Last week we spoke about hashgacha pratis. Tonight perhaps also with Purim in mind we'll move to a closely related topic, the topic of emuna. Obviously there are many many elements, many many sub-topics, but we're going to focus primarily on one. Emuna is central to Purim which basically is a Yom Tov devoted to mechiat Amalek. We're all familiar with the famous Mishna in Rosh Hashanah commenting on the pasuk of והיה כאשר ירים משה ידו וגבר ישראל וכאשר יניח ידו וגבר עמלק.
And then not coincidentally the Torah says the lashon ויהי ידו אמונה עד בא השמש. That the instrument with which Amalek is vanquished is emuna. And the reason for that is because Amalek represents asher korcha baderech. Rashi quotes three pshatim, the first of course is lashon mikre. That Amalek embodies the denial of hashgacha pratis, the denial of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's involvement in the world, and the only way that can be countered is with ויהי ידו אמונה בזמן שישראל משעבדים לבם לאביהם שבשמים. V'yesh le'ha'arich b'zeh. But instead I want tonight to talk about another element of emuna which is critical, integral to milchemet Amalek. And that is, besides the obvious relevance of the Haftorah Parshas Zachor, that it deals with another confrontation with Amalek, there's another important connection between the Haftorah and Parshas Zachor. The Navi says as follows: ויהי דבר ה' אל שמואל לאמר נחמתי כי המלכתי את שאול למלך כי שב מאחרי ואת דברי לא הקים ויחר לשמואל ויזעק אל ה' כל הלילה. וישכם שמואל לקראת שאול בבקר ויגד לשמואל לאמר בא שאול הכרמלה והנה מציב לו יד ויסב ויעבר וירד הגלגל. ויאמר שמואל מה קול הצאן הזה באזני.
And then a couple of psukim later: ויאמר שמואל אל שאול הרף ואגידה לך את אשר דבר ה' אלי הלילה ויאמר לו דבר.
And then Shmuel goes on to relate to him the very sharp and devastating tochacha which Hakadosh Baruch Hu had communicated to him. What's remarkable about these psukim? What was Shmuel's reaction when he first hears that Hakadosh Baruch Hu has decided that malchus Yisrael will not continue through Shaul? So the Navi tells us that vayichar l'Shmuel. Shmuel was angry. He was outraged. Obviously kaveyachol Shmuel didn't agree. Shmuel obviously felt vayichar l'Shmuel, vayichar l'Shmuel. Right, it's reminiscent of Yonah getting angry. Obviously Shmuel felt that kaveyachol that this wasn't a just decree, it wasn't a just gezar din and ויזעק אל ה' כל הלילה. What would we have expected in the morning when the night ended unsuccessfully for Shmuel, we would have expected Shmuel to come somewhat stammering, stuttering, and apologetically telling Shaul, you know, I don't really understand it, and I empathize with you, but what can I do, I have to relay this message which the Ribbono Shel Olam sent. That's not what he says. If you only see and hear Shmuel in his encounter with Shaul, so you would imagine, you would feel that Shmuel was so outraged at Shaul's behavior that he a thousand percent endorsed the gezeirah. You don't see any trace, it's not even a shemetz of that initial reaction, a reaction which lasted all night of ויחר לשמואל ויזעק אל ה' כל הלילה. So what happened? So clearly Shmuel realized that if all his tefillos notwithstanding, Hakadosh Baruch Hu refused to reverse what he had said, ניחמתי כי המלכתי את שאול למלך, so Shmuel obviously realized that maybe he didn't have, he, Shmuel HaNavi, didn't have the moral capacity to understand why what Hakadosh Baruch Hu was saying was right. But that notwithstanding, he had one thousand percent conviction that if that's what the Ribbono Shel Olam is telling him, and that's what the Ribbono Shel Olam is communicating to him, so then that must be right. And therefore when he talks to Shaul, so he's not, he's not role-playing, he's not posturing rachmana litzlan, he's speaking with a hundred a thousand percent, again, conviction that this is the right thing, that the punishment which Hakadosh Baruch Hu has decreed is the right thing, though he personally in terms of his own personal moral sense doesn't really understand it. But nevertheless, his acceptance is not simply a hachna'ah that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is omnipotent, is the Ribbono Shel Olam and therefore we follow what he says. No, the acceptance is not just that we have to accept it, we have to follow it, the acceptance is predicated on the notion that what Hakadosh Baruch Hu says is right. And that's a very important component of emunah is in situations where we are called upon to display emunah, it doesn't simply mean to begrudgingly accept what Hakadosh Baruch Hu says. It means to affirm what Hakadosh Baruch Hu says. It means to accept it as what's right and what's true, to affirm it, not merely to begrudgingly accept it. We'll give several examples of that in a minute. Now Amalek lich'ora is the mitzvah, the paradigm of a mitzvah, mechiat Amalek is the paradigm of a mitzvah which offends our moral sensibility. The famous Gemara in Yuma, it's also a Midrash Rabbah in Koheles on the pasuk of אל תהי צדיק הרבה בשעה שאמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא לשאול לך והכית את עמלק אמר ומה נפש אחת אמרת תורה הבא עגלה ערופה כל הנפשות הללו על אחת כמה וכמה.
The Torah teaches us that one life is so valuable, is so precious, is so unique, that we have the whole Parsha of Egla Arufa. כל הנפשות הללו על אחת כמה וכמה. And then, it's mishuras hadin, אם אדם חטא בהמה מה חטאה, אם גדולים חטאו קטנים מה חטאו,
how can it be a mitzvah to kill innocent children? יצאה בת קול ואמרה לו אל תהי צדיק הרבה. A person can't be more moral, more sensitive, more understanding than the Ribbono Shel Olam. And that also is part of the link between the haftarah and the krias hatorah parshas zachor. The krias hatorah parshas zachor of תמחה את זכר עמלק means perhaps, perhaps, but definitely, you can't understand it. It doesn't correspond to your moral sense, but part of your emuna is again, not only to accept it in the sense of well, we're weaker and Hakadosh Baruch Hu is stronger and he's the Ribbono Shel Olam so we have no choice, beles bereira we accept it, but rather as we see Shmuel accepting it, meaning that maybe we don't have the moral capacity or the profound understanding to understand why it's right, but we're supposed to accept it again, not simply begrudgingly, beles bereira, but with a sense of affirmation that it's not only mitzvah but that it's emes. And that's an important and critical component of emuna. Let me just mention a few, a few other sources which point to that. First of all, the Gemara in Berachos, which we mentioned a few weeks ago, where the Gemara has the chiyuv of saying the bracha of dayan emes. So the Gemara says, כשם שחייב לברך על הטובה כך חייב לברך על הרעה. אמר רבא לא נצרכה אלא לקבלינהו בשמחה.
Based on this Gemara, the Rama paskens in Yoreh Deah that when a person makes the bracha, when a person says tzidduk hadin, so a person is not supposed to say, what can you do, that's what the Ribbono Shel Olam wanted. Because the implication, the Rama says, is well, if somehow or other we could have had our way, Rachmana litzlan against the Ribbono Shel Olam's way, then we would have. The Rama says, on the contrary, when the person says baruch dayan emes, he's supposed to affirm the correctness and the truth of what Hakadosh Baruch Hu did, not just an acknowledgement of submission, but an affirmation, an affirmation. And that's the essence, again, of this dimension of emuna which we're discussing. Similarly, the Rambam writes at the end of Hilchos Me'ilah as follows: ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולדעת סוף עניינם כפי כוחו ודבר שלא ימצא לו טעם ולא ידע לו עילה אל יהי קל בעיניו ולא יהרוס לעלות אל ה' פן יפרוץ בו ולא תהא מחשבתו בו כמחשבתו בשאר דברי החול בוא וראה כמה החמירה תורה במעילה ומה אם עצים ואבנים ועפר ואפר כיוון שנקרא שם אדון העולם עליהם בדברים בלבד נתקדשו וכל הנוהג בהן מנהג חול מעל בה ואפילו היה שוגג צריך כפרה קל וחומר למצווה שחקק לנו הקדוש ברוך הוא שלא יבעט אדם בהן מפני שלא ידע טעמן ולא יחפה דברים שלא כן על השם ולא יחשוב בהן מחשבתו כדברי חול הרי נאמר בתורה ושמרתם את כל חוקותיי ואת כל משפטיי ועשיתם אותם אמרו חכמים ליתן שמירה ועשייה לחוקים כמשפטים העשייה ידועה והיא שיעשה החוקים.
So what else do we have to do? What more is there to do besides... So what else do you have to do? What more is there to do besides asiyah? The Torah says do the mitzvah, I did it. So what more do you want from me? והשמירה שיזהר בהן ולא ידמה שהן פחותות מן המשפטים. So the Rambam says, my father ein kaporas mishkavo always called attention to this Rambam, that shmirah is an obligation to esteem the chukim. And ushmartem vaasisem means that we're not yotze our chova just by observing and fulfilling mitzvos. But there's a chiyuv to esteem them even if we're stumped by the mitzvah and even if we don't begin to understand the mitzvah. ליתן שמירה ועשייה שיזהר בהן ולא ידמה שהן פחותות מן המשפטים.
The same thing, the same point the Rambam makes in a more with a narrower focus here it encompasses all chukim and by implication all mitzvos. The Rambam says in Hilchos Avodah Zarah after he talks about the issur of lishol ba'al ov, yidoni, mechashef, ocheiz es einayim ודברים האלו כולן דברי שקר וכזב הן. והם שהטעו בהן עובדי כוכבים הקדמונים לגויי הארצות כדי שינהגו אחריהם. ואין ראוי לישראל שהם חכמים מחוכמים להימשך בהבלים אלו ולא להעלות על לב שיש תועלת בהן. כל המאמין בדברים אלו וכיוצא בהן ומחשב בלבו שהן אמת ודבר חכמה אבל התורה אסרתן אינן אלא מן הסכלים ומחסרי הדעת.
It's not enough just to abstain from all these idolatrous practices ov, yidoni, kishuf etcetera, but a person has to again not just to submit, not just to comply, but a person has to affirm the truth of what Hakadosh Baruch Hu is telling us. The Ramban al HaTorah makes the same point in Parshas Eikev on the pasuk כי אם שמור תשמרון את כל המצוה הזאת אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם לעשותה לאהבה את ה' אלוהיכם ללכת בכל דרכיו ולדבקה בו.
Says the Ramban שלא תיפרד מחשבתו מן ה' אל אלוהים אחרים. שלא יחשוב שיהיה בעבודה זרה שום עיקר אלא הכל אפס ואין.
Again, it's not enough uldavkah bo as says the Ramban adds an added another component to the obligation again. It's not enough to abstain from avodah zarah but to think maybe there's something to it rachmana litzlan but rather אלא הכל אפס ואין. והנה זה כמו שאמר אותו תעבודו ובו תדבקון והכוונה להזהיר שלא יעבוד ה' וזולתו אלא לה' לבדו יעבוד בלבו ובמעשיו.
And one final, there are many more that we could mention but one final mareh makom, again it's one we've seen already. The Magid Mishneh at the end of Hilchos Lulav where the Rambam quotes the pasuk תחת אשר לא עבדת את ה' אלוהיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב מרוב כל.
That the Torah is so so harsh on someone who observes mitzvos but doesn't do it besimcha. He's medakdek in mitzvah kalah kechamurah but he doesn't do it besimcha. So what's so terrible if he doesn't do it besimcha? So the Magid Mishneh explains if he doesn't do it besimcha, so it means that he basically is only submitting, but really he thinks that these are burdensome. He doesn't think that this is the right thing to do. He thinks that this is burdensome, onerous, it's something I have to do belas brera because otherwise I'm gonna have to give a din vecheshbon. But he doesn't think it's right. He doesn't think it's emes. He doesn't have emuna in it, and that's why the Torah is so, so harsh with this person of תחת אשר לא עבדת את ה' אלקיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב. חייב לעשותן והוא שמח בעשייתן,
not מצד שהן חובה עליו והוא מוכרח ואנוס. But rather יעשה הטוב מצד שהוא טוב ויבחר באמת מצד שהוא אמת ויקל בעיניו טורחן.
And again, there are other marei mekomos. The last phrase in the Magid Mishne of veyakel be'enav tarchan, that whatever effort or exertion is required for kiyum hamitzvos should seem to be inconsequential in his mind. משל למה הדבר דומה: Let's say a person has to, he's told there's a treasure which is five feet, buried five feet deep in the ground. So it's cold outside, so digging is very difficult because the ground is frozen. Would anyone consider it a burden? Would anyone consider it onerous to have to dig the five feet to get the treasure? That's what the Magid Mishne says. Rav Moshe Feinstein had a very powerful and sobering observation. Rav Moshe zecher tzaddik livracha said, we're all familiar with the phrase in Yiddish, it was a commonplace, it was margla befumaihu of those who came to America earlier in this century, when not working on Shabbos meant losing a job. So margla befumaihu after a krechtz: עס איז שווער צו זיין א ייד. It's difficult to be a Jew. So Rav Moshe said that that attitude destroyed an entire generation. And the reason that the children of these people assimilated on such a large scale was because they identified Yiddishkeit with עס איז שווער צו זיין א ייד. And as difficult as it was, the reaction should have been: What a minor and worthwhile sacrifice it is for the Ribono Shel Olam and his Torah. And that's exactly the Magid Mishne's veyakel be'enav tarchan. So not only, so what Rav Moshe adds to what we've seen in all these other marei mekomos is not only is this emuna required, but also without it, not only are we lacking in the emuna, but it doesn't take long until we're lacking, rachmana litzlan, even in the actual observance as well. And the Mishna says in Pirkei Avos, Perek Kinyan Torah, that the Torah is nikneis במ"ח דברים. Amongst those mem cheis devarim is emunas chachamim. What does emunas chachamim mean? So emunas chachamim, it should have said, it should have said, bekabalas divrei hachachamim. What's the lashon emunas chachamim? So it's quite clear, the Machzor Vitry talks about this. Emunas chachamim means that there is no Torah Sheba'al Peh if we simply submit to the authority of Chazal. There's no masora can't be sustained or be. Better, better formulated, our belief in masorah won't endure if all we do is accept the divrei chachamim but without believing that they're emes. It's not enough to say Chazal said it, and what Chazal say is buttressed by the lav of lo sasur, so what can I do? But it's supposed to be emunas chachamim, there's supposed to be a belief that what Chazal said not only is authoritative but is true. And without that, our belief in masorah and in Torah Shebe'al Peh can't endure. Now as self-evident as as that may seem, it's something which needs a lot of reinforcing. And again, Purim, a yom tov of mechiyas Amalek, which is based on emunah, so certainly this element of emunah is also something which we need to reinforce. To say that we're Orthodox Jews and as such we have no choice but to accept what Chazal said, we have no choice but to say brachos which Chazal formulated. But the truth is that the brachos are insulting to half of Klal Yisrael, but we have no choice but to submit to what Chazal says is not acceptable, is not acceptable. Emunas chachamim doesn't mean to accept as authoritative and to simultaneously disparage as insulting. Emunas chachamim means that we accept and we affirm that what Chazal, what our chachmei hamasorah have taught us and have told us is not only authoritative but is true. Now we may or may not have the capacity to understand why it's true. Our reaction may be like Shmuel's reaction was, vayichar l'Shmuel. But the difference in the Parsha of Amalek between Shmuel and Shaul, where Shaul was over on אל תהי צדיק הרבה the Gemara in Yoma says, and Shmuel after vayichar l'Shmuel, ויזעק אל השם כל הלילה, so the Ribbono shel Olam said no, then it's no. It's not just that he submitted, but he affirmed what the Ribbono shel Olam said. And that same attitude is not only vis-a-vis d'Oraisa, the same attitude is vis-a-vis d'Rabbanans as well. Kimdumanne that in the famous story with Rabbi Akiva, when Rabbi Akiva was in jail and had only a few precious ounces of water and said that he would rather use it for netilas yadayim than even drink what was necessary to sustain himself, that he would rather risk his life than be over divrei chaveirav, Rabbi Akiva said. Kimdumanne that Rabbi Akiva didn't simply mean that if you don't have the gezeiros and the siyagim that Torah won't survive, but Akiva said if you don't have the emunas chachamim in Chazal, the Torah won't survive either. And even though Rabbi Akiva was muchan, that he was ready literally to be moser nefesh to reinforce that point. If someone insinuates that Chazal acted out of a personal bias or out of a sociological bias, so the Gemara in Brachos says in Mi Shemeso that chayav niduy for that. Dugma hishkuha, if you say that Shemaya and Avtalyon gave a certain psak about geirim because they themselves were geirim, not because it was correct, not because that's what they held was the halacha, but that they were just influenced, that Chazal were influenced either by a personal bias or any other, any other bias, anything other than a pure Torah truth. And moreover, even if a person accepts it as authoritative, but to simultaneously disparage, that's not emunas chachamim. That's not what if that had been acceptable, then Shmuel would have come to Shaul and said, what can I do, beles brira I have to deliver this message? And when Shmuel speaks to Shaul, he speaks to him with 100% total conviction. In making a cheshbon hanefesh why we anichshal in this crucial, crucial element of emuna, the answer, unpleasant though it may be, is that it's rooted in middas hagaiva. A person is over an אל תהי צדיק הרבה when he feels that his or his society's or his generation's moral sense is the standard for morality and therefore what doesn't correspond is lacking in morality. Now that's basically gaiva, basically gaiva to say that what we understand, what we feel is the standard and therefore if we can't understand a particular beracha which Chazal introduced, maybe we can, maybe we can't. But the point is whether we do understand or whether we don't understand, there are always going to be things we don't understand in every sugia in kol hatorah kulah. There are always going to be things we don't understand. Whether we do or whether we don't, it's very important that we attribute the flaw and the inadequacies to ourselves and לא ישים מחשבתו בהם כמחשבתו בדבר חול ולא יחפר דברים אשר לא כן על מצות
says the Rambam. At the beginning of the parsha of eved ivri in Mishpatim, so the Ibn Ezra writes as follows: אמר לך כלל לפני שאחל לפרש כי כל משפט או מצוה כל אחד עומד בפני עצמו אם יכולנו למצוא טעם למה דבק זה המשפט אל זה או זאת המצוה אל זאת נדבק בכל יכולתנו
ve'im lo yacholnu we can't understand a particular pasuk, we can't understand a particular mitzvah נחשוב כי החיסרון בנו מחסור דעתנו. We should attribute the chisaron to ourselves, not to the object of study. And even though at this point the Ibn Ezra only seems to be talking about d'oraisas, from his conclusion it's clear that he was also talking about how Chazal interpreted the Torah. His conclusion after he then tells you that כי תקנה עבד עברי refers again not to a Kna'ani, not to a avdo shel ivri, but actually an eved ivri, which is the way Chazal tell us, after bringing all the ra'ayos, he says, הנה התברר כי דברי קדמונינו נכונים כי עליהם נסמך בכל המצות כאשר קבלו מאבותינו.
So it's quite clear from the way he concludes that his initial amar lecha klal was not just a sense of humility vis-à-vis the Torah and Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but a sense of humility vis-à-vis Chazal as well. Mentioned one in Midrash Rabbah, Shmos, is that the one there? Take a look, I'm sorry, I don't remember the loshon on the posuk of Elokim lo sekallel. So Rashi already tells us from Chazal that it refers both to birkas Hashem as well as to dayan. So the Midrash is focusing on the second pshat that it refers to dayanim. And it says given that the issur klala applies to any Jew, lo sekallel cheriesh, it applies to anyone, so why does the Torah here single out dayanim for as the object of the klala in formulating the lav? So it says that even though there's an issur by any Yisroel, it's especially chamur by dayanim שמלמדים את העם משפט. And it says וכן מצינו בקרח ועדתו that nigmar dinam because they started off with Moshe and Aharon. And so too we find by the anshei Yerushalayim, ויהיו בוזים במלאכי אלקים, the neviim. They had contempt for the neviim. And then all of a sudden the medrash switches, shift gears. And the medrash talks about someone who doesn't interpret the words of Chazal properly. Someone who doesn't apply himself to understanding the words of Chazal. And the implication in the medrash is remarkable. That that same attitude of irreverence and disrespect which is evident when a person is mekalel a dayan and which the Torah so forcefully condemns, it's that same attitude which also underlies that same irreverence and lack of respect when we dismiss the words of Chazal just out of hand. It doesn't make sense. It's not right, but we have to do it anyway. And the medrash implies by the smichas haparshios that that too in an axiological sense also is included in the issur of Elokim, and in the sense of dayanim, lo sekallel.