Let's come back to, I think we had skipped a little bit further, but back to page 52. Towards the middle of the page, Sof Davar Rav Simcha Zelig. Rav Simcha Zelig was the, had been a talmid, תלמידו וחברו של רב חיים. He'd been a talmid of Rav Chaim in Brisk and when the Beis HaLevi was niftar. The Beis HaLevi was niftar shortly after the Tsarist government shut down the Volozhin. In the timeline as I guess as the Hashgacha had things planned, it happened shortly thereafter and then Rav Chaim was appointed to succeed his father as Rav of Brisk. The irony is, you know, that Rav Chaim revealed his derech, derech ha-Rishonim to the world, you know, before he was Rav Chaim Brisker when he was Rav Chaim Volozhiner, but Rav Chaim Volozhiner was a description that was already taken, it was already copyrighted. So hence Rav Chaim Brisker. So when Rav Chaim was offered the Rabbanus, he brought Rav Simcha Zelig in as Dayan and considered him an adam gadol me'od. And my brother sheyichye commented that Rav Simcha Zelig is the only contemporary mentioned in the sefer, Rav Chaim's sefer. Three times in the sefer quotes Yedidi ha-Grashas Rav Simcha Zelig. Grashas, I think maybe it says Grashaz, I don't remember. So Sof Davar then that's what's referred to, תלמידו וחברו של רב חיים שפעם נכנס עם רב חיים לבית פלוני אלמוני בעיר וילנא. כשהמתינו לבעל הבית שיבוא דפדף רב חיים בספרי חב"ד שהיו מונחים על השולחן. ומתוך כובד ראש פנה לרב שמחה זעליג ואמר
shneihem shogim. They both err to their hashkafasam, shogim le-hashkafasam. עולם נברא למען טובה ולמען חסדה ולמען רצונה. The sefer dan kanireh, apparently, on this problem and copied two de'ot: l'maan tuvah, l'maan chasdah. Hashkafa zo that the Rambam fixed as a solid foundation in his sefer Moreh Nevuchim, and common in many forms in the voluntaristic hashkafah in metaphysics and in religion, like that of Solomon ibn Gabirol in Mekor Chayim and the system of Duns Scotus who was influenced by the former, היא חותמו של איש ההלכה. So parenthetically, the Rebbe said that Rav Chaim learned Moreh Nevuchim. That's just sort of one reflection of that fact that Rav Chaim was, I don't know what ridiculous understatement, well-versed in the Moreh as well. This characterization of accepting the Rambam's understanding or highlighting the complete inability to understand why Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world as being the stamp of ish ha-halacha reflects something that the famous concluding lines of the Rav's essay Halakhic Mind where he said, there he extends this thesis. extends the thesis even further that out of the sources of halakha one can reconstruct a philosophy and this is one iteration of that, one instance of that. The question is earlier the Rav contrasted the mystical approach again. In the footnote he indicates that he was illustrating based on the concept of tzimtzum in Chabad philosophy, not how tzimtzum is understood in other strains of Kabbalah. So the Rav contrasted the approach and the outlook on the world that the Chabad understanding of tzimtzum generates with that of the Ish HaHalakha. B'kitzur, oversimplifying because that's the only way we can pretend to understand. So that צמצום על פי קבלה approach says that the only way the world can exist, this physical world that we inhabit, the only way that that can possibly exist is when Hakadosh Baruch Hu's presence is very much hidden and camouflaged and disguised. The mashal being that the same way, you know, if the light of the sun is blinding if a person looks directly at the sun, that's why when it's deceptive and we think we can during an eclipse, you get all these warnings to be careful not to look at the sun because it can cause retinal damage, lo aleinu. If a person looks directly at the sun, so the light of the sun is so brilliant and so powerful that it would blind a person. So again, every mashal is inadequate and incomplete, but mashal l'davar domeh, Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence when it's not hidden doesn't allow, would simply negate the existence of our physical world. So the only way the world exists is through again this hidden with layers upon layers of camouflage, the hidden presence of Hakadosh Baruch Hu in the world. That's what the Rav has quoted and outlined and in the footnotes he provides the quotes from Likutey Torah. Ma she'ein kein, he depicted, reading on the bottom of page 51 in the text, that Ish HaHalakha... now what that then gives rise to is this sort of sorrowful attitude towards the metzius, that this world is not the best place to be because Hakadosh Baruch Hu's presence is so hidden and to aspire to higher realms where the worlds are less physical and therefore Hakadosh Baruch Hu's presence doesn't need to be hidden as much is really where a person wants to be and would be closer to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And by contrast the Rav presents that איש ההלכה אינו בועט בהויה במציאות. It doesn't reject as it were this worldly existence. On the contrary, וקובע בפשיטות ובתמימות זכה בספר בראשית וירא אלקים את כל אשר עשה.
I think it's a misprint, no? I think the pasuk is את כל אשר עשה והנה טוב מאוד. So just to make explicit, so the Rav then correlates this positive attitude towards the world with the Rambam's understanding of the ma'an ratzono and correlates this again sorrowful approach which gives rise to the desire to transcend to the understanding of the ma'an tivo or ma'an chasdo. So how does those correlate? Why couldn't you say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu lema'an chasdo created the world and the world's a great place? What's the correlation? The question clear, Rabosai? So lichora as follows. What gives rise to this theory understanding of the ma'an tivo or alternately the ma'an chasdo is a mindset that seeks to understand what lies behind the beriah. Now if one can seek to understand that so then kal vachomer one can seek to understand the how of the beriah. How does the world exist and how is it not negated by Hakadosh Baruch Hu's infinite existence and that's what gives rise to the whole understanding of again Hakadosh Baruch Hu concealing as it were his presence the same way when you put on sunglasses so then you can look at the sun and without being blinded, Hakadosh Baruch Hu concealing his presence. Ma sheken the axiomatic mindset of the ma'an ratzono says no we can't the world is a fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world is a fact and we begin from there. So if that's the case so then one also is not presuming to understand how it came about it's a given. The ma'an ratzono it's something which lies beyond our capacity to understand the why and how it's a given. As a given so כל מה דעביד רחמנא לטב עביד there's no room to inject any kind of this sorrowful attitude or approach. That's what the Rav wrote earlier on page 49. אין סוד הצמצום בהלכה נוגע בשאלות קוסמוגוניות. Cosmogony, the study of the genesis of the world, of the cosmos. ואין ההלכה עוסקת במיסטוריות מטפיזיות. ואין ההלכה עוסקת במיסטוריות מטפיזיות.
Meta mistoryos so ואין ההלכה עוסקת במיסטוריות מטפיזית the halacha doesn't isn't preoccupied with metaphysical mysteriousness. ואינה דורשת במופלא ממנה בנוגע ליצירת ההוויה כמו שעשו המקובלים.
So that's what we were just explaining. That's where you get the connection between the lema'an tivo, lema'an chasdo with the mindset the approach and the lema'an ratzono with the alternate the alternate approach. Okay I think we were holding around 54, 55 somewhere so let's continue maybe on page 55 towards the. מאמרו של גליליאו שספר הטבע כתוב באותיות של משולשים מרובעים עיגולים כדורים ושאר צורות מתמטיות חל גם על ההלכה ולא לחינם אמר הגר"א לאיש שתירגם את הגיאומטריה האוקלידית לעברית
Euclidean geometry כי כשחסר לאדם מידה אחת בחוכמת המתמטיקה תחסר לו עשר ידות בידיעת התורה אין זו רק מליצה יפה המעידה על רוחב דעתו של הגאון אלא אמת כפולה בתורת ההכרה של ההלכה.
Galileo said that you know that the book of nature is written in letters of triangles squares circles etcetera so that understanding is true of Halacha also. So the Rav says pshat in that famous comment, I think the Pe'at HaShulchan is the one I think who records it, that the Gaon had said that for every every measure of deficiency that a person has in mathematics, so there will be that will translate tenfold into his understanding of Torah. And so you know ordinarily that statement you know sort of תורה ומדע מראה מקום right? It's cited in in context of the Gaon's appreciation for mathematics. And the Rav is is clearly saying that if that were the extent of it then it would be I don't know irresponsible hyperbole. I mean to say that that for every measure one is missing so then one is lacking tenfold in yedias haTorah? How does that how does that work? Okay so if you know an approximation of pi so it makes learning the first perek in Maseches Sukkah easier and then there are other sugyas which are facilitated by some background in mathematics but I mean that doesn't that doesn't add up to what what the Gaon said, right? So apparently what the Rav is suggesting is the following. Right we know that that a crucial tool and and stepping stone to understanding is to be able to use a mashal. And that helps us transpose but not just transpose it also elevate to understanding through the mashal which is known to us and understood to us so that helps us grasp something which previously was unknown and was beyond our grasp. That's the that's the significance of of a mashal. So if mathematics is not only sort of a I don't know ancillary discipline Parparot l'Chochma but the mashal as the Rav keeps coming back to it again and again and again here throughout Ish HaHalacha but also provides a mashal for understanding how Halacha functions, so then you can understand what the Gaon said, right? Then already you can can understand that you know the Gaon wasn't being hyperbolic in in his statement. And the Tziyon haYesod, continuing here on in the next paragraph on page 55 of the Halachic Man, והנטייה היסודית של ההלכה היא להחזיר את האיכות של הסוביקטיביות הדתית את תוכן תודעת איש הדת השוטפת חש מהרה כגלי הים ומתנגשת בחוף הריאליות ונשברת בכמויות מוצקות וקיימות והלכות נטועות כמסמרות אשר כל רוח לא תעקרן ממקומן.
Right, the fundamental disposition, I think tendency is probably not a strong enough word, usually we translate netiyah as tendency, I'm not sure if that's strong enough for this context, of halachah is to capture religious subjectivity, the content of the awareness of the homo religiosus which as long as it's in that subjective state, like waves that crash onto the shore, so once the wave reaches the shore, so then there's nothing left of the wave as powerful as it was in its brief moment, it's that's how short-lived it is. So halachah translates that into stable, enduring quantities, into halachos which are firmly grounded and established, that are not undone. Again, just the flow in terms of how how this how this flows from what the Rav's been explaining is as follows: invariably, if if the ultimate religious experience is by trying to transcend this world that we live in, so then it it ends up being something very subjective. There is no objective kelim in this world to to contain that kind of effort, desire, aspiration to to transcend this world. But according to halachah, no, that kedushah is something that's recognized here, so that means that halachah translates, again, the the subjective yearning, the religious awareness into quantitative, this-worldly forms. הרצון העליון משתקף בין בראי המציאות ובין בראי ההלכה האידיאלית על ידי שיעורים ומידות.
Again, just as mathematically one can translate qualitative experiences into quantitative equations, so too in halachah translates the subjective religious feeling and mindset into quantitative terms. The Rav is saying it in a very profound philosophical sense, on a sort of a more psychological mussar level. So there is a beautiful vort from the Shem MiShmuel, the Sochatchover Rebbe. He comments on the Gemara in Sotah that Rashi on the parashah on the Torah quotes about the semichus haparshiyos in Parshas Naso between the parshah of Sotah and the parshah of nazir. So Chazal say that הרואה סוטה בקלקולה יזיר עצמו מן היין. So the Shem MiShmuel says, no, you would have thought aderaba. You would have thought, again, Chazal assume as a typology that that what brought the sotah to sin so grievously. that she became intoxicated. So you see the dangers of intoxication. So ha-ro'eh sota be-kilkulah, יזיר עצמו מן היין, she-k'neged nezirus so that he won't be able to touch a drop of wine. So the Shem MiShmuel says aderaba. Someone who's seen a sota be-kilkulah, he doesn't need another nezirus because he's seen firsthand what the devastating consequences can be from drinking and becoming intoxicated and losing control and self-discipline. For everyone who's never seen a sota be-kilkulah, so it's recommended to them. But how do you recommend it to ha-ro'eh sota be-kilkulah? So the Shem MiShmuel says, and again, it's sort of the psychological mussar parallel to the Rav's profound philosophical depiction, he says no, ידעת טבעה של דעתו של אדם, no matter how powerful an experience is, so at the time a person experiences it, so it seems that it's just so overwhelming that it doesn't need any, it doesn't need to be bolstered in any form or fashion. ידעת טבעה של דעתו של אדם, that's not true, that no matter how powerful an experience is, it wanes gradually until it wears off and there's nothing left. Kamah she-Chazal amru, ha-ro'eh sota be-kilkulah, now a person sees and understands so vividly, so deeply the dangers and the devastation brought about by intoxication, so יזיר עצמו מן היין, a person has to translate it into a kabbalah because once translated into that form, it will endure. And obviously the takeaway from this midrash is not to become a nazir, but short of becoming a nazir, that's what the Shem MiShmuel intended. אין הדתיות הסובייקטיבית קיימת, וכל אלה השאיפות הנוטות אחרי הסובייקטיפיקציה,
subjectification, subjectification, so I'll have to say it three times fast, של המעשה הדתי, השוללות מוחשיות וגשמיות מחיי הדת ומכניסות את האדם לעולם מופשט וזך, שאין בו לא אכילה ולא שתייה, אנשי דת, אנשי דעת יושבים ועטרותיהם בראשיהם ונהנים מחווייתם הפנימית מסערת רוחם השואף אל על מקמיותיהם הטמירות,
hidden, מגעגועיהם הנעלמים ומכיסופיהם המסתוריים סופן להיבטל. Again, again, the Rav intends it philosophically, the Shem MiShmuel is a parallel. What the Rav is saying, and let's just read a couple more lines, kocha ha-stichi, let's come back to what that word means, good luck finding it in the dictionary, כוחה הסטיכי של הדת התוקף על האדם ומשעבדו וכובשו. So without translating that well, the force of religion which subordinates a person in, again, in the positive sense, שלטת רק שהדת היא דת ממשית, concrete, דת חיים מוחשיים שיש בהם מראה ריח ומשוש, דת שבשר ודם מרגישה בכל חושיו עורקיו ואיבריו בכל מהותו וישותו,
das sensualist, again, it's a misprint, they were so busy putting these yuds here, they got carried away and put in a yud here also, but שאש התאווה באה עמה במגע ומשא בכל צעד ושעל דתיות סובייקטיבית של עמדות רוחניות של אמוציות ואפקטים ושל השקפות ושאיפות אינה רואה סימן ברכה.
What the Rav is saying is, again, it's a remarkable thought. What the Rav is saying is again it's a remarkable thought that to that Ha-Kadosh Baruch Hu gave us the Torah and the Torah's designed to impact us. The Torah's designed to elevate us, the Torah's designed to guide and direct us. So there has to be a correlation between the religious life that the Torah provides and commands with the human reality of a person. And in the same way the ויפח באפיו נשמת חיים and it's notwithstanding but we live, we're physical, the neshamah is associated with a guf and we live in this physical world. So it can't be that, again, a physical world of, which is concrete and tangible and sensual in terms of our senses, so it has to be that Ha-Kadosh Baruch Hu's, how can it be that Ha-Kadosh Baruch Hu's ideal system for us in this world doesn't mirror our reality in this world? Like every other line here it's a profound thought. And that's the segue to the next paragraph, that Ish Ha-Halacha לא קיבל את הוראת Moreh Nevuchim בנוגע לפיוטים שירות ותשבחות. Tze u-lemad ma bikesh Moreh Nevuchim la'asot le-piyutei Yisrael ולא כמו שיעשו הפתאים באמת אשר המריצו בשבחים והאריכו דברים בתפילות חיבורים ומליצות כקצון וירבה היתר זה אצל המשוררים והמליצים ואצל מי שיחשוב שעושה שיר וקצתם יש בהם מן השטות והפסד הדמיון.
At least within Ish Ha-Halacha, I don't know, you have to check to make sure this ha'arah is correct, at least within right earlier, back on page 52, השקפה זו שהרמב"ם קבע ליסוד מוצק בספרו מורה נבוכים. So the Rav doesn't just refer to Moreh Nevuchim, he refers to the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim. And here he doesn't mention the Rambam. Meaning that within within Ish Ha-Halacha when the Rav is disagreeing with the Rambam, so then he doesn't mention the Rambam. The term Rambam you know suggests Rabbeinu Ha-Gadol, you know, that who for close to a thousand years אשר מפיו אנו חיים ומימיו אנו שותים. So in that in this instance where he's where he's saying differently, so he doesn't mention, mentions Moreh Nevuchim without without invoking the name of the Rambam. Ish Ha-Halacha לא קיבל את הוראת Moreh Nevuchim בנוגע לפיוטים שירות ותשבחות. Tze u-lemad ma bikesh Moreh Nevuchim la'asot le-piyutei Yisrael ולא כמו שיעשו הפתאים באמת אשר המריצו בשבחים והאריכו דברים בתפילות חיבורים ומליצות כקצון וירבה היתר זה אצל המשוררים והמליצים ואצל מי שיחשוב שעושה שיר וקצתם יש בהם מן השטות והפסד הדמיון.
The Rambam wanted that tefillah should be more philosophically correct, not politically correct, but philosophically correct. So the he was unapologetically critical of the types of anthropomorphism which you find in the piyutim. Now Ish Ha-Halacha obviously insists that one needs to understand that all these depictions of Ha-Kadosh Baruch Hu are anthropomorphic. I mean that is absolutely essential, but with that understanding, again, part of again this depiction of Halacha as a. as a dat which is a dat mamashit, a dat sensualit is that again with that crucial understanding that these descriptions of Hakadosh Baruch Hu are anthropomorphisms, but the Halakha does allow for all these, for the types of piyutim that the Rambam was critical of. אף על פי כן מתרפקת כנסת ישראל על דודה using the imagery from Shir HaShirim b'Shir HaYichud v'HaKavod. וכשהשכינה קורצת לנו עין and when it winks מתוך דמדומי חמה של כעס בבת צחוק של סליחה ומחילה
on Yom Kippur אנו קושרים כתר מלכות לראש עתיק יומין ובשעת רחמים ועת רצון ברגע עליית נשמה והתרוממות הנפש כשהרעיונות צמאה לא-ל חי וכל ישותנו נכספת ועורגת אליו אנו מרבים בפיוטים ושירות.
The Rav zichrono l'vrakha once characterized the Yom Kippur seder hatefillah that we have, the Yom Kippur Machzor, that there are two main axes. One is viduy, right, ten times, and the other is all the piyutim, the shiros v'sishbachos. So the Rav is describing that latter axis. ואין אנו משכיחים בהדו the echo של המדרש הפילוסופי העוסק בשאלת התוארים השליליים אין ההלכה חוששת ממחשבות
speculative-iot ובהפשטות דקות מן הדקות מצד אחד ולרגשות סתומים לחוויות עמומות והפעלת כוחו והפעלות כהות ולסובייקטיביות מתחמקת מצד האחר היא קובעת דין ומשפט בישראל.
Let's then let's skip to the paragraph haHalakha on the top of page 57. ההלכה רוצה להביא את הדתיות לידי אובייקטיפיקציה objectification לא רק על ידי הכנסת המעשה החיצוני והפעולה הפסיכופיזית לעולם הדת אלא גם על ידי סידורו של הקורלטיבי הפנימי בתחום הרוחני של האדם.
Halakha translates into objective norms into ma'aseh hamitzvah subjective states, emotions, aspirations. ההלכה קובעת חוקים ומציבה ציונים המשמשים כעין סכר dam בפני הזרם הסובייקטיבי של איש הדת הפלאי הסוחף לפעמים במערבלתו את כל הוויתו של האדם ופשיות מעורפלות.
Again the same way when when you when you have a dam so it controls it regulates the flow of water says so Halakha does the same again for the subjective religiosity. מן דאמר אחד סובר כי אין מצוות צריכות כוונה כלל כלל רק כוונה שלא להוציא שלא לבטל את מעשה המצווה.
So even though in the context where the Rishonim say this it's like if you look for instance in Talmidei Rabbeinu Yonah in the first Perek of Masechet Berakhot it's one of the few answers on a Tosafot, so the Rav consistently presents it as did Reb Chaim, as the Rav quoted, as something which is not not questionable. You know that if a person has kavanah shelo l'tzet there's no m'kayem hamitzvah so the Rav used to quote a lashon from Reb Chaim, the original was in Yiddish but the way it translates into English is you don't force-feed a mitzvah. If a person is, you know, chai v'kayam that he doesn't want to be yotze we don't impose a kiyum mitzvah on him. רק כוונה שלא לצאת shalala zos, that would negate the ma'aseh mitzvah. אפילו למאן דאמר שמצוות צריכות כוונה, אינם נזקקים לכוונות סודיות המכוונות כלפי עולם נעלם.
We don't need esoteric kavanos which are coordinated with some hidden dimension, אלא מחשבה פשוטה וגלויה לקיים במעשה זה מצוה פלונית אלמונית.
So note the definition of kavana lotzes. The definition of kavana lotzes, Shulchan Aruch paskens that we hold mitzvos tzerichos kavana. So really, anytime before we do a mitzvah, we should stop and have kavana. The Chayei Adam says that bedi'eved by most mitzvos, so the kavana is basically automatic in the following sense. I mean there's no other reason to be putting on tefillin in the morning other than the fact that it's a mitzvah. And lav b'chdi that the mitzvos, the examples where the Gemara debates mitzvos tzerichos kavana are shofar, matzah, where there's a possible alternate interpretation of what one's doing. A shofar, again, we generally don't see it even in a ten-piece band, but a shofar is a musical instrument, so there is such a thing as tokeia l'shir. And matzah, a person is, crackers is food to eat, so there is an alternate understanding and of what one is doing. I don't know, people don't walk around with black boxes on their, you know, on their bicep and on, you know, on their head. Okay, but the Chayei Adam says that more, you know, bedi'eved. V'she-be-rov koach Chayei Adam lechatchila a person should have this kavana. So what is the kavana that we're supposed to have? Again, how does the Rav define it? אלא מחשבה פשוטה וגלויה לקיים במעשה זה מצוה פלונית אלמונית.
So it's interesting, the Rav doesn't say that a person should have kavana lotzes, kavanat hamitzvah, but a person should also be thinking the particular mitzvah, right? So hineni mechaven to be m'kayem mitzvas hanachas tefillin. Hineni mechaven to, you know, lis'atef b'tzitzis and to be m'kayem the mitzvah of tzitzis. There is an interesting Rashi in Rosh Hashanah. Admittedly, I don't know that this Rashi has analogues in the other sugyos of mitzvos tzerichos kavana, but here in Rosh Hashanah kaf-ches, if you take a look at Rashi dibbur hamaschil shekfa'u parsi'im. So if you hold that the Gemara says that שלחו ליה לאבוה דשמואל כפהו ואכל מצה יצא. If a person was coerced into eating matzah, he's yatza. And the Gemara explains it means kfa'u parsi'im. Whatever reason the parsi'im coerced the person into eating matzah, meaning he's doing without kavana lotzes. So notice how Rashi says, how Rashi is going to explain what's missing, the kavana that's missing when a person does it without that kavana lotzes, says Rashi, שכפהו פרסיים ואף על גב שלא נתכוון לצאת ידי חובת מצה בליל ראשון של פסח.
That's exactly what the definition that the Rav is giving here, that the kavana lotzes consists of אלא מחשבה פשוטה וגלויה. Totally exoteric, there's nothing mystical about, you know, l'yached or whatever the mystical kavanos are, אלא מחשבה פשוטה וגלויה לקיים במעשה זה מצוה פלונית אלמונית.
So the same way the Halacha brings, let's read a bit more, ובשעה שתילי תילים של כוונות וייחודים נאמרו על ידי חכמי הסוד,
they were piled up, המוליכות את תודעתו של אדם לעולמין דלא אתגליין. כוונת המצווה מופיעה בהלכה לאור האובייקטיביות והחוקיות. גם הכוונה וגם המעשה הם מעצמה של תהליך אובייקטיביזציה.
So the same way ha-halacha insists that again spiritual impulse, subjective religious feelings have to be translated into concrete olam hazeh-dik actions, so the same's true, the kavana is on the same level. The kavana is also within olam hazeh. So within olam hazeh it's got nothing to do with the effect it's going to have on Yud-Kay-Vav-Kay, the osiyos of Yud-Kay-Vav-Kay or any other mystical realities. In olam hazeh, the kavana in olam hazeh is לקיים במעשה זה מצוות בוראי. And bi-guf devarav, again as indicated in the footnote quoting from the Noda Bi-Yehuda: ובגוף הדבר שצריך להוציא מפיו שעושה הכוונה על פי הסוד ומביא ראיה מריש זבחים קל וחומר בכוונת התפילה והמצוות שיש בה כמה עיקולי ופשורי וכמה חשש קיצוץ בנטיעות כאשר ועיני כל זה במופת פשיטא שיש לבטל שלא יכוון כלל.
So just as it says that Chazal were afraid if a person would think about what the kavanos of the korbanos are, that he would make a mistake and think the wrong kavana and derail the hakravas hakorban, so how much more so is that true here? If the person in having mystical kavanos has the wrong kavanos, it can be avoda zara-dik. שיש בה כמה עיקולי ופשורי וכמה חשש קיצוץ בנטיעות. That's what kitzutz baneti'ot means, right? Literally it means cutting down saplings, the things that are planted, but it means misunderstanding and therefore misapplying things in the realm of sitrei Torah. כאשר ועיני כל זה במופת, Nefesh Ha-Chaim talks a lot about this also, this kind of misunderstanding in terms of having these kinds of kavanos, he spells it out in more detail. פשיטא שיש לבטל שלא יכוון כלל ודי שעושה המצווה לשם מצווה ובכל דבר שאין ברכה לפניה הנני נוהג לומר בפי הנני עושה דבר זה לקיים מצוות בוראי. ובזה די ואין צריך יותר והכוונה היא רק פירוש המילות. על פי הוראה זו נהגו כל גדולי ההלכה.
So it's interesting, Noda Bi-Yehuda says ובכל דבר שאין ברכה לפניה הנני נוהג לומר בפי הנני עושה דבר זה לקיים מצוות בוראי.
So the Abudraham, other Rishonim talk about this as well, talks about why there's no birkat hamitzva on Kriyat Shema. And the Abudraham explains very beautifully, he says that the role of a birkat hamitzva is to get us to stop and pause for a moment before doing a mitzva and to do it as an act of קבלת עול מלכות שמים, as an act of kabbalas ol mitzvos, as an expression of קבלת עול מלכות שמים, kabbalas ol mitzvos, not that we should just do it sort of by rote. Problem is that we then say the birkat hamitzva by rote also, okay, so we're stubborn enough we can mess up everything, but okay, that's another kasha obviously. So the Abudraham says where the mitzva itself consists of קבלת עול מלכות שמים, so then the birkat hamitzva is superfluous. So that's basically what the Noda Bi-Yehuda is saying now as where there's no birkat hamitzva, so then I stop and I say that הנני עושה דבר זה לקיים מצוות בוראי because that's the role of the birkat hamitzva. Noda Bi-Yehuda is very much in the same vein as the Abudraham. Okay, so maybe next time bli neder we'll pick up with Ma'aseh Rav Siman here in the bottom of page fifty-seven.