When we talk about controversial topics of the day, there aren't a lot of people that know how to address these topics with a combination of cultural awareness, personal sensitivity, intellectual integrity, erudition, a complete command of Torah sources firsthand. I believe Rabbi Twersky is somebody who knows exactly how to do this, and it's a result I think of the combination of two unique dynasties from which he comes. One is Chernobyl Hasidus, and we can talk about the warmth of Hasidus that he has and the sensitivity and the brilliance of the Brisk Soloveitchik dynasty of which he's a direct descendant. I'll just add one more thing so you appreciate who we're about to hear. Rabbi Twersky studied undergraduate in Harvard University while he was learning chevrusa with his grandfather Rav Yosef Ber Soloveitchik. All I can say is I'm very, very jealous. Rabbi Twersky, please. That when I was be-al kochi listening to the introduction, I thought that the follow-up to that the introduction couldn't be accurate was because Chofetz Chaim wrote a sefer about Hilchos Lashon Hara, so you have to, you can't really, can't say the whole truth, I thought that's where we were headed but okay, a bait and switch. Birshus Harabbanim. So we'll first try to discuss the the question at hand whether or not women are permitted, can be allowed to put on tefillin and then try to reflect on this as a test case for some broader methodological issues in terms of questions that that arise in in contemporary times. So our question begins with the classical source, if if you have the sourcesheet in front of you, the Rama. The the Rama lived in the in the 16th century and is basically the unchallenged leading decisor of halacha for Ashkenazic Jewry. And in many cases where Rav Yosef Karo who wrote the Shulchan Aruch and and then the Rama added his glosses to the Shulchan Aruch, in many cases where there is no explicit disagreement, so his positions are also accepted by Sephardic Jewry as as well. So the Rama writes in Shulchan Aruch commenting on the halacha that the Mechaber, Rav Yosef Karo who the author of the Shulchan Aruch writes that that women are exempt from the mitzvah of tefillin because it's מצוות עשה שהזמן גרמא, it's a time-bound positive commandment and and of course we know that the general rule of thumb is that women are exempt from such mitzvos. So the Rama writes ואם הנשים רוצים להחמיר על עצמן מוחים בידם. That in contradistinction to most mitzvos where we accept the normative opinion is that even someone who's exempt from the mitzvah is allowed to volunteer to do the mitzvah, can fulfill the mitzvah on a voluntary basis. So that's why it's everyday practice that when women want they go into the sukkah and they sit in the sukkah and when women want to take a lulav on Sukkos they take a lulav on Sukkos etc., even though they're exempt from those mitzvos as well. But the Rama says that that practice doesn't apply to the mitzvah of tefillin. And that if if a woman wants to volunteer for the mitzvah so then she's told that this isn't appropriate. Why is it not appropriate? So presumably the understanding is because unlike other mitzvos there's a downside to the mitzvah of tefillin in the sense that there are prohibitions that a person can violate while wearing the tefillin. The kedusha of tefillin, the sanctity of tefillin is such that there are things that... If a person would be involved with while wearing tefillin would involve prohibitions because they would contradict the kedushas tefillin, the sanctity of tefillin, whether it's that a person is distracted from the tefillin and therefore engages in behavior or idle talk which is inconsistent with the sanctity of tefillin, whether it's in terms of maintaining a certain bodily purity. But that's why there's a downside to the mitzvah of tefillin. That's also the background to why most men who are obligated in mitzvas tefillin fulfill the mitzvah on a very very minimal basis, where ideally theoretically we should all be in tefillin now, we should be wearing tefillin not just when we daven shacharis, we should be wearing tefillin all day. It's the same type of consideration which is why with very few exceptions most men only fulfill who are obligated in the mitzvah only fulfill it on a very minimal basis. Okay so that's the background. So this is a very unequivocal and categorical statement of the Rambam. Why doesn't the shiur end at this point? So the truth is it really should but we're just going to explain why that is, why that is. Can the following case legitimately be made? If a woman sincerely, again sincerity doesn't necessarily mean doesn't imply whether or not it's on target or misguided sincerity can be of either variety. Let's say a woman sincerely wants to put on tefillin. So can the following be marshaled to justify that practice? So if you look in source number two, so the Rambam in Hilchos Tefillin writes that כל הפטור מקריאת שמע פטור מתפילין. The Rambam cross references his earlier list of exemptions from the mitzvah of krias shema and says that same list holds true for the mitzvah of tefillin. Okay so we need to follow the Rambam up on that cross reference. In source number three, so the Rambam writes that נשים ועבדים וקטנים פטורים מקריאת שמע. Again we'll hone in on the aspect which is our focus at the moment, that women are exempt from krias shema, the same rule because it's a time-bound positive commandment. Tefillin is also a time-bound positive commandment whether it's because one doesn't wear tefillin at night or whether it's because one doesn't wear tefillin on Shabbos and yom tov. But either way the result is that tefillin is a מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא, a time-bound positive commandment. And that's all the Rambam says about it, meaning the Rambam doesn't add this caveat and not only are they exempt but they can't volunteer either. So mistama the simple reading from the Rambam and one could perhaps adduce other sources which also sort of their silence that they don't have this note of protest that the Rama records. So can one then invoke the Rambam and we mean the Rambam not just literally the Rambam but the Rambam maybe as representative that okay so we do find that the Rama objects again very unequivocally. But maybe maybe if a woman is asking sincerely so maybe there's basis to diverge from that decision of the Rama. Maybe to give it its to try to strengthen that case a little bit. So in source number four the Gemara is talking about at the beginning at the beginning of Sefer Vayikra, the book of Vayikra in Chumash. So the Torah has a mitzvah there the Torah is talking about one specific type of sacrifice a korban olah and the Torah says וסמך ידו על ראש העולה. That there's a mitzvah for the person who's offering this sacrifice in the Beis Hamikdash prior immediately prior to when the animal is slaughtered that for the person the baal hakorban the person who's bringing head of the animal. וסמך ידו על ראש העולה. Were that not a mitzvah, were that not a prescribed action, it would be forbidden, it would be proscribed because one is not allowed to derive benefit from an animal which has been consecrated to serve as a sacrifice. Since the Torah says it's obligatory, the commandment is also the dispensation. The Gemara tells the story, how is it, the Gemara tells the story that only men are obligated for we have a pasuk which teaches us this, that when a man brings a korban there is this mitzvah to do the semicha, to rest one's hands and lean and rest one's full weight on the head of the korban. So that aspect, that step in the process of bringing the korban only applies to when a man is bringing a korban, not when a woman is bringing a sacrifice. Nevertheless, the Gemara tells a story that the women did semicha, so how is that possible? If you need the obligation to be the dispensation, because otherwise you're not allowed to rest your weight on an animal that's been consecrated as a sacrifice, so how could we let them do it? The source says no, they weren't doing real semicha, they were just gently putting, placing their hands on top of the animal as opposed to leaning all their weight on the animal. So there was no downside to what they were doing and we let them do it. If you take a look at the last line of the source, or the penultimate and then the last line: לא מפני שסמיכה בנשים, not because there is an obligation again of leaning one's weight on the animal, not that that pertains to women, אלא כדי לעשות נחת רוח לנשים, but rather to give them a sense of satisfaction, to be able to respond positively to an initiative, to a sincere request. So doesn't this, I don't have time for my calisthenics this morning so I thought I would multitask during the shiur. So doesn't that strengthen the case? Doesn't that strengthen the case if we can find the Rambam, again, the Rambam as a representative source who didn't object to women volunteering for the mitzvah of tefillin and there is this principle, this is a Gemara, there is this principle that we find that Chazal, that our rabbis articulated of לעשות נחת רוח לנשים, to be sensitive and to give them an outlet for what they want to do. So shouldn't that apply here in the case of mitzvas tefillin? Did you say that the Rambam didn't object to the women doing the mitzvos of tefillin? Explicitly all he records is they're exempt and he doesn't say anything more about it. So if you just record that they're exempt, the truth is it's not as simple as that, which is why we're just saying the Rambam is representative, but there certainly are such sources. Again maybe in a different occasion maybe we could debate that, but anyway, that's the way we're going to simplify and streamline things. Okay, so that sort of is the case that one could make. Lechoiro, whatever initial appeal this case may have, it's actually halachically is very very flawed and for at least three reasons. The first one is the Rama lived in the 1500s. So for close to 500 years or so, there's been an unchallenged and universally accepted practice. this that again not only Ashkenazic Jewry in this instance, but Sephardic Jewry as well, follows this ruling of the Rama. So to come today and and try to change and and overturn that means to undertake to disagree with 500 years of of precedent. So what's the halakhic significance of precedent? Why why does that carry so much weight halakhically? So for two reasons. Number one, even if the practice and the custom were of more recent vintage, even if it didn't have a 500 years of momentum and and depth behind it, even if it were more recent, so there is a a a rule, a klal famously enunciated in the Yerushalmi in Yevamos in source number six beginning in the middle of the second line, כל הלכה שהיא רופפת בבית דין. If ever you have a question how to determine what the halacha is. You have dissenting opinions. And you don't have clarity based on the sources themselves what's what which is the normative opinion? ואין אתה יודע מה טיבה. So then Tzei u're'ei. Go out literally, go out and observe heichan tzibbur noheig. See what the accepted practice is u'nehog. And you should then follow that accepted practice. So this is so practice, Minhag Yisrael a behavior of the the observant Jewish community is something which halakhically carries a lot lot weight. And is something which even if it's not a 500 year old practice, even if it's of more recent vintage, is something which is the basis for deciding halacha. That's number one. Number two, when something when the Rama says something for 500 years, says something and for 500 years no one has dissented, so that that means that all of the greatest greatest poskim and acharonim, all the greatest greatest decisors of law, it's clear contextually when you have such a statement of the Rama, if you don't say anything, so then silence certainly in this context implies that they concur. That's clearly the the implication ex silentio, right? That's the implication from their silence. So what does that mean? Just to to mention a few people, so it means the Ba'al HaTanya in in his Shulchan Aruch, so he he follows suit. Before the Ba'al HaTanya, the Magen Avraham, the Taz, the Chayei Adam, the Mishna Berura, all the the Kaf HaChaim, all the greatest poskim all either explicitly or silently concur with this Rama. So in trying to diverge from this psak of the Rama, so again the Rama himself is of towering stature and authoritative status, but that's further reinforced by all those who over the past 500 years, some explicitly and some in their silence have concurred and and basically reinforced the psak of the Rama. The mindset, if you take a look in in source number five, the context of of source number five is a little bit too complicated to to go into now, but source number five is a far far cry from what we're talking about. The Ba'alei HaTosafos in Maseches Beitzah record a machlokes between two of the Ba'alei HaTosafos, two of the greatest greatest Ba'alei HaTosafos. The Rabbeinu Tam, who was Rashi's grandson, and Rabbeinu Tam's nephew, the Ri. Again, two of the the greatest greatest Ba'alei HaTosafos. So they have a machlokes concerning Eiruv Tavshilin when Yom Tov is on is on Friday, so erev Yom Tov, whether the erev Yom Tov is Thursday or Wednesday, so we make an Eruv Tavshilin. In the details of Eruv Tavshilin, there is a machlokes between the Rabbeinu Tam and the Ri. Rabbeinu Tam is more stringent and the Ri is more lenient. And the Ri adduces what he considers several proofs to his position, and then he says ומכל מקום אומר ר"י לא מלאני לבי לעבור על דברי דודי.
He says, I don't have the audacity to go against the words of my uncle Rabbeinu Tam. So this is someone who, I don't know, they're both so great that we couldn't rank them, we couldn't rank them, but sort of the mindset with which one approaches the words of the greatest sages is with tremendous, tremendous what we call yiras hakavod, a tremendous, tremendous sense of honor which is rooted in awe because of the spiritual giants we're dealing with. So this is the Ri who himself is such a person articulating that sense of inhibition that he feels when it's one against one, and he himself is one of the greatest of the Rishonim. על אחת כמה וכמה, so much more so today for any individual to take upon their shoulders to overturn, again, not only a decision of the Rema, but a decision of the Rema which has been either explicitly or implicitly reinforced by all the greatest poskim of the past half a millennium is not a simple thing to do. Okay, so a, so that's again, so precedent is significant for two reasons: it's significant, a, because of that means that so many, that the greatest poskim for the past half millennium all have lined up behind this psak. And number two, even if the custom and the practice would have been of more recent vintage, a universal practice amongst observant Jewry it itself carries tremendous weight. Okay, so number one, to allow a woman, sincerity notwithstanding, to put on tefillin, it goes against this precedent as discussed. Number two, the Rema is actually—the context of the Rema, we'll take a look in source seven—the Rema is talking about how, be it a dayan, a judge who's a member of a religious court of Beis Din, be it a chacham, be it a very very learned rabbi who's a decisor of halakha, how they can and how they cannot render a halakhic decision. So let's say that there's a question, and on this question there's an explicit dispute amongst the Rishonim, amongst the medieval codifiers. So says the Rema as follows: לא יאמר האדם אפסוק כמי שארצה. Okay, so the Rambam says this, the Ra'avad says this, Rashi says this, Tosfos says that. So, it's more convenient for me, it's more convenient for me for whatever reason to follow Rashi, not Tosfos, to follow the Rambam, not the Ra'avad. לא יאמר האדם אפסוק כמי שארצה, I'm going to decide the halakha as I want, בדבר שיש בו מחלוקת when there is a dispute, ve-im oseh kein, look at these next four words rabosai: הרי זה דין שקר. That's a, if he does it in the context of Beis Din, so then that verdict of Beis Din is a false verdict, and if he does it as a chacham rendering a decision on a question that came to him, so then that decision, that psak, would be a psak sheker, would be a false psak. אלא אם הוא חכם גדול ויודע להכריע בראיות הרשות בידו.
If a person is a very great chacham, extremely extremely learned and He can marshal Talmudic, compelling Talmudic support for his decision, so then hareshus b'yado. Then he has license to to render such a a decision. When machlokes exists, when there are differences of opinion in halacha, so when we're not we're not allowed to sort of shop around and mix and match and adopt whichever opinion suits us, whichever opinion accommodates us. No, there's integrity to the halachic process. The way decisions, the question takes into account all the realia, all the factors, but after all those factors and after all those realia are factored in, so then the decision has to be made one according to the internal canons of halachic decision making. It can't be, you know, this is really going to work for me and if the answer is no, that's really going to make my life, it's going to be very inconvenient, so what's wrong with following the Rambam? So that's what the Rema here is telling us, that that's not a legitimate way to to rendering a decision. Decisions have to be arrived at with integrity, and integrity means not based on what's convenient, not not based on on what's what's going to resonate, but decision means decision. To to decide a question with integrity means according to the canons of halachic psak. The canons of halachic psak are is that if there's a dispute, so the way you pasken, the way you decide like one side of that dispute is that the posek, the decisor, has to marshal what he feels is compelling halachic support from the sources for that position. It can't just be done as a matter of convenience, as a matter of this is what's going to this is what's going to work for us. It's not it's not a it's not shopping. It's it's not shopping. That's that's problem number two with with the case that's made: well, we want it, so we'll justify it in light of the Rambam. Problem number three with that case that we made to ostensibly allow but not actually obviously to allow a woman to put on tefillin, case number three is the following. This type of question when a rav has to render a decision on this type of question, so the question needs to be assessed not only sort of on its technical level, but also on its axiological level. Let's give an an example. When reform started in in Germany, so so we all know what the ultimate agenda was because we know where where it ended up. The ultimate agenda was to reject all the basic tenets of traditional Jewish belief and faith and and the practice. But that wasn't sort of the headline initially. So the initial reforms were there was an attempt made to sort of camouflage them as being halachically legitimate. So one of the first reforms they wanted to introduce was to that to no longer davven in Lashon Hakodesh because that's too Rachmana litzlan, too too parochial, vechulu vechulu. We have to davven in German. Okay, so how do you sort of try to dress that up as being halachically legitimate? Well, the Mishnah says in Sotah that אלו נאמרים בכל לשון. The Mishnah discusses different mitzvos and discusses which mitzvos of again involving speech involving a text, which mitzvos require Lashon Hakodesh Hebrew and which mitzvos can be fulfilled in a vernacular as well, bechol lashon. And the mitzvah of tefillah of prayer, it's explicit that that mitzvah can be fulfilled, the obligation can be discharged in the vernacular also if a person. So that was the support they marshaled. But obviously the the achronim of of that day. They all opposed it, again, they gave their technical reasons as well, but they all opposed it because they understood where it was coming from and what it represented and that it wasn't just an innocent attempt to to increase people's level of focus during prayer by removing the the challenge of having to understand the Hebrew. It was clear that that it was coming from assimilationist tendencies and desires. So questions need to be assessed not only on a technical level, but they need to be also assessed on an axiological level. What values are embodied in the suggested practice? Is it simply a there's nothing more to it than mitzvah A or no as in this example let's say of of saying that across Germany everyone should now start davening in in German. We know what they wanted to move Shabbos to Sunday etcetera. Okay. When that ideological assessment is made, when that axiological assessment is made, it has to be made not just based on the individual. Because an individual can be unaware of societal influence and can be easily just swept away. So the the assessment is not the assessment of the particular individual in in our test case, not of any individual woman who approaches the rav, but where does this come from? That may or may not be known and understood by the the woman who's the petitioner and it's quite clear, it's quite clear, I think indisputably that where it comes from is that one of the major sources of confusion in today's world is this desire for egalitarianism. This desire that men and women should have completely identical roles within yahadut. Now that's something which is antithetical to Judaism. Judaism clearly sees that although men and women possess the same degree of kedushat Yisrael, the same degree of sanctity based on Jewishness, but that that halakhic equality and that equivalence of sanctity notwithstanding, there are common aspects to their roles and then there are differences between the roles that the Torah respectively assigns to men and women. So that's obviously very much politically incorrect in today's world. In in today's world the Western world around us has gone way way beyond the boundaries of reason in its pursuit of egalitarianism. So even professions which require brute physical strength in order to be safely carried out, and it's just a biological, anatomical fact that men have more muscle in their body than than women, so they have to change the requirements to qualify to be a fireman because the requirements women couldn't match them. So no, but that can't be, so that becomes discriminatory. Instead of saying that there are realities and and just biologically, anatomically a woman is not... no, there has to be complete complete identity. And and that's something which is a major major axiom of the Western world and is something which is antithetical to Torah, which Torah tells us is not true. That that equality and and notwithstanding, there can be different roles and there are different roles that the Torah assigns. So that's where the desire Is not to volunteer for another mitzvah where it's coming from broadly speaking, not talking about any one individual, but where it's coming from broadly, where it's coming from sociologically is from this campaign for egalitarianism. And some people who advocate for this are, they're wrong, but at least they're honest enough to say what their agenda, what their agenda is. So even if there were no technical issues, even if we didn't have that Rama that we began with, and even if on a technical level the halachic process was sound, which it isn't, just what it represents on a level of values, on an axiological level, totally, totally precludes any such thing. So bekitzur, in summation, so those are at least three very, very compelling reasons why it can't happen. The significance of 500 years of precedent, as we discussed, the fact that halachic decision-making isn't made based on what's convenient, what's most desirable, but it has to be made according to internal halachic considerations, and then the three, what the desire, not referring to any particular individual who may have been unknowingly brainwashed and caught up in a sociological current, what that represents on a level of values. Because of that, that's why no bona fide rav has or ever will countenance such a suggestion. Maybe just to take a couple of minutes to try to reflect a little bit more, one more very crucial point. What about לעשות נחת רוח לנשים? Why isn't that a pushback? That again that Gemara that we looked at that said that we do take into account the fact that the women wanted to do smicha, so we figured out how we could let them do it without violating the halacha that one shouldn't derive benefit from a sacrificial animal. So here, this is why it's very important to not simply sort of just cherry-pick a line from the Gemara and then transpose it to a different context, but to understand the context in which the line appears and then to understand the context in which one's question arises and see if those are comparable contexts. In the Gemara's case, biyemei Chazal, there was no egalitarianism, people were not looking to erase all practical differences in roles between men and women, and what the women wanted to do in terms of smicha on the korban, there was no broader social, axiological context to it the way there exists with the issue of tefillin today. It was the same impulse to go into the sukkah or the same impulse to take a lulav, it was the same impulse to again do the smicha on the korban. This third, again, overriding, crucial, crucial consideration of what does the suggestion represent axiologically, what values are driving it. So the values in the Gemara in Chagigah are pure values, and the values here are sadly, tragically assimilationist values. The Gemara in Chagigah has no relevance to our issue at hand. And that perhaps is maybe a good way to segue into just a few brief concluding remarks. It is possible to be an expert in one area of halacha. It is possible. There are people who are experts in business law, there are people who are experts in the laws of family purity, and it's known if you have a complicated question in business law, so this Expert in one area of halacha. It is possible there are people who are experts in business law. There are people who are experts in the laws of family purity and it's known if you have a complicated question in business law, so this rav is especially, especially learned and and that's an area of his his expertise. There is there is such a thing that the greatest, greatest, greatest rabbonim of the generation, so their expertise is is uniform in all areas of halacha. But it is it is legitimately possible and it does exist and and it's it's legitimate. What what doesn't exist and can't exist is to be a a is to presume to be an expert in one area of halacha and to be ignorant in other areas of halacha. A person can be well-versed in all of Torah, but especially there's one area where his expertise is especially pronounced. That exists and it exists because it is something legitimate which is possible. What's not possible is to be ignorant in 19 volumes of of of the shas, assuming that the gemara consists of of a 20 volume set, and and to profess expertise in in one volume. And and the this last point we're discussing is a good illustration of that. Because even if the question at hand is a question in the person's so-called field of expertise, but a person has to have a feel for halacha to know is this a correct juxtaposition if I quote the gemara לעשות נחת רוח לנשים to be sensitive to what they want? Is it not a correct juxtaposition? How a person has to have a sense of of for halacha as a whole, for the halachic system as a whole, on what level do you assess a question? Do you assess a question only on a technical level or do you assess a question on its on its on its axiological level, on its level of values as well? Is it how does a person pasken a question? How does a person decide a question when there is a difference of opinion? These are all sort of meta issues which require a feel for the halachic system for the halachic system as a whole. And and that feel is only a person can only gain such a feel by being well-versed in across the full range of Torah. If a person is well-versed in in Torah as a whole, so then yes, so then a person has a feel for these meta issues of halacha. How do you assess a question? What type of basis is needed to to render a psak? Is this context comparable to to another context where I want to bring a raya? If a person has that feel for halacha, for the system as a whole, for Torah as a whole based on years of intensive learning across the the spectrum of Torah, then yes, a person can legitimately be expert in one area of halacha not not in in others. Chazal have have very the the scary words of of censure for unsound psak for for decision making which is arrived at not through a sound process. If you take a look on on the last side of of the booklet, so it is a mishna in in Pirkei Avos, it's source number nine, rabosai. Just the last seven words or so of the mishna: הגס לבו בהוראה שוטה רשע וגס רוח. Gass libo b'horah means that that a person is much too casual and because of his casualness he's arrogant in rendering halachic decisions. Chazal describe such an individual as again reading and trying to translate as accurately and faithfully as possible without editorializing as a shoteh. Shoteh contrary to its colloquial usage. meaning someone who's delusional. That doesn't mean a fool. It means someone who's who's delusional. Rasha, evil, vegass ruach, and and arrogant. Now this, if you look in the commentaries on this Mishna, the commentaries on this Mishna say that the Mishna here is talking about a person who's qualified to be deciding Halacha, eminently qualified, but he does so too hastily. He is not as deliberate in thinking and rethinking the question as Halakhic decision making requires. But he's he's he's qualified, it's just that he's the process is too accelerated and even then Chazal censure the person with these words. If you take a look in source number ten, so you see that that the Shulchan Aruch reflects this understanding of the commentaries in Pirkei Avot, tzarich hadayan, again we're talking about the same thing applies to to any ruling in religious law, but right now the Shulchan Aruch is talking in context of of a judge who's part of of a of a religious court, a Beis Din. צריך הדיין להיות מתון בדין. The judge on the religious court has to be deliberate. Shelo yifsekenu, he should not render his decision, ad sheyachmitzennu, he has to let the question sit in his mind for a while, the same way you let the dough sit and it rises and becomes chametz, ad sheyachmitzennu. He has to let the question sit so he can think and rethink. Look at it from all angles, veyissa veyitten bo, and only then יהיה ברור לו כשמש. Then he'll have the clarity which is required to rendering a ruling. So how much more so, these are words of censure for someone who's for if the greatest individuals of the generation would render a decision but too hastily without the required deliberateness, so this is what Chazal say. How much more so then this description is transposed, but it's transposed with a kal vachomer, right? How much more so in source number eleven, תלמיד שלא הגיע להוראה ומורה. What happens if you're dealing with someone who's bechlal not qualified to render decision? Umoreh, and and that notwithstanding, so the person ignores his own lack of qualifications and renders Halakhic decisions? So the Shulchan Aruch transposes this censure of the Mishna Avos, הרי זה שוטה רשע וגס רוח. He's he's delusional, he's evil, and and he's he's arrogant. The very sharp words, the very sharp words. But we're not supposed to censure we're not supposed to edit out or subject Chazal to censorship. We need to not only know whether they approve it, disapprove it, but we need to know with what degree of vehemence that approval or or disapproval is is stated. Okay, so that's maybe an outline of the response to the question and and some of the broader methodological issues. Any questions? Feel free to ask. It's a good don't hold back, ask questions you have. Thank you so much for coming. So you're mentioning shopping around for like Halakhic shopping? And I am a ba'al teshuva of less than two years ago. And none of my family is religious, but I want to shop with integrity, right? And I was wondering how you can do that without really shopping as it were. Yeah, that's that's a great great question. So I think the answer is that there has to be a consistency to what a person does. There has to be a certain underlying principle which which explains, you know, whether I make one bracha on my tefillin in the morning or whether I make two brachos, what time I end Shabbos, etc. There has to be an underlying principle. That underlying principle, again, so if in in the case that that in your case what you're describing, it can come from finding and identifying a rabbi. be for yourself and asking his guidance in these areas. And then if let's say on some areas his position is lenient, again, he obviously he has to be eminently qualified to serve in that role for you. But assuming that the individual has those qualifications, so then when you're asked, when you get up to Shamayim, you know, why were you lenient in this? So the compelling answer would be because I followed my Rebbe and when he was stringent I followed his stringencies and when he was lenient I followed his leniencies. And that gives consistency. Some people in this situation it's not obligatory. Some people want to do this and it's entirely legitimate, will try to find out on the father's side of the family if it's possible to know, you know, where do they come from? And what were their practices? Was my great grandfather a Polish Jew who was a Gerer Chasid and therefore you may have to go shopping and therefore I will I'll adopt I'd like to reconnect with that family tradition albeit although it didn't it wasn't handed over to me directly. I'd like to reconnect to that. So that's also, so then in such a case, so the person would follow the customs, the practices, the halachic decisions accepted by that community, the community to which his father's father or father's father's father belonged and that would also be a legitimate answer to the consistency question. So that's I think that's the basic approach. Yeah in source 11 there it says about isheh it says that she has killed many victims. I'm just wondering in the time when when this was written it seems like it belies an idea that because it's a she has killed many victims that the women are not qualified to make psak. Is that was that my misreading? Because women are not as as so the very often there's a contextual meaning of a verse and then Chazal will also say that you can sort of apply this verse acontextually to a different area. So the pasuk isn't talking about rendering halacha and it's not targeting women and it's not singling out women. Chazal's use of this verse is an acontextual use of the verse and I think when Chazal said it and when the Shulchan Aruch recorded it, I don't think it even occurred to them that a woman that this might be applied to a woman because women weren't paskening shailos. So there isn't any such any such implication there. How does the Rav define healthy religious growth? So to maybe use a little bit of a mashal, a little bit of a metaphor. So I think if you go to gyms, you may have noticed I don't go too often to gyms but I should but if you go to gyms so sometimes on the wall there's a sign that says no pain what's next words? No gain. No pain no gain. What does that mean? If I can easily curl twenty pounds. I can do it easily. And that's all I do in my workout every day, I'm not going to grow, I'm not going to improve, I'm not going to add strength and muscle. I'll probably maybe it'll help sustain that I shouldn't regress but I'm not going to there's not going to be progress either. So I have to be pushing myself. On the other hand if right now I can easily do twenty pounds and I'll say okay no pain no gain so now I'm going to start curling a hundred pounds so rachmana litzlan I'm going to end up in the hospital with all kinds of all kinds of injuries. So there has to be a balance between pushing oneself but not pushing oneself too hard. A person has to be ambitious but realistically ambitious in religious growth. How can a person tell? So it's a good thing to have a rebbi to consult with because אדם קרוב אצל עצמו, it's hard to have accurate self-perception sometimes and it's easier when there's another set of eyes. But for oneself a symptom which is usually reliable is that if a person isn't enjoying what he's doing, if there's no simcha, if he has no Simchas HaChaim, if there's no joy of life, then it usually means that what he's doing is too much, too fast, and too onerous. I can be breaking my teeth on the first page of Gemara I ever learned and it's not easy and it's not necessarily satisfying but underneath that there's a sense of satisfaction that this difficulty is worth it and simultaneously it's difficult and I'm also happy, I'm also enjoying it. I think in the Rebbetzin Kanievsky biography she's described as having had a very rich emotional life. So it describes how in the years, the first years after her marriage, as the pattern continued to be, they were living in Bnei Brak because yibadel lachayim her husband was very close with his father, at the time his uncle was still alive as well, and that was the best place for him. And so as not to disrupt his learning they would never go away for Shabbos either. So basically even though Bnei Brak to Yerushalayim is not such a long bus ride, she basically never saw her family. And this was very hard for her and she used to cry. But underneath the tears she was happy about it. The two can coexist. So it can be difficult to learn to read a page of Gemara, but if underneath that simultaneously I'm happy about what I'm doing, I wake up in the morning looking forward to the day and I have the energy to apply myself, so that's an indication that I'm pushing myself but not too hard. If I wake up in the morning and I dread what awaits me today, so that's an indication lo aleinu that I'm pushing myself too hard, too fast, and that it's too onerous. Oh yes, so thank you so much for coming today and generously giving your time to speak with us. I sort of had a two-layered question and they were both directly related to this topic. So one was I had heard that Rashi's daughters put on tefillin and I was wondering if you might be able to address the potential reasons that they had halachically for that. And the other question was sort of this modern question which is nowadays we're sort of dealing with a situation where a lot of Jews in the diaspora have internalized some both assimilationist, Western values as you mentioned and also, coming from a Jewish line, have some level of dedication to Judaism. So right now we would like probably to get more people to be more deeply involved with Judaism and for people who are in a place, women who are asking, "Can I put on tefillin?" they probably have this inner conflict of both sets of values pulling them in both directions. On one hand they want to get closer to Judaism, so that might be their motivation for asking to put on tefillin. On the other hand, their reason for asking to put on tefillin might be somewhat as a result of being influenced by external intellectual, philosophical influences. So for that group of people in terms of how to make sure that they get more involved with Judaism and long term it seems like a relevant, if you say oh no you can't put on tefillin, then maybe that sort of person who already has that mindset might feel sort of alienated, I'm trying to do this thing to connect myself more to Judaism but I can't do this, so where do I go? And they might go away from it. Or if you say to do that then maybe it's compromising a traditional Jewish approach to this kind of thing and overall in a more systematic level as their mentality comes with them as they try to connect more to Judaism. So I'm sort of wondering how do you see this struggle and how to address it for people who find themselves in that kind of position? So both the questions are really very excellent, thank you. In terms of the first question, yes. There is such a report that it says in, but we can go further back. It says that the Talmud reports that Shaul Hamelech's daughter wore tefillin. So if we're looking for precedent, we can find even more ancient and time honored precedent, which is why—I don't mean this exclusively, but this is the easiest angle to see it from—which is but what Rashi's daughters did or didn't do in the 11th century in their cultural context. Again, it's similar to the point we made of why the Gemara in Chagiga about the la'asos nachas ruach about being accommodating, why that's misplaced to transpose that to our context. So the same is true for any precedent, whether it's Rashi's daughters or whether it's Michal bas Shaul, Michal the daughter of King Shaul. They didn't live in a time and place where there was confusion about egalitarianism, where there was a desire to basically reshape rachmana litzlan and reconfigure rachmana litzlan Judaism and halacha in a way that is egalitarian, and because of that, nothing carries over. In terms of your second question, also excellent, and I'm doubly appreciative of the question because I think I was remiss not to have volunteered this initially. Practically, if a rav is approached, this isn't the kind of question to which he gives a one word answer. If he's approached and asked that some milk fell into the chicken soup, can I still eat the chicken soup or not? So at the end of the day, it can be a one word answer. If the answer is no, maybe he should say I'm sorry, we'd like to join us for Shabbos dinner, but other than that, it can be a one word answer. He can say yes or he can say no. Here, before the rav ever says no, I think he needs to explain the issues. He needs to explain where the no is coming from, what the no is. He needs to try to proactively again not just rebuff the proposal, the initiative, but he needs to provide the legitimate alternative for it. And then in that context, ultimately, unapologetically, he does explain why it's a no starter. But you're absolutely right, it's not something that the rav would simply say no and sorry there's a line, I gotta talk to the next person. It's something that context and alternate legitimate expressions should be substituted. It's the desire sometimes we're tempted to say well if only we water things down, if only we make this compromise, so look how many Jews maybe we'll be able to attract. It's a losing proposition because the point is to attract them to legitimate Judaism, not to attract them to a watered down form of Judaism. So that's why as appealing as this type of accommodationism can seem, it's a losing proposition because what we want to do is expose people to the genuine beauty of genuine Judaism and not some adulterated version of it. I'm just going to take a couple more and then I'm going to stop. I'll take maybe one last question. Yes, one more? So I guess correct me if I maybe heard you wrong but I believe that earlier you said you didn't believe that it would be possible for a major posek to come one day and pasken differently on this subject about tefillin? So I wonder then, because it seems like we have a precedent that sort of there are things that we become meikilim on even after a long period of long-standing tradition to be machmir on. And the example I'm thinking of is when the Chofetz Chaim permitted women's Torah study after a lot of women were dropping out to go get secular educations. So I'm wondering if, you know, if there there's a precedent to become meikel on something that was traditionally not accepted, is there is there no possibility to apply that same principle to this case? So again, thank you for the question. The question is is also an excellent one. Again, both in terms of the substance of the question and also the, it also sort of provides opportunity to reinforce some of the methodological issues that we spoke about. You're absolutely correct. There was on a on a practical level, not conceptual, on a practical level, so yes, the revolution happened which was ushered in and inspired by the Bais Yaakov movement of formal Torah education for women and formal Torah education that not only involves the written Torah but the Torah Sheba'al Peh, the oral Torah as well. And sort of if one looks literally, phenomenologically, so that that is something revolutionary. That is something revolutionary. When one looks not just on the surface but one looks conceptually, it's not the revolution that it appears to be in the following sense. It was always the case that women were taught Torah. A woman was in the kitchen and I don't know my my mother, shetichyeh, and my grandmothers and great-grandmothers knew the halachos of kashrus far better than I ever will. They used to kasher their own they used to kasher their own, you know, their own meat and chicken. And they used to, I still remember as a kid, I still remember my mother salting and broiling livers. Now they don't give you the livers anymore, I guess too much cholesterol. They don't even give you the livers in the in the in the chicken anymore. So they were very expert in in many areas of Jewish law. And when they would bake, whether they were baking challah or bread or cookies, so then they had to set aside challah. They had to set aside a portion of the dough. They had to know what to do with it. They had to know what to do with it if they were outside of the Land of Israel, if they were inside the the Land of of Israel. If they lived in the Land of Israel they had to know how to set aside trumos and ma'asros. They they were expert in laws of family purity to know when there's a question, when there isn't when there isn't a question. So it was never the case that the women weren't taught Torah. So where was the line? So where was the line? So the line on the other hand, there is there is an explicit statement in Sotah which strongly discourages a father taking the initiative and imposing Torah learning on his daughter. But he clearly taught his daughter all these things. How did the daughter know how to salt the the meat and the chicken etc.? So the answer is that what women needed to know for practical observance, to be observant God-fearing Jews, they were always taught. Voluntary, theoretical learning was not initiated by the father, was not imposed by the father. What the Chofetz Chaim and his contemporaries, the other the other giants of of his day who also concurred and and supported the this Bais Yaakov movement, what they said is that in modern days, in modern times... The education we're talking about is not theoretical and therefore optional but is necessary to give them a grounding in faith. And that's why on a deeper level the principle today is the same as it always was, but due to changed reality, the way that principle translates is different. A moshel: let's say one day you go to the rabbi and you tell him that some milk fell in your chicken soup. Fine, he tells you, no problem, bon appetit. Next day again, a bit of a shlimazl I guess, next day again you go back and once again there's some milk in your chicken soup and today he tells you, sorry, it's not good. So the rabbi is being inconsistent? On the surface it seems so. If you scratch a little bit, so you find out that the proportions yesterday were one set of proportions; it was a big pot of chicken soup. Today it was a little pot of chicken soup. So the question changed. When the question changes, so the answer changes and with total consistency because different facts and different factors elicit different responses even though the principle, the underlying principles and rules, are the same. So the world changed. The principle of women's Torah learning is the same as it's been from the times of the Mishna and the Gemara, but the way that rule is to be applied depends upon what the social religious reality is. Every halachic decision consists of applying halacha to what the reality of the situation is. If two situations differ, so then the same halacha consistently can give two different responses. Thank you very much, rabbi.