פרק ז הלכה ז רבותיי. הנוקם את חברו עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר לא תקום. ואף על פי שאינו לוקה דעה רעה היא עד למאוד. אלא ראוי לאדם להיות מעביר על כל דברי העולם שהכל אצל המבינים דברי הבל והבאי ואין כדאי לנקום עליהם.
Keitzad hi hanekimah? אמר לחברו השאילני קרדומך אמר לו איני משאילך. ולמחר צריך לשאול ממנו אמר לו השאילני קרדומך אמר לו איני משאילך כדרך שלא השאלתני כששאלתי ממך הרי זה נוקם. אלא כשיבוא לו לשאול ייתן בלב שלם ולא יגמול לו כאשר גמלו וכן כל כיוצא באלו. וכן אמר דוד בדעותיו הטובות אם גמלתי שלמי רע ואחלצה צוררי ריקם.
Rambam emphasizes with regard to lo tikom again as the placement of the halakhah already reflects the fact that it’s a de'ah ra'ah. It reflects that a person attaches significance to that which is really shallow and empty. Shehakol etzel hamevinim, discerning people, mevin in the sense of someone who’s discerning, שהכל אצל המבינים דברי הבל והבאי. Let’s say you have a three-dollar bill in your pocket. You have a whole wad of three-dollar bills and someone comes and rips them up and the person becomes irate that the other person is depriving him of his fortune. So what would we say? We’d say that he’s delusional. The three-dollar bills are all counterfeit. They’re not worth anything. They don’t represent anything. So says the Rambam: שהכל אצל המבינים דברי העולם, shehakol etzel hamevinim. If a person is discerning, it’s all divrei hevel vehavay. So what, so it makes as much sense to be motivated to take nekamah or. fortune which was comprised of a three dollar bill. It's counterfeit. It's nothing. The Chinuch sees a different yesod at the core of issur nekama. The Chinuch, who has a different opinion in terms of hashgacha pratis in the Rambam, the opinion of the Chinuch accords with that of the Chovos HaLevavos. He says that the Torah ossers nekama because it's theologically it's, it's wrong. That what motivates nekama is that a person wants to get even. So if a person wants to get even, it presumes that the other person is the source of whatever happened to him. And the Chinuch says that in reality כל שייקרה מטוב ועד רע הוא סיבה שתבוא עליו מאת השם יתברך.
That in reality, what happens to a person, again in in the Chinuch's scheme of things, whatever happens to a person is bashert. If Reuven hadn't been the instrument for this to happen to Shimon, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu would have orchestrated that there be some other instrument. So it's totally irrational if Shimon is makpid on what happened to him, it's totally irrational for him to try to take revenge against Reuven because Reuven was a replaceable part here. If Reuven through his bechira chofshis hadn't opted to act as the instrument, Hakadosh Baruch Hu harbei shluchim l'Makom. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu would have, would have orchestrated this through some other, some other means. The Sfas Emes has a similar understanding. He explains the pshat in the pesukim in the beginning of Parshas Vayigash based on that. Initially, בהתודע יוסף אל אחיו, so the Torah describes לא יכלו אחיו לענות אותו אני יוסף אשר מכרתם אותי מצרימה אני יוסף העוד אבי חי ולא יכלו אחיו לענות אותו כי נבהלו מפניו.
So Chazal say, the Gemara in Chagigah, the Midrash says, that אוי לנו מיום הדין אוי לנו מיום התוכחה. That the brothers when they were only being held accountable before Yosef, before basar vadam, so they couldn't answer his tochacha. So אוי לנו מיום הדין אוי לנו מיום התוכחה. What was the, what, where do you see the tochacha in this pasuk? So the Beis HaLevi famously explains: why is Yosef asking them again haod avi chai? The brothers don't have any updated information. The brothers, since they last had an audience with Yosef, Yosef asked them then how Yaakov was, and then they never made it back home because Yosef had them arrested. So Chazal see that it wasn't an innocent question haod avi chai. That it was really tochacha: is it conceivable that all these years that Yaakov Avinu is still alive despite the grief that you caused him by what you did to me? So clearly Yosef holds the brothers responsible for his mechira. And yet, within the same, the same audience, so then אל תעצבו ואל יחר בעיניכם כי מכרתם אותי הנה כי למחיה שלחני אלקים לפניכם ולא אתם שלחתם אותי הנה כי האלקים.
So those pesukim sound like that Yosef is totally whitewashing and totally exonerating the brothers. So which is it? Is it אוי לנו מיום הדין אוי לנו מיום התוכחה, or is he exonerating the brothers? So the Sfas Emes says kedarko bakodesh in two lines. Sfas Emes compressed profound thoughts into phrases, into, he wrote very sparingly. So the Sfas Emes says like this, again, elaborating what the Sfas Emes says: the brothers did what they did because of their own bechira, which is why Yosef holds them accountable for what they did. They weren't cognizant, they didn't have a nevuah and they weren't cognizant of carrying out some mission. Hakadosh Baruch Hu to send Yosef down to Mitzrayim. No, they acted וישנאו אתו ולא יכלו דברו לשלום and Vayekanu Vo Echov, they added, again, acted whatever it means for the Shivtei Kah, but they acted out of Sinah and Kinah. And that's why Yosef holds them responsible and he's giving them Tochacha. But then when Yosef sees that they're afraid of him, that he's going to take revenge, so Yosef says, when I'm looking at you, so then I hold you accountable. But when I'm looking at it from my, from my end of things, so I recognize that what happened to me was Bashert. It was supposed to happen to me. If you hadn't done it out of your, out of your Bechira, it would have happened some other way. So I'm not, I'm not, I have not the slightest desire for revenge, I have not the slightest inclination for revenge. You have no reason to be afraid of me because Mitzidi, as the object of what happened, as the victim of what happened, so I recognize that ועתה לא אתם שלחתם אתי הנה כי האלהים. You, as the subjects, as those who acted, you have to realize that you weren't knowingly carrying out some divine plan. You were, you were doing something which was terrible. And that's why he had previously given them Tochacha. So that's how the Chinuch understands the Issur Nekama. The Rambam, who's of the opinion that the degree of Hashgacha Pratis that a person is Zoche to depends upon his Dveikus Bashem, so for the Rambam, that's not the Pshat Issur Nekama. The Pshat Issur Nekama again is that it's a דעה רעה עד עד מאוד. It's getting upset that, that a person is upset. He lost a million dollars, a million-dollar fortune which was comprised of, of three-dollar bills. וכן כל הנוקם לאחד מישראל עובר בלא תעשה. I don't know what the change in Lashon is, but by Nekama, so the Rambam writes Hanokem Es Chavero and by Netira, it's Hanoter Leachad Miyisrael. I don't know why he changes it. וכן כל הנוטר לאחד מישראל עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר ולא תטור את בני עמך. כיצד ראובן שאמר לשמעון שכור לי בית זה או השאילני שור זה ולא רצה שמעון לימים נצרך שמעון לראובן לשאול ממנו או לשכור ואמר לו ראובן הילך הריני משאילך ואיני כמותך ולא אשלם לך כמעשיך והעושה כיוצא בזה עובר בלא תטור אלא ימחה הדבר מלבו ולא יטרנו שכל זמן שהוא נוטר את הדבר וזוכרו שמא יבוא לנקום לפיכך הקפידה תורה על הנטירה עד שימחה העוון מלבו כלל ולא יזכרנו וזו היא הדעה הנכונה שאפשר שיתקיים בה יישוב הארץ ומשאם ומתנם של בני אדם זה עם זה.
If we all accumulate grievances against each other, so then human interaction becomes very complicated and, and very difficult and often, often impossible. So what constitutes a violation of Lo Sitor? Again, so Lo Sitor means to, to harbor a grievance, right? To hold a grudge. So what happens if, if the person does, again, it's not Lo Tikom, so he does even though he was initially denied? He does rent, he does lend the object. So clearly, if he says Ani Chemosecha, so clearly that's Lo Sitor. What happens if he's thinking that, but he doesn't say it? Is that also Lo Sitor? So I don't know, you kind of get contrary indications here in the Rambam. Initially, again, this is Toras Kohanim, Rashi I think on the Torah quotes it also. So initially, the way the Rambam depicts... So I don't know, you kind of get contrary indications in the Rambam. Initially, again, this is all Toras Kohanim. Rashi, I think on the Torah, quotes it also. So initially, the way the Rambam depicts lo sitor, it's clearly that the person says it, he articulates: אין כמוך ולא שלום לך כמעשיך. Right, he clearly articulates it. And what's more, it seems clear that the Rambam wants us to know that that's bedavka because the Rambam says העושה כזה עובר בלא תטור. I mean what makes it the lo sitor is what he said, right, not what he's doing. I mean he's giving, he's extending the, he's lending the object, he's renting the object. So the lashon of haoseh is a striking lashon in this context. It's as if to really, really underscore that it's the asiyah of netirah, it is the articulation of the grudge. So that seems pretty clear that what the Torah targets when the person articulates the netirah. But then the Rambam's hemshech of אלא ימחה הדבר מלבו ולא יטרנו and ולפיכך הקפידה תורה על הנטירה עד שימחה אותו מלבו seems to be explicit that the Torah requires not only that the person be misgaber on the grudge and lend the object or rent the object, but that he not that even inwardly he doesn't hold that grudge. So which of the two is it? So apparently, what you'd see here in the Rambam is that within mitzvos, within dinim, again here we'll express it as it as we have it here in terms of an issur, but this type of two-tiered construct is relevant by dinim as well. You have what formally constitutes the lav. To formally violate the lav of lo sitor, a person has to articulate it. He has to say אין כמעשיך אין כמוך ולא השלום לך כמעשיך. He has to say it. העושה כזה עובר בלא תטור. And if a person doesn't say it even though he's thinking it and feeling it, so he's not over lo sitor. However, that's not to say that the Torah approves of holding on to the enmity as long as it's not articulated. There is a hakpadah of the Torah. So there's two levels to the din. The level which constitutes a lav is where the person articulates it. But the Torah is also makpid and in that sense a person is clearly doing something—doing in quotation marks—a person is clearly doing something asur, he's clearly doing something wrong al pi Torah even if he doesn't articulate it. It's a less serious violation because it's not a full-fledged violation of lo sitor. You wouldn't say that he was over lo sitor. Is he doing what the Torah considers wrong? Is he acting against the Torah's hakpadah? Yes, he certainly is, but it doesn't constitute lo sitor. The Rambam has these two tiers within the mitzvah. Is this parallel to what Rambam says by lo sachmod or there is it because the only violation is maaseh? By lo sachmod, so there... oh, you mean first lo sisaveh, the stage of lo sisaveh, then lo sachmod. But but there it's not within the same... it's not within the same lav, right? There the lo sisaveh is the person wants it and the lo sachmod is that he campaigns to get it. But there it's not present within the same lav. And that's what's so novel over here is that the Rambam is saying that these two elements, these two tiers, they're both present within lo sitor. And there it's because you have lo sisaveh as well as lo sachmod. In fact, that answers another, this recognizing that the Rambam sort of has these two tiers within the mitzvah, it also answers another kashya, which is that initially in Halacha ches when the Rambam presents lo sitor, it seems quite clear that lo sitor is an independent lav. The Torah has a lav of lo sikom, the Torah has a lav of lo sitor. And it's not that lo sitor is a syag de'oraisa. No, lo sitor is its own, is its own lav. Then in the Rambam's אלא ימחה הדבר מלבו he says shema yavo linkom. Then he depicts the lo sitor simply as a syag de'oraisa on lo sikom. So lichora again here too the answer is that on the level of the full-fledged violation of lo sitor it's an independent lav. In terms of the Torah's hakpada about holding onto that enmity, so that the Rambam says is a syag, a syag de'oraisa of shema yavo linkom. And since the Ramban in his, in his very beautiful comment on ve'asisa hayoshar vehatov Perek vav pasuk yod ches in Sefer Devarim: ורבותינו בזה מדרש יפה אמרו זו פשרה לפנים משורת הדין.
Ve'asisa hayoshar vehatov teaches us that when two ba'alei devarim have a dispute and they go to Beis Din, so they should request peshara. They shouldn't ask that Beis Din pasken din, they should ask that the Beis Din pasken peshara. And ve'asisa hayoshar vehatov also refers to lifnim mishuras hadin that in general in mitzvos that a person should do lifnim mishuras hadin. How does ve'asisa hayoshar vehatov lead to teach peshara and lifnim mishuras hadin? והכוונה בזה כי מתחילה the previous pasuk says שמור תשמרון את מצות ה' אלקיכם ועדתיו וחקיו אשר צוך.
That's the pasuk preceding ve'asisa hayoshar vehatov. והכוונה בזה כי מתחילה אמר שתשמור חקיו ועדתיו אשר צוך ועתה יאמר גם באשר לא צוך תן דעתך לעשות הטוב והישר בעיניו כי הוא אוהב הטוב והישר. וזה עניין גדול לפי שאי אפשר להזכיר בתורה כל הנהגות האדם עם שכניו ורעיו וכל משאו ומתנו ותיקוני הישוב והמדינות כולם.
It's impossible. The Torah needs to be finite because we're finite. So it's impossible for the Torah to directly specifically address every situation that every Jew is ever going to find themselves in. Every bein adam lachaveiro situation and scenario that every Jew is ever going to find themselves in, so the Torah can't directly specifically. address each such situation or scenario. So what does the Torah do? אבל אחרי שהזכיר מהם הרבה the Torah gives us several specific direct mitzvot כגון לא תלך רכיל לא תקום ולא תטור ולא תעמוד על דם רעך לא תקלל חרש מפני שיבה תקום וכיוצא בהן.
Chazal learn bederech klal ועשית הטוב והישר בכל דבר עד שיכנס בזה הפשרה ולפנים משורת הדין.
So the Ramban says that mitzvot are supposed to help us develop an intuition for what proper behavior is. It's not just that we're supposed to sort of understand what the mitzvah formally demands of us and comply, but beyond that, we're supposed to be able to develop an intuition for what the Torah wants of us, what the Torah expects of us in any given situation based on our exposure to so many specific mitzvot. So how does and again the the second and third examples that the Ramban gives here in terms of what helps us develop an intuition for what's proper behavior is לא תקום ולא תטור. So how does לא תקום ולא תטור and again same question for all the examples the Ramban gives, how do we extrapolate from that that the Torah wants us to to go for pshara rather than din? That the Torah says that we shouldn't be satisfied whenever we have an obligation, we shouldn't be satisfied with what is required of us al pi din but we should go lifnim mishurat hadin. How is that implied by לא תקום ולא תטור? How do we extrapolate from לא תקום ולא תטור and get to pshara and lifnim mishurat hadin? Lichora the pshat is like this. Ve-emet is, again this is the Ramban's analysis of לא תקום ולא תטור, what's wrong with nekama? It's zeh tachat zeh, tit for tat. You know, you didn't lend me your car, so mehei teisei so why should I lend you my car? What's wrong with that? It's I wasn't the one who who defined our relationship that way. I wasn't the one who initiated this, but if that's the way you want it to be, so we're not so close. You don't trust me, so mehei teisei I should trust you. Why should it be, why should the relationship be be one-sided? And certainly, certainly, how do you understand lo titor? Certainly, certainly, lo titor I am willing to to go beyond beyond what you did for me, so I'm certainly entitled to to highlight that. And yet the Torah says no, the Torah says לא תקום ולא תטור. Lo telech rachil. Lo telech rachil again is as we learned earlier in the perek that the Rambam underscores, it's a lav of lo telech rachil even if what a person says is true. So why am I guilty of some infraction if at the end of the day what I said about Reuven was true? If Reuven doesn't want people pointing out that he's not a nice person, so let him be a nice person. What am I, why am I at fault for just speaking the truth about Reuven? So what do what do all these have in common is that sort of the question that we're asking, the pushback as it were against לא תקום ולא תטור, against lo telech rachil is operating with a very very rigid system of din. You didn't lend me your car, I don't lend you my car, right? And al pi din, so that is a correct reaction. But the Torah says that's assur, right? The Torah says that's a terrible thing to do. So clearly what the Torah is telling us again if we're not only mekayem the din but but we develop an intuition for what's correct behavior based on the din, so then it's clear that the message the Torah is telling us is that bein adam lachavero is not supposed to be the way way we interact with each other is not supposed to be based on operating with some kind of harsh rigid middas hadin. And and that's the answer to the its of the questions, that's the answer to why the Torah ossers nekomah and why the Torah ossers netirah and why the Torah ossers lo selech rachil even if it's true. Yes, in in some other quotation marks moral system other than then the the Torahs, so ein hachi nami so these things would be acceptable. And and that's and that's what the Ramban is saying, that's how va'asisah hayashar vehatov tells us peshara because if if we don't just narrowly literally be mekayem the mitzvos of lo sikom and lo sitor but we allow it to to form our intuition, so then we understand that the way we're supposed to interact with each other is not based on a harsh and rigid middas hadin. It's supposed to be with a lifnim mishuras hadin. So if there's a dispute, so you go to Beis Din for peshara, you don't go for Beis Din for din. That's the clear upshot if a person understands what the what's at the core of of lo selech rachil, of lo sikom, of lo sitor. Could be that that what underlies the this again not so much the Ramban, but the this idea of of the Torah is that olam chesed yibaneh. None of us held an IOU against Hakadosh Baruch Hu that he had to create us. So our very existence is is not an existence which ever would have happened lefee middas hadin. Lefee middas hadin, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu wasn't lacking anything. Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't there was nothing self-serving about briash ha'olam. That's what the Rav says, that's what it means olam chesed yibaneh. We don't know why Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, but we do know the what, we do know that the what that it wasn't to to address any need that he has. Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't have needs. So it was an act of altruism. So the whole briyah is a metziyus of chesed. So how can how can a person think that the way we're supposed to interact is is lefee middas hadin? And that's what the Torah says lo sikom, lo sitor, lo selech rachil. Maybe the peshat in mipnei seivah takum in the Ramban is that often again mipnei seivah takum from from an older person. So when people get older, so their kochos often become diminished and they're not as productive members of society as they once were. So in the secular world, so there's tremendous bittul for them, tremendous bittul for them. Beyond a certain age a person can't get a job and beyond a certain age a doctor isn't interested in saving people's lives. They they think they think it's it's a waste of of time and and and resources. And the Torah says no mipnei seivah takum, no aderaba, you have to be mechabed a person more when he becomes old than when he was young. So the Torah says punk farkert. So it's not that we're not supposed to operate with a middas hadin. The whole metziyus, the Drashas HaRan has a line where he says the whole world is a metziyus shel chesed. Otherwise the world wouldn't exist, olam chesed yibaneh. So how can it be that oh no, so this person he's he or she is X years old and and isn't really productive, so. But that's what the Torah says no mipnei seivah takum and therefore if if we understand what what the message of that mitzvah is, not just what the mitzvah demands of us, but what the value of the mitzvah is, what the message of the mitzvah is, so then that that will also manifest itself in peshara and lifnim mishuras hadin. Okay, so so far for the first things.