Transcript

והנראה לי בטעם השמטת הרמב"ם ז"ל המצוות האלו ממנין המצוות אינו מסייע למצוות העשה.

I think that's what's written there.

על כן הניחם ולא חיבר בהם ספר מיוחד וכאשר חקרתי על מספרם ופרקיהם מצאתים לרוב מאוד בהתערבם עד שחשבתי כי מה שאמר דוד עליו השלום לכל תכלה ראיתי קץ רחבה מצוותך מאוד אמרו על מצוות הלבבות כי מצוות האיברים יש להם מספר ידוע כמות תרי"ג מצוות אך מצוות הלבבות רבות מאוד עד כי אין לספרם מספר.

It could be what we're going to talk about, it could be is not needed to understand the Chovos HaLevavos. It could be that the way this paragraph should be understood is that all Chovos HaLevavos are nichlal within those Chovos HaLevavos that appear within the minyan Taryag. It could be that's what this paragraph means. But so I don't know whether it's digressing or just מעניין בבחינת עניין לעניין. It's a davar muskam. You find this in a davar muskam that the minyan Taryag is not intended to and isn't totally comprehensive in the sense that anything and everything that we're required to do can be traced back to something which is in the minyan Taryag. Now that obviously poses a big question which we're gonna leave for today in terms of so what's the significance of the minyan Taryag? Okay, so that is a very, very big question. Within the Rambam, the way you see this in a very, very powerful way is the following. If you take the Rambam's Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim and then you search in Minyan HaMitzvos for the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, so you'll find some of them, but you absolutely will not find all of them. You won't find in Minyan HaMitzvos Torah Min HaShamayim. You won't find in Minyan HaMitzvos זאת התורה לא תהא מוחלפת. Maybe arguably it's in bal tosif and bal tigra. Okay, maybe. So I don't know, I'm not sure if that's a good example. You won't find in Minyan HaMitzvos the twelfth, the Ikkar of Moshiach. You don't find at least literally in Minyan HaMitzvos the Ikkar of Techiyas HaMeisim. So how can and again that wasn't an exhaustive list. So how can that be? Right? If a person is mefackpeik in any of the above, so he's a kofer, he's a min, he's yotzei m'Klal Yisrael, and it isn't in Minyan HaMitzvos. So the answer is, the dibrei hakol, the term Mitzvah in the phrase תרי"ג מצוות נאמרו למשה מסיני has a certain formal definition which doesn't correspond to everything that we're commanded to do or believe. Maybe even a stronger and more powerful illustration, although I don't know more, but certainly equally, maybe even more powerful. So the Bahag famously, this is what the Rambam is disagreeing with in whether he acknowledges metziyas Hashem. It's not something which is optional for the Bahag, but it doesn't appear in his minyan hamitzvos. Why doesn't it appear in his minyan hamitzvos? So everyone explains because metziyas Hashem is axiomatic for Torah. It's not one of the mitzvos hatorah. It's something which is axiomatic for all mitzvos hatorah. Axiomatic for mitzvos hatorah is that there's a metzaveh. Now, again, that doesn't mean, well, since it's not in minyan hamitzvos, so therefore it's optional. No, what it means is that again the term mitzvah in the phrase taryag mitzvos is used in a restricted sense, in a sense that's narrower intentionally and doesn't encompass everything that we're obligated to do. Now what that formal definition of mitzvah is, lav davka that all the monei mitzvos agree on that, but everyone agrees that the list of taryag mitzvos is not exhaustive and that it's a fallacy to say, well, if it's not in taryag mitzvos, it's not a chiyuv. Which is why the alternate reading of the Chovos Halevavos is here is that lav davka that all the toldos you can really, again, but either way the yesod is here, whether it's needed in the Chovos Halevavos, tochon or it doesn't, but either way this yesod is true. Rav Chaim Vital, I think we mentioned in the beginning of Shaarei Kedusha says that there are no mitzvos in the Torah by and large that deal with midos. Despite the fact that כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה זרה and a person who's misga'eh is ke'ilu kofer ba'ikar, despite these condemnations of midos ra'os in the strongest terms, but they're not in minyan hamitzvos. So for Rav Chaim Vital, his definition of what mitzvah means in the context of taryag mitzvos, again, there's sort of shtei nefashos, two levels of nefesh. The midos have their root in the nefesh hashafelah and mitzvos address mitzvos hatorah, the mitzvos which are in the Torah address the higher nefesh, the nefesh hasichlis. But the fact that there's no formal lav for Rav Chaim Vital against anger, against ga'avah vechulu, the fact that there's no formal lav doesn't mean that it's אסור בתכלית בתכלית האיסור. And the same is true for the Bahag in terms of emunah b'Hashem, and the same is true for the Rambam in terms of those of the yud gimmel ikkarim which are not featured in the minyan hamitzvos. What's the Rambam's definition? Which of the yud gimmel ikkarim do you have in the minyan hamitzvos? Which don't? So if you look, it corresponds to the following. The Rambam tells us, Chovos Halevavos agrees with this, that's what Sha'ar Hayichud is about, that a person can know logically metziyas Hashem, he can know logically that Hashem echad, he can know logically that Hashem ein gof, he can know logically that Hashem kadmon. And again, logically in not logically in the sense of that it makes sense, but logically in a formal sense of constructing a logical demonstration, a logical proof. Logically in terms of a formal sense of constructing a proof. Mah she'ein kein. The truth of let's say Ma'amad Har Sinai notwithstanding, it's not something that you can construct a logical scientific proof for. Ma'amad Har Sinai happened and we have a tradition that it happened and vechulu vechulu, but it's not something where you can construct a logical proof. A mitzvah, a mitzvah asei for the Rambam is that there's something beyond belief that you're supposed to do. So for each of the ikkarim of metzius Hashem and Hashem echad, so the mitzvah is yediyah even in the logical sense. Mah she'ein kein, that's those mah she'ein kein let's say techiyas hameisim. So techiyas hameisim we know. It's a pasuk in Daniel and we have a tradition but it's not something you can construct a logical proof for that there has to be techiyas hameisim. No, it's lo nitpas in that. Lo nitpas in that, so there's nothing to do. And the formal definition of mitzvos is that the mitzvah asei is something to do. So that's for the Rambam. Again, the Nefesh Hachayim distinguishes between the two nefashos, the lower nefesh and the higher nefesh. The Bahag distinguishes between what's axiomatic to mitzvos and what are mitzvos peratios. But al dibrei hakol, the minyan taryag is not intended to and isn't all-encompassing in terms of chiyuvim.

ואמרתי עוד שמא הן כל כך מבוארות וידועות לכל וכל בני אדם דבקים בהם עד שלא נצטרכו לחברם בספר

Meaning what's written in a sefer doesn't necessarily correspond to what's most important or what's most basic but what's most needed to teach people. Something can be very basic, very elementary, but if for that reason it's taka very well known, then there's no need to be mechaber in a sefer. So for instance, I forgot, I saw this, I'm not sure who, but the Adam Gadol points out, I think it doesn't say anywhere in Shulchan Aruch you have to have a mechitzah in shul. Everyone knows! So it's not what sometimes what it doesn't say is because it's mefursam. And the mefursamos not only einan tzerichun raya, מפורסמות אינן צריכן כתיבה. And that's what the Chovos Halevovos says. So maybe that's why there's no Sefer Chovos Halevovos because aderaba, it's so basic, it's so fundamental that everyone knows what you're supposed to do. So we need sefarim in bishul and techum Shabbos because there not everyone knows, but we don't need sefarim here. So the hava amina is that's the hava amina.

וידעתי מנהג בני אדם ברוב הדורות הנזכרים בספרים ומצאתים רחוקים מזה מן המצווה

It's not true. אלא הזריזים בחירי הסגולה בהם כפי הנזכר עליהם Only yechidim understand and are mekayem Chovos Halevovos.

אחר שהיה צריך להעיר ולהורות עליהם וכל שכן ברוב אנשי זמננו זה

In my generation says the Chovos Halevovos,

אשר זלזלו בחכמת מצוות האיברים כל שכן במצוות הלבבות ואשר ידבנו לבו מהם לעיין בחכמת התורה הוא מתכוון לדבר שיקרא בו חכם אצל עם הארץ ושיעשה לו שם אצל הגדולים ויצא מדרך התורה אל מה שלא יקנהו מעלה יתירה ולא ינקהו ממכשול בנפשו ושאם לא היה יודע לא היה נענש עליו והניח. אם אנחנו חייבים לעיין בו מצד שכלנו, או אם יספיק לנו אם נדעהו מצד הקבלה שנאמר שאלוקינו אחד כאשר יאמרו הפתאים מבלי אות ומופת, או אם אנחנו חייבים לחקור על עניין האחד האמת והאחד העובר להבדיל העניין הזה אצלנו משאר ענייני האחדים הנמצאים.

So is it enough to believe Hashem echad, or does a person have to know it mitzod hasechel? Is it enough to say Hashem echad, or is there a chiyuv to understand that when we say echad, predicated of Hashem, it's echad in a unique sense, not like echad that's used in any other context?

והעניין הזה אין המאמין רשאי שלא ידענו, שהתורה הזהירה עליו דכתיב: וידעת היום והשבות אל לבבך כי השם הוא האלוקים.

And yediah, what's the raya, what's the raya from the pasuk? So however you understand what v'hasheivosa el levavecha, again, is the raya already from the first phrase viyadata hayom, or is it a yediah which the Torah then says v'hasheivosa el levavecha? But either way, the result, either of the initial phrase or the two phrases in conjunction, is that yediah means more than just acceptance mitzad ha'emunah. It means more than just accepted belief. It means to know in the sense of understanding, to understand to the best of one's ability.

וכן שאר המצוות הלבבות שזכרנו ושננו עתידים לזכור אשר לא תיגמר אמונת המאמין אם לא ידעם ויעשם, והיא החכמה הצפונה שהיא אור הלבבות ונוגה הנפשות,

ve'aleha amar hakasuv: הן אמת חפצת בטוחות ובסתום חכמה תודיעני. What does Chovos Halevavos mean when he says:

ויטה מדרך התורה אל מה שלא יקנהו מעלה יתירה, לא ינקהו ממכשול בנפשו, ושאלמלא היה יודעו לא היה נענש עליו?

And then he's going to say here subsequently, skipping, well, in the next paragraph he says, just skipping two lines for the moment:

ונשאל אחד מן החכמים על שאלה נוכרית מעניין דין הגירושין.

Ve'heishiv u'she'alo:

אתה האיש השואל על מה שלא יזיקהו אם לא ידענו.

Same yesod, right? A yediah that a person is not deficient if he lacks.

הידעת כל מה שאתה חייב לדעתו מן המצוות אשר אינך רשאי להתעלם מהם ואין ראוי לך לפשוע בהם, עד שנפנית לחשוב בשאלות נוכריות אשר לא תקנה בהן מעלה יתירה בתורתך ובאמונתך, ולא תתקן בהן מעוות במידות נפשך?

Ve'hinei ani nishba

כי מחמש ושלושים שנה אני מתעסק במה שצריך לעניין מצוות תורתי, ואתה יודע רוב תאוותי בעיון וברוב הספרים אצלי, ולא פיניתי ליבי למה שפנית ליבך לשאול עליו, והאריך להוכיחו ולביישו על זה.

So again, the Chovos Halevavos clearly says two things. Clear and we understand. The other is not, not so clear. Again, it's clear, you know, the neglect of Chovos HaLevavos. So that's clear. The very stinging critique of that. What does he mean about

שאלות נכריות אשר לא תקנה בהן מעלה יתירה בתורתך ואמונתך?

So le'chora you have to say as follows. A person can ask what's the din in a theoretical case and let's say a theoretical case which is very far-fetched that it would ever happen. So even you know, even if the person's a moreh hora'ah, it's a karov levadai or if not vadai that he'll never encounter this situation. A person can ask what's the din in such a case. The question can emerge either of two ways. Either, I don't know, the person sort of has a knack for, you know, coming up with strange scenarios and unusual questions. Or it can be that, you know, he was learning a sugya in Gittin and he was mesupak how to understand a certain din and to concretize what the two tzadim were, so he gives the following nafka mina. So presumably the Chovos HaLevavos is talking about the first scenario. He's talking about someone who has sort of has a knack for generating questions and it's not emerging from, you know, conceptually he's mesupak. Is it this or is it that? You know, does this din... the same way, you know, you can have the Maharal and others have attacked what they label pilpul. So what does that refer to? Again, sort of outwardly, externally, you know, a person can have a safek how to learn pshat because again, he just is being a pilpul and you know, whatever you tell him, he'll make a, he'll come up with a safek, is it this or is it that? Is it A or is it B? You know, in the, there used to be a, I don't know if the joke is told anymore, used to be associated, but I don't think it's fair to repeat who it was with, what it was associated with, that they would chakker what makes a cup of tea sweet. So one side is that sugar makes tea sweet. And they said no, no, it's the act of stirring that makes tea sweet. Aye, but you can stir all day long if there's no sugar it doesn't get sweet. No, that's only because the sugar is a tenai that it should have a chalos shem of stirring. So that was the safek how to understand. So what's wrong with that chakirah? So what's wrong is that Reb Chaim never ever said is it A or is it B. It's when you encounter a difficulty if you understand it one way so then you begin to... So then you begin to rethink that, no, maybe it's not supposed to be understood this way, maybe it should be understood the other way. There has to be a prompt. Maybe the prompt is a machlokes Rishonim that you see that they came to different conclusions from reading this Gemara, which obviously is a prompt that there must be more than one way to understand this Gemara. Maybe it's a difficulty which is the prompt. But it's not stam to be mepalpel and is it this or is it this? Otherwise, you end up wondering what makes a good cup of tea. Sweet. So there too, it lends itself to the same, it can be ממש אמיתה של תורה, which it obviously is with Rav Chaim, or it can taka be a kopol which is worthy of critique. So the same thing is true with asking what's the din in such and such a case. If it's just because a person has a knack to come up with a question, so the Chofetz Chaim says, so what are you spending your time in that? If the nafka mina is concretizing something which is relevant to understanding a sugya, understanding a Rambam, a din in Shulchan Aruch, so then he wouldn't—then we're not going to dismiss that שאלמלא ידו לא היה ניגש אל הלב and that it's not something which is important. Okay.