As the title indicates, for tonight, I didn't so much choose a topic in halakha or hashkafa to try to explore and expand upon, but rather to identify a very formidable challenge of our time and to try to think aloud a little bit how we can respond to that challenge, what the coping mechanisms and strategies are. At least partially, it probably lends itself as much to a conversation as it does to a shiur. So if at any point, either during or after, there are questions which will help us clarify, so please, please feel free. We live in a time when large segments of Western society, American society, have rejected traditional norms and canons of morality. This is a trend that began over 50 years ago, but in frightening ways has intensified the past few years. And as a result, the gap that's opened between Western beliefs, axioms, assumptions, practices, lifestyle, and that of the Torah becomes greater and greater. And it's important that we recognize what the implications of these developments are for us. They potentially affect us in a very, very significant way. And that's because, maybe working backwards in terms of citing the sources, the Rambam writes in Hilchos Deios that דרך בריאתו של אדם, it's human nature, להיות נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחרי רעיו וחבריו. A person is drawn after, in his character traits, in his or her behavior, the character traits and the behavior which is exemplified, which is manifest by one's colleagues, ונוהג כמנהג במנהג אנשי מדינתו. And it's human nature that we adopt the practices of surrounding society. Chazal tell us famously that אוי לרשע ואוי לשכנו. In Parshas Acharei Mos, so the Torah has, the Torah writes that כמעשה ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם בה לא תעשו וכמעשה ארץ כנען אשר אני מביא אתכם שמה לא תעשו ובחקתיהם לא תלכו.
So the Torah tells us, it's a lav not to imitate the immoral behavior which happened in Eretz Mitzrayim, and similarly not to adopt any of the practices of Eretz Canaan. But that's not all the pasuk says. The pasuk identifies Mitzrayim for us: כמעשה ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם בה. And the Torah identifies Eretz Canaan for us: אשר אני מביא אתכם שמה. Mitzrayim in which you lived for 210 years, Eretz Canaan where you're headed, which is your, which is the last stop on this journey. What, we really don't know at this point in the Chumash what Eretz Mitzrayim is and we don't know what Eretz Canaan is? So why does the Torah have to, in this context, identify Eretz Mitzrayim and Eretz Canaan? But it's clear that the Torah is telling us: maybe, maybe you'll think... that these lavin, these prohibitions aren't necessary. The behavior in Mitzrayim, Mitzrayim is is sort of the in Canaan of of the epitome of immoral societies. The immorality was rampant. So maybe you'll think that a person will just instinctively is going to recoil and how is it conceivable, how is it imaginable that a person is really going to engage in the same type of behavior in which they they engaged in Eretz Mitzrayim and Eretz Canaan? And if there is a lav already, if there are lavin already, so maybe you'll think that we don't really need to have our guard up against this because this this is an easy one. This is an easy one. The Torah says no, כמעשה ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם בה. You lived there for two hundred and ten years. And when when you're surrounded by something, so human nature is that the influence seeps in. So no matter how objectively repulsive the behavior in Mitzrayim or Canaan is, don't think that that you're immune to the influence. You're still susceptible because she'yeshavtem bah, because you lived there. And you're going to be susceptible to the influence in Eretz Canaan because you're going to live there, אשר אני מביא אתכם שמה. So what's happening in the society around us is is not only of interest and concern because of our concern for society at large, but it's also of of great concern because of its potential effect on us, or or maybe actual effect that it's already having. So how does how does one sort of not fall prey to that? So if one reads further, if one learns further in Hilchos Deos, so the Rambam talks about the relocating to try to escape influences and find a more wholesome society. So we're not going to we're not going to talk about that. A, I assume that for just about everyone here at at this stage of your life, it's not necessarily practical. And and number two, equally significantly, is that I don't know that there's any corner of the world where where one will be free from these from these influences. After Avimelech discovers that Rivka is in fact Yitzchak's wife, so he he challenges Yitzchak, 'Why weren't you straight with me? Why why did you identify her as as your sister?' And Yitzchak Avinu answers, כי אמרתי רק אין יראת אלהים במקום הזה. Yitzchak Avinu said, 'I came here to Eretz Plishtim, and I didn't see any Yiras Shamayim. I saw a flourishing society, maybe with lots of culture, but I didn't detect any Yiras Elokim, no Yiras Shamayim.' Yiras Shamayim acts as a check and balance. Yiras Shamayim is a healthy source of healthy inhibition. The pasuk, ראשית חכמה יראת השם. The foundation, reishis in the sense of beginning of, the foundation, the first thing. When when you want to build a building, you you have to lay the foundation. The foundation for all chochma is is Yiras Hashem. What does it mean to have to have Yiras Shamayim? So part of what Yiras Shamayim entails, the Rambam writes in Sefer HaMitzvos, lehipached mimenu, to have a sense of fear, simple fear, ולא נהיה ככופרים ההולכים בקרי. And we shouldn't act as those who deny Hakadosh Baruch Hu, that one can just act without considering consequences, אבל נראה ביראתו בכל עת. So part of what Yirah Shamayim entails means to live with a sense of fear. This isn't our topic, obviously the sense of fear in Avodas Hashem is complemented by a sense of Simcha in Avodas Hashem as well. It's not our topic tonight. To live with a sense of fear and a sense of accountability. And that's how Yiras Shamayim serves as a check and balance, how it serves as a healthy source, healthy inhibition. A person lives with a sense of accountability. That's one element of our approach, of our strategy in trying to cope with the challenge that we have. Another element. The pasuk says in Mishlei that תועבת ה' כל גבה לב, that it's an abomination to Hakadosh Baruch Hu if a person is haughty, if a person is arrogant. Chazal say in Masechet Sotah that כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח, if you have a person again with arrogance, אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא, kavyachol Hakadosh Baruch Hu says: אין אני והוא יכולים לדור בעולם. There isn't enough room for the two of us, says Hakadosh Baruch Hu in the world. The world isn't big enough to accommodate both the Ribbono Shel Olam as well as a person who's arrogant. But perhaps the strongest statement is one which we come across in the Rambam in Hilchos Deos. The Rambam writes that Kol hamagbia libo, a person feels haughty, the Rambam writes: Kafar ba'ikar. That the person has denied Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Now there are many Maamarei Chazal, some of which the Rambam quotes, which talk about sort of equivalencies, and they'll say ke-ilu, it's as if. For instance, in that same halacha the Rambam writes that כל הכועס הוא כאילו עובד עבודה זרה. A person who gets angry and has that loss of control which comes with experiencing anger, it's as if the person is oveid avoda zara. It's not actual avoda zara, obviously. Getting angry is not actually avoda zara, but it's ke-ilu. On a certain level there's a moral or religious equivalence. What's so incredibly striking and powerful and scary about this statement when the Ram says Kol hamagbia libo, he doesn't have that ke-ilu, there's no chaf hadimyon. It's not that it's as if, it's not that it resembles, it's not that it's it is. It is. It actually is. Kol hamagbia libo, Rambam says is Kafar ba'ikar. It's intuitive that gaiva, that arrogance, that haughtiness, that it's a midah meguna, it's a bad character trait. That's something which is intuitive and resonates with all of us. But why is it so bad? It's so bad that it's an abomination, so bad that Hakadosh Baruch Hu says the world isn't big enough to accommodate the two of us, so bad that the Rambam codifies in halacha that it's Kafar ba'ikar. Most basic beliefs about Hakadosh Baruch Hu? What are our most basic beliefs, or at least some of them? So the Torah says that ein od milvado. What does ein od milvado mean? We had also, isn't- isn't the- the shulchan here? What- what does it mean that ein od milvado, that there's nothing other than Hakadosh Baruch Hu? So what it means is that only Hakadosh Baruch Hu genuinely independently exists and everything else just feeds off of His existence. Everything else is totally dependent, totally contingent, as though, without the negative connotation, not intending the negative connotation, that we're all parasites. We're all- we all feed off of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence. ein od milvado. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is absolute and independent and we are contingent and totally dependent. Our existence is not our own. Imagine someone who's- who has to be- someone's not well, he has to be linked up to a heart-lung machine. His vital processes are not his own. He's not breathing on his own. His heart is not pumping on his own. So that's even when Baruch Hashem we're blessed with the- with the health not to be in that actual situation, but the moshal is apt. And that's what it means: ein od milvado. Hakadosh Baruch Hu's chochmah is אין לו ערך ולא קץ. Hakadosh Baruch Hu's wisdom is inestimable and infinite. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is temim deios. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is perfect in His knowledge and we are tiny creatures with da'as kalah me'utah, with very, very limited and superficial understanding. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is hatzur tamim pa'alo, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is perfect and we are ourselves. Authentic emunah, genuine belief has to inspire and instill humility. There's no way a person can have genuine authentic belief without it inspiring and instilling humility. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is ein od milvado. Hakadosh Baruch Hu's chochmah is אין לו ערך ולא קץ. It's inestimable and- and- and infinite. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is perfect, hatzur tamim pa'alo, and the contrast to each of these is so, so jarring. Genuine belief, authentic belief in Hakadosh Baruch Hu has to instill- has to inspire and instill humility. Alongside these two elements, many of the ba'alei mussar present the following idea. I'll give a moshal. Let's say, let's say we come across someone who rachmana litzlan is lax in shemiras Shabbos. Lax in shemiras Shabbos. In order to- let's say we don't come across someone, let's say I'm looking in the mirror, not that I'm looking out, let's say I'm looking in the mirror and I see laxity in some area of halakha. To get myself to improve, or if we're trying to get others to improve, so there has to be a two-pronged approach. Number one, a person has to be inspired to want to improve, to understand the chashivus, the importance. So in the example of Shabbos... And to tell the person Shabbos is edus le'maaseh bereishis and when the person rachmana litzlan because the Shabbos is is the testimony that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, if a person rachmana litzlan cuts corners on shemiras Shabbos, so that's a way of of that translates into an eidus sheker, into a false testimony about Hakadosh Baruch Hu. But all the inspiration in the world, all the exhortation, I still I still have to know the halachos of Shabbos. I still have to know how it's permissible to heat food on Shabbos and how it's not permissible to heat food on Shabbos and similarly for for the rest of the of the lamed tes melachos. So there's a two-pronged attack, there's a two-pronged approach. Number one, I I need it needs to be impressed upon me, I need to impress upon myself the importance and therefore the need to be scrupulous. But then I have to be able to to implement that, I have to be able to translate that. So there's always going to be this combination between mussar and halacha. So for instance, when when the Chofetz Chaim decided to to try to solve the problem of widespread disregard and laxity in terms of shemiras halashon, so he actually wrote two different seforim. He wrote Chofetz Chaim which is hilchos lashon hara and then he wrote a sefer Shemiras Halashon which is all the maamarei Chazal talking about the importance of shemiras halashon and how serious an aveira it is when there isn't shemiras halashon. You need that that same, you need that that two-pronged approach. Mesillas Yesharim earlier talks talks about it. So we also need to to learn as much genuine halacha and hashkafas HaTorah as possible, to to know what is genuine halacha, what the halacha genuinely says and what the guidance the halacha genuinely gives us and what the what the authentic hashkafas HaTorah is on on subjects, with all the with all the humility and all the yiras shamayim and all the willingness and all the receptivity, but we need the substance of of what what the Torah genuinely says in terms of halacha, in terms of hashkafa. Another crucial element in in our quest for clarity is cheshbon hanefesh. Chazal call באו הנפש חשבונו של עולם. There's a series of of questions that that each of us individually and communally collectively need to pose to ourselves. What values do I embrace? What assumptions do I operate with? What are my axioms? And then what's the basis for them? Things that that that I take for granted. What what what's the basis for them? And here it's important to gain perspective on a couple of things. Sometimes seemingly the source for our for a position that we'll adopt and that we'll advocate passionately, seemingly the source is from within our tradition, from within Torah. We'll quote ve'ahavta lere'acha kamocha. We'll quote we'll quote דרכיה דרכי נועם וכל נתיבותיה שלום and and suggest what the implications and applications of those types of values are. So here there's a fundamental fundamental point that that it's almost impossible to exaggerate its importance. Chesed. And again, using that as an example, as an illustration for these types of values, always and can only be defined in light of emes. But what does that mean as follows? Is it a good deed, is it a chesed if someone asks me for a drink, for me to give that person the drink? So usually the answer to that question is yes. But if the person is an alcoholic or a recovering alcoholic and the drink that he's asking me for is an alcoholic drink, so then it's not a chesed. So chesed can never be independently defined. It can never be autonomously defined. It always has to be defined in a broader context, in a context of emes. If someone asks me to pass the bottle so they can have a drink, but maybe they're unaware of it, or maybe the person is aware of it but doesn't know better to care about it, but the drink is not kosher. It's not a chesed to do. One can't sort of isolate ve'ahavta lere'acha kamocha, deracheha darchei noam and apply it and draw conclusions and see what the implications of that are. No, it has to be part of the overall system of what's right and wrong, what's mutar and assur, what conforms to ritzon Hashem and what doesn't conform to ritzon Hashem. So the fact that superficially something seems to be a chesed and the Torah told the world about chesed, that's where it comes from, from ve'ahavta lere'acha kamocha, doesn't mean that that is necessarily a Torah value in terms of this application, it doesn't mean that the conclusion in this particular context is going to be warranted. Another point. Chazal and in their footsteps the Rishonim identify human seichel, sevara as a source of truth. So for instance when Rav Saadia Gaon in his philosophic work Emunos V'deos talks about what sources of knowledge there are, one of the sources of knowledge is our seichel, is sevara. When the Chovos Halvavos wants to prove everything, he proves everything based on pesukim in Tanakh, ma'amarei Chazal, and then he argues it in sevara, logically, to show you how it's logically warranted. The reason seichel, sevara is a source of truth is something Rav Nissim Gaon says that any mitzvah in the Torah which is a mitzvah which our seichel dictates as well, it's not only that it's a pasuk in the Chumash, but our seichel dictates as well, so he says those mitzvos are incumbent upon gentiles as well. Gentiles are not bound by the other six hundred and six mitzvos when the mitzvos are just based solely on the fact that it's a pasuk in the Torah. But if the mitzvah also is something for which we have a moral intuition, which our seichel, which our sevara dictates as well, so he says all of those types of mitzvos are incumbent upon kol ba'ei olam, they're incumbent upon all of humanity. So why is that? The only reason seichel and sevara are sources of truth are because they're G-d given. And by definition if I find myself in a position where what seems right to me, what seems intuitive to me is clearly, clearly at odds with a pasuk in Chumash, with... Straight, maybe I've been unduly influenced by the surrounding society, but there's never a contradiction. It's not שני כתובים המכחישים זה את זה, there's never a contradiction between, there's no moral dilemma between what my conscience tells me this and the Torah tells me that. My conscience is only a guide when I can assume that it's reflecting what Hakadosh Baruch Hu implanted within me. But by definition, if it's at odds with what it says in the Torah, it clearly that isn't what Hakadosh Baruch Hu implanted within me because everything Hakadosh Baruch Hu says is consistent and harmonious. So there's never ever a moral dilemma between what my intuition tells me this, my sechel, my sevara tells me this, but the Torah tells me differently, Chazal tell me differently. And in this context, there's no difference between whether it's a pasuk in Chumash or whether it's a maimar Chazal. The pasuk in Malachi says, this is the end of nevuah, the last message of nevuah, which is sustaining us until until Mashiach comes and we'll have people who are Mashiach himself will be a navi and nevuah will return, so the pasuk that sustains us until then is Hakadosh Baruch Hu said through Malachi, זכרו תורת משה עבדי. So what a striking phrase: Toras Moshe. And Chazal use that phrase as well. Chazal refer to the Torah as das Moshe, the religion of Moshe Rabbeinu. The Rambam uses that phrase. He says that Sefer Hamada, the first sefer of the fourteen seforim of Mishneh Torah, he talks about the things which are ikar das Moshe. What do you mean das Moshe? It's Hakadosh Baruch Hu's Torah. It should be Toraso and it's the das, it's the religion of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, it's God's religion, it's not Moshe Rabbeinu's religion. So the answer is of course it's Hakadosh Baruch Hu's Torah, of course it's Hakadosh Baruch Hu's religion, everything about it is, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu communicated that to us through a masorah which began with Moshe Rabbeinu on Har Sinai. Which is why there's no difference in in this context or any other context between whether something is whether we encounter something explicitly in a pasuk in Chumash, in a pasuk in Tanach, or whether we encounter something explicitly in in a maimar Chazal and and something which is which there's a consensus omnium within within Chazal. And that's why Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself refers to the Torah as זכרו תורת משה עבדי as the Torah of Moshe Rabbeinu. Usually it's it's pedagogically unsound to to do what what I've been doing for the past half hour or so, to talk more abstractly without giving concrete examples. The reason the reason I've shied away from that is that I don't want to create the wrong impression that I'm talking about one or two particular issues. There's just so many incredible applications to what we're what we're talking about in terms of the assumptions, the mindset of modern society versus the Torah's assumptions and the mindset the Torah would have us have. I don't want to risk giving the wrong impression of buttonholing this, that we're talking about one or two particular particular issues. I hope it's at least somewhat clear the abstractions notwithstanding. The society in which we live and if anything said seems extreme, it's only extreme because the society in which we live is an incredibly extreme society. You're probably used to hearing from old-timers like me about how the world has changed within the course of their own lifetime, but I have to tell you, it's a different world than the world I grew up in, which is not to say that the world I grew up in was perfect and and was a blueprint for Torah society. But the world is a totally different world. The sense of entitlement that exists in society, the sense of that people feel entitled for self-gratification for whatever they want, it can't be that I want to do something, it can't be according to society that I want to do something, that I have a desire, and that I'm told no, that's assur, you can't do that. That can't be. Self-gratification is an inalienable right in society. The self-centeredness that that both reflects and promotes is one that obviously very quickly translates into a sense of arrogance and is just such a strong counterpoint to the yirat shamayim and humility which we're talking about. And then when if someone then responds with but the Torah says that this is wrong, this is inappropriate, so then that person now becomes depicted as I don't know, being repressive, as being bigoted, as being insensitive, as being biased, as being discriminatory. And what the Torah says in today's world, in today's society, when I was a kid, people did things that were assur, but they didn't claim, they didn't wrap themselves in a mantle of righteousness when they did what was assur. No, they said we're doing what's assur. That's what began in the sixties. In the sixties, they began doing dvar assur and they said openly we don't care, we don't care that you think this is assur. And now it's with self-righteousness, what the Torah says is assur is self-righteously critiqued in the name of how can you deny a person his or her inalienable right to happiness? Again, happiness, chesed, all these terms can't be defined independent of right and wrong. Everything has to be defined in the context of right and wrong. And as indefensible as the society's positions are philosophically, religiously, they still infiltrate, they still seep in, and we're still influenced by them. And it's so, so crucial that we engage in this cheshbon hanefesh of what assumptions do I make, what do I take for granted, and where does that come from? Does it, does it align With what I've learned when I learn halachos, genuine halachos haTorah? Does it align with genuine hashkafos haTorah? Well no, maybe it's just something which society has foisted upon us. I think maybe I'll stop here if there are questions to either clarify or to explain further. I'm happy to try b'ezras Hashem to be able to answer or otherwise we can just stop here. Thank you very much.