Last week as requested, we tried to provide perspective, halachic perspective on the hostage deal. Over the course of the week, there was several questions requesting clarification on certain points. So perhaps we'll review some, not all, of what we discussed and try to elaborate some, not all, of the points that we discussed last week. We spoke of the fact that Halacha prioritizes pikuach nefesh of the rabbim over pikuach nefesh of yechidim. And again, with the obvious implications that that has for prioritizing the elimination of Hamas yimach shemam. The truth is one does - I'm not sure that one really needs to cite chapter and verse on that, that one prioritizes pikuach nefesh of the rabbim over pikuach nefesh of yechidim. It's very compelling, very intuitive, but just to mention one or two again as rashei perakim. Now is not the time for a full-blown in-depth analysis, but one or two marei mekomos reflecting that din kedima, that prioritization of pikuach nefesh of rabbim over pikuach nefesh of a yachid. The Rambam writes - the first part of what we're reading he's quoting from a Gemara in Eruvin and then he adds - Rambam writes in perek beis of Hilchos Shabbos, halacha chaf-gimel: גוים שצרו על עיירות ישראל. You have a city, a Jewish city, and our enemies come and they lay siege to the city. Bechol makom, I'm skipping a few lines, אם באו על עסקי נפשות o shearchu milchama o shetzaru stam יוצאין עליהן בכלי זיין ומחללין עליהן את השבת. So you go out with weapons, armed, and clearly this is a situation of pikuach nefesh and ומחללין עליהן את השבת as needed. And then the Rambam continues: ומצוה על כל ישראל שיכולין לבוא. It's incumbent upon everyone, ומצוה על כל ישראל, incumbent upon everyone sheyecholon lavo, who are positioned and able to come, the mitzvah is incumbent upon them לצאת ולעזור לאחיהם שבמצור ולהצילם מיד הגוים בשבת. Now lechora it's clear that anyone who's coming to assist when you have an ir Yisrael that is surrounded by our sonim with murderous intent that they're putting themselves in danger, that this is fraught with danger. The coming to their rescue obviously is fraught with danger. Now there is a Yerushalmi that the Hagahos Maimoniyos quotes where the Yerushalmi says that a person is obligated to expose himself to safek sakana to save someone else who's in vadai sakana. So let's say at a time of, I don't know, of an epidemic or something rachmana litzlan. So in treating a, if no one treats the patient who's already sick is a vadai sakana. In being exposed to the patient, so there's a safek sakana. So the Yerushalmi says that a person is obligated to expose himself to safek sakana to save someone who's in vadai sakana. This Yerushalmi doesn't appear in the Rambam, doesn't appear in Shulchan Aruch. The many Gedolei Acharonim, amongst them the Smach in Choshen Mishpat, say that the Rambam thinks that the Bavli doesn't agree with this Yerushalmi and doesn't pasken like the Yerushalmi. And that the Rambam is of the opinion that one is not obligated to expose himself to safek sakana to save his friend who's in vadai sakana. So what's happening over here? How can it be מצוה על כל ישראל you have to go? So clearly because the Yerushalmi is talking about a case of pikuach nefesh of a yachid. And this is pikuach nefesh of the klal, this is pikuach nefesh of rabbim. Again, there's, we're giving rashei perakim, there's a lot to... another mareh makom with rashei perakim. The other perspective, we had seen this in a different context last time, right? We mentioned that the two halachic issues: one is that halacha prioritizes pikuach nefesh of the rabbim over pikuach nefesh of the yachid, and two, that the mishna says that אין פודין את השבויים יותר מכדי דמיהן, that one cannot, one is not allowed to pay a disproportionate ransom to redeem a shavuy, a captive. So the Gemara has an iba-ya which the Gemara isn't really poshet as to what the reason is. What's the problem? So we mentioned last week the second possibility the Gemara raises, that it incentivizes the sonei Yisrael to take hostages. But the first tzad the Gemara has is mishum douchka de'tzibura. אין לנו לדחוק הציבור להביאו לידי עניות בשביל אלו. So there's douchka de'tzibura. It's just the disproportionate ransom is something which is just too onerous for the tzibur. Now the Ramban comments that every case of shivyah, a stam case of shivyah means that the shavuy's life is in danger. And אף על פי כן the Gemara says that yitachen the reason is that we have to prioritize not just pikuach nefesh of the rabbim, we have to prioritize the tovas harabbim over the pikuach nefesh of a yachid. One last mareh makom, the Chazon Ish, he's not machriya, but the Chazon Ish entertains the possibility. ויש לעיין באחד רואה חץ הולך להרוג אנשים רבים. There's a missile, rachmana litzlan, and the trajectory of the missile is such that it's going to impact a heavily populated area. ויכול להטותו לצד אחד and the person can deflect the trajectory of the missile. ויהרג רק אחד שבצד אחד. And in so doing, he can deflect the missile to a place where there will be just one lone casualty. Ve'eileh shebetzad zeh, and those who right now are targeted by the current trajectory, the rabbim who are right now in the current trajectory of the missile, אלו שבצד זה ינצלו. ואם לא יעשה כלום יהרגו הרבים והאחד ישאר בחיים.
So here we're not talking about just prioritizing pikuach nefesh of the rabbim over the yachid, the Chazon Ish is entertaining the possibility that this, that it should be construed as an act of. towards the yachid. And he says Efshar, he's not sure. But ad k'dai kach, ad k'dai kach. So again, that's not a question of just prioritizing which is one's first goal, right? The Chazon Ish is talking about something which is much, much more mechudash than what we're talking about. We're talking about what is one's primary goal, what one prioritizes as the goal and the Chazon Ish says and maybe in light of that ad k'dai kach that that one would deflect the missile towards the yachid to save the rabim. So that's the klal, again, just as rashei perakim all of these really need much fuller presentation and discussion. But the klal is that the halacha prioritizes pikuach nefesh of the rabim over the pikuach nefesh of the yachid. We spoke about the fact that that the unspeakably indescribably painful plight of the of the hostages and and their families, families are also living through a gehinnom, a different type of gehinnom than the hostages, but but certainly a type of of of gehinnom on Earth makes it difficult to retain clarity on the the halachic priorities of pikuach nefesh of rabim, pikuach nefesh of yachid. And here I think it's kedai because this has just virtually endless application to understand a profound, profound insight of the Rambam. Rambam says what happened as a result of the cheit of Adam HaRishon? So the nachash tells Chava that if they'll eat from the tree vihyissem kelohim, it's lashon chol, Onkelos says k'ravrevaya, yodei tov vara. So the Rambam was asked, so as a result of cheit Adam was given the capacity to discern the difference between good and bad? That's isn't that something very positive to know the difference between good and bad? How can it be that that that capacity only came only came as a result of cheit in the aftermath of cheit? So the Rambam answers so so profoundly. He says before Adam stepped out of the world in which HaKadosh Baruch Hu had originally placed him, Adam HaRishon lived in a world of muskalot. The relevant categories by which things were measured were not tov vara but were emes v'sheker. Emes v'sheker are intellectual categories, more importantly, even more importantly, they're moral categories. Tov vara, tov vara is used for a wide range of things, ותרא האשה כי טוב העץ למאכל. Tov, tov vara, ah, that was a good steak. Tov and ra are not categories, tov and ra are categories that belong to the subjective, aesthetic, and emotional realm. If you take a math test, the correct assessment of two plus two equals four is that it's a true answer and that two plus two equals five is that it's a false answer, not that one's a good answer and one's a bad answer. Initially, before Adam and Chava allowed themselves to be nimshach achar hataivos, they looked at the world and assessed whether things were emes and sheker, which means they assessed objectively. Then they stepped out of that world when ותרא האשה כי טוב העץ למאכל. No, she should have looked at mutar and assur, not tov and ra, not oh does it look delicious, does it look enticing? She should have looked is it mutar, is it assur? But ותרא האשה כי טוב העץ למאכל וכי תאוה לעינים. So now we, post cheit Adam haRishon, don't a priori experience everything purely in terms of emes and sheker. We're prone to experiencing things, again, with elements of subjectivity, with elements of emotion, when really it should be an objective determination. It's not, it doesn't come totally naturally the way it did to Adam kodem hacheit. After the cheit, human nature, as a result of the cheit, human nature changed and now it's an avodah. What was natural for Adam before the cheit to see the world in categories of emes and sheker, of mutar and assur, now it's an avodah. Because naturally we also tend to see things and experience in categories of tov and ra, which are ותרא האשה כי טוב העץ למאכל, which are subjective, aesthetic, emotional categories. And it's an avodah, it's a very big avodah rabbosai, it's a very big avodah, everyone has the avodah. We all live in the world, the universe that we inhabit is the post cheit universe, so we all have that avodah and that nisayon as to whether or not we're making judgments based on tov and ra, emotionally, subjectively. But if we're talking about right and wrong, right and wrong is not supposed to be determined that way, right and wrong has to be determined by emes and sheker, by objective criteria. The implications and applications of this insight of the Rambam are endless rabbosai, endless. What we're talking about is one painful, exceedingly so, illustration, but obviously there are very very many of them. Towards the end last week we spoke about the interplay between halakhic and political considerations and I just wanted to elaborate a little bit, maybe to begin with a משל על פי דבריו. The Rambam writes in Hilchos Shevissas Asor that when the... Decision is made whether or not a choleh should eat on Yom Kippur is מאכילין אותו על פי רופא אומן, uman mumche, על פי רופא מומחה באותו מקום. When there's a medical aspect to the shaila, so that has to be assessed by a medical mumche. It's not that aspect, that dimension of the shaila is not assessed by the rov, but the input for that, for assessing that aspect of the question, that dimension of the question has to come from a rofe mumche. Similarly, the rov was asked what the halakha's position is on relinquishing territory to achieve peace. And he said that he thought that in halakha one would do that, one would relinquish territory to make peace, but he said it requires a military and political assessment whether or not in fact the relinquishing the territories is that the metzius. And he said, "That I can't comment on. I'm not an expert in military affairs, I'm not an expert in political affairs." And ultimately the halakhic framework he provided that he thought that it was the right thing to do if it would ensure peace, but he said that determination has to be made by people with political and military expertise. And that's what we were talking about last week. We were talking about last week when we spoke at the end about the obvious American pressure which was applied before the Israeli government agreed to, I think it's not editorializing and not to an extremely lopsided deal where hundreds and ultimately thousands of murderers whose hands are dripping Jewish blood, not only Jewish blood, gentile blood as well, are being released in order to gain the freedom of innocent hostages, innocent men, women and children. So obviously there was extreme pressure to agree to that deal and to agree to the ceasefire. And what we were saying is that at this point, again, halakha provides the framework that one prioritizes pikuach nefesh of the rabim over the pikuach nefesh of the yachid. And halakha says that אין פודין את השבויים יתר על כדי דמיהן. So you have to prioritize national security. Now, whether or not the cost of having said no to that pressure was something which creates a greater national security risk is a political assessment and determination and calibration that needed to be made, and that ultimately will determine what the halakha is. The same way the doctor's input is ultimately based on that that the rov is going to decide whether or not the choleh eats on Yom Kippur, it's going to be based on that medical input, so too the halakha needs the political input. If the cost of not cooperating is deemed to be a greater threat to national security, then in light of that political analysis, so then one is prioritizing, one is still prioritizing the pikuach nefesh of the rabim. Is not one that a rav can pronounce on his own, is not one that a rav can unilaterally pronounce because it requires this political assessment, and that's not his area of expertise. The political assessment is not his area of expertise anymore than the medical assessment is in the shaila Yom Kippur. We spoke about how Rabbanim moreh hora'ah limit themselves to the halachic aspects and dimensions, and then need the input of be it medical experts, political or military experts. But you know, it's also true in the reverse. Politicians, some of them may have expertise on political matters, but they certainly have no expertise or even competence on moral matters. And let's just say it's deeply disturbing to hear politicians making forceful pronouncements on moral matters as to what the moral priorities are in the war. They're also obligated to stay within their area of competence. And finally the last point we spoke about, and here too I was a little bit mekatzeir מקום שאמרו להאריך הן רשאי לקצר. The stage that we're in of this first phase of what was negotiated, dictated, whatever the right word is, the process, a process is still unfolding. Now the facticity of the part of the deal that's been implemented until this point, that doesn't change, right? Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't give us the ability to change the facticity of the past. But its significance is very much not yet determined. What in retrospect in weeks, months or years when one looks back on the deal that happened a couple of weeks ago, what that will have led to, what will be the links following that in the chain of events, so that's very much still in the future, and because of that, even the significance of the past hasn't been determined. Whether the cooperation with will then yield things which will help ensure security and advance all the right and noble and true goals, that very much still could be the case. So again the facticity of what has happened is final, but ultimately what counts is what its significance will turn out to be. And that's why there is very much a makom for But to determine the significance of of the past, and that's why our עבודה continues to be to react to this unfolding situation with with with תשובה, with תפילה.