.
Sinat achim in klal Yisrael is divisive and destructive. שאלו שלום ירושלים ישליו אהביך. The Malbim explains the difference between shalom and shalva. Shalom is chitzoni. It refers to relations between Yerushalayim, Yerushalayim here representing the Jewish people and other nations. Shalom is chitzoni. Shalva is pnimis, internal harmony. אמר שעל ידי שישראל יהיה להם שלום פנימי שיהיה אהבה ביניהם זה יגרום שלום ירושלים החיצון.
Shalom Yerushalayim is determined by yishlayu ohavayich. When there's shalva which is pnimis, internal, shalva amongst Jews, so then Jews kelapei chutz enjoy shalom. Sin'ah's divisive and destructive, ahava unifies and protects. Now clearly the challenge to avoid sin'ah and cultivate ahava is in the face of disagreements. And the challenge is twofold. First of all on the level of middos, it's an emotional, psychological challenge. At times we're easily annoyed, irritated, provoked by other Jews' opinions and behaviors. So again on the level of middos. But the challenge runs much deeper than that also. The challenge is also one that we experience as a moral and religious challenge of how does one reconcile ahavas Yisrael with being true and steadfast with one's own principles. Dovid HaMelech, pesukim speak of sin'ah. Dovid HaMelech speaks of sheker suneisi va-asa-eivah. I hate, I hate sheker, I find it abominable. יראת השם שנאת רע. So is it possible to reconcile? And if so, how? So maybe let's begin by classifying different types of disagreement. One type of disagreement is which one that exists with other... different psak, a different derech, a different hashkafa, and אלו ואלו דברי אלוהים חיים. The second type of disagreement is again with other committed Jews, shomer Torah u-mitzvos, but when they're wrong. When it's not an eilu v'eilu disagreement, but they're wrong. They subscribe to an opinion, a belief, they follow a psak, a derech, a hashkafa which is wrong. And the third type of disagreement is with those who are not shomer Torah u-mitzvos. Not even, at least overtly, ma'aminim. Now, the first type of disagreement clearly is the one that's easiest to navigate. The Gemara tells us in Yevamos, אף על פי שנחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל בצרות and other cases the Gemara lists, לא נמנעו בית שמאי מלישא נשים מבית הלל ולא בית הלל מבית שמאי ללמדך שחיבה ורעות נוהגים זה בזה לקיים מה שנאמר האמת והשלום אהבו.
It's possible and therefore imperative to love emes and shalom. But that's in an eilu v'eilu disagreement, because one recognizes Beis Hillel, it's not our opinion, but Beis Shammai is אלו ואלו דברי אלוהים חיים, it's also an emesdike opinion. And Beis Shammai views Beis Hillel in the same way. So when we're in the situation with an eilu v'eilu difference, so the avodah is to remind ourselves of that yesod and acknowledging the validity of an alternate but very much legitimate within the boundaries of Torah opinion in no way compromises one's commitment to or one's love of emes and simultaneously it's האמת והשלום אהבו. But what about the other types of disagreement? So the Rambam writes in Perek Vav of De'os, Halacha Gimmel, מצוה על כל אדם לאהוב את כל אחד ואחד מישראל כגופו.
And the Rambam is clearly talking even about class of disagreement number three, kal va-chomer number two, כל אחד ואחד מישראל. He's not talking about a חבר בתורה ומצוות, כל אחד ואחד מישראל. So clearly the mitzvah is operative even in the situations of disagreement number two and number three and kal va-chomer number two. How is it possible? So the kasuv ha-shlishi is that a person, a Jew is not completely defined by his actions or his behavior. And because that's the case, the ahava that's directed or acceptance of the behavior. Because the person is more than the behavior, than the conduct, than the views that he espouses. And because that distinction exists, because a person is not completely defined by his behavior, that's what allows for Ahavas Yisroel even in situation number three and kal vachomer situation number two. Ahavas Yisroel doesn't imply endorsement or approval. It can be despite complete and total rejection of, of the other person's, the other Jew's views. Now, conceptually it sounds like a little bit of a difficult balancing act, but the truth is it's something which is intuitive to all of us. Most if not all of us have relatives with whom we either have disagreements of number two or number three, or both. And in those situations it's intuitive. Right? We just, we intuit that my child, my parent, my sibling, my grandparent, my cousin, my uncle, my aunt, or whatever the case may be, is, is more, is something more and therefore bigger than and not totally defined by the areas of disagreement and again, disagreement number two or number three. Not elu v'elu disagreements, right and wrong disagreements. And even number three. We all intuit that. We all, we all intuit that. The reason we intuit it by family is because we perceive our children as such, we perceive our parents as such, we perceive our siblings as such, we perceive our grandparents as such, our uncles and aunts as such. But it's not intuitive with other Jews because we wrongly don't perceive them as brothers. But if, if we did, if our perception was correct, if we were to correct that, if we were to get a new prescription and, and see with the right lens, so then the same way it's intuitive within our nuclear family, it would be equally intuitive with, with fellow Jews. Now, it's true that the Gemara in Pesachim says that if you see dvar ervah in someone, that רב נחמן בר יצחק says mitzvah lisnoso. Mitzvah lisnoso. What's his pasuk? Shenemar יראת ה' שנאת רע. Pasuk in Mishlei. יראת ה' שנאת רע. That Yiras Hashem, one of the expressions of Yiras Hashem is sinas ra. So why doesn't the Rambam, my son once commented on this, why didn't the Rambam mention this as an exception in Hilchos De'os then? When he says מצוה לאהוב כל אחד ואחד מישראל, so there should have been bameh devarim amurim. But it doesn't appear in Hilchos De'os as an exception. So apparently, the sina here isn't the sina that contradicts and precludes ahava. It's a sina that coexists with the ahava. And then mimeila, this doesn't constitute an exception. And it's meduyak in the posuk that yiras Hashem, the Nachman bar Yitzchak's posuk is יראת ה׳ שנאת רע. Ra, evil. He doesn't say mere'im, he doesn't say evildoers. So even the mitzva lisno'o is one that coexists with the ahava. How? Maybe the Baal HaTanya's formulation? Maybe a different formulation? The Baal HaTanya famously says שישנא את הרע שבו. You don't hate the person, you hate the ra shebo. But even if you don't go with the Baal HaTanya's formulation, it's clear from the posuk and then it's reflected in the fact that the Rambam doesn't present this as an exception that the sina is not a sina which precludes ahava, it's a sina which coexists with ahava. And notice the other posuk we mentioned also when Dovid HaMelech says sheker saneisi ve'esa'eiva. Again, the sheker. The hatred is concentrated on the sheker. Now there is one exception to the rule. There is one exception to the rule. The Rambam in the hakdama to Perek Chelek says after listing the yud gimmel ikkarim that if a person believes in the yud gimmel ikkarim, he's a ma'amin, so then mitzva le'ehov vechulu. But otherwise, he quotes the posuk הלוא משנאיך ה׳ אשנא. And notice how this posuk differs from the other psukim, right? It's not sheker saneisi, it's not sinas ra. No, here takeh ein hachi nami, in that posuk the sina is directed to the person. הלוא משנאיך ה׳ אשנא. There are very, very, very, very, very few and far in between and very isolated cases where people qualify for that halacha. Yes, there is such a halacha. ruba de-ruba de-ruba of people who are confused bizmaneh zeh are tinokos shenishbu. There's more to be said on the subject than that, but we're talking about a very, very at most we're talking about a very tiny, tiny fragment, not even segment, of Klal Yisrael. The mitzvos, the issur of sina, the mitzvas asei of ahava is always inyana de'yoma. The Chofetz Chaim as you know in his hakdama to Chofetz Chaim says that the main cause for why the Beis HaMikdash is still destroyed is because we haven't addressed and redressed the cause for its initial churban. Beis HaMikdash doesn't remain destroyed out of inertia. It's only as long as the underlying cause continues to reverberate that the churban persists. So it's always inyana d'yoma. But we certainly understand that this past year plus it's that that's accentuated and magnified. You know, the challenge of avoiding sin'ah and having ahavah is exponentially greater in Eretz Yisrael, in Medinas Yisrael than it is here. And that's something that we need to be fully aware of. Differences between Jews in Chutz La'aretz don't determine governmental policy. So there's no—the street doesn't belong to us, there's nothing to fight about. What's there to fight about? Ben-Gurion? It doesn't lo govar zavna. There's nothing to fight about. So the challenge is exponentially greater in Eretz Yisrael, in Medinas Yisrael where the differences spill over into differences that affect very directly and very immediately people's lives. Again, that doesn't mean that sin'ah is countenanced anywhere. It just means that אל תדין את חברך עד שתגיע למקומו. But we certainly have a chiyuv, just within our daled amos, to be mischazek in these mitzvos. It's our chiyuv. And additionally, we hope that it generates a zchus and generates a metaphysical momentum that can spill over outside of our daled amos as well.