And so they said וכן אמרו ומי שעשה מצווה ולא נתכוון לעשותה לשם שמיים שאינו מקבל עליה שכר.
So what was the Chovot HaLevavot referring to here? לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצוות אפילו שלא לשמה. So he thinks that there's no kibbul sachar for לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצוות אפילו שלא לשמה? Yeah, you should do it but but there's no sachar? So maybe and maybe what he means is is like this. Again ultimately you know we'll have to say a little bit lav davka in in terms of the lashon. Everyone agrees that that meimra of רב יהודה אמר רב notwithstanding of יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצוות אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה,
everyone agrees that there is a shelo lishmah which is beyond the pale, which is which is unacceptable. העושה שלא לשמה נוח לו שלא נברא says the Gemara in Berachot Yud Zayin. So the question is where the line is between the shmah, the shelo lishmah which is encouraged, not as the ultimate but encouraged as hopefully as as a stage towards the ultimate, and and what's a shelo lishmah which is which is unacceptable. So the way Tosafot in Berachot draws the line that the shelo lishmah which is unacceptable is הלומד על מנת לקנטר. He has destructive goals in mind. He's learning so that he can he can undermine others with his learning as opposed to הלומד על מנת שיכבדוהו. But הלומד על מנת שיכבדוהו is nichlal in לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצוות אפילו שלא לשמה. Hagam that the person person recognizes that that's what's motivating him, the Tosafot says no רב יהודה אמר רב is encouraging the person: do it, שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. In Mesillat Yesharim So the Ramchal writes that the shelo lishma which רב יהודה אמר רב is encouraging is for kabbalas sechar and avoiding onesh. I think we spoke about this, right? But if it's for ashirus, if it's for kavod, so רב יהודה אמר רב is not allowing for that. And as we discussed, the pshat in that is that for kabbalas sechar, so the person is being misyaches to it as a mitzvah. If it's for ashirus, if it's for kavod, so he's being misyaches to it as a good investment. He's not even being misyaches to it as a tzivui Hashem. And mistama according to Ramchal it would be true if the person is learning not with a combination of motivations, right? Usually even when we have shelo lishma, we hopefully have a little bit of lishma in there as well. So we're talking about, let's say it's entirely entirely shelo lishma. According to Ramchal, it's entirely to get kavod, it's entirely for ashirus. So ein hachi nami, mistama he's not being mkayem mitzvah, and Ramchal would say that he's eino mikabel la's'char. Is that a cogent reading of the Chovos HaLevavos? I don't know. I know if you say what he means by ולא נתכוון לעשותה לשם שמיים, it means he's not doing it leshem mitzvah. He's not doing it leshem mitzvah. I mean, it's not so let's say according to when according to Tosfos, I'm sort of double dipping here. But according to Tosfos, העושה שלא לשמה נוח לו שלא נברא, shelo lishma means shelo lishma ingantzen. So ולא נתכוון לעשותה לשם שמיים, he's not being misyaches to it as a mitzvah, so eino mikabel la's'char. I don't know if that's what he means. The alternative is, I don't know, that the Chovos HaLevavos holds that there's only schar if a person... I don't know, it's hard to imagine that's what he means. Maybe you do have to say the pshat we just suggested. ולא נתכוון לעשותה לשם שמיים means he's not doing it leshem mitzvah. It's an instrument. It's an instrument for olam hazeh-dike considerations, be it kavod, be it ashirus, or whatever it may be. וכיוון שקוטב המעשה ועמודו בנויים על כוונת הלב ומצפונו, וראוי שתהא חכמת מצוות הלב קודמת בטבע לחכמת מצוות האיברים. וכאשר התברר לי חיוב החכמה הצפונה מן השכל והכתוב והקבלה אמרתי, שמא המין הזה מן המצוות איננו מחויב בו בכל עת ובכל מקום, כשמיטה כיובל כקרבנות.
Mistama this is the Chovos HaLevavos is being rhetorical here and for pedagogic purposes. I don't know he really wasn't sure about this. This is his... the same way Rabbi Yehuda HaLevi later writes what he wants to tell us as a dialogue. Why does it have to be a dialogue? He thinks that that's the most effective way to present. So I don't think that Rabbeinu Bachya was really mesupak on all these stages. וכאשר עיינתי מצאתי שהיא חייבת תמיד כל ימינו בלי הפסק.
Both the Chayei Adam and the Mishna Berura in Beiur Halacha, so they both begin right away with the sheish mitzvos temidiyos from the Sefer HaChinuch: the mitzvah of anochi, לא יהיה לך אלוהים אחרים על פני, שמע ישראל ה' אלוקינו ה' אחד,
ahavas Hashem, yiras Hashem, and ולא תתורו אחרי לבבכם ואחרי עיניכם. The sheish mitzvos temidiyos. But that yesod of mitzvos temidiyos is really here in the Chovos HaLevavos. That's what the Chovos HaLevavos is here underscoring: that Chovos HaLevavos are mitzvos temidiyos. מצאתי שהיא חייבת תמיד כל ימינו בלי הפסק ושאין לנו שום טענה בהנחתה.
Maybe we'll just read and see his mashal and then try to just comment very briefly. ושאין לנו שום טענה בהנחתם. There's no excuse, there's no defense for neglecting it. Kemo again, what are the examples of the Chovos HaLevavos which are mitzvos temidiyos? כמו יחוד אלהינו בלבבנו ועבדו במצפוננו וליראה ולאהבה אותו ושנכסוף לעשות המצות שאנחנו חייבים בהן. כמו שאמר הכתוב אחלי יכונו דרכי לשמור חוקיך. ושנבטח בו ושנמסור נפשותינו אליו. כמו שנאמר בטחו בו בכל עת עם שפכו לפניו לבבכם. ולהסיר השנאה והקנאה מלבבנו ושנפרוש ממוסרי ענייני העולם שטורד נפשותינו מעבודת השם. ככל זה אנו חייבים בו תמיד בכל עת ובכל מקום ובכל שעה ובכל רגע ועל כל עניין בעוד שכלנו ונשמתנו בו. והדומה לזה עבד שציווהו רבו לעשות שתי מלאכות האחת בביתו והשנית בשדה.
Kemo avodas ha'adamah ולעיין בה בעתים ידועות ובשעות ידועות. אם יעברו העתים ההם או אם לא ימצא לעשות מפני דבר שימנעהו יסתלק מעליו חיוב המעשה חוץ לביתו. אבל המעשה שציווהו לעשותו בביתו אינו מסתלק מעליו כל ימי עמדו בו ועבודת אדוניו כשלא ימנעהו מונע ולא יטרידהו טורד וחיוב המעשה תמיד עליו כשיפנה.
So what's the mashal? Mashal is like this. So the field, the work that the adon assigns him outdoors. So there the ability of the eved to be able to carry out that assignment, it depends upon, it's the outdoor work, it depends upon external circumstances. If there's going to be a blizzard, so then there are going to be times and conditions and circumstances that will prevent him from doing it. That's half the mashal. The other half the mashal is that there isn't that much to do that it would be tamidi. But let's focus on this half of the mashal. That because it's external, so then mimaila there are external conditions that impact or impinge upon one's, upon the eved's ability to do the work. Mah she'ein kein what's inside the house, so then external conditions are irrelevant. They don't, they have no impact. So again, the nimshal being chovos evarim and chovos halevavos. Chovos evarim, I don't know, there can be a shortage of daled minim and you cannot have daled minim. There can be a shortage of flour and you cannot have matzah. There can be, a person doesn't have a guf naki, you can't put on tefillin. There are all kinds of possible meniyos and ikuvim. But chovos halevavos, chovos halevavos, there's nothing that can interfere or impinge unless the person himself, again, by mosrei inyanei ha'olam, distracts himself. But there's no external, there's no possible external force or factor that can prevent the person from attending to chovos halevavos. So when you think about that, it's something very, very far-reaching. It means that no matter what external circumstances are, maybe rachmana litzlan the person is very poor and works morning to night and longer to barely eke out a parnassah. There are all kinds of, maybe who knows what problems or challenges or issues the person has to deal with. Says the Chovos HaLevavos, but ultimately, ultimately, there's nothing that can intrude upon a person to the point of interfering with chovos halevavos. It's both pashut and extraordinary when you think about it. There's no external factor that can impinge. With chovos haivorim, there's all kinds of external factors that can impinge. The only thing is is if it's self-imposed. The obstruction can be self-imposed, ella ahavas haolam. If a person again distracts himself by being focused on this worldly pleasures, so that he can be distracted. But that's self-imposed. ושאינו אנחנו מבינים עניין בוראנו כמו שנאמר והיה כינור ונבל תוף וחליל ויין משתיהם,
because they're busy partying. So then mimaileh, פעל השם לא יביטו ומעשה ידו לא ראו. So the yesod that the Chovos HaLevavos is highlighting here is relevant again, ultimately it's all- it all comes back to Chovos HaLevavos, but sort of even if that's not the point that's being emphasized. That klal in life, rabosai, a person the chiyuv hishtadlus and the importance of chiyuv hishtadlus notwithstanding, but ultimately a person controls absolutely nothing. Absolutely nothing. A person can make hishtadlus, but you know what that hishtadlus yields is by definition out of his hands. A person controls nothing. He's sovereign over nothing. Conditions in his life, a person has no control over- again, we're supposed to make hishtadlus so there are no self-imposed problems. A person can create self-imposed problems. A person can have self-imposed poverty by not equipping himself, by not making hishtadlus for parnassah. There can be all kinds of self-imposed problems, but the point is that even when a person isn't doing that, ultimately, obviously we're not in control of anything. But there is one thing that a person's always, always in complete control of and that is what his reactions are and what his attitude is to what happens to him, what happens around him. I mean, in the Soviet Union, there was such reshaim, they figured out how to take that away also, when they would put the dissidents in mental hospitals and drug them and make them into zombies. But assuming that a person is not subjected to that kind of appalling rishus and achzaryos, so the one thing that a person is as long as he's sentient, as long as he's of sound mind, the one thing that a person is always in control of is what his reaction to things is, what his attitude towards things is. So on the one hand that's the only thing, but on the other hand it's everything, in the sense that so let's say rachmana litzlan, again not self-imposed, let's say a person is rachmana litzlan experiencing yissurim. So again on the one hand he has no control over anything. Miedach gisa, the fact that the one thing that he does control is what his attitude is, so his attitude frames what's happening. Is it- is he just engaged in a futile struggle against a force greater than he? Or is he mekabel? And as mekabel he's matzdik es hadin and it becomes an experience of tzidkas hadin and ahavas Hashem. So on the one hand it's nothing and on the other hand it's everything. Right, let's stop there.