Certainly one of the leitmotifs of both the Yom Tov of Purim as well as the Megilla. Certainly one of the leitmotifs of Purim and of the Megilla is the role of hashgacha pratis. One of the very important yesodos which emerges from the Megilla when Mordechai says to Esther ומי יודע אם לעת כזאת הגעת למלכות he tells her not to attribute her queenship to coincidence or to accident but rather it's due to hashgacha pratis. And very significantly Mordechai tells her that an appreciation for hashgacha pratis is not just some theoretical belief that we're supposed to have but it's something which has implications and ramifications for how we act as well. It's not just a question of how we believe and what we believe but it also determines and dictates course of action. So let's first review exactly what our belief of hashgacha pratis is and then consider the halacha l'maise aspect as it were of that belief. It should be noted at the outset that what we're going to discuss is not the only approach or understanding of hashgacha pratis not to the exclusion of all others but it certainly is one which is adopted by many Rishonim and reflected in several ma'amrei Chazal which we'll review together. The Gemara in Arachin on דף טז עמוד ב dealing with the question of yissurim says the following: עד היכן תכלית יסורין which it's clear from the Gemara's answers that the question is how trivial can yissurim be? What small details of life which seem to be amiss should be understood and attributed to yissurim? So the Gemara says אמר אלעזר כל שארגו לו בגד ללבוש ואין מתקבל עליו.
If you go to the tailor and when the tailor finishes the job the suit doesn't fit properly so you should know that's yissurim min hashomayim. The Gemara says גדולה מזו אמרו אפילו נתכוונו למזוג בחמין ומזגו לו בצונן בצונן ומזגו לו בחמין
it's also yissurim. If you want hot tea and you get iced tea that's also yissurim. And then finally the Gemara says that במתניתא תנא אפילו הושיט ידו לכיס ליטול שלש ועלו בידו שתים.
If you're reaching in for seventy-five cents for three quarters to buy a can of soda and then your hand only fishes out two quarters fifty cents that's. That too is a form of yissurim. That too is a form of yissurim. Now lich'ora it's quite clear, and if there is any question about this, the Maharsha dismisses the question. It's very difficult, if very difficult to say that what happens is accidental, but nevertheless bedi'avad ex post facto it's treated as yissurim. It seems quite clear that if any of these minor, trivial, routine, seemingly routine occurrences are to be understood as yissurim, then it also has to be understood that they come min hashamayim and that they weren't routine. And in fact the Maharsha, if you take a look in the Maharsha on this gemara, so he says just that. He says just that, that these yissurim come to be ממרק עוונותיו של אדם and that it's a chesed of the Ribbono Shel Olam that he, that he inflicts such easy and simple yissurim as well. That not all yissurim are what we associate with the term, but many of them are very easy to tolerate. But in terms of hashgacha pratis, so this gemara seems to say that down to the most minute details of what happens to a person, that all of that should be understood and attributed to hashgacha pratis. That's evident in another well-known ma'amar chazal in the first perek of Chullin, where the gemara says אין אדם נוקף אצבעו מלמטה אלא אם כן מכריזין עליו מלמעלה
that a person doesn't bang his finger, doesn't stub his toe unless it was decreed mil'ma'ala, unless that was decreed min hashamayim. So here too again, not only hashgacha pratis but hashgacha pratis down to the most minute details. Of course in terms of more momentous happenings, there's the famous gemara in Makkos which Rashi on the Torah quotes in the parsha of galus for the rotze'ach b'shogeg. Rashi says if one person kills b'meizid, Rashi quoting Chazal and there were no edim, and one person kills b'shogeg and there were no edim, so neither of them got the appropriate onesh. So what does Hakadosh Baruch Hu do? So Hakadosh Baruch Hu orchestrates things that, that the one who killed b'shogeg will kill a second time b'shogeg and the one, the murderer b'meizid will get what's coming to him. And the one who killed b'shogeg, it will be witnessed and he'll get the galus. So here too what's seemingly an accident, b'shogeg, accidental killing, so it's quite clear that Chazal are interpreting that it's not b'shogeg and that it is be'hashgacha pratis. But again, the other gemaras are even more significant in that it's quite clear in these ma'amarei chazal that the hashgacha pratis is down to the most minute details and what's seemingly routine. You stick your hand in your pocket and even though there are three coins there, you only get two coins. So that too is a form of yissurim which are being inflicted by the Ribbono Shel Olam. This is clearly the understanding of Rabbeinu Bachya in Chovos Halevavos in Sha'ar Habitachon. He's clearly operating with the same understanding as these ma'amarei chazal and it's also, this is a complicated parsha which we're just touching upon, not delving into. It's also lich'ora the understanding of the famous Ramban on the Torah in a few places, for instance as you're all familiar with it at the end of Parshas Bo, where the Ramban writes ומן הנסים הגדולים המפורסמים אדם מודה בנסים הנסתרים שהם יסוד התורה כולה שאין לאדם חלק בתורת משה רבינו עד שנאמין בכל דברינו ומקרינו שכולם נסים אין בהם טבע ומנהגו של עולם.
A person is obligated to believe that everything that happens to us, bechol devareinu umikreinu, is kulam nissim. Hashgacha pratis ordains everything. אין בהם טבע ומנהגו של עולם בין ברבים בין ביחיד הכל בגזירת עליון כאשר הזכרתי כבר.
So here too again, the Ramban's approach here is a parsha bifnei atzma, but... What's the halacha l'maise of this? What's the halacha l'maise of recognizing that when a person is nokef etzbo milmata, it's a direct result of the fact that gazru alav milmala. Again, just that there should be no misunderstanding, of course las man d'palig when we're talking about hashgacha pratis down to the minute details, it doesn't mean what a person does. What a person does is bechira chofshis. We're talking about what's done to a person. A person as an object, there is hashgacha pratis down to the most minute details. As a person as a subject, so then is הכל בידי שמים חוץ מיראת שמים. A person does according to his bechira chofshis. So we're talking about a person as an object of what happens and in that sense. But lemai nafka mina? What's the halacha l'maise? We said that from the Megillah, one of the lessons to be learned when Mordechai tells Esther, מי יודע אם לעת כזאת הגעת למלכות, is that the belief in hashgacha pratis carries over halacha l'maise as it were in terms of what we do and how we feel and how we react. So I think this can be understood by looking at some psukim towards the end of Sefer Bereishis. In Parshas Vayigash, after Yosef reveals himself to the shevatim, ויאמר יוסף אל אחיו גשו נא אלי ויגשו ויאמר אני יוסף אחיכם אשר מכרתם אותי מצרימה. ועתה אל תעצבו ואל יחר בעיניכם כי מכרתם אותי הנה כי למחיה שלחני אלהים לפניכם.
And then in pasuk ches he says, ועתה לא אתם שלחתם אותי הנה כי האלהים וישימני לאב לפרעה ולאדון לכל ביתו ומושל בכל ארץ מצרים.
So these psukim are very, very problematic. The simple pshat in the psukim seems to be that Yosef is whitewashing the brothers. He's telling them לא אתם מכרתם אותי הנה כי האלהים. As though as though there were no bechira chofshis. As though somehow or other the brothers had done what they had done involuntarily. And therefore, ועתה אל תעצבו ואל יחר בעיניכם כי למחיה שלחני אלהים לפניכם
and לא אתם שלחתם אותי הנה כי האלהים. However, that pshat in the pasuk is very, very difficult to maintain. First of all, l'divrei hakol in Parshas Miketz, the brothers themselves are aval asheimim anachnu. The brothers themselves are modeh that they that they sinned in mechiras Yosef. And it's especially problematic and dramatically so according to the famous Chazal which the Beis HaLevi elaborates on in the very previous pasuk before Yosef begins this address, ויאמר יוסף אל אחיו אני יוסף העוד אבי חי ולא יכלו אחיו לענות אותו כי נבהלו מפניו.
So the Beis HaLevi, as you all know, quotes the Midrash that says אוי לנו מיום הדין אוי לנו מיום התוכחה that the brothers couldn't answer Yosef who was basar vadam, so how are we going able to answer the Ribbono Shel Olam on a יום דין ויום תוכחה? So the Beis HaLevi explains where was Yosef giving them tochacha? So he explains that Yosef was was telling them is it possible that ha'od avi chai? Why is he asking them ha'od avi chai? They haven't been back to Eretz Kna'an since he last asked them. Ella mai, he's not asking them as a point of information, but he's asking them rhetorically: Can it be that Yaakov survived all that tza'ar which you imposed upon him through the mechira? So he's giving them tochacha. He's giving them tochacha such strong and and condemnation that ki nivhalu mipanav, that they're that they're totally mute. And then he turns around and says no, לא אתם מכרתם אותי הנה כי האלהים. So lichora it's very, very difficult to maintain. maintaining that somehow or other Yosef is totally whitewashing them and telling them that you're not guilty and that the whole thing was ordained by Hakadosh Baruch Hu and you you acted involuntarily. So ela mai, what is he telling them? So lichora what Yosef is telling them is as follows: Yosef having already given tochacha, so Yosef is now reassuring them. Don't think that because you were choteim that I will want to take revenge against you. Because Yosef says from my perspective the fact that you were chotei because of your bechira chofshis notwithstanding, from my perspective what happened to me was לא אתם מכרתם אתי הנה כי האלהים. The fact that you and again Yosef is not whitewashing them. According to the Midrash we just quoted in the previous pasuk he's giving them strong strong tochacha. But what he's telling them is this: If you think that what happened will motivate me to try to take revenge against you, so let me reassure you that from my perspective your bechira chofshis and your cheit notwithstanding, but from my perspective the Ribono shel Olam wouldn't have allowed it to happen to me unless it were his will that this happened to me. So therefore from my perspective, which doesn't relieve you of an iota of responsibility, it doesn't conflict with aval ashemim anachnu and it doesn't conflict with the mussar of ha-oda'ah veha-viduy, but from my perspective you should know that I view it as לא אתם שלחתם אתי הנה כי האלהים. And be-emes Chazal tell us that that was Yosef's reaction all along. In Mikeitz, excuse me in Vayeishev, so Chazal comment on the pasuk of ויהי בעת ההיא וירד יהודה מאת אחיו. So at that time וירד יהודה מאת אחיו. So Chazal say the pasuk is telling us amidst everything that was happening at that time וירד יהודה מאת אחיו. What was happening at that time? So Yaakov Avinu was being misabel for Yosef. And Reuven was osek besak veta'anis על שבלבל משכבי אביו. And Yehuda was osek likach lo isha. And Yosef was osek besak veta'anis al devar hamichira. That's what Chazal say in the Midrash. So why was Yosef osek besak veta'anis because he was sold? We would have understood if he was being misabel also, if he was bocheh. But no, Chazal say he was osek besak veta'anis, i.e., again, that same the same perspective which Yosef speaks from in Parshat Vayigash, Chazal say that's what accompanied Yosef throughout. That the bechira chofshis of the brothers notwithstanding, their responsibility notwithstanding, Yosef interpreted that if this was allowed to happen to me, so then I must be at fault for something. And that's why Yosef's response was that he was osek besak veta'anis. So right here lichora so we see an important important example of how the belief in hashgacha pratis has ramifications halacha l'maaseh. And that is in terms of how a person relates to adversity in general and befrat people who wronged him. People who wronged him. So the pesukim here seem to be telling us that because of our belief in hashgacha pratis, that a person as an object of circumstances, not a subject, a person as an object of circumstances, that what happens to him is לא אתם שלחתם אתי הנה כי האלהים. The reason Hakadosh Baruch Hu did not interfere with your bechira chofshis and allowed you to execute your bechira chofshis against me was כי האלהים, it was the Ribono shel Olam's ratzon that this should happen. Which means that if I am wronged by someone... If if I suffer some kind of reversal of any any form or fashion so the reaction of anger against the person who seemingly imposes this upon me is totally beyond is totally misses the point. It totally misses the point. That reaction would only be correct and to the point if the cause and effect here was that since Ploni since Ploni dislikes me so Ploni Ploni therefore did something to hurt me. And had it not been for him this wouldn't have happened to me. What Yosef says when Yosef was sold he was also k'sachar v'onesh. So apparently Yosef Hatzaddik said no. It can't simply be that because the brothers conspired against me that the Ribono Shel Olam allowed this to happen to me. It must be that it's also some kind of kapparah some kind of onesh for something I did. And be'emes the Sefer Hachinuch says this as well. In the mitzvah of nekamah in Parshas Kedoshim מצוה רמ"א shelo lincov כל מה שנמנענו מלקחת נקמה מישראל לא תקם ולא תטר
an issur dekomah. Mishorshei hamitzvah says the Chinuch שידע האדם ויתן אל לבו כי כל אשר יקרהו מטוב עד רע
anything which befalls a person again a person as an object not as a subject הוא סיבה שתבוא עליו מאת השם יתברך ומיד האדם מיד איש אחר לא יהיה דבר בלתי רצון השם יתברך על כן כשיצרהו או יכאיבהו אדם ידע בנפשו כי עונותיו גרמו ולא ישית מחשבותיו לנקום ממנו כי הוא אינו סיבת רעתו כי העוון הוא המסבב וכמו שאמר דוד עליו השלום הניחו לו ויקלל כי אמר לו השם יתברך תלה העניין בחטאו ולא בשמעי בן גרא.
That's meforash the idea that we're talking about. Just parenthetically the example of Shimi ben Gera also illustrates the the dialectic we're talking about that the person who wrongs the other person is guilty because he's doing so with his bechirah chofshis. After all Dovid instructs that tell Shlomo Hamelech that Shimi ben Gera should not shouldn't die in his shouldn't die in his bed. And yet me'idach gisa תלה העניין בחטאו ולא בשמעי בן גרא. Exactly this dialectic which we're discussing. And the Chinuch says explicitly again that the practical implications of this are that if a person's reaction is to get revenge then he totally misses the point and totally misunderstands what happened. So again number one in terms of practical implications for how we feel how we react so certainly how we react to someone who wronged us it simply becomes just totally irrelevant irrelevant to focus one's anger on the person who again seemingly bederech hateva on the natural plane is the source for for the bad which which befell a person. The other primary reaction and emotion which is totally transformed based upon this belief and understanding of bechirah chofshis and again here too you'll look in the Chovos Halevavos Sha'ar Habitachon he explains this. Let's say a person were Person works towards a certain goal. Say medical school. And he works tremendously hard. He makes all the hishtadlus. And then he doesn't get accepted. And then he doesn't get accepted. So it's devastating. It's devastating. The normal quote reaction would be one of certainly great frustration and understandably enough of depression. Depression to varying degrees depending upon one's inclinations. In light of again the chinuch, the Ramban, the ma'amrei Chazal we spoke about, the Chovos Halevavos, so again that too is totally, totally out of place. A person is frustrated when he doesn't achieve what he should have achieved. Then a person is frustrated. And therefore, if a person knows that he has certain potential and he's squandering that potential, he knows he could be learning more. He knows he could be spending more time learning and accomplishing more in learning, but he's not doing that, so then for good reason he feels frustrated. Because that's a person as a subject. But as an object, when a person makes all the appropriate hishtadlus and something eludes him, so then here too what hashgacha pratis means halacha lema'aseh is that to be frustrated again is totally inappropriate. Totally inappropriate because if מאת השם היתה זאת and כל מה דעביד רחמנא לטב עביד, so one's reaction is, well, Baruch Hashem, the Ribono Shel Olam is directing me to whatever I'm really supposed to be doing, rather than this sense of overwhelming frustration and failure at not having achieved what a person wanted to achieve. So this belief in hashgacha pratis, if we internalize it with total sincerity, has the potential to totally transform our actions and reactions to everything that happens to us. It undercuts anger, it undercuts a desire for nekama, it undercuts a sense of frustration. And these reactions, again the sense of frustration or such, have to be limited exclusively to where again we as subjects in exercising our bechirah chofshis were remiss in doing so properly. However, where it befalls us, so then what hashgacha pratis says is that again, had this been accident, had it been happenstance, so then a person would be ripped apart by frustration. If a person knows that it's from the Ribono Shel Olam, so then he accepts it with total equanimity because that's the way it's supposed to be. And finally, the practical ramifications of this belief and understanding in hashgacha pratis is that not only again does it undercut desire for nekama, anger, frustration, etcetera, in terms of what befalls us, but it also allows us to make everything—and this is a major emphasis and stress of Chassidus as well—it allows us to make everything into an opportunity for avodas Hashem. Dehainu, when a person views and understands that what befalls him. In the words of the Chinuch of כל אשר יקראהו מטובה עד רע הוא סיבה שטובה עליו מאת השם יתברך
so then the emuna with which a person accepts everything that befalls him is also an exercise in avodas Hashem. Let's say a person is felled by illness rachmana litzlan. So the reaction can be one of two: a person can be totally frustrated at what he can't do, or the person's reaction can be, so now Hakadosh Baruch Hu decided that my avodas Hashem should consist to a large degree of accepting these yissurim and accepting what He has imposed upon me. And to the extent that we are insensitive to the hashgacha pratis, so to that same degree we miss on a daily basis opportunities of avodas Hashem in terms of accepting be'ahava what the Ribbono Shel Olam sends our way. Because if we don't recognize that it comes from the Ribbono Shel Olam, we're not mekabel it as such. We're not mekabel it as such, so then the course of the illness was not any avodas Hashem in that, because I didn't recognize that as coming from Hakadosh Baruch Hu and I didn't accept it as such. So there was no on the, so really the time taka is wasted and all the frustration is correct. If a person recognize it, recognizes that הוא סיבה שטובה עליו מאת השם יתברך, then in the way he reacts and the way he is mekabel everything, so that makes everything, it allows him to respond to the opportunity and occasion which everything provides for avodas Hashem. There is a saying from the Baal Shem Tov on the pasuk of שמאלו תחת לראשי וימינו תחבקני. So we know that the symbolism of yamin and smol, let's say in a meimar Chazal of לעולם תהא שמאל דוחה וימין מקרבת. That yamin represents rachamim, represents ahava, yamin mekarves, and smol is docha, that it represents din, represents hardship, represents adversity. So the Baal Shem Tov says that שמאלו תחת לראשי וימינו תחבקני, that sometimes we experience Hakadosh Baruch Hu in a bechina of yamin, that vimino techabkeni. And everything goes well and we have ideal circumstances to learn Torah and to do mitzvos. And at other times we experience Hakadosh Baruch Hu as smolo tachas roshi of smol docha. And the Baal Shem Tov says, but you have to recognize that both are kavyachol the hands of Hakadosh Baruch Hu and both are occasions and opportunities for avodas Hashem. But that potential can only be unlocked if a person has this emuna and understanding of hashgacha pratis.