Okay, I'd like to welcome everyone to the third and in a certain sense final shiur in our series of pre-Shavuos shiurim. I want to thank everybody for joining us, ask you to please turn off your cell phones, put them on vibrate. Tonight's shiur is being graciously sponsored by Dr. and Mrs. David Levy in honor of Noam's graduation and also by Robert and Miriam Fagan לעילוי נשמת אלישבע בת משה בנימין in the merit of the learning that we do, the neshamos should have an aliyah. We thank our sponsors for sponsoring the shiur tonight. You know that when Yosef was in jail, so the butler and the baker had dreams. You'll remember the Sar Hamashkim and the Sar Haofim who had dreams. And the pasuk says that first the butler, the Sar Hamashkim, had a dream and he tells over the dream and Yosef tells the interpretation. And then the Torah says something very fascinating: וירא שר האופים כי טוב פתר. The baker saw that Yosef did a good job of explaining the significance of the butler's dream. So Chazal want to know, what does it mean וירא שר האופים כי טוב פתר? And there are many explanations. Maybe it means that he gave a positive interpretation, so the baker figured, hey you know, I'll also give that type of interpretation. But the Rashbam says a very penetrating, very simple and very, very penetrating comment. He says: nikarim divrei emes. When a person speaks the truth, the Sar Hamashkim gave a beautiful interpretation that resonated true. It resonated correct with the Sar Haofim. So he figured Yosef would be a great person to tell over his dream to as well. nikarim divrei emes. When a person speaks the truth, you can tell. You can tell the truth. As someone who's spent many, many years talking to high school kids and sometimes asking them, you know, if they did or didn't do a certain activity, so I can tell you over the years, you learn. nikarim divrei emes. You can generally, not always, not always, but you can generally tell when a person speaks the truth. And I think one of the, Chazal say also חותמו של הקדוש ברוך הוא אמת. The signature of Hakadosh Baruch Hu is truth. משה אמת ותורתו אמת. And the truth, I think, in our world, our world is an olam hasheker. It's a world that has a lot of things that masquerade as truth. It's not always easy to see. תשת חשך ויהי לילה זה העולם הזה דומה ללילה. We can't always see the truth and it's difficult sometimes to see the truth in this world. And we are so blessed and excited that רב מאיר טברסקי שליט"א has agreed to come share with us a little bit about seeing Hakadosh Baruch Hu in this world, about emunah in modern times. Something that the truth of the Ribbono Shel Olam, which is something that especially kids in high school but many people sometimes wrestle with a clear connection, a clear understanding. So many people have difficulty with this. And I think it's such a special zchus for us to have Rav Twersky with us because anyone who knows anything about Rav Twersky and I've baruch Hashem had the tremendous zchus to spend over the last, I guess, 12 or 13 or 14 summers, maybe even more, the real zchus to spend some quality time, quiet time, observing Rav Twersky, listening to Rav Twersky, being influenced by Rav Twersky in so many ways. And I can say that one of the many special characteristics for anyone who knows the way Rav Twersky conducts himself and the way he speaks. He chooses his words very carefully and tries to speak words only of emes. There's no other ulterior motives, there's no agenda, there's no politics. It's simply the emes of devar Hashem, the emes of Toras Hashem hakedosha. And we're so, feel so privileged and so appreciative that Rav Twersky made the trip out tonight to share with us. He'll be speaking about the topic of emuna in modern turbulent times. Before he begins, I just also want to give a special welcome, such a zechus for us again to have Rabbi Schrayer here with us as well. It's a zechus to have you here and again we thank everybody for coming. Please give your attention to Rav Mayer Twersky. Thank you Rabbi Kaminetsky. Paskin bechvod achsanya. I'm very grateful to Rabbi Kaminetsky for the the opportunity to share some divrei Torah this evening. The yeshiva's reputation, well-deserved reputation as a very special makom Torah is known far and wide. The prodigious efforts of the talmidim, the rebbeim, the parent body, the ba'alei batim, and all of course under the the very special inspired leadership of Rabbi Kaminetsky. דרש רבי שמלאי שש מאות ושלש עשרה מצות נאמרו לו למשה.
Hakadosh Baruch Hu communicated 613 mitzvos to Moshe Rabbeinu. שלש מאות וששים וחמש לאוין כמנין ימות החמה, 365 mitzvos lo sa'aseh corresponding to the numbers of day in in the solar year. ומאתים וארבעים ושמונה עשה כנגד איבריו של אדם, 248 mitzvos asei, positive commandments, corresponding to the limbs of the body. אמר רב המנונא מאי קרא, what pasuk hints at at this special number of taryag? תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהלת יעקב. תורה בגימטריא שית מאה וחדסרי הוי.
The gematria of Torah is 611. The disparity of two is accounted for by אנכי ולא יהיה לך מפי הגבורה שמענום. The Rambam and and most Rishonim based on this Gemara say that anochi is to be counted within the minyan taryag. And in fact, if you take a look at the next source that you have here on the page, so the Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvos in in the first of the mitzvos asei cites this Gemara as as his proof that that anochi should be included in the minyan taryag. In terms of the precise definition of the mitzvah, that that there is a very important machlokes in the Rishonim. Let's begin by familiarizing ourselves with the Rambam's presentation of the mitzvah. So we're looking at the third source here in perek aleph of Yesodei Hatorah. The Rambam writes that יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות, the foundation of all foundations and the pillar of all wisdom, of all branches of wisdom, לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון. Sham is not the, doesn't have a spatial connotation, the Kesef Mishneh points out, it's it's an Arabic idiom meaning that there is. שיש שם מצוי ראשון, there is an eternal being. והוא ממציא כל נמצא, and and he gives existence to everything that exists. וכל הנמצאים משמים וארץ ומה שביניהם לא נמצאו אלא מאמתת המצאו,
everything else exists from and through Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence. אם יעלה על הדעת שהוא אינו מצוי, if one were to conjure up the notion that he is not present. rachmana litzlan, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't exist, אין דבר אחר יכול להימצא. Nothing else would exist because our existence is not our own. Conversely, אם יעלה על הדעת שאין כל הנמצאים מלבדו מצויים, if one would conjure up the thought that everything else didn't exist, הוא לבדו יהיה מצוי. Hakadosh Baruch Hu, His existence would be unaffected by that, ולא יבטל הוא בביטולם שכל הנמצאים צריכים לו, everything that exists depends upon Him, vehu baruch hu, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu אינו צריך להם ולא לאחד מהם, neither collectively nor individually does Hakadosh Baruch Hu depend upon anything or anyone. לפיכך אין אמיתתו כאמיתת אחד מהם. Therefore, Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence is sui generis, it's unique. We can't think and we shouldn't think of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence in the same terms, in the same categories that we think of our own finite dependent existence. Hu shehannavi omer, that's what Yirmiyahu Hanavi says, v'Hashem Elokim emet. הוא לבדו האמת ואין לאחר אמת כאמיתתו, that only Hakadosh Baruch Hu truly, genuinely, independently, intrinsically exists. והוא שהתורה אומרת אין עוד מלבדו כלומר אין שם מצוי אמת מלבדו כמוהו.
There is nothing else other than Hakadosh Baruch Hu that inherently, truly exists. Hamatzuy hazeh, Hakadosh Baruch Hu, what do we know about Him? הוא אלוהי העולם אדון כל הארץ והוא המנהיג הגלגל בכח שאין לו קץ ותכלית.
Hakadosh Baruch Hu is responsible, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is sovereign over the world, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the responsible for natural law and everything that happens in the wake of natural law. ידיעת דבר זה מצוות עשה שנאמר אנכי ה' אלהיך. So let's just summarize what elements the Rambam includes in the mitzvah of anokhi. So first of all to know that Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists. How is that in the pasuk anokhi Hashem Elokekha, that the shem yud-kei-vav-kei is derived from the root of havayah. Havayah means existence. So the name yud-kei-vav-kei has at least two implications. Number one, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists intrinsically, not dependent upon or by on any external source. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is existence and Hakadosh Baruch Hu is existence in the sense that He's the source of everything else that exists. All that is is compressed into the four letters of yud-kei-vav-kei. Elokekha, your God, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is sovereign over the world, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is responsible for everything that exists in the world. Again, the equivalent in modern terms of what the Rambam describes about the movement of the galgal, of the sphere, is the whole aggregate of physical laws and the physical processes that we know within the universe. Okay, so that's the Rambam's definition. To highlight what's so remarkable about the Rambam's presentation of anokhi, let's look at how some of the other rishonim present this mitzvah. So if you'll take a look, the source right afterwards, from the Sefer Hachinuch. So the Sefer Hachinuch writes, להאמין שיש לעולם אלוה אחד שהמציא כל נמצא. Again, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the one who gave, who gives existence to everything that exists. ומכחו וחפצו היה כל מה שהוא, and it's from His potency and He voluntarily brought into existence everything that is, ושיהיה ויהיה לעדי עד, and that ever was or ever will be. וכי הוא הוציאנו ממצרים ונתן לנו התורה. And He took us out of Mitzrayim and He gave us the Torah. Similarly, the Semag, one of the ba'alei hatosafot who also compiled a list of the taryag... The Mitzvos, the Smag was an itinerant preacher. He used to go around to communities darshening, trying to exhort people to deeper and better Shemiras HaMitzvos. So the Smag writes in Mitzvas Aseh, Mitzvah Rishonah, Mitzvas Aseh Leha'amin to believe כי אותו שנתן לנו את התורה בהר סיני על ידי משה רבנו הוא השם אלוקינו שהוציאנו ממצרים
to believe that Hakadosh Baruch Hu who gave us the Torah he is the one and the same who was responsible for everything that happened in the course of Yetzias Mitzrayim. And finally we take a look on the top of the second side, the Ramban in his commentary on Aseres HaDibros: Anochi Hashem Elokecha הדיבור הזה מצות עשה. This, the first of Aseres HaDibros, constitutes a Mitzvas Aseh. Amar Anochi Hashem, Yarad Veyetzaveh Osam Hakadosh Baruch Hu commands literally them שידעו ויאמינו כי יש השם הוא אלוקים להם כלומר הווה קדמון
again Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists eternally מאיתו היה הכל בחפץ ויכולת everything came from Him because He willed it, because of His omnipotence ve-hu Elokim lahem and He's sovereign over the world. Again all this is compressed into the words Anochi Hashem Elokecha. Again Hashem implying existence and Elokim means power. Lavan says yesh le-eil yadi that I have the strength and in Shiras HaYam מי כמוך באלים השם so the shoresh of Eil again it's sometimes used as lashon chol similarly Elohim sometimes used as lashon chol it means potency, it means force. So all of this which the Ramban has taught us so far is compressed into Anochi Hashem Elokecha she-chayavim la'avodo and we're obligated to serve Hakadosh Baruch Hu, to worship him. ואמר השם הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים כי הוצאתם משם תורה על המציאות ועל החפץ
that Hakadosh Baruch Hu taking us out of Mitzrayim established, it proved for us His existence and that He rules the world as He wills. Okay. So what do all the Rishonim's presentation of Anochi Hashem Elokecha highlight something very remarkable within the Rambam's presentation and that is that the Rambam seems to have forgotten about the rest of the pasuk. The Rambam took Anochi Hashem Elokecha and he stopped. The Mitzvas Aseh lada'as doesn't include Yetzias Mitzrayim, it doesn't include Mattan Torah. The Rambam includes in his definition of Anochi, ידיעה זו היא מצות עשה only what's compressed into the three words of Anochi Hashem Elokecha. The other Rishonim what would seem to us to be naturally take their cue from the entire pasuk. The pasuk says not only Anochi Hashem Elokecha but it says אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים. So if the Gemara tells us that Anochi is a mitzvah, so it's a mitzvah not only to know what's compressed into Anochi Hashem Elokecha but equally to know what's stated in the preamble to the pasuk. Why doesn't that appear in the Rambam's definition of the mitzvah? So to answer this question we need to establish two points. Point number one and here I apologize, a little bit of תורה שבעל פה this source is not in front of you. The Sha'arei Kedusha, the Sha'arei Kedusha is written by Rabbi Chaim Vital, the famous disciple of the Arizal through whom most of the Toros of the Arizal are known to us. So Rabbi Chaim Vital writes in the beginning of his Sefer Sha'arei Kedusha just to dispel any misunderstandings, this is not my bekius, this is a much quoted perek from some Sha'arei Kedusha if you'll take a look for instance in the Chofetz Chaim's hakdama to Chofetz Chaim he references... this idea of Chaim Vital, he says that something remarkable and seemingly anomalous in the Torah. You find in Maamarei Chazal such as כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה זרה. כל המגביה ליבו כאילו,
or maybe the girsa is without keilu, kofer be'ikar. One who gets angry, it's as if, it's as if he's engaging in idolatry. A person who feels experiences haughtiness, it's as if or maybe it actually is kefira, heres, kahana v'kahana about different midos. And yet when you look at the Minyan Hamitzvos, they're conspicuously absent. There is no mitzvahs lo saasei prohibiting anger and according to the Rambam, according to most monai hamitzvos, there's no mitzvahs lo saasei against gaiva either. So on the one hand, it's tantamount to kefira. In the case of kaas, it's כאילו עובד עבודה זרה and yet on the other hand it doesn't seem to rank to make it into the Minyan Hamitzvos. So Chaim Vital explains briefly, very briefly, to sort of sketch it in the Kabbalistic categories that he provides and then we'll sort of uproot it into a context that's more familiar and more within our comfort zone. He says there are two souls. There's a lower soul and there's a nefesh elyona. The lower soul is what sort of animates our bodies, our physical existence and the higher soul, the nefesh elyona is the nefesh hasichlis, is the intellectual soul. Says Chaim Vital, midos are rooted in the nefesh hashafala, in that lower soul. Taryag mitzvos are rooted, address the nefesh haelyona hasichlis. And then Chaim Vital says something absolutely remarkable and if you can get your hands on it, you have to see the words for yourself, have to see that I'm not embellishing ki hu zeh. But first a mashal to introduce. Imagine someone is looking at a course listing in medical school and he sees that they don't teach basic biology, they don't teach basic chemistry. So what does he take away from that? So apparently biology, chemistry is not really too pertinent for a career in medicine. V'horaya, look at the course listings in medical school, there's no bio 101, there's no chemistry 101. In reality, what obviously is the correct inference? That biology and chemistry are so fundamental and so elementary that they're prerequisites. That a person can't even think of entering medical school unless he's already achieved a certain level of knowledge and mastery in terms of biology and chemistry. Says Chaim Vital the same is true in terms of the relationship of midos to mitzvos Hatorah. The reason midos are not included in the minyan Taryag is because they're a prerequisite. The reason there is no issur kaas, the reason there is no issur gaiva is because that refinement, a certain measure, a certain modicum of that refinement of character is necessary to be able to even relate to mitzvos. And then he makes an absolutely remarkable statement. Listen to this rabosai, absolutely remarkable. He says and that's why deficiencies in midos are worse than any others. Because if you're gonna have a crack in the building, you'd rather have a crack on the upper stories than a One of the the many fundamental ideas to be extracted from the Chaim Vital is that the Minyan Taryag, the 613 mitzvos are not all-encompassing in the sense of exhaustively, comprehensively encompassing all our chiyuvim, all our obligations in this world. There's a certain formal definition, a certain formal circumscription of what's included in Minyan Taryag, and not only are there things that are important and obligatory which are not reflected formally in the Minyan Taryag, according to Chaim Vital, what's most important, what's most fundamental is not reflected in the Minyan Taryag. This is an idea in different ways everyone agrees to. It's so so important. Sometimes we we walk around with a misconception of if it doesn't say so, if you can't show it to me in the Minyan Taryag, so then it's not binding, it must be optional. And the Chaim Vital says that's as reasonable as saying that if basic biology or basic chemistry is not taught in medical school, so obviously it's irrelevant to to one's medical training. To give another example, and again this is a harder example to flesh out, we're not going to try to do it but just to illustrate the same yesod, so so important, so so fundamental, Taryag mitzvos are not intended and are not all-encompassing in terms of our chiyuvim, in terms of belief, in terms of behavior. If you'll take a look, the Migdal Oz, a very enigmatic and and cryptic commentary on the Rambam's Yad HaChazaka, so in פרק ב הלכות דעות הלכה ג, the second source you have on page 2 in front of you, so the Migdal Oz comments again, the Rambam is listing kaas and and gaiva, anger and arrogance, haughtiness as exceptions to the rule of the golden mean. And the Rambam says that יש דעות שאסור לו לאדם להנהיג בהן במידה הבינונית, and the first exception he mentions is gaiva, and he quotes his nusach, his girsa of the Gemara in Sotah that כל מגביה לבו כופר בעיקר. And the Migdal Oz is also bothered by the fact, so where is it in minyan hamitzvos? It's so basic, it's so fundamental. Where is it in minyan hamitzvos? So he also suggests, and again, we're not so interested in the particulars of of his definition, of his suggestion, we're more interested in the corroboration that there's a formal aspect to what was included in Minyan Taryag. And once we recognize that, we realize that it's not at all the case that Minyan Taryag is all-encompassing in terms of our chiyuvim. Vetihema al HaRambam, the second line. First of all, he he cites the fact that the Smag does have a law for for gaiva in the in the minyan hamitzvos. And then he says in line two, ותימה על רבינו משה ז"ל. And and the Rambam here is very perplexing, shelo minao. Why doesn't he include it? ואני רואה שהזכירו כאן באיסור, he in fact mentions that we're prohibited from having that feeling of arrogance, of haughtiness. ואם לא כללו בחשבון הלאו, and and if Rambam didn't include it in his 365 mitzvos lo sa'asei, אני אומר הטעם לפי שהדבר מסור ללב ומי יודע ומי מכיר בו אלא השם יתעלה,
that since it's something that can't be measured, it's something which is purely an inward state, a person can carry himself as though he felt humble and not necessarily be that way, so therefore, formally, such prohibitions are not enumerated, they're not included in the 365 mitzvos lo sa'asei. The last line of this source. הלאוין הבאים בחשבון הם הניכרין לעולם ובית דין יכולין להזהיר עליהן.
That the 365 mitzvos lo ta'aseh are ones that are discernible, that are outwardly recognizable. Again, the same point as the formal aspect to what's included in the minyan taryag. Perhaps the most remarkable expression of that is take a look at the say, just if you review for a minute the Rambam's Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, right? We all say it every morning after the tefillas shacharis. The Rambam's Yud Gimmel Ikkarim: metzius Hashem, right? The existence of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Yichud Hashem, the oneness, the unity of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The incorporeality, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not physical and anything which is true of physicality is not true of him. Number four, Hakadosh Baruch Hu's eternity. Number five, that we relate to Hakadosh Baruch Hu directly, we worship only Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Number six, that there is nevuah. Number seven, the uniqueness of nevuas Moshe Rabbeinu. The eighth, Torah min hashamayim. The ninth, the eternity and the immutability of Torah. Torah is eternal, it doesn't change. The tenth, that הקדוש ברוך הוא ידיעה, omniscience. Number 11, schar va'onesh, reward and punishment. Number 12, Moshiach, yemos hamashiach. And number 13, techiyas hameisim. Physical bodily resurrection. The Rambam writes as you all know in the hakdama le'perek cheilek, that this defines Jewish faith. If a person doesn't subscribe to these 13 principles of faith, he doesn't have a cheilek le'olam haba, with the eternal consequences associated with that. So you would think that Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, if anything is going to be accommodated in minyan hamitzvos, so if we open up the Rambam's list of the taryag mitzvos, without difficulty we should be able to find all of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. So since we have a 10:00 deadline, we're not going to go through all 365 mitzvos, but I invite you to. You're not going to find them. You will not find all the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. You won't find the majority of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. Which ones will you find in minyan hamitzvos? You will find the first of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is anochi Hashem elokecha. Numbers two, three, and four are all rolled into שמע ישראל השם אלקינו השם אחד because the Rambam explains that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's unity is only possible because he's not physical. Number four is included with anochi. Number five is the issur avodah zarah. Maybe, maybe number six is the mitzvas asei of eilav tishma'un, to listen to a navi, to obey the words, the instructions of nevi'im. After that, nothing. Torah min hashamayim is not in the minyan hamitzvos. Yemos hamashiach is not in the minyan hamitzvos. Schar va'onesh is not a mitzvah in the minyan hamitzvos. There's nothing more fundamental, there's nothing more defining, there's nothing more mandatory in terms of belief and they're not in minyan hamitzvos. Why? Again, apparently there's a certain formal definition of what was intended to be classified as a mitzvah, and it was never ever intended as the Rav Chaim Vital told us and as everyone concurs, it was never ever the case that minyan taryag was represented as all-encompassing. So now, tachlis. So what is that formal definition for the Rambam? Why is it that the first four ikkarim find their way into minyan hamitzvos and from nevuas Moshe Rabbeinu, from number seven and on, don't? So let's look, if you go back again to the sources on page one. So let's notice that there is another point of contrast between the Rambam's presentation of the mitzvah anochi as opposed to that of the Acharonim, the Chinuch, the Smag, the Ramban. The Rambam writes: יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע. The Rambam's interest... in knowledge, right, leida. The Rambam summarizes, he concludes in Halacha Vav, yediat davar zeh. Knowledge. The other Rishonim, the Sefer HaChinuch talks about leha'amin. The Smag, leha'amin. The Ramban mentions both. So the other point of contrast is the Rambam is focused on yediah, the other Rishonim on emunah. And what the Rambam means by yediah in this context, it doesn't always mean it, but it means it in this context, is a yediah that lends itself to logical proof, logical demonstration. The Rambam's formal understanding of mitzvas asei is that there has to be an asiya, that's something you do, either with the eivarim, with one's limbs, what we would call an action, or there has to be an asiya in terms of even cognitively, there's a logical proof that a person walks through, there's a logical demonstration that a person arrives at, that he engages in. But mitzvos which are mitzvos of emunah, Torah min hashamayim, doesn't lend itself to the formal logical proof. It's as true, it's 1000% true, but it doesn't lend itself to the same formal type of logical deduction as metzius Hashem in the Rambam's opinion. Those chiyuvim, again, the truth is 1000% and the basis for it is overwhelming, but it doesn't lend itself to formal logical proof. There isn't a 'all men are mortal, Aristotle is a man, therefore Aristotle is mortal.' It doesn't lend itself to that type of logical deduction. There is no asiya, even cognitively there is no asiya, and hence formally it's not a mitzvah. Oh, coming back to our original question, why did the Rambam forget about the rest of the pasuk? When the Rambam tells us what elements are included in the mitzvah of Anochi Hashem Elokecha, he in quotation marks 'forgets' about the balance of the pasuk אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים. Well, so we understand. The Rambam says, of course you have to know it, of course it's fundamental, but formally in terms of my רבנו משה בן מימון's understanding of the formal definition of what classifies as a mitzvas asei, it's only a yediah which lends itself to logical, again logical in a formal sense, not in a colloquial sense, right, logical in the formal sense of yediah. Historical yedios don't lend themselves in a formal sense, again formal as in 'all men are mortal' etc., to that type of yediah. They lend themselves to a different type of understanding and conviction. But the formal definition of mitzvas asei focuses on again the logical yediah. Okay, whereas take a look again, let's reread for a moment on the top of the second page of the Ramban, Ramban says, and he says, the last word in the second line, אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים, כי הוצאתם משם תורה על המציאות ועל החפץ.
According to the Ramban, the Torah's not so interested in the logical deduction. The Torah's more interested in the knowledge which is an outgrowth of history, the knowledge which we attain, which we arrive at by having witnessed and by having transmitted from generation to generation the reflections of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So for the Rambam, leida is underscoring the logical knowledge, and only that is formally part of the mitzvas asei. The rest is important, is binding, is mandatory, is absolutely true, but not formally a mitzvah. And the Torah also is stressing again the formal logical knowledge. For the other Rishonim, the Torah is stressing the knowledge which history affords us, which Hakadosh Baruch Hu's involvement in the world affords us. The Rambam by no means belittles this. He writes in one place in the Moreh, he says that if we didn't have tradition to guide our reasoning, he says maybe one or two people in every generation would figure things out. Not everyone's an Avraham Avinu. So the Rambam isn't denying the importance, the authenticity of the knowledge from history, but he thinks the Torah also wants that our belief in Hakadosh Baruch Hu should be grounded, should be anchored in yediyah. Let's step back for a minute Rabbosai and reflect. Two sources of knowledge: logical knowledge, historical knowledge. Both of which are a source of our emunah bashem, of our yediyas Hashem. I don't know when there was last an age when people were so blessed in terms of these sources of knowledge available to them. I don't know how far back Libi omer li we're talking about millennia, how far back one has to go to find an age which on one level was more conducive to emunah. Let's explain what that means. Modern science going back to let's say back to Newton for instance, understood the world to be a closed and static place. The world functioned, modern science discovered rules of nature. Everything was static in terms of their understanding and conception of the world. And for argument's sake, the world as Aristotle thought might have always been there because it just seemed to be a closed, stable, self-sufficient system. So modern science no longer believes that. Modern science now believes that there was a Big Bang, that there was a beginning, and other than the most devout apikorsim, everyone recognizes that there was a beginning. And if there was a beginning of time, there's a Hakadosh Baruch Hu behind that. You have to be גור גור א פרומע אפיקורוס not to draw that conclusion. There are such fruma apikorsim. The Soloveitchik writes in one place, says everyone has faith. Apikorsim have faith in apikorsus, and we have faith in the Torah. But it's not the case that apikorsim don't have faith. Modern science today believes in a beginning of time, and that's reinforced by the fact that the universe isn't closed and static. It's expanding, not oscillating. It's not like an accordion going in and out. It's expanding, it can't expand forever, which means that it began in time. It's only been around so long. There has to have been a beginning. There has to have been a Bereishis bara Elokim. Once upon a time, to know Hakadosh Baruch Hu through history, we needed exclusively to refer back to nisei mitzrayim. Today, you go online, you book a ticket to Eretz Yisrael, and you land on the tarmac at Lod Airport, and you're overwhelmed that you're walking in the middle of an ongoing, unfolding nes, which defies natural understanding. You go around in Eretz Yisrael and you see as the Rav commented, you see the fulfillment of the nevuos in Yechezkel. Yechezkel says that when Klal Yisrael will be exiled from Eretz Yisrael, the land will remain barren. No one else is going to be able to cultivate the land. The Rav said in a Drasha once, I heard the tape, that the 19th century was the century of colonialism. You had the colonial empires. England was a major colonial power. So they developed the colonies. There was one place in the world that they couldn't develop. The same strategies, the same tactics that worked all over the globe, it didn't work in Eretz Yisrael. Nothing. Eretz Yisrael was a wasteland. It began to change in 1948. So I don't know when the last time was that there was an age that was so conducive, whether one's looking again for the logical or in its place scientific knowledge that the Rambam told us about, or whether one's looking for the historical, personal, experiential knowledge of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. I don't know when there was a time that was more conducive to Emunah than today. And yet, Hachush me'id, but things are not so Pashut. Things are not so simple. So how is that? How do we understand that? So perhaps the framework for that, for thinking about that is provided by a remarkable, remarkable comment of Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky in his Sefer Emes L'Yaakov, beginning of Parshas Va'eira, commenting on the Chartumim, he says, you study Chumash, it's quite clear there's magic, there's witchcraft. You look in Chazal, the Sheidim are all over the place. Says Rav Yaakov, what happened? Where are they? What happened to all the magic? What happened to all the witchcraft? Where did all the Sheidim go? Right, Chazal say that anyway, what happened to them all? So Rav Yaakov says something remarkable. Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants, Kach gozra chochmaso, that everything, everything should depend upon Bechirah chofshis. A person should always be able to find an excuse, an avenue, an option to opt out. To opt out of Torah, to opt out of Emunah. No matter how compelling the basis for Emunah is, Ratzon Hashem is that a human being has to have Bechirah chofshis. Says Rav Yaakov, when we live at the time of Nevuah, when you had Neviim who could and did perform Osos u'mofsim, so what was the counterweight to that? What happened to one's Bechirah? You go see Elisha, you see what Elisha can do, you see Techiyas hameisim, you go see what Eliyahu HaNavi can do. How does that leave room for Bechirah? Says Rav Yaakov, if you live when Aharon HaKohen can throw the stick down and it turns into a Nachash, for there to be Bechirah, there has to be Chartumim who through Kishuf can do the same. Absent Nevuah, when there's no longer Nevuah, says Rav Yaakov, you don't need the Kishuf anymore. What happened to the Kishuf? The Kishuf left the world when Nevuah left the world. It was no longer needed as the counterweight, as the countervailing force. And so what are the countervailing forces? So Rav Yaakov, he gives us a way to think about the question. Again, the basis for Emunah today is stronger and more compelling than it's ever been. And yet, Hachush me'id that it's not so simple. So I'd like to share with you two answers, not competing answers, complementary answers, and by no means is there any information that these are the only two answers. We've never lived in a time that was so conducive to emuna b'Hashem, but we've also never lived in a time that the world around us was so numbing and so conducive to going through life without thinking. Whether it's the affluence and the materialism, or whether it's the technology, it's hard to have time to think. If I'm not texting, I'm checking my email. If I'm not that, then you'll choose your apps, I'm not sure of the whole range of options on the smartphone. All of that has a numbing effect. There's so much. Mesillas Yesharim says it's an endemic nisayon. Gashmius is an endemic nisayon, but the more gashmius there is, the more affluent life is, the more affluent the society is, the more of a nisayon it is. And the technology. Once upon a time, a person was out of touch. There was only so long that the phone cord extended, and if the phone cord didn't reach there, so a person was out of touch. Once upon a time when you walked down the street, so you couldn't be on the phone, so you had to think a little bit. Today, the countervailing force to just how compelling, again, whether it's the implications of modern science or whether it's the implications of the miraculous ongoing existence of Medinas Yisrael, the countervailing force is that we're numbed into not thinking. The Rambam writes, you have it here on your source sheet, that the tzelem Elokim of a person is his intellectual capacity. When the Torah tells us we're created betzelem Elokim, it's a capacity, it's an endowment that has to be realized, it has to be activated. It's a capacity to think, to know Hakadosh Baruch Hu, to connect to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. But as Chazal say, Chazal comment on why it is that the Atah Chonantanu in the שמונה עשרה מוצאי שבת is integrated into the brachah of Atah Chonen, so Chazal say אם אין דעה הבדלה מנין. The distinctions, discernment, if there's no knowledge, I'm not going to know the difference between kodesh and l'chol, I'm not going to know the difference between Shabbos and sheishes yimei hama'aseh. im ein de'ah, if there's no knowledge, if there's no thinking, havdalah minayin? im ein de'ah, if there's no knowledge, if there's no thinking, havdalah minayin? It doesn't matter how much there is to understand, it doesn't matter how compelling, how suggestive the world around us is, אם אין דעה הבדלה מנין. One modern-day counterpart or analog to the chartumim, to the kishuf of earlier days. Another one, those of us who live in the Western world, so we have deeply ingrained within us democratic values, the democratic definition of freedom, of self-autonomy, and implicit, perhaps explicit, in those democratic notions and ideals is no one tells me what's right or what's wrong. No, that's my inalienable right. Self-autonomy, self-expression are the keywords, the operative words. The Rambam writes, the Rav used to highlight this, if you'll take a look at the next to the last source that you have here in the pages in Hilchos Kerias Shema, this is the Rambam's elaboration of the Mishnah at the beginning of the second perek in Maseches Brachos as to why we begin Kerias Shema with the parsha of Shema because we're not saying the three parshios in the order they appear in the Torah. So the Rambam says because the first parsha, again Chazal say the first parsha is קבלת עול מלכות שמיים. How does the Rambam translate it? It has the mitzvos of Yichud Hashem, השם אלקינו השם אחד, the mitzvah of Ahavas Hashem, ואהבת את השם אלקיך, and the mitzvah of Talmud Torah of Veshinantam Levanekha. Says the Rambam, מפני שיש בו ייחוד השם אהבה ותלמודה. So apparently Talmud Torah is part of קבלת עול מלכות שמיים. How so? So says the Rav in a famous drasha that I'm sure many of you are familiar with, because Talmud Torah means that a person surrenders his everyday mercantile logic and values and surrenders that to the logic of the Torah and the values and the morals of the Torah. A lot of us are ma'aminim, but the countervailing force today that needs to be recognized because we need to recognize it in order to know what has to be overcome and where we need to strengthen ourselves, instead of talking about קבלת עול מלכות שמיים as a dear friend of mine likes to point out, we talk about self-expression. And because of that, if the mitzvah doesn't resonate, so to our democratic mindset, what takes precedence? No, self-autonomy, self-expression. Rashi says in Rosh Hashanah, of course, of course, mitzvos are given for our benefit, לטוב לנו כל הימים לחיותנו כהיום הזה, that's Hakadosh Baruch Hu's motive. But what is our mindset supposed to be? The last source you have in front of you, Lav Le-aneg Nitnu. Our mindset is that it's an ol, it's something to which one surrenders. It's true that ultimately if a person really knows and really understands and really appreciates, it's self-expression, but a person doesn't measure it by that. Lav Le-aneg Nitnu, קבלת עול מלכות שמיים, it doesn't, it's not about self-autonomy, and it's not about whether or not I'm in a position to appreciate that אין לך בן חורין אלא העוסק בתורה, self-expression, it's קבלת עול מלכות שמיים, it's surrendering to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. There's never been an age so conducive to אמונה בהקדוש ברוך הוא, to Emuna Be-Torah, seeing the fulfillment of nevuos, but there has to be bechira. There always has to be bechira. There has to be a challenge because if one only thinks everything is so compelling, it has to be a challenge to think, otherwise there's no bechira. And even when one thinks and recognizes יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון, there has to be a challenge to, to accept the natural consequence and implication of that. There's a mindset that resists surrendering to Hakadosh Baruch Hu and therefore resists Ol Malchus Shamayim. The Ramban quotes a Mechilta that when Hakadosh Baruch Hu came to give the Torah to Klal Yisrael, kavyachol, the Mechilta gives a mashal, מלך שנכנס למדינה, a king comes to a country and the people say Gizra Aleinu Gezeira, give us a code of law, give us civil law. And the melech says first you have to accept me as king and then I can, then I can legislate for you. First is Anochi Hashem Elokecha, Hakadosh Baruch Hu says you subscribe to that, you subscribe to that with all its implications, you overcome again the challenge which has to be there, there has to be a challenge otherwise there's no Bechira Chofshis, and עונים על הן הן and when. We hear that Aseres Hadibros, we think, we think to ourselves that yes, we affirm it and we affirm it with all its consequences, recognizing again just how compelling it is, so halevai we should be zocheh to kabbalas hatorah.