The central question, not the central question, but the question which should preoccupy our attention is how to ensure constant growth as Bnei Torah, constant growth in Yiras Shamayim. Now that question needs to be paramount not only for someone whose involvement with Talmud Torah is perhaps somewhat arai or at least in terms of time available very limited, but the question should also be paramount and is equally vital for us as Bnei Yeshiva. I'm sure you're familiar with the story which the Rav tells in Ish HaHalacha, the exchange between Rav Chaim and Rav Itzele Volozhiner. Rav Itzele of course was a leading proponent of introducing Mussar into the Yeshivos and Volozhin resisted. So Rav Itzele came talmudov byado with the Gemara in Berachos of
לעולם ירגיז אדם יצר הטוב על יצר הרע אם נצחו מוטב ואם לאו יקרא קריאת שמע ואם לאו יזכור לו יום המיתה
and said that this Gemara provided a mandate for introducing the study of Mussar. Rav Chaim answered with the Gemara in Kiddushin of אם פגע בך מנוול זה משכהו לבית המדרש that involvement in Torah per se should ensure what the Mussar movement identified as its goals. Now in what sense is this true? How does exactly does this happen? So certainly on one level it's super rational, it's kabbalah, it's something mystical that just the involvement with Torah has an effect on a person. I remember when I first began to give shiur, so Rav Gershon Zachs zichrono livracha commented and said that if one is successful as a Rebbe, so the hashpa'ah that one should have in talmidim is not just through whatever divrei mussar one says, but the Torah itself should be mashpi'a. Those were his words. The Torah itself should be mashpi'a. And that's I assume one level of meaning in Rav Chaim's statement of אם פגע בך מנוול זה משכהו לבית המדרש that the Torah itself should ensure this growth as Bnei Torah in Yiras Shamayim. But I think that there's another level as well and unless and this level requires our conscious attention in order to realize the potential which Torah has for facilitating our growth as Bnei Torah in Yiras Shamayim. And this is very well illustrated by the famous Ibn Ezra in this week's parsha. Ibn Ezra commenting on Lo Sachmod, again it's an Ibn Ezra with which you're all familiar, commenting on Lo Sachmod, it's not clear why the Ibn Ezra has the discussion on Lo Sachmod rather than Lo Sisaveh, but leaving that aside,
אנשים רבים ישתוממו על זאת המצווה איך יהיה אדם שלא יחמוד דבר יפה בלבו כל מה שהוא נחמד למראה עיניו.
People wonder, how can the Torah legislate something such as taivas haleiv? The Torah can tell us to discipline our actions. It can tell us what to do, what not to do. How can the Torah tell us what to feel, what not to feel, what to desire, what not to desire? I think in contemporary usage, language, the Ibn Ezra would say again, not only is the Torah here seemingly legislating emotions, but it's legislating instincts. And how can that be? An instinct is something automatic, right? But when we think of instinct, so we think of that it's involuntary. So how can the Torah tell a poor person who's walking around in torn, tattered clothing, in rags, how can the Torah tell him that when he walks alongside some palatial mansion and sees through the window and sees the gvir sitting and being waited upon and eating from fancy china and drinking from the best glassware, how can the Torah tell this person not to instinctively desire that I wish that were mine, I wish I could have it? The Ibn Ezra answers:
ככה כל משכיל צריך שידע כי אשה יפה וממון לא ימצאנו אדם בעבור חכמתו ודעתו רק כאשר חלק לו השם. ואמר קהלת ולאדם שלא עמל בו יתננו חלקו. ובעבור זה המשכיל לא יתאוה ולא יחמוד. ואחר שידע שאשת רעהו אסרה השם לו יותר היא נשגבה בעיניו מבת מלך בלב הכפרי. על כן הוא ישמח בחלקו ולא ישיב אל לבו לחמוד ולהתאוות דבר שאינו שלו כי ידע שהשם לא רצה לתת לו.
So the Ibn Ezra answers with his famous mashal, and the pshat of his mashal about how a poor, boorish villager doesn't imagine in his wildest dreams and therefore doesn't desire to marry the princess. So the Ibn Ezra says that a psychological principle which Hakadosh Baruch Hu established in human nature is that a person is chomeid what he thinks is possible, what he thinks is attainable. And what a person thinks is impossible, unattainable, a person's not chomeid. A person doesn't covet what he can't imagine ever happening. And if a person does covet something, he does desire it, it's because he feels and he believes that it could just as well be him living on the inside of that mansion and it could just as well be the gvir who would be on the outside. The Ibn Ezra says if only we would take seriously our belief in hashgacha pratis, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu apportions to each and every one of us exactly what we're supposed to have, no more and no less, and number one, that is what's right and what's best, and number two, even if we don't appreciate that fact, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu's will can't be overturned. So then a person would never ever be chomeid, a person would never ever be misaveh. Let's just reflect for a moment upon what the Ibn Ezra says. Again, it's such an it's difficult to exaggerate the importance of this yesod. Again, the person's walking by. He doesn't consciously decide that he's going to covet. He does it instinctively, right? It's an automatic instinctive reaction. And yet the Ibn Ezra is saying if only this person would take seriously his belief in hashgacha pratis, that wouldn't happen. In other words, what the Ibn Ezra here is telling us is that in the realm of emunos v'deos... emunos v'deios and middos, it's not enough that we know, it's not enough that we believe, but the Torah requires that it be internalized, that it be so deeply ingrained and internalized within us that it then generates our instincts, and that there's no such thing as an instinct which is, or at least in terms of Torah u'mitzvos, which is one which is again just involuntary. No, the instinct, when you analyze it, when you think about it, you realize that this instinct for coveting really reflects again a certain hashkafa, a certain sense that this is attainable, that it is possible, and that it would be better for me. If a person would not only know, he would not only believe, but he would internalize his belief in hashgacha pratis, so then his instinct would be different. His instinct in walking by would be: so that's what the Ribbono shel Olam apportioned to that person; for him, the nisayon of osher is best, and for me, the nisayon of aniyus is best. So the yesod here is that for a person to act, think, and feel as a ben Torah at all times, the basic emunos v'deios of Torah, of Yahadus, have to be internalized. And again, this is a perfect test case in that it illustrates again how one's emotions and even one's instincts ultimately are determined by what beliefs a person internalizes. Now, it's on that level also that the Gemara in Kiddushin should be understood: אם פגע בך מנוול זה משכהו לבית המדרש. And that certainly requires effort on our part. That's not something which just happens mystically of its own accord, but it's something that we need to work on. Let's just first mention one or two other mareh mekomos just to corroborate this basic idea and then talk a little bit about this very practically. First of all, it's a pasuk:
וידעת היום והשבות אל לבבך כי ה׳ הוא האלהים בשמים ממעל ועל הארץ מתחת אין עוד.
So the Torah clearly tells us that v'yadata hayom is insufficient, but it means—but what's required is v'hashevosa el levavecha, that a person shouldn't simply intellectually believe, subscribe to the ikrei haemuna, but it has to be something which is a part of him, which is internalized. If you take a look again, again where we find this emphasis, for instance, in the Sefer HaChinuch in the mitzvah of nekama, the Sefer HaChinuch basically explains the mitzvah of nekama along the same lines, that nekama is nonsensical in light of our belief in hashgacha pratis. Because in light of our belief in hashgacha pratis, whatever happens to a person, ultimately HaKadosh Baruch Hu ordains that it happens for whatever reason, for whatever reason: kaparas avonos, yissurim shel ahava, whatever the reason is, ultimately HaKadosh Baruch Hu ordains it. He allows that person to exercise his free will against me only because kach gazra chochmaso. Mimeila, says the Sefer HaChinuch, the ultimate cause of whatever happens to a person is hashgacha pratis. Nekama is nonsensical. Listen to how he explains it. He says: משורשי המצוה שידע האדם ויתן אל לבו. Right? That same complementarity again, not just yeda ha-adam. The anger and the instinct for revenge, it's not going to be sufficient that a person knows it, it has to rather be yitein el libo. One last example, but again once we become sensitized to it, so I think we'll come across other examples as well. The Ramo Shulchan Aruch quoting from the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim in Siman Aleph when the Ramo talks about שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד that a person doesn't behave in front of a melech the way he would in private, then the Ramo concludes כל שכן שישים האדם אל לבו. Again, not כל שכן שידע האדם that we're always in the presence of the Ribbono Shel Olam. We know that, but it's not enough, it's needed שישים האדם אל לבו that those basic emunos and deyos which we know, the problem is that in moshchehu l'veis hamidrash, what's supposed to be happening in the beis hamidrash is not only learning and knowing, but v'hasheivosa el levavecha. And sometimes we neglect that part of the mitzvah of talmud torah. Now it should be clear even from the examples we've mentioned until now, and bli neder in the next week or two during these brief shiurim we'll give a few more very specific examples that this method of tikkun hamiddos through internalizing hashkafos, through internalizing basic yesodos ha'emunah is so much more effective and powerful than simply trying on the level of behavior to modify one's behavior. Again, example: when it comes to lo sachmod, so a person can try to walk around telling himself all day lo sachmod is an issur d'oraisa. I shouldn't do it, I shouldn't do it, I shouldn't do it, and can constantly struggle on that level. He might enjoy a measure of success, probably inevitable that he'll suffer setbacks. When a person takes the approach of, well what's the hashkafa which I haven't internalized which allows me to be chomeid? Let me identify again those basic yesodos ha'emunah, those basic hashkafos. Again, this is true not only bein adam l'chaveiro, it's true bein adam l'makom as well. So that again changes the person, it changes his reactions in a much more fundamental way than just trying to control behavior. So if a person wants, as we all do, that there should be constant aliyah, that there should be constant growth in tikkun hamiddos, in yiras shamayim, so each one of us, beino l'vein atzmo, has to make a cheshbon hanefesh. Make a cheshbon hanefesh and try to identify what areas am I deficient in. What middos megunos do I see in myself? Is it atzlus? Is it kaas? Is it a lack of chessed, a lack of empathy? A lack of yiras shamayim? What areas am I deficient in? And then, the way to attack it is to then try to understand, well, what hashkafos have I not internalized? If I find myself growing angry, losing my temper, what hashkafos have I not sufficiently internalized if I find myself constrained and and shackled by atzlos v'chulu. And in each case, again, as as the Ibn Ezra illustrates and again bli neder we’ll try to apply this to specific middos. It’s not simply that, well, that kaas is no good. It’s deeper than that, it’s more basic than that, but that’s the basic approach, again, through the cheshbon hanefesh to identify the areas which most need improvement and then to try to recognize what are the hashkafos which need to be internalized. Now, having done that, having done that, so how does a person go about internalizing? It’s a nice word, it’s an even nicer idea, but what does it mean halacha l'maaseh? How does it happen halacha l'maaseh? So sometimes we're contemptuous, I hope that's not too strong a word, of elementary solutions. We want something which seems a chidush, something which seems profound. And because of that, we neglect, again, certain elementary and very basic solutions. This is a good example. There is no magical solution for how one internalizes. The solution which the Torah recommends, and in a minute I’ll read you a line the Mesillas Yesharim basically says this, is that the way HaKadosh Baruch Hu again created human nature is that the way something becomes internalized is by being constantly reinforced. Constantly being reinforced. To operate with the example that we focused on tonight, the Ibn Ezra. If a person struggles with lo sachmod, so then a person identifies that the reason he covets is because again, his his emunah in hashgacha pratis hasn't been sufficiently internalized. So that's stage number one. He’s diagnosed the symptom of lo sachmod, he realizes that the cause is the lack of internalizing emunah in hashgacha pratis and then the practical method and strategy is simply to spend time, several times a day, to take a few minutes out and to talk to himself, to think to himself, again בין אדם לבין עצמו about hashgacha pratis. That whatever that כל מזונותיו של אדם is ktzuva, that כל מה שיקרה לאדם מטוב ועד רע is סיבה שתבוא עליו מאת השם יתברך. So it’s enough to learn it once or twice, to know it, maybe to learn it a few more times to make sure you don’t forget it, that you can always recall it from your memory bank. But if we want to internalize it, not just yeda ha'adam but yosem el libo, it simply requires constant reinforcement. And what it means is on a daily basis, a person has to again a few times over the course of the day stop and be mechazek himself in that particular area. Mesillas Yesharim says it in the following context, at the very beginning in his hakdama. He says
אין התועלת הנלקט מזה הספר יוצא מן הקריאה בו פעם אחת.
There's nothing to be gained or the real purpose of this sefer will not be achieved by studying the sefer once.
כי כבר אפשר שלא ימצא הקורא בשכלו חידושים אחר קריאתו מה שלא היה בו לפני קריאתו אלא מעט.
Either you'll find nothing new or maybe a little bit new in my sefer. אבל התועלת יוצא מן החזרה עליו וההתמדה. Constantly reviewing it is how the goal will be attained. Why? Because what will result from this constant reinforcement? So again, here comes the key phrase, because the result will be יושם אל ליבו חובתו אשר הוא מתעלם ממנו. Because the result of the constant review will be that it will result in shima el halev, in this internalizing which is otherwise again can't be accomplished just by studying for the purpose of knowing. That's not enough. I think this is how the, just to conclude and to summarize, I think this is how the Gemara in Makkos should be understood. The Gemara has how several of the nevi'im condensed taryag mitzvos or organized them around certain yesodos. Whether it's Micha or other nevi'im. And then the Gemara says, בא חבקוק והעמידן על אחת שצדיק באמונתו יחיה. That everything is a function of emuna. Everything is seen through the prism of emuna. And certainly part of what Chazal mean there is what we're talking about, is that the yesodos of Torah, yesodos of emuna, when we are conscious of not only knowing them and believing them, but of shima el halev, of v'hasheivosa el levavecha, so they then regulate again not only what we believe but what we do, what we think, and it's that which ensures again constant growth and aliya, again not only bein adam l'Makom but bein adam l'chavero as well. Bli neder next week, what we'll try to do is select a few particular middos, a few particular areas, and again try to follow this pattern of what the hashkafa is or what the hashkafos are which need again hachazara and hahasmada in the words of the Mesillas Yesharim in order to internalize to allow for the tikun hamiddos.