Sometimes when it's between a person and his fellow perhaps we will try to touch upon three different mitzvos and try to gain a little bit of an understanding. The Mishnah in the first perek of Avos, Mishnah Vav, הוי דן את כל אדם לכף זכות. It's actually a Gemara in Shavuos, which you have in front of you the first source, darshens this from the pasuk of betzedek tishpot amisecha. betzedek tishpot amisecha not only governs the behavior of Dayanim in Beis Din, but betzedek tishpot amisecha is even in terms of forming opinions and impressions of people. That's also nichlal on a d'oraisa-dik level in the pasuk betzedek tishpot amisecha. Devar acher betzedek tishpot amisecha, הוי דן את חברך לכף זכות. And again, lest we entertain the thought that this is an asmachta and not a drasha gemura or something, so the Rambam quotes in Sefer Hamitzvos, the Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvos, in the second source, ube'chlal gam kein, what's also included in the d'oraisa betzedek tishpot amisecha שיחייב שידין את חבירו לכף זכות לא יפרש מעשיו ודבריו אלא לטובה.
What are just the practical dinim of being הוי דן לכף זכות? So after the Rambam and Rabbeinu Yonah give us the same yesodos. That if you have someone where the context of what he's doing is unclear, it could be something very legitimate and subject to favorable interpretation, it could be that he's doing something bad and subject to unfavorable interpretation. If there's a context that he's a big tzaddik, a person who never does aveiros, so then you have to interpret everything he does even if it looks bad, you have to interpret that what he's doing is good. If there's a context that he's a rasha rachimana litzlan, so even what he's doing on the surface looks good, he's giving tzedakah or something, so you're supposed to interpret based on the context that he has some kind of ulterior motive. But what if there is no context? Because the person is a good person but with his inconsistencies, I guess that description sounds a bit too fits a little bit too well for comfort. Does mitzvos, but that's not the only thing that he does, he does other things also, so there's no who the person is doesn't provide context and the action itself is also ambiguous. So then that's where there's a mitzvah to be dan lekaf zechus. The mitzvah is to interpret favorably. Or the person is a total stranger. There too there's no personal context. Either there's no personal context because again the person himself has inconsistencies or there's no personal context because the person is a stranger. So then if what the person is doing is ambiguous, the mitzvah of being dan lekaf zechus says you have to dan lekaf zechus. But when there's a personal context, so not only if what he's doing is ambiguous but seemingly if what he's doing is certainly bad, if he's a big tzaddik you have to assume that what he's doing is good and there's some kind of extenuating circumstance. And if he's a big rasha, even if what he does seemingly even if ostensibly it seems good, again the personal context tells you that it should be interpreted in negative light. These are not only pirtei mitzvah but they're actually klalim which one sees operative in other contexts as well. What does that mean? That sounds a little cryptic. There's a pasuk in the beginning of Toldos. Where the pasuk describes Esav: ויבא עשו מן השדה והוא עיף. So that's a pretty, seemingly a pretty parve description. You're out in the Mediterranean midday heat, you come home, you're going to be, understandably, you're going to be tired. That seems to be a pretty parve and innocuous description. Chazal say in the Gemara Bava Batra sixteen-b, you have in source three, well we know it from Rashi, I think Rashi references this in the Parshat HaTorah that חמש עבירות עבר אותו רשע באותו היום: בא על נערה מאורסה,
ve'harag es ha'nefesh, ve'kafar be'ikar, ve'kafar bi'tchiyat ha'meisim, ve'shat ba'bechora. בא על נערה מאורסה - כתיב הכא ויבא עשו מן השדה וכתיב התם כי בשדה מצאה.
Ve'harag es ha'nefesh - כתיב הכא עיף וכתיב התם אוי נא לי כי עיפה נפשי להורגים.
Ve'kafar be'ikar - כתיב הכא למה זה לי וכתיב התם זה קלי ואנוהו,
etcetera. So on the surface, Chazal seem to take this pasuk, which is again, seems like an innocent enough description, and say, 'no, it's really depicting horrible, horrible, horrific behavior.' But the emes is, here basically what we're encountering in parshanus is the same yesod that's operative in the dinim of דן את חברו לכף זכות. That the context of whom the description is said dictates what the simple pshat of it is. Maybe just to illustrate, once I had occasion to be talking about this, someone came over afterwards and told me the following story about Rav Hirshsprung. Someone came over to Rav Hirshsprung, zecher tzadik livracha, and asked him a kasha. A young guy, a frech guy. And Rav Hirshsprung said, 'I don't know.' And apparently, it was nika on his face that he was rather satisfied to have stumped one of the gedolim. So after he walked away, so Rav Hirshsprung says to his son-in-law, 'he thinks that my "I don't know" and his "I don't know" are the same.' So the truth is, what Chazal are telling us in the parshanus, what they're telling us in the halachos of the sod of דן את חברו לכף זכות is intuitive, it's the simple pshat. If you go over, you go over with a shver Yerushalmi, you go over to a child in Gan and you ask him a pshat, and he says 'I don't know,' so what he means is, 'I'm only up to hey and there's some other little squiggles here that we haven't learned yet because I'm only holding by alef-beis.' Then you take that same Yerushalmi and you go to Bnei Brak and you ask Rav Chaim Kanievsky, and he tells you, 'I don't know,' so mistama there's three other Yerushalmis that he doesn't know how this stims with. So of course that's the simple pshat. The simple pshat of what the words mean, the simple pshat in what the words mean depend upon the personal context of the pshat. That's what's evident in the din of דן את חברו לכף זכות. That if a person is a big tzadik and you see him riding in a car on Shabbos, so obviously there's a pikuach nefesh, obviously... who do they tell the story about that he saw someone riding in a car on Shabbos, he yelled, 'Mazel Tov, Mazel Tov!' assuming that he was taking his wife to the hospital, that she was in labor. But that's the simple pshat as that story with the 'I don't know' very beautifully illustrates. The emes is that there's another... sorry, I don't have... this was actually on the list of mareh mekomos, but the exact reference wasn't there so it couldn't be put here. I didn't have time to look it up. But there's a fascinating, fascinating comment that the Rambam has, I forget if this is the part that's called the Hakdama or the Psicha, one of the introductory sections to the Moreh. So the Rambam says if when you're learning the Moreh you come across - listen to this, rabosai - you come across things that don't make sense, so you have to be mekayem the mitzvah of הוי דן את חברו לכף זכות and assume that there's pshat, just that you're not getting the pshat. So the emes is, that this also, that context determines, every time you have a shvere Rambam, so it's also this same principle. Every time you have a shvere Rambam, every time you have a shvere Ketzos, you have a line in Rav Chaim you don't understand, so again, the context determines why is a person breaking one's head to understand it? Because the context of someone else... That can't be that can't be the reaction. So this is these principles are principles in halakha in the sugya of dan lechaf zechut. They're principles in parshanut and in pshat in Tanach and they're yesodos in Talmud Torah. The Gemara in Shabbos on source 4 with which you're all familiar: Tanu rabanan, הדן חבירו לכף זכות דנין אותו לזכות. Ma'aseh b'adam echad שיורד מגליל העליון ונשכר אצל בעל הבית אחד בדרום שלש שנים.
Erev Yom Kippur אמר לו תן לי שכרי ואלך ואזון את אשתי ובני. אמר לו אין לי מעות. אמר לו תן לי פירות אין לי. תן לי קרקע אין לי. תן לי בהמה אין לי. תן לי כרים וכסתות אין לי. הפשיל כליו לאחוריו והלך לביתו בפח נפש.
So he returns home so dejected. Ve'achar haregel נטל בעל הבית שכרו בידו ועמו משא שלשה חמורים אחד של מאכל אחד של משתה ואחד של מיני מגדים.
Bamba, Bissli, on the best, all all the good things. Vehalach lodo beiso. אחרי שאכלו ושתו נתן לו שכרו. אמר לו בשעה שאמרת לי תן לי שכרי ואמרתי אין לי מעות במה חשדתני?
And chashad doesn't have in this context the negative connotation that it often does. אמרתי שמא פרקמטיא בזול נזדמנה לך ולקחת בהן. Even even a person who's very well-off can have a temporary cash flow problem. ובשעה שאמרת לי תן לי בהמה ואמרתי אין לי בהמה במה חשדתני? אמרתי שמא מושכרת ביד אחרים.
Rented it all out. ובשעה שאמרת לי תן לי קרקע ואמרתי אין לי קרקע במה חשדתני? אמרתי שמא מוחכרת ביד אחרים.
No, he has an arrangement with people that they're going to work the land. ובשעה שאמרת לי אין לי פירות במה חשדתני? shema einam menusaros. ובשעה שאמרת לי אין לי כרים וכסתות במה חשדתני? אמרתי שמא הקדיש כל נכסיו לשמים. אמר לו העבודה כך היה. הקדשתי כל נכסי בשביל הורקנוס בני שלא עסק בתורה. כשבאתי אצל חברי בדרום התירו לי כל נדרי. ואתה כשם שדנתני לזכות
haMakom yadin osecha lizechut. What what's that beracha that he gives him? Again, the inyan of being dan lechaf zechut means when there's ambiguity, when there's chesron yediah, right? If I know for a fact that the person is gratuitously שלא במקום פקוח נפש eating chazir, if I know that one hundred percent definitively, so there's no mitzvah to be dan lechaf zechut. The mitzvah to be dan lechaf zechut is when there's a chesron yediah, when when there's something which is ambiguous. So what does it mean to say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu should be dan lechaf zechut? What's the beracha that Hakadosh Baruch Hu should be דן ידך לכף זכות? Let's leave that question for a second and and maybe raise a different question. The emess is that the mitzvah of of being dan lechaf zechut, the mitzvah is itself is omer darsheni. What does that mean? Lich'ora, let's say we had been asked what should a person's reaction be to a Jew whom you don't know, you don't know he's a stranger to you, and and he did something which is very very ambiguous, פנים לכאן ופנים לכאן, whether it should be understood favorably or unfavorably. So I think we would have said, so reserve judgment. Don't rush to judgment. Reserve judgment, you don't know what happened, so so reserve judgment, don't form any judgment. And the Torah says more, Torah doesn't tell us to reserve judgment. Torah says you have to be dan lechaf zechut. Lema'aseh, lema'aseh, it's unfortunate but obviously this is true, if a person is always mekayem the mitzvah of being dan lechaf zechut the way he should, sometimes he's going to be wrong. That that's the metzius, it's not going to be right one hundred percent of the time. So why not just why not just reserve judgment? Why not just reserve judgment? So l'chora the pshat is like this. To be able to reserve judgment in in such a scenario requires a detachment, a sense of distance which is not consistent with the orientation of Ahavas Yisrael that a person should have. Let's take take take an extreme example. Let's say a parent sees a child do something. So right away if if there's a way to see it l'tovah, so a parent's love is gonna is gonna see that is gonna see that. A parent is not gonna say you know I'm gonna have this clinical clinical detachment and say well maybe maybe what my son did was okay but maybe what he did was horrible. No, l'kaf zchus l'kaf zchus, the parental love should express itself into seeing it favorably. You can't the mitzvah to be dan l'kaf zchus means that that we shouldn't have that clinical detachment that lets us just be neutral about about a fellow Jew. That's what the reserving judgment is simple when you feel neutral. If I have no feelings about Ploni, it's very easy for me to reserve judgment but I'm supposed to have feelings about Ploni. I'm not supposed to be in a state of of neutrality and clinical detachment. And that's what's reflected in the mitzvah of being dan l'kaf zchus. Now because that that's the answer to the second question. The first question is still outstanding. Consider the following following scenario. Let's say someone is arrested and convicted a 19 year old say is Rachmana l'shlan arrested and convicted for for selling drugs. And now it's time for the judge to sentence to sentence him. So two scenarios. Scenario number one the judge says we're in the midst of an opioid crisis, masses of people are dying from overdoses and the people who are selling drugs are merchants of death and he sentences sentences the 19 year old to the maximum sentence which is possible under under the sentencing guidelines. That's scenario number one. Scenario number two is the judge says he's 19 years old, he's immature, he has a squeaky clean record until now, he made a mistake albeit a big mistake but it was a mistake, he'll grow up very fast from this mistake and because of that he's gonna sentence him to the minimum sentence which is allowable under under the sentencing guidelines. So which one is right? Which one is wrong? You can't say that either one is wrong but that either one is exclusively right. There's legitimacy and validity to both responses. So that means that even when the facts are known that it can still be dan something l'kaf chovah or l'kaf zchus. If the orientation is... so now the pshat is like this. Hayos that the yesod of being dan l'kaf zchus is not what you should think in a matzav of chesron yedia. No, the yesod of being dan l'kaf zchus is that positive favorable orientation, that lack of neutrality, that lack of detachment, that's really what the yesod is. Okay, it plays itself out, it expresses itself in a matzav of chesron yedia that that you interpret something, you spin it, you interpret it favorably but the yesod is look I don't have this neutrality which lets me reserve judgment. No, I have... I have a bias in favor. I have a bias in favor and because of that, okay, because of that, what? Because of that, in a case of chasar yedia, I judge favorably. But the yesod is that a person should have that favorable bias. Oh, so that's what the bracha is, המקום ידין אותך לכף זכות. Ribono Shel Olam should have that favorable bias as it were, even when there doesn't have to be chasar yedia for that favorable bias to translate, to happen, nafka mina. Okay, that's one hara in this sugya. That's maybe we'll use that to segue a little bit to one hara in מצות ואהבת לרעך כמוך. The Rambam's drash on the pasuk. The Rambam writes. Let's take a look at two Rambams back to back here, sources five and six on the sheet. מצות עשה על כל אדם לאהוב כל אחד ואחד מישראל כגופו שנאמר ואהבת לרעך כמוך לפיכך צריך לספר בשבחו ולחוס על ממונו כאשר הוא חס על ממון עצמו ורוצה בכבוד עצמו.
Okay, that's one Rambam. The second Rambam in Hilchos Aveil, source number six. מצות עשה של דבריהם לבקר חולים ולנחם אבלים ולהוציא המת ולהכניס הכלה וללוות האורחים ולהתעסק בכל צורכי קבורה לשאת על הכתף ולפניו ולספוד ולחפור ולקבור וכן לשמח הכלה והחתן ולסעדם בכל צורכיהם ואלו הן גמילות חסדים שבגופו שאין להם שיעור אף על פי שכל מצוות אלו מדבריהם הרי הן בכלל ואהבת לרעך כמוך. כל הדברים שאתה רוצה שיעשו אותם לך אחרים עשה אתה אותן לאחיך בתורה ובמצוות.
See, the question which mamash can keep you up at night here is the Rambam in Hilchos De'os is just so, thank you, is just so incomplete lechora. Why doesn't the Rambam in Hilchos De'os mention all these forms of gemilus chasadim which he enumerates in Hilchos Aveil? Lama? Why not? The definition of ahavas Yisrael, V'ahavta L'rei'acha Kamocha in Hilchos De'os is so brief, so sparse. And then Hilchos Aveil, so here we get the picture, here we get the full picture. So how is it? Ich veis, kemoshe'isbarei, something. The Rambam expected us to learn Mishneh Torah k'seder? It's a long time from, a long time from Hilchos De'os to Hilchos Aveil. Wow, it's a long, long time. If you don't skip, it's going to be a long time from Hilchos De'os to Hilchos Aveil. Long, long time. What's going on? Okay, let's now juxtapose two Gemaras. שלושה הקדוש ברוך הוא שונאים, towards the end of that first line in source seven, rabosai. The third of those three whom He is described in Pesachim as הקדוש ברוך הוא שונאו is הרואה דבר ערווה בחברו ומעיד בו יחידי. כי הא דטוביה חטא ואתא זיגוד לחודיה,
he came alone to beis din v'sahid bei about a davar she-be-erva, about a chayav malkus, something for which one eid is not ne'eman, for which you need two eidim, וסהיד ביה קמיה דרב פפא, Nagdei l'Zigud. He gave malkus to Zigud. Amar leih Tuvia chata and Zigud minnagid, how's that going on here? Amar leih in דכתיב לא יקום עד אחד באיש ואת לחודך אסהדת ביה שם רע בעלמא קמפקת ביה.
You have no ne'emanus as ed echad, stam m'tzaltzel sheima. אמר רב שמואל בר רב יצחק, Amar Rav nonetheless even though you can't go tell anyone mutar l'snoso, she'ne'emar כי תראה חמור שנאך רבץ תחת משאו. Mai sonei? Ileima sonei goy, v'hanya sonei shebe'emar sonei Yisrael v'lo sonei goy. אלא פשיטא שונא ישראל. U'mi shari l'misnei? And obviously we're not talking about atu b'ahava yani that the person hates him shelo k'din, והכתיב לא תשנא את אחיך בלבבך, אלא דאיכא סהדי דעביד איסורא.
If that's the case he's not sonei acha, he's not your personal enemy, כולי עלמא נמי מסני סנו ליה. Mai shna hai? אלא לאו כהאי גוונא דחזי ביה איהו דבר ערווה. אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק
ka-mashma-lan it's mutar l'snoso but mitzvah l'snoso, she'ne'emar יראת ה' שנאת רע. Okay, so not only is it muttar, it's a mitzvah to hate a ba'al aveira. אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר קרא ואהבת לרעך כמוך ברור לו מיתה יפה
and at least twice when the Gemara is trying to figure out what sreifa means, does sreifa mean literally to burn the person at the stake? Is that what misa'as beis din means? Or no, as what the halacha the conclusion is, they pour the lead and it's an inner sreifa that the person's inwards are burnt. So the Gemara says that it goes back and forth different ways different possible yalpussos. Gemara says in hacha nami that there were two possible yalpussos. We could have gone either way. But v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha is ברור לו מיתה יפה and to have שריפת הגוף ולא נשמה is the more horrible of those two misos. So here's a person who's chayiv misa, misa'as beis din. And the way we pasken to be חייב מיתת בית דין, the response to the hasra'a has to be יודע אני שאני חייב מיתה על מנת כן אני עושה.
So he's mamash a rasha l'hachis, a rasha l'hachis with the worst with an aveira for which a person's chayiv misa. And the Gemara says v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. So how do these two Gemoras shtim? How does v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha shtim with mitzvah l'snoso? There is a famous, there is a famous vort here from the Ba'al HaTanya in source number nine. So if you take a look at that last paragraph there, וגם המקורבים לו והוכיחם ולא שבו מעוונותיהם שמצווה לשנאותם מצווה לאהבם גם כן.
Says the Ba'al HaTanya, we think that ahava and sina are mutually exclusive and that's why we think there's a stira. And he doesn't reference these Gemoras, but applying what he says to the second Gemara as well, and that's why we think there's a kasha that the two Gemoras contradict each other. It's not true. Ahava and sina can coexist. You can simultaneously love and hate someone. U'shteihem hein emes. How is that possible? שנאה מצד הרע שבהם ואהבה מצד בחינת הטוב הגנוז שבהם שהוא ניצוץ אלוהות שבתוכם המחיה נפשם האלוהית.
The sina, says the Ba'al HaTanya, is supposed to be targeted. It's supposed to be targeted. It's not sort of an indiscriminate sina for the whole person, but the sina is for the rasha in them. And that's how the Ba'al HaTanya says that sina and ahava can and therefore are supposed to coexist. So that again, the Ba'al HaTanya doesn't, I don't think he references in this paragraph he's referencing the Gemara in Pesachim. I don't think he references in Sanhedrin, but lichora it's pashut that that's how al pi the Ba'al HaTanya, how one would reconcile those two Gemoras. In source five, so the Rambam writes: מצוה על כל אדם לאהוב את כל אחד ואחד מישראל כגופו
sh'ne'emar ve'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. לפיכך צריך לספר בשבחו ולחוס על ממונו כאשר חס על ממון עצמו ורוצה בכבוד עצמו.
So, by the way, I should have mentioned this before, but where does the Rambam get those two particular applications of ahavas Yisrael? So the Kesef Mishneh already metzayen that the two mishnayos in Avos in Perek Beis, mishnayos yud and yud beis respectively, Rabbi Eliezer omer: יהי כבוד חברך חביב עליך כשלך. Rabbi Yosei omer: יהי ממון חברך חביב עליך כשלך. So it's clear that the k'shelach is reflecting ve'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha, and that's where the Rambam got these two examples. You see that there's something special about those two applications as you find that the mishnayos single them out. Okay, sorry, I should have mentioned that before. But okay, so noch amol, let's reread the beginning of source five again: מצוה על כל אדם לאהוב את כל אחד ואחד מישראל כגופו
sh'ne'emar ve'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. Let's read the conclusion of source six: כל הדברים שאתה רוצה שיעשו אותם לך אחרים עשה אתה אותם לאחיך בתורה ובמצוות.
In Hilchos Deios, to whom does the chiyuv of ahavas Yisrael apply? כל אחד ואחד מישראל. In Hilchos Aveil, to whom does it apply? le'achicha b'Torah u'v'mitzvos. Those are not equivalent formulations. There's a very big gap between those two formulations. It's clear in the Rambam, bechora, it's just muchach u'muchach in the Rambam that the Rambam has two tiers, T-I-E-R, two tiers, whatever, two tiers within the mitzvah of ve'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. There's ve'ahavta l'reiacha, there's one level, there's one tier of the mitzvah which is כל אחד ואחד מישראל. כל אחד ואחד מישראל. There's another tier which is עשה אותם לאחיך בתורה ובמצוות. Yitachen that to a degree, according to the Rambam, ahavah and sinah aren't mutually exclusive, not like the Baal HaTanya says. To a degree, to a degree, he'll be modeh to the Baal HaTanya, but not fully. To a degree, according to the Rambam, ahavah and sinah are mutually exclusive. When there's a mitzvah lisnos, it's a mafkiy of that upper tier of the chiyuv of ve'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. But the lower tier, so that's כל אחד ואחד מישראל. And that, bechora, would be how the Rambam sees these two gemaros in sources seven and eight. I looked, if you have a makor, please, I was looking, I didn't find in terms of drashos Chazal that explicitly, again, bechora, I think it's explicit if you juxtapose these gemaros, but just how the pasuk is being darshened that you have those two tiers. I mean, there is a sort of cute way of presenting it, and I don't have a maamar Chazal to back it up. In effect, according to the Rambam, so Chazal are reading the pasuk with two ways of punctuation. There's ve'ahavta l'reiacha, kamocha. And there's ve'ahavta, l'reiacha kamocha. Do you hear the difference? Okay, let me try that one more time. Ve'ahavta l'reiacha, when the kamocha is not modifying the reiacha. It's modifying the ve'ahavta. Ve'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. How should you ve'ahavta? Kamocha. יהי ממון חברך חביב עליך כשלך. יהי כבוד חברך חביב עליך כשלך.
Your ahavah should be kamocha for reiacha. Who's reiacha? כל אחד ואחד מישראל is reiacha. But then there's ve'ahavta... of the mitzvah. Oh, so far that Ramban is missing even in the Oz VeHadar Gemara so I don't know, I don't know, I have to find the makor. But in any case, it's clear in the Rambam, the two Rambams put together, it's klar that that's how the Rambam understood the Chazal on this issue. Okay, so if someone is not achicha betorah umitzvos is mechuyav to in the higher level towards other people? He's not really. Correct, correct, it's not reciprocal. Okay. Okay, but be'emes, okay, so lichora that he'ara, I think even if you don't agree with the next step, I think that he'ara is clear from the Rambam. Now, but again we're still left with a kashya. Why does the Rambam give such a seemingly incomplete presentation in Hilchos De'os? So the vort is like this. By all מצוות בין אדם לחברו, whenever you have מצוות בין אדם לחברו, there's two possible and very often both are present, there's two possible mechayvim in a מצווה בין אדם לחברו. Again, just to first give a mashal and then if let's say to treat someone, to treat another person, a fellow Jew with dignity, so there's two mechayvim. Number one, he deserves that dignity. He deserves that dignity. בין כך ובין כך, he deserves that dignity. Number two, your middos dictate and demand that you act that way independent of whether he's a mechayev, you're a mechayev. A person has to maintain a certain standard of behavior in his bein adam lachaveiro just metzad atzmo. In American bottom lines, let's not mention appreciation for that. Everyone's response to the mud being thrown is to get down in the mud and throw the mud right back, and there's no mamash not the slightest, slightest sensitivity to that. A person has to have a certain standard of behavior for himself regardless of whether the person he's interacting with, whether or not that person is a mechayev or not. So there are two possible mechayvim in bein adam lachaveiro and often you have both, it's not an either or of which of the two you're going to have. What's Hilchos De'os about? Hilchos De'os is not about bein adam lachaveiro. Hilchos De'os, if you go back to perek aleph of Hilchos De'os, Hilchos De'os is how much should I eat? That the mida beinonit is in eating also. It should be how much money should I look to to amass? It's also bein adam lachaveiro, but it's clear the Rambam in one... In Hilchos De'os the Rambam is talking about דעות הרבה יש לכל אחד ואחד מבני אדם, יש אדם שהוא בעל חמה רותח תמיד, ויש אדם שדעתו מיושבת עליו ואינו כועס כלל, ויש אדם שגבה לב ביותר, ויש שפל רוח, ויש בעל תאוה, ויש בעל לב טהור מאד, ויש בעל נפש רחבה שלא תשבע נפשו מכל ממון העולם, ויש קצר נפש שדיו אפילו דבר מועט שלא יספיק לו ולא ירדוף להשיג כל צרכו
etc. ודרכים אלו של כל הדעות including achzari, rachman, etc. So Hilchos De'os is not about bein adam lachaveiro. Hilchos De'os is about the mechayev of what my obligation to maintain a certain level of conduct and behavior dictates that I have to do for the other person. U'miyitachen, again the Rambam has two tiers, so here's the suggestion on this. The Rambam has two tiers to the mitzvah of ahavas Yisroel. There's one which is called achad ve'achad miYisroel. There's one which is acheicha batorah u'mitzvos. Achad ve'achad miYisroel was in Hilchos Deios because there the mechayev is not the other person. It may be like the Gemara in Sanhedrin says, it may be that he's a rasha, and it may be that v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha is telling you בורר לו מיתה יפה. So this is the mechayev, not that the chaveir is the mechayev, not that not that you have to be courteous because because he deserves it. No, you have to be courteous because you have to be a mentch. You have to be courteous because it's Hilchos Deios-dikah mechayev. All the additional, the second tier, no, that's acheicha batorah u'mitzvos. There the mechayev is acheicha batorah u'mitzvos, not Hilchos Deios. So the Rambam holds off and and puts that in Hilchos Avel. Okay, it's late, so maybe some other time we'll we'll get into the Kessef Mishneh's 10 and 11. Thank you very much, everyone. Yasher koach. This was refuah sheleimah, this was refuah sheleimah, גרשון יעקב בן פייגל, and our chaver מאיר משה בן חנה. Everyone. Does anybody know if it's the email? I want to make sure I announce about the email before you leave, don't go yet. Yes. Before we have any Q and A's... I asked a sheilah that doesn't say divrei sofrim. Before we have any questions and answers, a very quick announcement. I help co-sponsor the evening for those who don't know. I started an email group about twelve years ago, YRBS, for the purpose of creating events like this. So for those who are not on the email, as most of you are, if you want to just give me your email address, as you, just send me an email to hadaf.dovid@gmail or give me your email, just so in the future if you're not already on it, I can, I can include you for future events. Yasher koach, Aaron, for, for organizing.