Let's begin reading from the second paragraph here in this section, so on page 102 mitzad echad החזיק הרמבם בהשקפתו של אריסטו שההוויה האמיתית והנאמנת טבועה רק במסגרת הצורה המושגים הכלליים ותחום הפרטיות המשורש בחומר אינו זוכה לשם ישות גמורה וקיים רק בתור בבואת הכלליות.
Mitzad hasheni הכריזה ההלכה על השארת הנפש האינדיבידואלית. כיצד יתקיימו שני הפכים הללו?
Not necessarily with complete precision and rigor but the view of Aristotle, of Plato, that the Rav is referencing and that he says to a large extent that the Rambam does accept is that let's leave people aside for now. So you have leaves on the tree and in autumn every year they wither and they fall off and then in the spring so there are new leaves that grow back. In the animal kingdom so the lifespan is longer than that of a leaf but it's the same idea. So however many years I don't know dogs live 10 years, 12 years vechulei sometimes 15 years or whatever and the only thing that exists in the sense of if you identify or define existence as something which is enduring, if you say that only something that's enduring is true existence, it's not you can't point at any leaf and say that that leaf exists. You can't point to any particular animal, bird, or seemingly person and say that that exists because wait long enough and it doesn't. The only thing that does exist is this structure of trees with leaves, right? That klal, that general principle that the various species exist. But the individuals don't really exist, again defining existence as something which has a koach kiyum, something which endures. So that's what Aristotle says and you can understand you can understand where it comes from. I mean the Rambam tells us Aristotle was wrong on the biggest things in life but he wasn't krum. You can sometimes you can be wrong because you're krum, sometimes you can be wrong because you have certain wrong hanachot and you make a wrong turn at a certain point. So it's not krum, you understand you understand where this idea comes from. Havaya ha'amitit, true existence, ve'hane'emanet. צפויה אף במסכת הצורה Hamusagim haklaliyim right the universal concepts. True. Trees with leaves exist. This tree, this leaf. Everything is holeich v'va. Tchum haprtiyus. But when you look at sort of individual iterations, be it of the species of dogs, be it of the species of deer, be it of the species of people. When you look at individual iterations, אינו זוכה לשם ישות גמורה. That's not really that, that doesn't exist in the same sense, on the same level. V'kayam, it only exists as a reflection of again the that abstract, this is a reflection of the species. It's an iteration of the species. It's the species that exists because dogs are always around, but even Lassie's not immortal, you know. So on the one hand the Rambam does to a large degree accept that understanding, that framework, mitad sheini how does that, how is that consistent, comparable with belief in personal immortality? שאלה זו חוזרת וניעורה וניעורה לגבי יסוד ההשגחה. הלא האמונה בהשגחה פרטית היא אבן פינה של היהדות.
It's a cornerstone of Yahadus. הן מנקודת ההלכה הן ממבט החקירה והיא יסוד השביעי בי\"ג עיקרי הדת.
Schar v'onesh means that there is hashgacha, means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is exercising Divine Providence. And schar v'onesh is an expression, an application of that. נושא הפרוצס הדתי על פי השקפת היהדות הוא היחיד שאחראי הוא בעד מעשיו ופעולותיו ואין אחריות וערבות בלי השגחה.
To say that a person is accountable means that he's, excuse me, to say that a person is responsible means that he's accountable. Accountable means that there's someone to whom we have to give an account. It means there is hashgacha. לפיכך הוציא הרמבם את האדם מיתר הנבראים והכריז על זכות קיומו הפרטי בתור יחיד בין ביחס לעיקר השארת הנפש ובין בנוגע ליסוד ההשגחה הפרטית.
So where the Rambam then diverges from Aristotle is the Rambam says that Aristotle's construct is true for everything else in the world other than people. It's true that the individual dog, you wouldn't describe that as existence in the sense that you could say the species of dogs exists because there's no kiyum to it. And in terms of hashgacha, so the hashgacha is for species, hashgacha is not for the individuals. And the exception to that is Adam, is man. ואשר אאמינהו אני בזאת הפינה ורצוני לומר בהשגחה אלוהית הוא מה שאספר לך וכו' אבל אסמוך בו למה שנתבאר אצלי שהוא כוונת תורת השם וספרי הנביאים וכו'.
Rambam says that he arrived at this understanding from Tanakh. Interesting. והוא שאני אאמין שההשגחה האלוהית אמנם היא בזה העולם התחתון ורצוני לומר מתחת גלגל הירח,
right the, the cosmological view in ancient times and medieval times and that's what the Rambam operates with also is that the world consists of a bunch of concentric spheres and the earth is in the middle. And then the galgal, the sphere which is closest to us, is that of the moon, and then the other galgalim are again they're all concentric are above it. Again if here's the earth and you're sort of looking up so then there's the galgal hayareach and then you have the other nine galgalim or however many again from looking upward above the galgal hayareach. So we're talking about mitachas galgal hayareach it means here on earth. So mitachas galgal hayareach is just a way of saying on earth. ואישי מין האדם לבדו vezeh hamin levado it's only humanity הוא אשר כל ענייני אישיו ומה שישיגם מטוב ורע נמשך אחר הדין כמו שאמר כי כל דרכיו משפט אבל שאר בעלי חיים וכל שכן הצמחים וזולתם דעתי בהם דעת ארסטו כי אלו כולם השגחה מינית ולא אישית ולא יתחייב לגמרי לפי זה הדעת השאלה לומר למה השגיח בבני אדם ולא השגיח בהשגחה ההיא לשאר בעלי חיים כי אשר רוצה שישאל עצמו ויאמר למה נתן שכל לאדם ולא נתן לשאר בעלי חיים כי מעזות השאלה האחרונה כן רצה השם.
So the Rambam says there's only personal hashgacha. There's only hashgacha pratis for people. There's no hashgacha pratis—the Rambam says like this, many rishonim say like this—there's no hashgacha pratis meaning personal hashgacha, individual hashgacha for animals, for fish, for birds. There's no hashgacha pratis. Again there's a hashgacha in the sense that Hashem maintains that klal, meaning He maintains the species, but there's no when you go fishing there's no hashgacha pratis on the fish. Maybe mitzad hatzayad there's hashgacha pratis, you know that that I don't know you'll catch a fish with less mercury or whatever or a bigger fish, but mitzad the fish there's no hashgacha pratis as to which fish you're going to catch. So it could only okay let's continue and then we'll explain some more be'ezras Hashem. Tamtzis devarai hi כי האדם תופס אדם מיוחד במלאכת ההוויה ושונה הוא לאופיו העצמי מכל הפועל בשעה שבייחס לכל היצור אנו אומרים שרק הכלליות קיימת קיום נאמן וטבעי ולא הפרטיות ובמידה אדם נקבעה הלכה לדורות כי גם קיומו האינדיבידואלי מגיע למרום פסגת הישות האמיתית והנצחית.
Again the only individual that truly exists amongst is in humankind, in humanity. Klapei laya עיקר הווייתו של אדם היא המציאות הפרטית של היחיד בין עונשי ועפרות לפיכך זוכה היחיד להשגחת השם ולחיי הנצח.
And that's why because again so Aristotle's scheme the Rambam says is correct and it works for everything but not for people. It doesn't work for people which is why there is hashgacha. People exist as individuals. Again animals, everything else don't exist as individuals. לפיכך זוכה היחיד להשגחה לשגחת השם ולחיי הנצח אדם הוא מצד אחד איש המין בבואת הכלל צל ההוויה האמיתית אולם מצד שני הוא איש אלוקים בישות אינדיבידואלית ההבדל בין איש המון לאיש אלוקים הוא כי הראשון מצטיין ב
b'passivity v'hasheini ב b'activity v'yetzira איש הכלל הוא פסיבי ביותר אינו מחדש כלל ואינו עוסק ביצירה האדם הפרטי אינו רק יצור פסיבי ורצפטיבי
v'subjectivi. הפועל ויוצר. הפעולה והיצירה הן סימני ההוויה הנאמנה המובהקת. So what the Rav is going on to say, he's already said it here the first time and he's going to elaborate because it's such an important and profound idea. For a person to exist as an individual is a potential we have. We're not born that way. We're not born that way. This distinction that everything else only the Klal exists, only the universal principle, the type, the class, the species exists and the individuals don't exist whereas by people the individuals exist also is a potential. It's a potential that has to be realized. Well what does that mean? Because another way of sort of understanding and explaining the Aristotelian scheme is that you can account for everything in terms of what happens to everything other than people just based on laws of nature, on natural laws. Again to say it in the terms that we operate with nowadays in modern categories, you know why does this dog look different than that dog so you can explain well in terms of genetics. Everything is explained in terms of genetics. It's true that that this dog looks different than the other dog but that's not individuality because they're both just a product of the laws of genetics. There's no individuality there. Their behavior maybe one dog is very aggressive and the other dog is more docile but again that's not really individuality because that's also just again trace that back to laws of genetics also that they have different instincts and the truth is that both of them are just purely driven by instinct. It's just that again in that original when Hakadosh Baruch Hu created that species so through the law of genetics he allows for diversity but that's not you know the fact that you know that there are poodles and German shepherds and vechulu, that isn't that doesn't constitute individuality because everything just traces back to: this is an iteration of the class of the species which is dictated by physical law. If a person lives his life I don't know just responding to urges catering to desires acting on instinct so there's no difference between that existence and the existence of a leaf of a tree and of a dog. It's just that the same way you know the tree is Tzomeach and the stone is Domem and the dog is Chai the person is Medaber but you know we understand that that stones and leaves and dogs are all equally nonexistent ayin l'eila so the same would be true of a person also. And that's what the Rav says ההבדל בין איש המין לאיש אלוקים הוא so what determines whether a person is really no different in the sense that he just is an iteration of the species or whether no he's an ish Elokim. Ha'ish harishon the former the ish hamin the one who's just an iteration of the species of man mitztayen he's distinguished he's characterized by passivity. he's acted upon, he's acted upon by urges which are natural, by desires which are natural, by instincts which are natural. He's acted upon and he just is and everything in his life is driven by that. vehasheni, the latter, the ish elokim, it's activity and creation because he's not he doesn't just respond to react to urges, desires, instincts. haadam haparti, if a person wants to exist as an individual, so he can't be rak yetzur pasivi, he can't be passive and receptive, ella poel veyotze, he has to be active and creating. הפעולה והיצירה הם סימני ההוויה הנאמנה המובהקים. A person is being creative. We think creative means you have to invent something that the anytime a person acts, anytime a person is misgaber al midosov, so that's engaging in yetzira. That means acting as an ish elokim rather than an ish amin. beram, zchut ontit zo, this ontic privilege, שנפלה בחלקו של האדם הפרטי ושמבדילה בינו לבין כל גילויי היצור והמקנה לו נצחיות,
eternity, vealmaves, immortality, בתחומו האינדיבידואלי תלויה באדם עצמו. hareshut beyado, it's up to the person, lehitkayem if he wants, so he can in quotation marks \"exist\" כמו שאר הפרטים בתחום הצללים והבבואות. He can just be a reflection of the real existence. Right? The real existence is the species, it's what really exists. It's the ecological system of trees with leaves that really exists, not the individual tree and individual leaves. o, the other choice in front of a person is קיום הפרט שיצא מן הכלל ושזכה בהוויה קבועה ומוצקת בעולם הצורות והדעות הפרודות מן הגוף.
ish amin or ish elokim. זו היא האלטרנטיבה שמסר הקדוש ברוך הוא לאדם. זכה הרי הוא איש אלקים בכל תפארת הוייתו האינדיבידואלית המזדבקת באין סופיות מוחלטת ובשפע אלוקי נהדר וקודש.
He earns immortality, lehashgachah, right? לא זכה הרי הוא איש אמין דמות אכולה ומטושטשת של הישיות הכללית.
And that's why it's not an all or nothing, right? A person can be on the spectrum of existence. You know, to sort of define and explain and illustrate, so the Rav was depicting the two extremes of someone who's purely ish amin or someone who's entirely ish elokim. But obviously there's a whole spectrum in between. A person can sometimes just be given to a yetzer hara. And when we do that, so we're acting as an ish amin. That doesn't mean that that's who we are entirely. It doesn't mean that every time we give in to a yetzer hara that rachmana litzlan we have forfeited an olam haba because at other points in our life we don't act that way. Every time we're misgaber al hayetzer we're acting as an ish elokim. Every time we do a mitzvah we're acting as the ish elokim. And that's what the Rambam then says that Since hashgachah, this is what the next quote says, that since hashgachah is dependent upon our emerging from the anonymity of being an Ish HaMin to being an Ish Elokim, so the degree of hashgachah also depends upon to what degree the person does that, to what degree he again steps out of that anonymity of being an Ish HaMin. As long as a person is an Ish HaMin, so there's nothing an individual, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't know him as an individual. When a person makes himself into an individual, so then Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows him as such. Did you understand it in terms of the Yetzer Hara side? Is this true for Yetzer Tov also? Let's say a person is naturally gifted with good middos and he doesn't do so much with that. Is he also mevatel that Ish Elokim even though naturally he's naturally inclined towards the good and he just... I think we discussed this. I think we did. I think in the Hilchos Aveilus shiur we talked about the beginning of Perek Vav, Hilchos Deios? No? We talked about the apparent repetition at the beginning of Perek Vav, Hilchos Deios? No? Okay. We did. We did. Yeah. Thank you. I don't think that was Krauss's. Sh-koach. I think it's for that reason that that tov morality, I think we brought kama ve-kama rayos that when you have morality which is natural morality, but then on top of it is the Mitzvos HaTorah, so the Torah takes it to a higher level. I don't know that a person ever has an instinct for the Torah's higher level of morality. Some people, yeah, some people are nice people, naturally born nice. You see it from when they're very very little. That, yes, some people definitely have a head start on middos tovos. That's certainly true the same way we're born differently in terms of everything else, we're born differently in terms of that also. I don't know that anyone fulfills l'maiseh just by naturally instinctively responding to what he feels. I don't know. We never really have this halachah l'maiseh because people are more mechazar al hapesachim. Let's say the hiuv de-machsoro. Hiuv de-machsoro means that if one has the means and if an ani isn't mechazar al hapesachim and he goes to Elon Musk if he were chayav in Hilchos Tzedakah as they appear in the Torah and Shulchan Aruch, so he would be mechuyav to give him everything he needs even if whatever whatever many hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars. That's not going to make too much of a dent in his bank account thing, frankly. Oh, we've got someone who's, you know, not quite, doesn't have as many trillions. Someone who's middle class, hundred billion dollars in the bank, middle class. I don't know that anyone has, you know, people, thousands of people, you know, write a check for ten thousand, fifty thousand, I don't know, a check for five million dollars. I don't know. I don't know. It's so beautiful and l'maiseh even in Mishneh Torah again, we never would have understood it as fully, as clearly, but again this too we have looked at. You know when you look at the Rambam in Perek Daled, Yesodei HaTorah, so the Rambam... The Rambam is quite clear that tselem elokim is a potential and again it's a motif which is a leitmotif in the Rambam that that to be human a person has to live a certain way it's not a status conferred by birth that a person okay now in halacha since we are since since no human being can be the judge of that so in halacha we relate to everyone as though the everyone is fully and equally human and and you know it's no defense against murder to say well I thought that guy was a rodef no because that decision is not given to us you know but kapei shamayim you know Hakadosh Baruch Hu who is in a position and does have the prerogative you know to make that call so a person is born with a potential to be human the Rambam says is a potential and it's only if it's actualized that the person has tselem elokim in reality as opposed to a tselem elokim which is just a potential and and that's what the that's the kernel of this idea that that the Rav is elaborating on here that's what he means again this next paragraph is beautiful we'll be getting to it in another time so let's skip to 105 the paragraph he starts on hashgacha but again this next paragraph again describes how see that's why you know we kind of I don't know we lema'aseh there are gedolei olam on both sides of the picture so I'm not intending to to promote one over the other but we tend you know when when we hear that the the Rambam's view on hashgacha that hashgacha depends upon a person's level I don't know we don't like it so much we're not we're not so inclined to that view but when you think about it where that comes from partially maybe not entirely but partially it comes from a sense of entitlement and that's we think that we're yachsonim by birth no I'm I'm I'm a person the same way the same way I'm different than an animal that that animals don't walk upright and and I walk upright and whatever if animals talk only Dr. Dolittle understands what they're saying and we certainly talk in a more more effective effective way so we think that we're intrinsically superior and therefore how can it be that what do you mean there isn't complete hashgacha pratis and the Rambam says no a person well this world view again it's very much based on the Rambam that that the Rav is explaining and again not you know one can't be machria rosho you know between the gedolei olam on both sides of things here is that a person has the potential to be special he has the potential to be an individual he has potential to be unique but he can also be like a behemah in terms of responding to urges he's again that that passivity and receptivity the Rav was talking about so then again he's just an expression of a universal law he's not he's not an individual so we have to earn hashgacha and we have it to the degree that we earn it and there's something very beautiful and compelling about that that world view also let's read a little bit the prose is so beautiful here let's not skip let's read a little bit in 104 was that supposed to be up there we go האדם מתקיים לפעמים רק בזכות If a person doesn't live as an individual, so then he exists, again exists in quotation marks, lowercase letters, only because again he's an expression, he's an anonymous iteration of the species. Imagine that you know what comes off the assembly line. And every car, okay the Rav says there's no laws of genetics and combinations, so every car that comes off the assembly line in the Ford plant looks the same. Okay, so there's a little twist that you know because of genes not every one that comes off the assembly line looks the same but l'maise it's just coming off the assembly line. And it is. So then it exists bishitfo shel hamin משום שהוא נולד ובא מאותו המין והסוג בצורתו הכללית החקוקה בו הרי הוא קיים משום השתתפותו באידיאה של הכלליות. הרי הוא בן אדם.
It's not a kopel-teitsh to the phrase, right? הרי הוא בן אדם. He's not an Adam, he's a ben adam. He's a derivative of, he's an iteration ben hamin, bavua the shadow, the reflection haklal, גילוי דמות המינית בתהליך ההתהוות morphological shel hamin. ברם אין בידו שום דבר שיבסס את קיומו כפרט יחיד אשר עליה תצטדק,
should be justified, עליה נשמתו וכוח ישותו ינקו מרשות הכלל. שורשותיו בקרקע הבינוניות ונופו נוטה לרשות הרבים. אין לו שיעור קומה משלו. אין לו דמות דיוקן מקורית,
there's nothing original about him, v'partzuf ishi individuali, there's nothing truly personal individualized about him. לא יצר ולא חידש ולא פעל כלום. הוא מצפי ופסיבי ברוח,
totally receptive, passive, משועבד לדעת אחרים ולהשקפתם. He doesn't go against conventional opinion and wisdom, doesn't think for himself. אינו מתעמק בחשבונו של עולם הגדול והקטן ואינו בודק את עצמו ויחסו לאלוהים ולאדם.
Just goes with the tide. That's also an instinct that a person is, where does the Rambam write this in Perek Vav Hilchot De'ot? That a person is נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחר רעיו וחבריו ונוהג כמנהג אנשי מדינתו.
That's also, that's a universal law, it's a universal law of human behavior. That's the way the person lives because he lives in a time when people are crazy and the whole world is amoral so he gets caught up in all this LG craziness. So that's living like an ish hamin. It's just being נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחר רעיו וחבריו ונוהג כמנהג אנשי מדינתו.
There's no, there's nothing individual about that. אין שמחים בקיומו ואין מתאבלים על מיתתו. חלף עבר כצל וכענן. לא הנחיל כלום לדורות הבאים ואין בשמו ניכר. אין בידו לא מצוות ולא מעשים טובים ולא זכויות. משולל היה כל תודעת אחריות היסטורית ושאיפה מוסרית.
He doesn't have any awareness of historical responsibility, any ethical aspirations. בעל כורחו נולד ולפיכך חי הוא ומת בעל כורחו. הרי זהו איש המין. ברם ישנו אדם שאינו זקוק לעזרת אחרים ולתמיכת המין בנוגע להווייתו. אדם זה יצא מרשות הזמן ונכנס לרשות עצמו. אינו קיים בזכות המין אלא משום ערכו הפרטי,
his individual worth. יש בחייו מפעולת היצירה והחידוש, right? The person creates himself, hahakara vehahavana, הוא חי לא משום ש He doesn't just exist by virtue of inertia because he was born, so for a certain number of years he'll exist, אלא בשם החיים עצמם והעולם הבא אחריהם. מכיר הוא את תעודתו ואת חובתו ותפקידו.
He recognizes what his mandate is, his obligation, his role. הוא תופס את כל השניות שבישותו ואת הבחירה המסורה בידו.
He understands that duality of ish hamin versus ish elokim. הוא יודע כי שתי דרכים לפניו ובאיזו מהן שיבחר יוליכוהו. אינו פסיבי אלא פעיל,
active. אינו רצפטיביות אלא הספונטניות, spontaneity, שמסמנת את דמותו. אינו מסגיר את עצמו el hamin, l'chukkei he'avar v'hadfus. He doesn't just sort of surrender himself to the species, to the genus, to the universal law, אלא כובש לו דרך היחיד והפרט ומשפיע על הכלל. הוייתו שוטפת כנחל עדנים אל מרחקים לאין ספור וקצים. הוא נע ולא נח, הולך ועומד, הולך ולא יורד. והוא מתגעגע וכמה אל אל חי, זהו איש אלקים.
Yesod hahashgacha נהפך למצוה ממשית לחובת האדם. That's exactly the point we were saying before. Hashgacha isn't just something which is automatically conferred upon a person, it's the obligation of the person to trigger it, to deserve it, to make himself into an individual who'll be governed by again, whether we like it or not we're governed by the hashgacha s'char va'onesh, but in terms of hashgacha beyond that, in terms of the protective umbrella of hashgacha. That's what the next line clarifies. הרי הוא חייב להרחיב את ההשגחה הפרטית החופפת עליו ולהגבירה. הכל תלוי בו ובידו. שבשעה שאדם יוצר את עצמו בתור איש אלקים ומפסיק את קיומו בתור איש המין, הרי הוא מקיים את המצוה הצפונה בעיקר השגחה. היצירה הכי נשגבה מן הארץ היא האישיות של הנביא.
The fullest, most sublime self-creation is that of the Navi. Look at this next sentence here. כל אדם חייב לחדש את הוייתו על פי דמות דיוקנו של הנביא ולהמשיך ביצירת עצמו עד כדי התגשמות האידיאה של נבואה.
Everyone should be looking to create himself according to the profile of a Navi. You know just like the Tanna Devei Eliyahu that is much quoted, חייב אדם לומר מתי יגיעו מעשי למעשי אבותי אברהם יצחק ויעקב,
so חייב אדם לומר מתי תגיע דמות דיוקני לדמות דיוקנו של נביא.
In this context and I'm not sure why he doesn't quote it here, maybe the Rav has this in the back of his mind but for whatever reason doesn't write it. I found the Chayei Adam zichrono livracha had a remarkable he'ara. חיי אדם פרק ו בהלכות מזוזה הלכה יג. Perek vav, Hilchos Mezuza, halacha yud gimmel. חייב אדם להיזהר במזוזה מפני שהיא חובת הכל תמיד. ובכל עת שיכנס ויצא,
every time a person goes through the doorway whether entering or exiting, יפגע ביחוד שמו של הקדוש ברוך הוא, so when we see the mezuza we're supposed to think of what it says on the klaf inside the mezuza, so that a person is encountering השם אלקינו השם אחד. ויזכור אהבתו ויעור משנתו. He should be aroused from his slumber, ushgiyoso, and his wallowing bahavlei hazman. So the mezuzah is encountering the mezuzah should wake us up. It should make us realize how we're squandering life by being so preoccupied with worthless matters and futile pursuits. Similarly in פרק ג' הלכות תשובה of the Rambam about Tekias Shofar: אף על פי שתקיעת שופר בראש השנה גזירת הכתוב רמז יש בו כלומר עורו ישנים משנתכם והקיצו נרדמים מתרדמתכם וחפשו במעשיכם וחזרו בתשובה וזכרו בוראכם אלו השוכחים אמת בהבלי הזמן
- that same phrase, right? Of havlei hazman that you had in Hilchos Mezuzah. ושוגים כל שנתם בהבל וריק אשר לא יועיל ולא יציל הביטו לנפשותיכם והטיבו דרכיכם ומעלליכם ויעזוב כל אחד מכם דרכו הרעה ומחשבתו אשר לא טובה.
Okay. So a person has to step away from, elevate himself above, again, the futile pursuits and worthless involvement, activities, behavior. Who's the Navi? יסודי התורה פרק ז'. So the Rambam says beineis hayeter (this is not the only thing he says), but beineis hayeter the Rambam says about the Navi that the Navi is מתקדש והולך ופורש מדרכי כלל העם ההולכים במחשכי הזמן והולך ומזרז עצמו ומלמד נפשו שלא תהיה לו מחשבה כלל באחד מדברים בטלים ולא מהבלי הזמן ותחבולותיו.
So that same phrase. Or in other words, what the Navi does is that he does what we're all supposed to be doing, but he gets a hundred on this test, whereas we get something less than that, but we'll leave it at that. The Navi isn't, that's what the Rambam is saying here. כשאדם כל אדם חייב לחדש את הווייתו על פי דמות דיוקנו של הNavi.
That's what you see when you juxtapose those three Rambams. עיקר הנבואה מופיע כאיכות השגחה בדופק צופים. So now again we see there are two as it were elements, two strands to the yesod of nevuah. Just as there are to hashgacha. Aleph, emunah bimtzius hanevuah שהקל מנבא את בני אדם. Yes, we believe in that there is such a thing as prophecy. But beis, just as we believe there's such a thing as hashgacha, but the same way hashgacha doesn't happen on its own (again in terms of schar ve'onesh it does, but beyond that it doesn't), so too nevuah, yes there is such a thing as nevuah, but that then translates into a challenge and an imperative for us. Just as there is such a thing as hashgacha, which then translates into a challenge and an imperative for us. שכל אחד חייב לשאוף אליה ולעלות בהר ה' עד סיגול השכינה.
Then the Rav quotes the Rambam we were just looking at and continues in the next paragraph, הרמב\"ם הכניס להלכה הדנה על יסוד הנבואה שהקל מנבא את בני אדם גם תיאור אישיותו ושיעור קומתו של הנביא ולא לחינם עשה זה כי גם דמותו של הנביא האיקונין שלו ותוכנית תודעתו שייכים לעיקר הנבואה ומשמשים הם בתור הטילוס,
the goal, והאידיאל של ההשתלמות המוסרית על פי ההלכה. Subsumed in the yesod ha-nevuah is what the ideal profile of a person is. On the top of 107, כשאדם מגיע לראש הפסגה, to the summit of the mountain which is nevuah, הרי גישם את תעודתו. He has realized, he has accomplished his mandate. Te'udat yotzer, the mandate of creativity, to self-create. מיד רוח הקודש שורה עליו ובעת שתנוח עליו הרוח תתערב נפשו במעלת המלאכים הנקראים אישים ויהפך לאיש אחר ויבין בדעתו שאינו כפי שהיה אלא שנתעלה על מעלת שאר בני אדם החכמים, כמו שנאמר בשאול והתנבית עמהם ונהפכת לאיש אחר.
Let's read here on page 110, ra'ayon ha-yetzirah, the second paragraph. Ra'ayon ha-yetzirah. ורעיון היצירה מפיץ אור בהיר, it spreads a clear light, על יסוד הבחירה וחופש הרצון עיקרון חירות הרצון מתבטא בשני כיוונים א האדם חופשי ליצור את עצמו בתור איש אלוקים ולגדע בריחי ברזל של איש המין המשועבד לכלל ולחוקיותו ב איש אלוקים שנוצר ונתחדש על ידי האדם עצמו אינו כפוף ואינו מציית לחוקיות המין שהלוא קיים הוא ברשות היחיד של הפרט וכל ישותו היא ישות אינדיבידואלית עצמאית בצביונה המיוחד ובדמות דיוקנה המסוימת.
Again, a person can create himself, can make himself into again an ish Elokim rather than an ish ha-min. And that ish Elokim is not governed by any laws in terms of dictating his behavior. And again when you come back to the description of the navi in this context, so the Rambam writes, ולא יהיה יצרו מתגבר עליו בדבר מעולם אלא הוא מתגבר בדעתו על יצרו תמיד.
Right, so again the yetzirah means to elevate oneself that one isn't governed. Again, the independence, it liberates a person, one isn't ruled, one isn't governed by the yeitzer and the navi does that to the fullest degree. הוא מתגבר בדעתו על יצרו תמיד. Let's look one more paragraph here. This is also an extraordinary insight, the whole thing is. על ידי כך מבינים אנו את דברי הרמב\"ם שהרחיב עיקרון הבחירה והכניס לתוכו את כל הישות הרוחנית של האדם ולא הגבילו רק סביב לרצון.
So what's this? Also an extraordinary insight. ברשותו של כל אדם ניתנה the Rav tells you which Rambam he has in mind חלילה אל יעבור במחשבתך דבר זה שאומרים טיפשי האומות ורוב גולם בני ישראל שהקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על האדם מתחילת ברייתו להיות צדיק או רשע אין הדבר כן אלא כל אדם ראוי לו להיות צדיק כמשה רבנו או רשע כירבעם או חכם או סכל או רחמן או אכזרי וכן שאר כל הדעות.
I think there was a close quote missing here. וכן כל המציאות הרוחנית של האדם נהנית מזכותה המיוחדת ליצור ולשחרר את עצמו.
So the Rav says that the Rambam here sort of compresses so much of what we're talking about into his presentation of Bechira Chafshis. What does he mean? What's new? What's Mechudash in the Rambam's presentation of Bechira Chafshis? The Rambam emphasizes I think we would have I don't know maybe we would have presented Bechira Chafshis as follows: we're free agents in the sense that we're not controlled it's not predetermined what we do. So if a person goes to the supermarket and is careful to buy Kosher meat that was his choice he was acting on his Bechira and if a person went to the supermarket and bought Traif meat that was equally a voluntary act that's Bechira. A person chooses what to do a person chooses how to act. Now the Rambam doesn't disagree with that but in Halacha Beis especially in Halacha Beis the Rambam is emphasizing that a person chooses who he will be not just how he will act. That's what the Rav is pointing out. The Rambam is emphasizing that a person chooses who he will be that Bechira the rejection of predetermination of what the Tipshei Ha'umos and ורוב גולם בני ישראל said the rejection of that is not only that a person that it's not predetermined what a person does no it's not predetermined who he is that's what the Rav says no because what the Rambam's telling you is that within that capacity for Bechira is the Koach Hayetzira and it's not just if we just say that a person sort of adjudicates between two possibilities you know he gets to choose door number one or door number two okay fine so that that's understanding Bechira on one level but when you instead say כל אדם ראוי לו להיות צדיק כמשה רבנו או רשע כירבעם או חכם או סכל או רחמן או אכזרי
the person determines who he is he determines what he is. I think that's what this line means. Again on back on page 111 על ידי כך מבינים אנו את דברי הרמב\"ם שהרחיב את עיקרון הבחירה והכניס לתוכו את כל הישות הרוחנית של האדם.
It's not that you know wherever on the spectrum of cruel to compassionate I'm born, okay, so I can at least control how I act. Maybe I'm taka on the cruel end of this spectrum, but bechirah I can control how I act. I don't necessarily have to... No, a person can control where he ends up on the spectrum. Because again, that's what the Rav says, bechirah is an expression of, an instrument of yetzirah. And that's why the Rambam emphasizes that the bechirah is not just what to do, but who to be. It's an extraordinary insight. אלו הן נקטי ספר של שבחה. יותר ממה שהראיתי על הגיליון כאן כתוב בתוך דעתכם.
And the Kohen Gadol says, יותר ממה שקראתי לפניכם כתוב כאן. אין המאמר הזה אלא צירופי אותיות ותגים חיבורי שברי פסוקים וליקוט קווים אופייניים מפוזרים.
Natul hu, it's lacking, הדייקנות המדעית בהירות הסגנון והסברה אינו אלא מעשה הדיוט. So you read these two sentences, you know, you think to yourself, like, who's he kidding? What's he talking about? But that's not correct. That's our, you know, small-minded reaction. When you, if you can write this, if you know so much, if you live in a world that you understand this, so then you're aware of just how much there is that a person doesn't know. And when we read this from our station in life, so what are you talking about? This is nifla me'od, and it is nifla me'od, but if you live in this world, so then you realize what's above you and you think that this is an hediyot. Ulam, and this does not rank second to anything else here in terms of the power of, doesn't rank second to anything else in the entire monograph, the force of this sentence for a person to be able to say this, wow. אולם גלוי וידוע לפני מי שברא את העולם שלא נתכוונתי אלא לכבוד ההלכה ואישורה.
I mean, we're supposed to do it when we do teshuvah, but to be able to say the Ribbono shel Olam knows that this was my pure kavanah. Wow. And then to try and think, is there anything in life that we could, that we ever did that we could say that about? I don't know. אולם גלוי וידוע לפני מי שברא את העולם שלא נתכוונתי אלא לכבוד ההלכה ואישורה שהותקפו לעתים תכופות בידי אלו שלא חדרו לתוך מהותם ולא עמדו על טיבם. משגיאות השם הטוב יכפר בעדי.