I'm backtracking for a moment to what the Chovos HaLevavos is giving representative examples of Chovos HaLevavos. וממצות עשה שבחובות הלבבות שנאמין כי יש לעולם בורא בראו מאין ושאין כמוהו ונקבל עליו יחודו ושנעבדהו בלבנו ושנתבונן בפלאי יצוריו כדי שיהיו לנו לאות עליו ושנבטח בו ושנכנע מפניו ושנירא אותו ונפחד וניבוש מהקיפו על נגלותינו ונסתרותינו ושנכסף לרצונו ונייחד מעשינו לשמו ושנאהב אותו ואוהביו כדי להתקרב אליו ונשנא שונאיו והדומה לזה ממה שאינו נראה מן האיברים. אבל הלאוין של חובות הלבבות הפך כל אלה.
If a person, God forbid, is a kofer be'ikar, so that's also a chovos halevavos, right? The opposite of יש לעולם בורא בראו מאין. He denies, denies yichud Hashem. Then the Chovos HaLevavos continues וגם מהם יתר לאוין מחובות הלבבות שלא נחמוד ולא ניקום ולא ניטור את בני עמינו. כדכתיב לא תקום ולא תיטור את בני עמך.
I hope, but I'm not sure, that that doesn't come out in a rambling fashion, but I'm not sure. What the Chovos HaLevavos doesn't say here, when he lists the mitzvos asei of chovos halevavos and then says, you don't really need to look beyond this list for lavin, because שמע ישראל ה' אלקינו ה' אחד, לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים על פני.
But isn't the same true, but he doesn't say it, isn't the same true also, let's say, שלא נחמוד לא ניקום ולא ניטור את בני עמינו? Is there no opposite mitzvah asei? So what is the opposite? So mostly the opposite of lo sisa'aveh and lo sachmod is to be sameach bechelko. If a person is sameach bechelko, then that's the antithesis of lo sachmod. לא תקום ולא תטור, what's the polar opposite there? הנוקם מחבירו עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר לא תקום ואף על פי שאינו לוקה דעה רעה היא עד מאד אלא ראוי לאדם להיות מעביר על כל דברי העולם שהכל אצל המבינים דברי הבל והבאי ואינן כדי לנקום עליהם.
So there is something, again, a person can be in compliance with לא תקום ולא תטור, but not necessarily have this middah being מעביר על כל דברי העולם שהכל אצל המבינים דברי הבל והבאי.
No, a person can not be nokem venoteir, he's misgaber. He's misgaber. You didn't lend me the kardom. Well, that's something. But I'm going to be misgaber and... and—and—and I don't hold it against you. So—so there certainly is an opposite deah. So, but the Chovos Halvavos, he doesn't say that, right? He makes a point of saying that the essence of Chovos Halvavos, the opposite is a lav, but when he gives these examples of lavin which deal with—again, those deal with again—deos, the way we use the word, not the way the Rambam uses the word. Emunos with deos the way we use the words. So then he says davor vehipucho, ase velo saase. But here by midos, he doesn't say that. Okay, so maybe—maybe these lavin in Chovos Halvavos you can't be medayek on because he introduces by saying, אני אזכור ממצוות עשה וממצוות לא תעשה שבחובות הלבבות מה שיזדמן לי.
Maybe once you have that hakdamah, it's—it's excessive to—I'm sorry. It was what was nizdamen. These weren't nizdamen. The lo sachmod, the lo sikom, the lo sitor weren't nizdamen. So what do you do with that? So I don't know, maybe—maybe the following. I'm not sure—not sure at all. Maybe the following. That the Chofetz Chaim in his hakdamah—I think it's the Chofetz Chaim, not Shmiras Halashon—quotes from Rav Chaim Vital in the beginning of Shaarei Kedusha that generally speaking—the Chofetz Chaim quotes it because he's highlighting an exception to it—but that generally speaking the Torah doesn't have mitzvos which deal with midos, which deal with deos. Right? Clearly Rav Chaim Vital has a different havannah in V'ahavta L'reiacha because for the Rambam, all midos and deos are basically part of V'ahavta L'reiacha. Now why that is, so Rav Chaim Vital goes on to explain. He explains it in terms of Kabbalah that there's—there's a higher nefesh or a higher level of the nefesh and there's a lower nefesh and the Torah, mitzvos ha-Torah address the higher nefesh, and midos stem from the lower nefesh. What that means when we sort of avoid the Kabbalah she-bo—which is beyond us—is that what Rav Chaim Vital is saying is that to a certain degree midos are prerequisites for Torah and that's why they're not in the Torah. Again the mashal being, if you look at the list of courses that you take in medical school, so you don't see basic biology, you don't see basic chemistry, you don't see basic organic chemistry. So, oh, so maybe that means that it's irrelevant and you don't need it? No, adrabba. It's so basic, it's so fundamental that you can't even apply to medical school without taking those courses. And that's why the Shaarei Kedusha says that on the one hand you find that Chazal reveal to us in—in—just how fundamental midos tovos are. כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה זרה. Okay. So even if you highlight the word k'ilu, but that's still a rather strong statement, that כאילו עובד עבודה זרה. avodah zarah. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu says about a ba'al gaiva that אין אני והוא יכולים לדור בכפיפה אחת, as if the world's not big enough for the two of us, Hakadosh Baruch Hu says. Doesn't have room for the ba'al gaiva and Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And yet, again, according to the Sha'arei Kedusha's understanding, none of these are embodied within mitzvos, because they're prerequisites. And he says something which is ayom v'nora. Ayom v'nora. He says which is why bad middos is worse than, again, he's not downplaying, he's not minimizing, he's not taking lightly aveiros. He takes them with all the appropriate chomer indicated by את ה' אלהיך תירא, but he says middos tovos are worse. The mashal being, if you have a building, let's say a building is ten stories high, and you see a crack on the facade of the tenth floor. Okay, inna nami, for someone walking on the sidewalk outside, that's not the greatest news. But in terms of the integrity of the building, okay, so there's a problem on the tenth floor. What happens if you see that same crack in the support pillars in the basement, in the foundation? So then that rachmana litzlan can bring the whole building down. Now for the, again, Chaim Vital recognizes, and that's what the Chofetz Chaim says in the hakdama to Chofetz Chaim, that there are exceptions. But maybe the pshat is, again, if this is correct, that the Chovos HaLevavos agrees with the Sha'arei Kedusha, that's one if. And the second is agam the Chovos HaLevavos himself underscores the fact that seichel is a mechayev, that something can be a chiyuv even if it isn't in the Torah. But if the sefer of Chovos HaLevavos is about mitzvos haTorah, so then you put all that together, then it's davka that he doesn't say that the opposite of לא תקם ולא תטר and lo sachmod are mitzvos because they're chiyuvim. But they're not chiyuvim which are which constitute mitzvos haTorah. Again, which again, al pi the Sha'arei Kedusha, doesn't diminish their significance, it underscores their significance. It means it's not the facade of the tenth floor, it's the foundation that's holding up the building. Let's continue a bit here. So again, the Chovos HaLevavos reviews the chiburim, he reviews rabbinic literature post chasimas haTalmud. וחקרתי עליהם ולא מצאתי בהם ספר מיוחד בחכמת המצפון וראיתי החכמה הזאת,
I don't know exactly what the translation, again, I think in modern Hebrew matzpun means a conscience. Means one's conscience. I don't think that's what it means here. But again, it means chochmas halev, the levavos. What does matzpun mean as distinct from levavos? I don't know. That which is hidden, not sure. וראיתי החכמה הזאת שהיא חכמת חובת הלבבות, maybe it's a synonym. שהניחוה בלא חיבור בספר שיהיה כולל שרשיה. V'tamati al zeh. What do you have English there? What does the English of chochmas hamatzpun? The knowledge of the inward life. Inward life. Okay, so taking it as basically as a synonym of chochmas halev. ותמהתי על זה תימה גדולה עד שאמרתי בלבי שמא המין הזה מן המצוות איננו מחויב מן התורה אלא שחיובם מדרך המוסר.
Maybe it's the pnimiyus, middos chasidos, להורות הדרך הנכונה והישרה וכמוהו כמו התוספות שאינם משורש. Other things which are additional. ובל נאשמים אם נעלמו מהם ועל כן הניחו הקדמונים לחבר בספר עד שחיפשתי על חובת הלבבות מן השכל ומן הכתוב ומן הקבלה אם אנחנו חייבים בהם אם לאו ומצאתם שהם יסודי כל המצוות ואם יקרה בהם שום הפסד לא תיתכן לנו מצווה ממצוות האיברים.
Not only are the chovos halevavos, but again, chovos halevavos are foundational. Without fulfilling chovos halevavos, it's it's non-meaningful to fulfill mitzvos ha-eivarim. Lichora what when the Chovos HaLevavos says, you know, and he's about to he's about to present, you know, the argument min hasechel and and the proofs מן הכתוב ומן הקבלה, he didn't need to to establish that it's a chiyuv and he doesn't need to find it in all three. When when the Chovos HaLevavos earlier listed the three sources of knowledge, sechel, what what's explicit in Torah Shebi-ktav and and what we have mikabbalah, what we have as part of mesorah, he meant that each one independently is is a mechayiv. It doesn't have to be. This is just, you know, to to underscore and and to present things even more emphatically that he's going to tell us that you find that all three sources of knowledge converge and and they all attest to chovos halevavos. Min hasechel she'amarti, what's the how does sevara dictate that there are chovos halevavos? כי כבר נתבאר לנו כי האדם מורכב מנפש וגוף ושניהם מטובת הבורא עלינו האחד נראה והשני איננו נראה ואנחנו חייבים לעבוד אותו עבודה גלויה ועבודה צפונה.
A person has to be totally devoted to Hakadosh Baruch Hu with everything he has. So obviously that means that that there's not going to be only chovos ha-eivarim, but there're going to be chovos halevavos as well. And conversely it also means that there's not going to be only chovos halevavos, there's going to be chovos ha-eivarim as well. חובות האיברים כמו התפילה והצום והצדקה ולימוד התורה ולמדה ועשות סוכה ולולב וציצית ומזוזה ומעקה והדומה להם ממה שיגמר מעשה על ידי חושי האדם הנראים.
The Nefesh Hachaim highlights that the Magen Avraham paskens that that we hold hirhur lav kedibbur even when it comes to mitzvas tfillah. Agav the tfillah is is defined as avodah shebalev, but but notwithstanding, so so we pasken that hirhur lav kedibbur. A person, it's not enough that a person will think to themselves the words of of the Shmoneh Esrei, he has to bechisuch sefasayim, he has to he has to say. So the Chovos HaLevavos is saying also, right? Tfillah is an illustration for the for the chovos halevavos of chovos ha-eivarim. אך העבודה הצפונה היא חובות הלבבות והוא שנייחד האל בלבבנו ושנאמין בו ובתורתו ושנקבל עבודתו ונירא אותו ונכנע מפניו ונבוש ממנו ונאהב אותו ונבטח בו ונמסור נפשותינו אליו ושנפרוש מאשר ישנא ושנייחד מעשינו לשמו ושנתבונן בטובתו והדומה לזה ממה שייגמר במחשבות הלב ומצפונו מבלי איברי הגוף הנראים ממנו.
So until this point, the Chovos HaLevavos is just emphasizing that it's intuitive, as he'll explain later in the sefer, it's al pi sechel that we have the chiyuv to be oved Hashem. To be oved Hashem, it it can't be that that chiyuv is is exhausted just through avodas ha-eivarim, just through chovos ha-eivarim. But then he says what's more, it's not only that you also have to have chovos halevavos, it's that without chovos halevavos there's no chovos ha-eivarim. וידעתי דעתי ברור כי חובת האיברים לא תשלמנה כי אם ברצון הלב. יסתלק מעל אברינו חיוב המצווה שאין חייבים בהם מפני שאין מעשה נשלם בלי חפץ הנפש בו. וכיוון שנתברר כי הבורא חייב את אברינו במצוותיו, לא היה נכון להניח נפשנו ולבנו שהם מובחר חלקי עצמנו שלא יחייבם בעבודתו כפי יכולתם.
I don't know whether it's intended this way, the Lashon always sounds like he's speaking psychologically, you don't do something unless you really want to do it. But Lemaise, it's certainly the case that without קבלת עול מלכות שמיים, without Kabalas Ol Mitzvos, there is no Kiyum Hamitzva. If a person, we're not coming to now as to whether or not this has value in terms of Jewish identity and maybe as a stage in Kiruv, and I don't mean to dismiss or disparage things that are very important in that vein. But if a person sits down ליל חמישה עשר בניסן and eats Matzah because it's a culturally Jewish thing to do, I don't know, maybe Rachmana Litzlan doesn't even believe in Ribono Shel Olam, maybe he believes in Ribono Shel Olam but doesn't believe in Torah Misinai, so he's not being Mekayeim a Mitzva. There's no Kiyum Hamitzva. If the person doesn't believe Asher Kidishanu Bemitzvosav, ברוך אתה ה' אלוהינו מלך העולם אשר קדשנו במצוותיו, then what he does is not a Mitzva. I mean, one does find that Hakadosh Baruch Hu rewards, אין הקדוש ברוך הוא מקפח שכר כל בריה ובריה. Not quite what exactly Og Melech Habashan believed in, but I don't think it would provide material for Sefer Haemunos Vedeios and Og Melech Habashan gets incredible reward in Olam Hazeh for something for which he even has sinister motivation. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu's giving Sachar Lechud and what's Al Pi Din a Kiyum Hamitzva Lechud. That's what the Rambam writes, that's true not only in terms of Taryag Mitzvos, it's true in terms of שבע מצוות בני נח as well. That if Bnei Noach, if a non-Jew is מקיים שבע מצוות בני נח Mihachra Hadaas, okay, so he's a Chacham, but he's not a Chasid, doesn't make him Chasidei Umos Ha'olam because if there's no recognition of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, just he has a sense, not even a sense that he attributes to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, he's not even attributing his moral intuition to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but he has a sense that if we steal and kill, then there's going to be total anarchy and it's not right, Vechulu. No, it has to be מפני שהקדוש ברוך הוא ציווה אותם בתורה והודיענו על ידי משה רבנו שבני נח מקודם נצטוו בהן.
So there's no Kiyum Hamitzvos without קבלת עול מלכות שמיים, without Kabalas Ol Mitzvos. That's what. So it's not only that there are also Chovos Halevavos, it's that without Chovos Halevavos there's no Chovas Ha'eivarim. Right? The Chovos Halevavos are the foundation.