The topic of Pikuach Nefesh is Docheh Kol HaTorah with the exception of the Gimmel Averos Chamuros. The Gemara in דף ה עמוד א explains this is true not only for Chayei Olam but even for Chayei Sha'ah. Even if it's clear that with the Chilul Shabbos or whatever Issur will be Mitztaref that we can only succeed maximum, maximum in prolonging the person's life a minute, a second, nevertheless, the Din is Mechalel Shabbos to override any Issur that's necessary. The Rav Soloveitchik, I think in one of his Teshuvos, dramatizes this Din and says imagine you could have someone who was a Cheresh and not only was he a Cheresh but on top of that he was a Shoteh and on top of that he was a Katan and on top of that he could be comatose and the maximum you could achieve for such an individual is Chayei Sha'ah, אף על פי כן the Halacha says that you have to be Mechalel Shabbos, הרי הוא ככל מכל דבר for this moment of life, for this comatose Cheresh, Shoteh, VeKatan. So clearly, clearly, what emerges from that Halacha is the Kedushas HaChaim, the great almost infinite value of life, of a moment of life. Let's try to understand this a little bit more deeply, just like any Inyan in Torah behooves to understand, but also it has ramifications for the entire realm of Bein Adam L'Chaveiro as well. The source for all Kedusha, the source for all worth and value in the world of course is Hakadosh Baruch Hu. All Kedusha, all worth or value ultimately is traced back perhaps directly, perhaps indirectly, but ultimately traced back to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. When the Pasuk says קדושים תהיו כי קדוש אני ה' אלוהיכם, it's not simply telling us the Ki Kadosh is not simply a reason for the Tzivuy of Kedoshim Tiyu. It's not simply that you must be Kedoshim because Hakadosh Baruch Hu is Kadosh, but it also means that you can be Kadosh. The Pasuk is also claiming and accounting for the possibility of Kedusha. There's a possibility of Kedusha because Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the source of Kedusha and כי קדוש אני ה' אלוהיכם therefore again you have first of all the possibility of Kedoshim Tiyu and then Mimeila a Tzivuy as well of Kedoshim Tiyu. And in that light, it's quite clear and מקרא מלא דברי הכתוב that this almost absolute value which is attached to a life is because of the Tzelem Elokim, because Kruyim Banim LaMakom. An individual who's a Tzelem Elokim, a Yisrael in addition who's not only a Tzelem Elokim but is Nikra VeBanim LaMakom, so that's the source of this again almost absolute worth, value of the tremendous Kedushas HaChaim. It's quite clear that this has to have implications for our Bein Adam L'Chaveiro as well. Let's try to understand that a little bit. The Chayei Adam in his Hakdama to the Halachos of Kibbud Av Va'Em in Klal Samech Zayin יסכר פי דוברי שקר. The mouth of people who speak falsehood should be should be shut who say that we're not indebted to our parents because our parents were mechaven l'hana'as atzmam and subsequently וכיון שנולד מהם נתן הקדוש ברוך הוא הטבע שהאב והאם יגדלו בניהם כטבע או בטבע ככל בהמה וחיה ועוף שמגדלים בניהם ואין הבנים מחזיקים טובה לאבותיהם
and even subsequently, again there's a parental instinct. Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives a parent, right, any any parent can can attest to this, there's a parental instinct to care for one's children. So why should the children feel indebted, why should there be any hakaras hatov for the parents? So the Chayei Adam says יסכרו וישתתקו וישתרשו כדכתיב תאלמנה שפתי שקר but l'mayseh the Chayei Adam doesn't help us why this is wrong. Right, the Chayei Adam very harshly, very harshly condemns people who say it, but he doesn't tell us why it's wrong. And l'marvei hapliyah, if you juxtapose this passage in the Chayei Adam with the Rabbeinu Bachya in Chovos HaLevavos at the beginning of Sha'ar Avodas Elokim, so Rabbeinu Bachya there as you know writes how the impulse for avodas Hashem should come from hakaras hatov. And he says that when you think about it, you'll realize that the only chesed which is done totally altruistically, of free will, is the chesed which Hakadosh Baruch Hu does with us and that every chesed which which we do one for another, he says, is motivated by some self-interest or by some instinct. And the first example that he gives is חסד של אב על הבן, right, the very first example he gives, and exactly this instinct, this teva, which the Chayei Adam is saying don't think that that undercuts the chiyuv of kibud av v'eim. So Rabbeinu Bachya in Chovos HaLevavos emphasizes how what parents do for children is not really totally altruistic, for exactly the reason which the Chayei Adam again so so harshly rejects as a reason for undercutting the hakaras hatov to one's parents. Now true, the Rabbeinu Bachya of course says אף על פי כן the Torah is mechayeivas in hakaras hatov, bein adam l'chaveiro, kibud av v'eim, in every context, despite the lack of of pure altruism. But תורה היא וללמוד אנו צריכים, why is this so wrong? Why is it so, why is the taina so terrible? Because lich'ora the facts on which the taina is based are indeed there, they are true. So the answer, the answer apparently is that the Torah is very, very particular that the way we view each other, bein adam l'chaveiro, the way one person views, relates to another can never ever be that the other person is simply an object, that the other person is simply an instrument. What's so terrible about this line of argument for why one should not feel a hakaras hatov to one's parents, is that what does it reduce the parents to? Instead of instead of relating to the parents as subjects, so one is relating to the parents as an instrument. Okay, so they're simply instruments, again, everything they did was in It was driven by an instinct. So that reduces the parents to an instrument and that, that is terrible יסכר פיך דובר שקר that we can ever relate one to another and achas kama v'kama a child to a parent as being an instrument, as being an object. Betosefes bi'ur, it would seem as follows: The Rambam explains in the hakdama to Perush Hamishnayos. The Rambam says any bar sechel doesn't act arbitrarily. Doesn't act without a goal, without a tachlis. A bar sechel is goal-oriented. What a person does, he does for a to'eles, for a tachlis. So what then is the to'eles of the entire briah? What's the to'eles of the entire briah? So the Rambam says אך כלל הדברים כל הנמצאים תחת גלגל הירח לא נמצאו אלא בשביל האדם בלבד.
kol ba'alei hachayim, kach haperos vehatzmachim, everything is a to'eles for adam. Everything is a to'eles for adam. Right, everything Hakadosh Baruch Hu created in this world is for our use, for our use. Mimeila, so the Ribbono shel Olam, right, the Ribbono shel Olam created us that we're the tachlis of the briah, right? That a person is the tachlis, the people are the tachlis habriah and everything else, everything else as Chazal say is לא נברא אלא לשמשני לא נברא אלא לשמשני. So imagine, imagine the magnitude of what we do when we relate to a person as not being a tachlis. When we relate to a person as being an emtzai. When we dismiss, when we dismiss and say, nah, the person is just he's he's acting according to his teva. And therefore, I'm not beholden, I don't have to be makir tov. So the result is that we're relating to that other person as an emtzai. He's a means, he's a means. And that, that contradicts the Ribbono shel Olam's plan for the briah. Is that people are the tachlis habriah. That's what everything is created for. So how can it be, how can it be that I will come and say, no, another person is only an emtzai? This perspective on other people and and this approach to bein adam l'chaveiro should simply transform everything, our attitude, our behavior. For instance, sometimes you go you go to a wedding. You go to a wedding. So there are waiters, there are bartenders. They're getting paid. They're getting paid to wait on the tables, they're getting paid to bring you the various courses. There's no question that when the waiter comes and serves you something, so we're supposed to say thank you. When he clears off the plate from one from one course and then brings the next course, again thank you. Not just sit there as though es kumpt mir because I'm an invited guest and he's being paid to do it. Because if you have that, if we have that attitude, so then we're relating to a person, to a person, the tachlis habriah, we're relating to as though he's just an object, as though he's an instrument, he's a programmed robot. Right? So what do I have to say thank you? A person doesn't say thank you. So then then the then the person again who's the tachlis habriah who's never supposed to be an object never supposed to be treated as an instrument so we're treating the the person as a robot. And the fact that the person is getting paid and that it's his job doesn't change our chiyuv to relate to each other as as a person. Sometimes when when people go into into into a restaurant into a food establishment and they're ordering something so you hear a loshon you hear you hear such leshonos and and to be if we're going to be rooted in Torah and and hear things and see things and react to things based on Torah it has to grate on on the ears. People walk in and they say let me have such and such. Let me have whatever fill in fill in the blank. Or let me have. And let me have is לא נברא אלא לשמשני doesn't refer to other people. The whole world is here equally to be meshammesh the other person and it's to me. And what the Rambam goes on to talk about here doesn't if you if you're familiar with the Hakdama L'peirush Hamishnayot doesn't carry over in terms of our our relations bein adam lachaveiro. Sometimes as there's a class going on in in a classroom and you forgot something in the classroom you forgot something in the classroom. So people tend to walk in okay they tend to walk in quietly or whatever to get what they forgot in the classroom but what what attitude towards all the people who are sitting in the classroom that's that's to speak? Again it's the כל העולם לא נברא אלא לשמשני but laafokei from all the other people in the world and certainly the hashkafa of the Torah which is embodied in the din of pikuach nefesh which is again ultimately rooted in the fact of banim lamakom doesn't allow for that. The Gemara in Shabbos the famous Gemara in Shabbos where Hillel responds to the challenge of the ger of למדני כל התורה כולה על רגל אחת. So both the Baal HaTanya and the Gaon interpret that the ger came and said yeah I heard the mishna that על שלשה דברים העולם עומד על התורה ועל העבודה ועל גמילות חסדים.
But I want an even simpler formula. Reduce it even more for me. למדני כל התורה כולה instead of the gimmel raglayim of Torah avoda gemilus chassadim tell me tell me regel tell me regel. So Shammai threw him out. The mishna says על שלשה דברים העולם עומד. So Hillel said דעלך סני לחברך לא תעביד v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. So the Gaon and the Baal HaTanya again shelo k'Rashi say that Hillel meant it kiphshuto k'mashmao not like Rashi says with the pasuk in Mishlei רעך ורע אביך אל תעזוב that that Hillel was using the pasuk with reiacha referring to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. No it's kiphshuto k'mashmao v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. So how does v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha encapsulate Torah and avodah as well? So the pshat the Gaon says it's k'katzar b'remiza the Baal HaTanya says it more ba'arichus. The pshat is that a person's bein adam lachaveiro ultimately is a reflection of his bein adam lamakom. And that a and that ultimately real correct dikduk bein adam lachaveiro is only possible when it's rooted in a bein adam lamakom and on the other hand and on the other hand it's a more accurate reflection and it shows just how deeply ingrained one's emunah is if it's not only when a person is omeid bitfilla that he acts properly but when he interacts with banim lamakom. So that in many ways is a more exacting test of one's not only bein adam lachaveiro but one's bein adam lamakom as well and these examples which we gave trivial perhaps. Trivial, but on the other hand, what it reflects and what it bespeaks is very, very far from trivial.