Thank you so much for the shiur and the insights into the Rambam and we have about 45 minutes slightly left and we'll try to get through a few of the really interesting and important questions that were submitted. It wasn't submitted in any particular order but doing my best in a random order. The first question has to do with aliyah. Many of our talmidim come here already very much thinking in the front of their mind, sometimes with even very specific and concrete timelines and plans on making aliyah, and many others who come here without that necessarily at the front of their mind but just being in the environment of the yeshiva in Eretz Yisrael eventually evolve towards thinking about aliyah in a very serious and meaningful way. So the basic question is, is aliyah mandatory? Is it obligatory? Is it just something that's preferable? Are there legitimate excuses not to make aliyah? Is that the way to look at it? That the default is you make it unless you have a patur not to? Or perhaps are there certain more positive affirmative reasons why a person might not? What are our obligations to the American or Chutz La'aretz Jewish community? Obviously every case is different, there's an enormous amount of subjectivity and a l'maiseh question for an individual person, but what are some of the general guidelines halachically, hashkafically that the talmidim could use to process such a big life decision? Since as Rabbi Gottlieb correctly indicated, since the final psak halacha obviously can't emerge out of such a forum and so we can talk about it, but I can't, I'm not qualified to render a psak halacha about anything, but again psak halacha can't emerge, it would have to be individualized, so it can't emerge from such a forum anyway. Before one looks to answer the question, we need to try to make sure that we ask the right question. You know sometimes you can ask a question and in an attempt to understand but if it's not the right question it's not going to get you in. You have to knock on the right door. You can knock on the door all day but if you're knocking on the back door in the hopes that they're going to knock on the front door and they're only listening for you at the front door, you're not going to get in through the back door. So a question is a way of looking for an entry point to a sugya, but you have to ask the right question. If one asks the wrong question, so then it's not going to get into the right point in the sugya. So the first thing to make sure that we ask the right question. So in learning, so the questions are supposed to suggest themselves. A question is suggested by a difficulty we encounter in the Gemara, a difficulty we encounter in Rashi, a difficulty we encounter in the Rambam, a difficulty the Ra'avad shows us in the Rambam. So that's what prompts the question, which then maybe is an entree to the havanah of a sugya. In this context, it's not as easy relatively speaking, it's not so easy in the other context either. But here, the importance of the question in terms of mitzvat talmud Torah, of how to understand the shitas haRambam, he doesn't count yishuv Eretz Yisrael in his Minyan HaMitzvot, the importance of that notwithstanding as a sugya in Torah, as a part of talmud Torah, when one reads the ma'amarei Chazal, one learns the ma'amarei Chazal at the end of Ketubot, for instance the Rambam quotes them in Perek Hei, Hilchos Melachim, does it really make a difference as the operative question whether one must live in Eretz Yisrael or whether a person who lives in Eretz Yisrael is zoche l'olam haba and kol avonotav mechulin? I don't know. If someone offers you 10 million dollars, do I have to take it or am I just completely—you gave me 10 million dollars, I'll take it. I'll take it and go endow a kollel for your sons and sons-in-law if that's the right thing for them. If it's such a big bracha, I don't know that the operative question is, well is it mamash a chiyuv or is it not mamash a chiyuv? When someone serves you your favorite dessert, you don't care, is dessert mamash a chiyuv, is it not mamash a chiyuv? Okay, maybe that affects when you do or don't make a bracha on dessert, so maybe that does have its place, that question, but l'maiseh in terms of what, are you going to eat the dessert? So maybe the opposite question is not so much is it a chiyuv as the Ramban says, or maybe not. Maybe the Ramban disagrees, and maybe some mitzva kiyumis or whatever, but it's hard to understand why the default position wouldn't be that a person would come to Eretz Yisrael unless there are legitimate compelling reasons that keep him out of Eretz Yisrael. Are those legitimate compelling reasons? I hope so. I certainly hope so. And the person has to be honest with himself in terms of whether or not that's why he's in chutz la'aretz. What are some of those potentially compelling reasons? As the Gemara says that you can leave Eretz Yisrael lilmod Torah, whether no Yeshiva in Eretz Yisrael, of course Yeshiva in Eretz Yisrael, but maybe the person that you're going to connect with, and the person that you're going to be able to be mekabel from, it's like a shidduch. That's the other thing the Gemara talks about leaving Eretz Yisrael for, is lisa isha. So learning is also a type of... they quote a Yerushalmi that I think... I think it's a Yerushalmi. The same way you have to have the right doctor, a talmid needs the right rebbi. So there are wonderful, wonderful rebbeim, but maybe for this talmid, the right rebbi happens to be in chutz la'aretz. Lilmod Torah and lisa isha, the Gemara talks about leaving Eretz Yisrael. What about living outside of Eretz Yisrael? I think there's a teshuva quoted very often, the teshuva of the Maharam Schick. Maharam Schick was in Hungary, and the Maharam Schick was from some gedolei talmidei chachamim so forth. And in those generations, so there was a big fight against reform, a different type of assimilation, and maybe not so different in some respects than what we have to deal with today. And the Maharam Schick had a talmid who wanted to leave his rabbanus in chutz la'aretz, and I guess it was in Hungary, I don't know, and I think he was offered a rabbanus in Eretz Yisrael, I'm not sure. And he wants from the Maharam Schick some bracha and give him a bracha on his aliya. The Maharam Schick said, how can I give you a bracha when you're doing the wrong thing? He said, you're... what you are in your rabbanus, you're combatting reforms, you're mechazek the tzibbur, you have no right to abandon your post. So Eretz Yisrael in different senses also presents that, a person has to be honest with himself what he's doing, where, what he's not doing. There is a German saying, which I think Rabbi Shachter quotes this also, it's... what is it? It's somewhat biting, but it's true, that the graveyard is full of indispensable people. So a person has to be honest about what he is doing and what he isn't doing. None of us are quite as indispensable as we would like to think we are. We're all more disposable than we think. That midah of yesod... there is a negiya that the Maharam Schick was describing. So every person has to know what I'm doing, does that qualify, is that the Maharam Schick teshuva or is that this rather sharp saying? Which of the two is relevant? Sometimes one is the applicable one, sometimes the other one is applicable. A person has to be very honest with himself. If he can, it's appropriate he should be misyayetz with others as well. If for whatever reason a person can't earn a living in Eretz Yisrael, the Avnei Nezer in the same teshuva who was asked why there are other tzaddikei hadorot who were so makpid on everything in their avodas Hashem, how could it be that all the tzaddikim throughout the doros didn't come to Eretz Yisrael? So he writes lehalacha, he says there's no mitzva to live in Eretz Yisrael if you're going to be supported from chutz la'aretz. The mitzva to live in Eretz Yisrael is if you're going to be supported in, if you're going to live and earn one's keep in... a person to live outside of Eretz Yisroel, but it should be on everyone's radar screen and it shouldn't be hesach hadaat. Why we live in chutz la'aretz, I don't know, but it should be the case that it's not hesach hadaat. Shifting gears, as talmidim, we all came to the yeshiva after the passing, after the petira of Rav Lichtenstein zatzal. What could you tell us about him, individually and personally, and in what ways was he unique from other gedolei Yisrael? In what ways should we be looking to learn from him or follow in his ways, even though unfortunately we'll never have a chance to meet him personally? It's a very good and sensitive question. I'm going to pass because there are so many people right here in the yeshiva who are much more qualified than I am to speak of him. I think it would be bechinat kofetz barosh for me to speak of him. In certain parts of the frum community, there's a very strict dress code for men, white and black. And in other parts of the community, obviously, there's a very different perspective, much more focused on freedom of expression. Is one better than the other? Are there, beyond the specific halachot of tzniut, other things that might exist? But if we're not discussing black and white, no pun intended, halacha, are there ideals, what should our perspective be? Are there limits to the freedom of expression, again other than actual strict halachot? What should our perspective be on the issue of external versus internal and genuine pnimiyut? Before voting for our favorite colors, let's talk a little bit be'gadol about the issue and then we can vote for our favorite colors. Dress is important. Dress is important. The Gemara says in Shabbat, it darshans the pasuk ve-chibadto me-asot derachecha, which is a pasuk in Yeshayahu which talks about the chiyuvim mi-divrei kabbalah that a person has on Shabbat. And ve-chibadto is referred to dressing up for Shabbat, that our standard of dress on Shabbat should be even higher than it is in the week, because the way you accord honor or respect is by the way you dress. Everyone gets dressed up for formal occasions. You go to a wedding, so we don't go to a wedding wearing our regular weekday clothes. You put on a nice suit and you go in more formal attire. Why? Because the occasion demands it. So we all have an intuitive sense that there is significance to dress. Again, if there's nothing inside, שקר החן והבל היופי, so that goes without saying. But manei mechabdutei, manei is part of the way a person accords respect. In that vein, in that vein, when people come to davven, so our dress should reflect what davvenen is. Davvenen al pi halacha is defined as omed lifnei hamlech. And our dress should, again, not commenting on color schemes now, but just in terms of how we dress, our dress should reflect the fact that we're omed lifnei hamlech. Shabbat, Shabbat is similar. The Rav points out in one of the Yartzeit Shiurim, you can take a look, there's a similar description that the Rambam gives for hachana l'tefilla and hachana l'Shabbat. Rambam describes in perek lamed of hilchot Shabbat that they used to be mitatefim b'talitam and they'd be yoshvim b'choved rosh to comes keyotzei likras hamelech. We have, we talk about Shabbos hamalkah, the Rambam has Shabbos hamelech. It's pshat, to dress up for for for Shabbos, not not casual. Shabbos is not, Shabbos is not a day of vacation, it's not a day of casual. The way we show and and demonstrate chashivus to something, one of the ways we do it, not the only way obviously, but one significant way in which we do it, is is through dress. The same thing applies to showing respect and chashivus for what we do in in in life. If we're machshiv as we should be, learning, being in yeshiva, so then that also translates into a certain dressing in in a dignified way. It doesn't necessarily mean that we have to show up for a night seder tonight with a tuxedo, no, black tie optional is not, is not correct, black tie optional for for night seder tonight. So it's not, not required that that that you show up for for night seder, you know, in in in hat and tails or whatever whatever whatever it's called, top hat and tails, but the dress should be dignified. It's it's a very, very, it's the ultimate dignified endeavor and pursuit to be involved in talmud Torah, and the dress should should reflect that. In the yeshiva world, the way that's been objectified is in in the black and white dress. The halacha shebo is the underlying idea and value that yes, there is significance to dress, that clearly, again, that clearly is a pshat in halacha, not only in the context of bigdei kehuna of lechavod uletiferes but in every context in halacha that applies to all of us. It's a way of showing that we're machshiv an event, a person, an endeavor that that we're doing, and because of that dress, dress is important. Sometimes, ironically, but this happens, ironically, sometimes people who want only pnimiyus make such an issue of the chitzoniyus that they're the ones who are emphasizing chitzoniyus. That happens sometimes, right? But I'm going to be, I'm so, so, so, I'm so, so focused on the pnimiyus and and I don't like chitzoniyus that I then make an issue of of the chitzoniyus and and I go around looking different than than than everyone. That's not being more tzanua. Adaraba, that's calling attention to the to the chitzoniyus. If when I walk into the beis medrash, everyone notices me because because of my, because I've dyed my hair pink for personal expression, so I don't know that that shows a stress on pnimiyus. Adaraba, that's calling attention to the chitzoniyus. But whatever, imagine, that that makes an issue out of out of out of the chitzoniyus. So the important, what's halacha are the values and and I don't know that the halacha translates those values here again literally necessarily into into black and white, it doesn't. But m'idach gisa, but if you find yourself in such circles, I don't know that it's a mitzvah to stand out. I don't know that it's a mitzvah to, no, I beshita, no, I beshita not wear. I'm just expressing that value. A person grew up in a, in a society, in a community where that value is expressed in in different colors, מה טוב ומה נעים. But there's no, there's no mitzvah to necessarily go against the grain. If a person, if you decide to go for a zman and learn in the Mir Yeshiva, so there's no mitzvah, adaraba, a person should be mipaneh. Nima hachok, a person is supposed to, is supposed to adjust, is supposed to adjust himself and his practice to the minhag hamakom. That's what all the mishnayos in the fourth perek of Pesachim are about, that אל ישנה אדם מפני המחלוקת. In the context of smichas korban, the Gemara has the idea of allowing certain things that might otherwise be permitted לעשות נחת רוח לנשים. How do we define that term? Is that an actual affirmative value which can impact halacha or How can it be applied generally, and if you're willing, specifically? The questions are all excellent questions. Maybe just to sort of highlight the complexity that one is supposed to be aware of, juxtaposed to that Gemara should be the braita in Torat Kohanim, we know it from the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah on daf 33, but it's a braita in Torat Kohanim as a machloket. Sifra, the other view is what Rabbi Gottlieb was quoting was the view of Rabbi Yossi, which according to most Rishonim is halacha and that is how we conduct ourselves l'halacha. Minhag Yisrael says maybe in certain circumstances one should be machmir for Rabbi Yehuda, but we pasken like Rabbi Yossi. Tosafot just cited the Torat Kohanim. Rabbi Yehuda says no that nashim can't be somech on korbanot. So why not? There are different Rishonim have different explanations. So on the Torat Kohanim we have some of the Rishonim, we have Peirush Harishonim, we have the Ra'avad, we have the Rash, some of the Rishonim. One of the peirushim in the Rishonim is that we're afraid that if a person volunteers for a mitzvah in which he or she is not chayav, then maybe a lackadaisical attitude and as a result the person may cut corners and it may create a distortion of the mitzvah. With or without that additional ta'am or mekor, again in this context the halacha certainly accords with the view of Rabbi Yossi. Whether the response is one of la'asot nachat ruach or whether the response is different, so much of that depends on societally, not necessarily in the individual case. So you try to notice the words, the caveats, the ofanim. So much of this depends upon what drives the issue societally if not necessarily individually. La'asot nachat ruach is a response to genuine religious yearning. La'asot nachat ruach isn't a way of trying to reconcile the Torah and Yahadut with alien values and aspirations of the secular world around us. La'asot nachat ruach isn't a way to give in to pressure when there's an agenda of egalitarianism, when there's a rejection of the Torah's clear differentiation of gender roles, whatever all that men and women have in common in their avodat Hashem notwithstanding and obviously there's a tremendous amount they have in common, there are also areas where the paths are supposed to diverge and the Torah clearly has gender roles. Whether the answer, whether the response of the chachmei hador is supposed to be la'asot nachat ruach and we should be bending over backwards to help facilitate and accommodate or whether the response is to resist and to teach correct, pure Torah values, so much of that depends upon the context, it depends upon motivation, it depends on what's happening. What makes the situation even more tragic than it is is the fact that again because one has to look at the broader societal picture and can't just look at the individual, that sometimes, yes, an individual has to be turned away because of knowing what that's going to be co-opted into. One of whom intends something very purely and one of whom does not, and yeah, Hashem yir'eh laleivav, but sometimes people tell you openly what's in their hearts, in which case we also know what's driving things. And unfortunately, the ones who suffer the most from the people who are constantly pushing and trying to change the boundaries, the ones who suffer the most from this are the people who have genuine, pure aspirations, because they make certain things impossible; they poison the waters sometimes. So I think that's the general machshava is a response to pure religious yearning and aspiration. It's not a way of trying to come up with a halakhically sanctioned compromise or diverging from what the Torah says is correct or Torah values, or of compromising. We're not supposed to compromise with the world, we're supposed to learn what the Torah tells us to think. We're not supposed to try to make the Torah fit whatever values we've absorbed from the outside world; we're supposed to try to cleanse our minds and hearts, veha'er eineinu betoratecha, and then vedabaik libeinu bemitzvotecha. First there has to be veha'er eineinu betoratecha. Most of our day is spent learning Gemara, like all other yeshivas, so simply, why is there such a disproportionate focus on Gemara? And specifically, there's two ironically but potentially different, almost opposite focuses that we have in this yeshiva. On the one hand, there's a tremendous focus on limud be'iyun, and on the other hand, perhaps more than any other yeshiva, there's an openness to learning other areas of Torah, such as Tanakh in particular and machshava. So as a kind of multipart question, why is there such a focus on Gemara per se as opposed to other areas of Torah? What is the value in those other areas of Torah relative to Gemara? And then specifically if possible, also within Gemara, how should one broadly speaking prioritize or balance limud bekiut, limud be'iyun, and limud halacha? Again, the bottom line of all these questions has to be individualized, so we can't presume to bring it to that level, maybe just to offer what some of the considerations are and what some of the perspectives are. Chazal say, and maybe it's the Gemara in Gittin, that לא כרת הקדוש ברוך הוא ברית עם ישראל אלא בשביל דברים שבעל פה.
Even though we divide Torah into Torah shebiksav and Torah shebe'al peh, but the bris that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, כי על פי הדברים האלה, and the Gemara darshans the pasuk: כי על פי הדברים האלה כרתי אתך ברית ואת ישראל.
That the bris that Hakadosh Baruch Hu established with us is for Torah shebe'al peh. Torah shebiksav is something which, on the contrary, the Torah made available for the umot ha'olam. The Torah was written beshivim lashon, ba'eir heiteiv; those were mitzvos to write the Torah on the stones when they crossed over the Yarden, beshivim lashon. The reason, so it's for that reason that again, in Torah shebe'al peh, obviously the ikkar is Gemara. A person doesn't, this is not intended as a disrespect to learning Mishnayos, but obviously a person understands Mishnayos al pi Gemara. Torah shebe'al peh means Gemara and לא כרת הקדוש ברוך הוא ברית. Another another perspective. You know, in terms of machshava, there are different, part of the richness of Torah is there are different there are different. Obviously the Rambam's machshava is not synonymous with the Ramban's machshava, and neither of those is synonymous with with a Maharal or a Ramchal. But what everyone has in common is halacha. So halacha is is what me'ached all legitimate, it's necessary, not necessarily sufficient, but halacha is what me'ached all all legitimate streams within within within Torah. Gemara, halacha, that's the preoccupation, that's the askanus. Ideally what learning Gemara should be. There's a Mishna in the first perek of Eduyos where the Mishna asks, given the fact that יחיד ורבים הלכה כרבים, so why do the Mishnayos record the divrei hayachid? That's such a that's just a such a strange question. What do you mean? We spend time, we find that Beis Shammai ve-Beis Hillel, we're not interested only in the views of halacha. And the Mishna in Eduyos no, Mishna Eduyos is bothered, Mishna Eduyos is bothered with the kashya, why why are the divrei hayachid recorded in in the Mishna? So it's clear that Mishna was intended as a Kitzur Shulchan Aruch. When Rabbeinu Hakadosh compiled the Mishnayos, it was intended as a Kitzur Shulchan Aruch. And a Kitzur Shulchan Aruch Beis Shammai does not get too much shelf space in in a Kitzur Shulchan Aruch. A Kitzur Shulchan Aruch is supposed to tell you what's le-halacha. Now juxtapose that to the fact there are sugyas in Shas where the Rishonim say that the shakla ve-tarya in the Gemara was based on a misunderstanding. That when one Amora asked a kashya on another Amora, so he misunderstood what what that Amora had said. So I would have thought be-evodai why is that in the Gemara? So let's let's edit that out. So clearly clearly avada avada learning Gemara results in halacha le-ma'aseh. It's the only way, it's the only way that the poskim can can get to halacha le-ma'aseh and it's the only way we can fully fully deeply understand what what the poskim say. But le-ma'aseh, what Ravina and Rav Ashi set out to do was different, fundamentally different than what Rabbeinu Hakadosh set out to do. Ravina and Rav Ashi set out to bring us into the beis medrash of Amoraim. Ravina and Rav Ashi set out not just to teach us the conclusions that Rav Huna and Rav Nachman arrived at, but to bring us into the beis medrash, to give us a back seat, a back back seat in beis medrash of Rav Nachman and Rav Huna, of Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish, of Abaye and Rava. It brings us into the beis medrash, brings us into the beis medrash and it's going to be uncensored, unedited. If there was a misunderstanding in the beis medrash, you're going to get you're going to you're going to be given that also because that's what what learning Gemara does. It brings you into the into beis medrash of hachmei Hamasora. That's what we're supposed to get out of out of learning out of learning Gemara. I mean the halacha is is pretty clear that there's supposed to be a din kedima for for learning halacha le-ma'aseh. Learning halacha le-ma'aseh doesn't doesn't really entail compromising on any of these things we've been talking about because the way to learn halacha le-ma'aseh is to begin from the Gemara with the Rishonim through the Shulchan Aruch down to the achronei haposkim. It's not so... that's what the Vilna Gaon reminded the world, that the way to learn halacha is not backwards, not from the Shulchan Aruch and the Beis Yosef and the Gemara is a source quoted in the Beis Yosef. No, the Beis Yosef is a source commenting on and reacting to to the Gemara. So really the way a person should learn halacha le-ma'aseh, a person is learning Bishul on Shabbos, so he sits and he learns and he learns perek Keira, he learns perek... learn the sugya any differently. The difference is, again, he traces it down with the help of the Shulchan Aruch or the Beis Yosef, with the down to the Mishnah Berurah, down to the Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, he traces it down to the halacha l'maaseh. So there's no compromise on learning. Given that fact, why do yeshivas disproportionately learn Nashim and Nezikin, and even those parts of Nashim and Nezikin are not necessarily learned l'maaseh? I guess shteie teshuvos badavar, neither of which are intended to discourage people from trying to follow that din kedima. Number one is that at a certain point, this is a little circular, but at a certain point you just have more to work with in Nashim and Nezikin, meaning in yeshivas there's no Ketzos HaChoshen and Nesivos HaMishpat in Seder Moed, there's no Ketzos and Nesivos in Nashim in the same sense as the Avnei Miluim, Ketzos and Nesivos and Avnei Miluim. So we have more to work with. And when they're trying to train talmidim, so they want to be able to expose them to the Ketzos, the Nesivos, to the Tumim etc. And we don't have that wealth in Seder Moed, and certainly not in Seder Kodashim. L'maaseh, again, that notwithstanding, a person has to figure out how to reconcile this with making the most of the yeshiva he's in and what the yeshiva is offering him. So l'maaseh we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that it does have a din kedima, that those parts of Torah which are halacha l'maaseh do have a din kedima. Just very briefly in terms of Tanakh, there is a cryptic Rashi in Berachos with which you're familiar. The question is what the Rashi means. The Gemara says who was it, one of the Tannaim was dying? רבן יוחנן בן זכאי? Who was it, one of the Tannaim was dying? So one of the last pieces of advice he gives to his talmidim, literally on his deathbed, is מנעו בניכם מן ההגיון. Rashi on that says that it means אל תרגילו במקרא יותר מדי. Seems like a person's ikkar hasaska, his main preoccupation again, as we said before, should be Torah shebe'al peh, not Torah shebiksav. Does that explain why we're so ignorant of Torah shebiksav? No. Is that what it means? No. But it does say that the ikkar hasaska should be Torah shebe'al peh, not Torah shebiksav. But it's also very important to recognize that there's no such thing as being an expert in Torah shebiksav and being ignorant in Torah shebe'al peh. There is, there are, a person can be expert in different areas of Torah. Gedolim are experts all over, they're experts across the board. There is such a thing as a person has a special bekiyus in Hilchos Eruvin, and he has a special bekiyus in Hilchos Ribbis, in business law, and he has an expertise in Hilchos Ishus. Avada there is such a thing. But that can't be, a person can't be an expert in one area and just totally ignorant in other areas. Torah is miksha achas. There's a certain approach to learning halacha that a person gains from being exposed, learning a lot all over. A person who has that general background, he can be an expert in one area. Similarly, there's no such thing as learning Torah shebiksav not through the lens of Torah shebe'al peh. There may or may not be a Gemara on this pasuk, but the lens to Torah shebiksav is always Torah shebe'al peh. Again, if you have a Chazal, so then the project is to understand what Chazal said about it. If there's no Chazal, okay, so then one has to be creative and figure out what is there in Torah shebe'al peh. that can be applied, that can be used to help me gain insight into Torah Shebiksav. The Torah Shebiksav isn't an independent area of expertise. We don't believe that the Torah Shebiksav can be separated from Torah Sheba'al Peh. Torah Shebiksav was given to be understood al pi the Torah Sheba'al Peh. It's not that there's the Torah Shebiksav, I don't know, the history and then there's the biology. The Torah Shebiksav, no, Torah Shebiksav is given to be understood al pi, על פי תורה שבעל פה. You open the classic, classic works in recent centuries, you open a Meshech Chochma, you open a Malbim and you see what it means to be creative in understanding תורה שבכתב על פי תורה שבעל פה. Thank you very much, Rabbi Rosensweig.