I'd like to begin on the note of Hakarat Hatov to our achsanya, our hosts this evening, ישיבת אור ותורה, for the past years have been gracious enough to host us and all the modest individuals who hide behind the name of the institution, so our gratitude is expressed to them. Rambam begins Hilchos Teshuva: כל מצוות שבתורה בין עשה בין לא תעשה all mitzvos of the Torah, whether positive or negative, אם עבר אדם על אחת מהן בין בזדון בין בשגגה
if a person violates any one of them, whether intentionally or unintentionally, שיעשה תשובה וישוב מחטאו when he repents, חייב להתוודות לפני האל ברוך הוא. He's obligated to articulate the teshuva in the presence of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, שנאמר איש או אשה כי יעשו מכל חטאת האדם למעול מעל בהשם ואשמה הנפש ההיא והתוודו את חטאתם אשר עשו
zeh viduy devarim. וידוי זה מצות עשה. This articulation constitutes a mitzvas asei. Keitzad misvadin? What is the formula? אומר אנא השם חטאתי עויתי פשעתי לפניך, one beseeches Hakadosh Baruch Hu, "I've sinned unintentionally, intentionally, rebelliously before You, Hakadosh Baruch Hu," ועשיתי כך וכך and one specifies the cheit. והרי ניחמתי ובושתי במעשי ולעולם איני חוזר לדבר זה. זהו עיקרו של וידוי.
The points that will command our attention b'ezrat Hashem are all very famous, probably been subjects of discussion for 800 years and more. First of all, the simple reading of the Rambam is that he defines the mitzvah not as the teshuva process, but the viduy, the oral confession, the oral articulation. Second of all, if one looks in the koteret, in the heading right underneath Hilchos Teshuva, there the Rambam seems to present things differently. מצות עשה אחת בתוך הלכות תשובה, within Hilchos Teshuva, one, one of the taryag mitzvos is discussed, v'hi, and that is, שישוב החוטא מחטאו לפני השם ויתוודה. Teshuva's not just the context, not just the backdrop to the mitzvah of viduy, but it seems to be given equal billing. What seems to be more intuitive to us, he defines the mitzvah as doing teshuva and articulating and the oral confession. And finally, the third point that b'ezrat Hashem we'll comment on is that unlike the Rambam's predecessors, for instance Rav Sa'adia Gaon, if you look on the bottom of the page, Rav Sa'adia Gaon says, Gidrei hateshuva arba'ah. There are four elements in repentance: ha'aziva, just practically discontinuing, abandoning the cheit, hacharat, the sense of regret, remorse, uvakashat haselicha, and asking Hakadosh Baruch Hu for forgiveness, v'hahachlata shelo yachzor. Unless we understand the word ana as an implicit bakasha, which it might be, so the Rambam at any rate explicitly doesn't include bakashat haselicha as part of teshuva. He does mention asking for mechila, asking for selicha in פרק ב הלכה ט when he talks about עבירה שבין אדם לחברו interpersonal sins rachmana litzlan. אבל עבירה שבין אדם לחברו כגון החובל בחברו או המקלל את חברו או גוזל וכיוצא בהן אינו נמחל לו לעולם עד שיתן לחברו מה שהוא חייב לו וירצהו.
One injures, one curses, one steals, he will not be forgiven until he gives to his friend what he owes him and he appeases him. until he repays whatever he might be obligated and has to appease his friend. אף על פי שהחזיר הממון שהוא חייב לו, even though he has returned whatever money he owes, צריך לרצותו ולשאול ממנו שימחול לו. He has to ask, he has to appease the person and ask for forgiveness. But when it comes to עבירות בין אדם למקום, the Rambam doesn't include bakashas hammechilah as part of the mitzvah, as part of the teshuvah process. The simple understanding would seem to be that at the very essence of any חטא בין אדם לחברו is the fact that one hurts one's fellow man. Assuaging those hurt feelings in the form of asking mechilah is therefore integral to the teshuvah. חטא בין אדם למקום, it's not the case that the Ribbono Shel Olam is insulted. It's not the case that the Ribbono Shel Olam is offended. Mechilah is something that we look for to avoid rachmana litzlan whatever punishment might be forthcoming otherwise. But mechilah is only integral to the teshuvah process when the cheit consists of an affront, offending a person, hurting a person, insulting a person. So then the teshuvah is measured by asking mechilah. Bein adam lamakom, that's not what the cheit is about. The cheit is not about offending Hakadosh Baruch Hu, it's not giving affront to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Mechilah's not an integral part of the teshuvah process. What about that contradiction in emphasis that in the Halacha the Rambam talks about that the definition of the mitzvah is the oral component, וידוי זה מצות עשה? In the heading he seems to say no, that the mitzvah is the teshuvah. So here, just very briefly, now was not the time to be maarich in this, but just very briefly, maybe submit for your consideration the following. If you take a look, that's what the rest of this whole booklet is about is to take home and to look at. You'll see there's a certain pattern in how the Rambam formulates mitzvahs asei. For the most part, if you begin, if you see where it says Sefer Ahava. You look in Hilchos Krias Shema. So Hilchos Krias Shema the Rambam says מצות עשה אחת והיא likro krias shema. Hilchos Tefilla has shtei mitzvos asei, לעבוד את השם בתפילה, לברך הכהנים את ישראל בכל יום.
Continuing in Hilchos Tefillin, Mezuzah, and v'Sefer Torah, להיות תפילין על הראש, likoshram al hayad, likboa mezuzah, לכתוב כל איש ספר תורה, לכתוב המלך ספר שני. So what's the pattern that clearly emerges? The Rambam writes with the infinitive. When he tells you what the mitzvas asei is that's going to be discussed in these Halachos, so the Rambam formulates it with the infinitive. Krias Shema, the mitzvah is to read Krias Shema. Tefilla, the mitzvah is to worship Hakadosh Baruch Hu through Tefilla. The mitzvah is for the kohanim to impart a blessing, to tie the tefillin on the hand, to affix the mezuzah to the doorpost. The Rambam does it with the infinitive, with the lamed. Halo davar hu that in Hilchos Teshuvah, if you look on the top of the page, so what should the Rambam have said to be consistent? Rambam would have said מצות עשה אחת והיא לשוב החוטא מחטאו לפני השם ולהתוודות.
He doesn't. Rambam writes it with a shin. Now if you continue, so you'll find out this isn't the only case. There are actually many other cases, very much a minority of cases, but there are several other cases where the Rambam also instead of using the infinitive to define what the mitzvah is, does it with a shin. So just to mention a few, I think representative examples. In Hilchos Gerushin, mitzvahs asei vehi... she-yegaresh ham'garesh b'sefer, right, not legareish, not with the infinitive, but with the shin. Mention one or two other examples. If you turn the page, you'll see what Hilchos Shmita V'Yovel is. Mitzva Zayin, could look at Mitzva Vav as well, she-yashmit kol halvah'aso. But the mitzvah of not collecting loans which that Shmita cancels, so the Rambam doesn't say lehashmit kol halvah'aso, she-yashmit kol halvah'aso. Then the final group of representative examples in Hilchos Shgogos. Everything there in Hilchos Shgogos is with the shin. שיקריב היחיד קרבן חטאת קבוע על שגגתו. Again, when the Rambam talks about the obligation to bring the korban chatas, the sin offering, so he doesn't say with the infinitive lehakriv, and so for each of these categories of korbanos. So what's the pattern that emerges here? When does the Rambam formulate the mitzvah with the lamed? When does the Rambam formulate the mitzvah with the shin? So ke-midumeh that the pattern is as follows. Whenever there's something either indirect or passive or sort of somewhat, let's leave it at those two adjectives for now, either indirect or passive, so the Rambam doesn't say the lamed. The infinitive means that the mitzvah is to do this. This is the mitzvah is to do this directly. So let's take the examples in Hilchos Shgogos. Unless the sinner happens to be a Kohen, his mitzvah is not to directly offer the korban on the Beis Hamikdash, he's not eligible to do so. He needs, he's going to do it indirectly. He's going to do it by agency of the Kohen. Mitzvah is not that he should directly bring the korban. she-yashmit halvah'aso is passive. Not a mitzvah to do something, it's to let it go, to relinquish, to relinquish the debt. So something, again, the lamed is employed in most cases, but only because in most cases the mitzvah is to do this directly. This is the mitzvah and the mitzvah is that the person does it directly, as opposed to some element of indirectness or passivity. What about the example that we mentioned in Hilchos Gairushin? There's nothing indirect or passive there, but there it's very similar, but there too there's no obvious, there's no mitzvah to get divorced. The mitzvah is that if that's the context of what's happening, if a person is getting divorced, so then to do it through a bill of divorce, through a get. But it's not that the Rambam can't say legareish because again that would have the wrong implication, the semantics wouldn't be right. So on the one hand, again, the she-yegaresh is something which is instrumental, but that's not what the mitzvah is. So the Rambam writes it with a shin. It's sort of indirect, maybe more conceptually indirect. So if we were to ask ourselves given the Rambam's definition here in Halacha Aleph, that the mitzvah וודוי זו מצות עשה, that the mitzvah is the oral confession, the oral articulation. So how would we classify the teshuvah itself? How would we classify the experience of teshuvah, of repentance? We'd say that that's a hechsher mitzvah, it's the equivalent of building the succa so you can sit in the succa. It's the equivalent of baking the matza so you can eat the matza. Certainly not, certainly not. We'd say that of course the mitzvah of vidui entails doing teshuvah. It certainly entails and assumes it in a much more fundamental sense than the mitzvah of living in the succa entails or assumes building the succa. And yet, that's not how the Torah chose to define the mitzvah. So the mitzvah entails, this is what the mitzvah entails, but in terms of what the actual mitzvah is, the mitzvah is vidui. So you read it this way, so then maybe there's not such a contradiction anymore between what the Rambam says here in the kotares. He doesn't say lashuv or lehisvados. the actual mitzvah that the Torah underscores, that the Torah formulates is the oral confession, is the oral articulation. For for the rest of the time that we have Im yirtzeh Hashem we'll be talking on the, trying to talk on a different level, more on the, on a philosophical level and try to follow through on the Rambam's philosophical analysis rather, not so much the halachic. Rambam in in the third part of Moreh Nevukhim devotes many chapters to Ta'amei HaMitzvos, to identify, to explaining what the reasons for the mitzvos are, and he does so by grouping the mitzvos into fourteen groups, and then he he explains each one. So in Perek Lamed Heh the Rambam tells us, the first class comprises the commandments that are fundamental opinions, I mean fundamental beliefs. They are those that we have enumerated in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, but teshuvah and taniyos also belong, as I shall explain, to this class. So these are mitzvos where either the mitzvah itself is the fundamental belief, or the mitzvah is something which comes to to inculcate or reinforce that fundamental belief. In Perek Lamed Vav the Rambam continues and says that teshuvah also belongs to this class. I mean to the opinions, and again by opinions the Rambam means fundamental beliefs, I mean to the opinions without the belief in which the existence of individuals professing a law cannot be well-ordered. People can't live by Torah without belief in the possibility of teshuvah. For an individual cannot but sin and err. אדם אין צדיק בארץ אשר יעשה טוב ולא יחטא. Chet is is just about inevitable. Either through ignorance, by professing an opinion or moral quality that is not preferable in truth, or else because he is overcome by desire or anger. The inevitability of chet. If then the individual believed that this fracture could never be remedied, he would persist in his error and sometimes perhaps disobey even more because of the fact that no stratagem remains at his disposal. If however he believes in repentance, he can correct himself and return to a better and more perfect state than the one he was in before he sinned. במקום שבעלי תשובה עומדים אין צדיקים גמורים יכולים לעמוד. Now let's look very carefully at this next sentence. For this reason there are many actions that are meant to establish this correct and very useful opinion. Again, the correct and very useful opinion is the belief in the possibility of teshuvah. I mean the confessions, the sacrifices in expiation of negligence and also of certain sins committed intentionally and the fasts. So maybe just three three short observations by way of assimilating what we just read here. First of all the Rambam here confirms the impression which we drew from Hilchos Teshuvah that the mitzvah is vidduy. When the Rambam says what mitzvos come to reinforce belief in teshuvah, he doesn't say a mitzvah of teshuvah. He says a mitzvah of vidduy, Ha-vidduyim in the Hebrew translation, confessions. But this is in this context so remarkable. If the Torah is coming to reinforce this fundamental belief, so why doesn't the Torah command? And that would have devastating consequences. Devastating consequences. So the Torah wants to reinforce that we should know that in the Ribono shel Olam's world, there is the possibility of teshuva. So if you would have asked me, so I would have said good, so have a mitzvah of teshuva. What does the Rambam say? No, there's no mitzvah of teshuva. What mitzvos come to to reinforce this belief? What mitzvos come to to teach us, to tell us that there is the possibility of teshuva is Viduy. Sort of like saying that that Yedias Hashem is is fundamental to everything, so we'll have a mitzvah de'oraisa that you have to wear a yarmulke because that will remind you that there's someone above you. No, have a mitzvah of Yedias Hashem. So that's the way the Torah does it? The Torah has a mitzvah of Yedias Hashem. So have a mitzvah of teshuva. You have to reinforce this fundamental belief, so the natural way to do it would seem to be through a mitzvah of teshuva, not somewhat indirectly through a mitzvah of Viduy. Also very interesting, why is it, what is it that a person would think is impossible? What is it that a person could would think that he couldn't achieve through through teshuva? So again, if you would have asked me without reading this or without reading it carefully, I would have said because if there's no teshuva, so then there's no possibility of forgiveness, and that's a very depressing thought. But that's not what the Rambam says. What the Torah is coming to counter is that without the Torah telling us differently, we would have thought that this fracture can never be remedied, שלא יוכל לתקן זה המעוות לעולם. What would have, what we would have not understood is we wouldn't have understood that the restorative quality of teshuva. But it's it's not the absence of forgiveness of the prospect of forgiveness that that would have haunted us. How can that be? How how can that be that that we we would have been immune to to that prospect? To the prospect of of not being able to to attain forgiveness? The inevitability of cheit and therefore Rachmana Litzlan the inevitability of punishment. Imagine the following. Have a 16, 17-year-old just recently receives a license. So his her parents lay down establish very strict guidelines for use of the car. The teenager ignores them, Rachmana Litzlan is in an accident and is permanently disabled. He can go to his parents and he can ask forgiveness. This forgiveness is in the present and in the future. So he can go, he can ask for forgiveness. But their forgiveness isn't backhealing. God forbid in such a scenario, it should never happen, their forgiveness can't undo won't undo the irreversible injury. But that we understand philosophically we understand that that's possible because mechila forgiveness is in the present and in the future. If I borrow a hundred dollars from someone and he wants to forgive the debt he doesn't have to reach into the past and erase the fact that I ever took out the loan. No, I took out the loan. But he's mikan u'lehaba in the present and in the future he's forgiving me that debt so mechila selicha forgiveness that's in the present and the future. We understand that that's possible. But hamuavas the stain on one's soul and the distance that that stain on the soul creates between a person and Hakadosh Baruch Hu we would have been prone to thinking rachmana litzlan that that's irreversible. It happened. It happened. Can't change what happened. And isn't that imprint indelible? That's what the Torah comes and says no. Even though it happened it can be totally reversed. We'll come back to this a little bit later b'ezrat Hashem. Parenthetically again the remarkable parallelism between the Rambam's philosophical depiction of teshuva and again what we saw in his halachic presentation that asking for mechila is not part of the mitzvah because what the mitzvat vidui is intended again on the philosophical level to reinforce is not the possibility of forgiveness. No. That we know about. The Ribbono Shel Olam is rachum v'chanun we know there's the possibility to forgiveness. That's not what the mitzvah is about. What the mitzvah is about is that one can address the cheit, the cheit that happened in the past, that even that can be addressed. But the most fundamental question we haven't touched on yet and that is why isn't the definition of the mitzvah the teshuva? Why is the definition of the mitzvah the vidui? Again the oral statement. Imagine the following. Your boss calls you in, middle of someone's relatively new in the job, the boss calls him in and says to him I want you to be here no later than 8 o'clock tomorrow morning and all subsequent mornings. Or the boss calls in the new hire and says to him when you come to work in the morning stop by my office at 8 o'clock I want to shmooze with you for a few minutes. Parents can say to a child please clean up your room. Or they can say when you clean up your room make sure to put the toys on that shelf. What's the difference between those two formulations? I want you to be here, I'm asking you to be here, I'm telling you to be here by 8, no later than 8. When you come to work in the morning so by 8 o'clock come into my office for a few minutes. The first formulation doesn't take for granted that the new hire was going to be here by 8. No, he's being instructed to be there at 8. It doesn't take for granted that the child's going to clean up his room. The child's now being instructed to clean up his room. The second formulation the boss is saying I don't have to ask you or tell you to be here at 8, when I hired you and I told you that in this company we work hard and we put in long hours it was understood that you're going to be here no later than 8 o'clock every morning. I'm not asking you or telling you now to be here at 8. I'm telling you something else, I'm telling you something that we're going to do at eight o'clock in the morning. It's understood that you're going to clean up your room. I'm adding something else. Imagine the following scenario of baal teshuvah. A person who before he became observant used to spend weekends very often at the racetrack. He used to drive a race car and derive tremendous enjoyment from doing so. Then he becomes observant. So he discontinues, he doesn't go, he's shomer Shabbos 100 percent. But he reminisces with great relish about shanim kadmoniyos when he used to be at the racetrack and race. As if to say, you know, it was a good ride until now. Okay, now it's over. Now I'm living differently. So what would we say? We certainly would think that there's something missing in the teshuvah. If a person can remember with relish the cheit even if realistically there's no way he could have or should have known better, if a person can look back on cheit with relish, if a person doesn't look back on cheit with remorse, so then he doesn't fully get it. Imagine if a person rachmana litzlan was mechallel Shabbos. The issur of doing melacha on Shabbos demands that that person have a sense of charata about the chillul Shabbos. There's no need, Avodas HaMelech talks about this point, there's no need for an independent obligation of teshuvah because if I could look back either with apathy or even with relish at the cheit, so then that extends the cheit, that perpetuates the cheit. If I could look back at the cheit without having a sense of resolve that this can't ever repeat itself, so then the cheit is being perpetuated. The Torah wants to reinforce our belief in the possibility of teshuvah, comes the Torah and says כי יעשה תשובה וישוב מחטאו. It's understood that if there's the possibility of teshuvah, you don't need an independent mitzvah to do teshuvah because to react any other way is to perpetuate the cheit. Where's the chiyuv to do teshuvah for chillul Shabbos rachmana litzlan? In the mitzvah of keeping Shabbos because if I can look back rachmana litzlan at an instance of chillul Shabbos and it doesn't arouse within me a sense of charata of nichamti uvoshti, if I can look back rachmana litzlan at an instance of chillul Shabbos without my reaction being this can't ever happen again, so then there's an element of the cheit that's being perpetuated. How come we don't, how come we don't intuit this? It's not the way we intuitively relate. It's understood you're going to be here at eight in the morning. It's understood if you don't want to perpetuate the sin of Chillul Shabbos, it's understood that there's going to be a sense of remorse and there's going to be a sense of resolve moving forward. How come this isn't intuitive then? And how do we know that it isn't intuitive? Because if it were intuitive, we would have a sense of urgency about doing teshuva. Anytime there was an awareness of a cheit, it wouldn't be filed out away for Chodesh Elul, filed out away for Aseres Yemei Teshuva, an account that has to be settled. If there were an awareness, a sense of apathy about a cheit, never mind a sense of enjoyment retrospectively. But even a sense of apathy, indifference about cheit, if we understood that on a certain level that extends the cheit, it perpetuates the cheit, there would be a sense of urgency in doing teshuva. And we would all live the way Rav Yisroel Salanter did, getting ready for Yom Kippur beginning Motzei Yom Kippur. We don't. So apparently we don't intuit. We don't experience it that way. The reason is that we view cheit very formally. We view cheit as a discrete infraction. If I park in a no-parking zone and I get caught, okay, so there's liability, there's an account that I'm going to need to settle. It's a discrete infraction, self-contained. If one has such a formal conception of cheit, then cheit doesn't imply the obligation to do teshuva. No, cheit is an account to be settled and teshuva is a mitzvah to settle that account. So what's wrong with that formal understanding of cheit? It's very wrong in at least two fundamental respects. If a person, whatever the cheit is, whatever the cheit is, but the cheit is not Rachmana litzlan doing melacha on Shabbos, not eating kosher food, not getting up in time to daven, not davening, that's not the cheit. The cheit is the zilzul bidvar Hashem who says not to do melacha on Shabbos. The cheit isn't the act per se. It's what the act represents. It represents again zilzul bidvar Hashem. A sense of indifference, a sense of apathy to the word and the will of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. That's what the cheit is. Why why is the eating the non-kosher food, why is that a cheit? It's a cheit because the Ribbono Shel Olam said not to eat it. The cheit again, it's not a formal, it's not oh this is something you don't do, I did it, that's a cheit. It's the zilzul bidvar Hashem. If the cheit can be defined as eating the non-kosher food, then the cheit doesn't obligate us to have a sense of remorse. It doesn't obligate us to have a sense of resolve that that cheit should never ever recur. The cheit doesn't obligate in teshuva. Teshuva has to be an independent mitzvah, an independent obligation. But if cheit is understood correctly, the cheit wasn't the eating nevela. It's the eating nevela represents a zilzul bidvar. Taking lightly, with indifference, contravening the word of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. If I remain apathetic to that afterwards, if subsequent to the cheit I remain apathetic, it doesn't bother me that I didn't daven this morning. Or I davened this morning, but it doesn't bother me that I didn't daven with any measure of kavana, so then that extends and that rachmana litzlan perpetuates this zilzul bidvar Hashem. If it's a formal infraction, it's done and finished. Okay, it's a demerit that has to be dealt with. It's an account that's payable. But it's self-contained. It's not mechayev betshuva. But if it's a zilzul bidvar Hashem and in the aftermath of that zilzul, in the aftermath of contravening the word, the will of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, there's a sense of being casual about it, a sense of being lackadaisical, that extends the cheit. It perpetuates the cheit rachmana litzlan. So why is it that we have this conception of cheit? Why is it that we have this skewed understanding of cheit? It points to a more basic problem. There are questions which we should ask ourselves daily and if we're remiss in doing so, we should certainly be asking ourselves now. What's life for? What are we here for? What is life for? What's life about? What's meaningful? What's enduring and what's ephemeral? If we live with those questions, then we'll live with the right answers. A person was born to be oved Hashem. Life is about connecting to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Life is about serving Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And Hakadosh Baruch Hu's motivation is to bestow good, as we understand His motivation within the world. Hakadosh Baruch Hu's motivation is to bestow good, to reward us in a way that it won't be what the Yerushalmi calls nahama dechisupha. It won't be bread of shame. It won't be something that we didn't earn. Our cheshbon should ideally be more altruistic, to serve Hashem for its own sake. But either way, what life is about, what we're here for, we're here for Torah u'mitzvos. A cheit isn't a formal infraction because a mitzvah is not simply a formal obligation. A mitzvah is the purpose of our existence. If we can turn our backs on that and then it doesn't bother us, it doesn't haunt us, so then that perpetuates the cheit. A boss doesn't have to tell us to be here at eight in the morning. That's already been communicated. There's a second fundamental error in conceiving of cheit as a formal infraction. Formal infraction, liability notwithstanding, doesn't impact me. Doesn't impact my innermost core. Doesn't make an imprint on my neshama. A cheit isn't simply a formal infraction, a formal violation. A cheit without teshuva, if we don't do teshuva, it sullies the neshama. In so doing, עוונותיכם היו מבדילים ביניכם לבין אלוקיכם. It creates distance between a person and the Ribbono Shel Olam. If you go back and rethink that line or two in the Moreh, so the Torah assumed this sensitivity. The Torah was afraid that without reinforcing belief in the possibility of teshuva we'd be demoralized, not demoralized because there's no prospect of forgiveness. No, forgiveness we understood is possible because it's in the present, it's with an eye towards the future. Why is it that we would have been demoralized? We would have been demoralized because there would be no way le-sakein et ha-mu'avas. We would have been demoralized because there's no way to heal the fracture. The Torah assumed that we have that sensitivity. And that's why the Torah is reinforcing the possibility of teshuva so that we shouldn't be demoralized by it. And yet we find ourselves in a position where we take the possibility of teshuva for granted. The Torah succeeded 100% in impressing that belief upon us. But we're asleep. We're not awake enough to recognize the need for teshuva. We're not enough to recognize the mu'avas which is created by a cheit. The magnitude of cheit is something that we have no sense of. A mitzva, Torah isn't just a mitzva, it's life, it's nitzchiyus. And conversely, a cheit isn't just a cheit, it's missing out on life, it's missing out on nitzchiyus. The pasuk, the source of the mitzva of vidui, the Rambam quotes in Parshas Naso: איש או אשה כי יעשו מכל חטאת האדם למעול מעל בה' ואשמה הנפש ההיא והתוודו את חטאתם אשר עשו.
What is it that galvanizes a person in the aftermath of כי יעשו מכל חטאת האדם למעול מעל בה'? A person is guilty of any of the range of sins rachmana litzlan, betrays Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So what is it that galvanizes a person to be able to fulfill the mitzva of והתוודו את חטאתם אשר עשו? Is the awareness that what the cheit entails is ve-ashmah ha-nefesh ha-hi. The awareness that cheit means ve-ashmah ha-nefesh ha-hi. The nefesh, the soul. When a person feels the guilt, the defilement in the soul, when he recognizes that's what happens, כי יעשו מכל חטאת האדם. It's then that we're cured of our sluggishness. We have such difficulty doing teshuvah because I don't know fully but we certainly recognize some of the כי יעשה מכל חטאות האדם, but if that doesn't translate into an understanding and an experience of the ve'ashmah hanefesh hahi, it becomes very very difficult to be able to do teshuvah. When cheit is something external, that means it was a formal violation, it's something external, a person can be sluggish about doing teshuvah. When cheit seems that a person, as the semantics of the word suggest, is missing out, missing out on life, missing out on the purpose of life, missing out on the call and invitation to nitzchiut, to eternity, then a person is not sluggish about doing teshuvah. The first of the bakashot in shemoneh esrei, we ask hakadosh baruch hu to give us understanding, insight, discernment. We follow that up by asking hakadosh baruch hu to help us in the process of teshuvah, in the process of repentance. Chazal comment in a different context that אם אין דעה הבדלה מנין. Without correct understanding, a person can't differentiate, a person can't distinguish. If the deiah is missing, if the deiah of what a cheit is is missing, if the deiah of what a mitzvah truly is, what Torah u'mitzvot truly are is missing, we can't distinguish stam a liability, a violation, from missing out on life. So we're not going to get the hashiveinu. The truth is that we have a natural sensitivity to cheit. The sluggishness that we feel, the superficiality with which we view cheit, probably is due to the fact long ago diagnosed by Chazal that כיון שעבר אדם עבירה ושנה בה הותרה לו. A person does a cheit, rachmana litzlan, a person repeats the cheit, so his sensitivity is dulled. The first time there's a sense of shock, and the second time a person already takes it in stride. But if that instinctive reaction to cheit is missing, it's certainly something which can be regained through reflection. If we exercise our da'at, so then we can turn to hakadosh baruch hu with a bakashah hashiveinu. If we exercise our da'at. and have the discernment, discernment to engage in havdalah, to distinguish, to see the difference between an empty vacuous life and a life of meaning and a life of joy in avodas Hashem. So then we'll be galvanized, we'll be energized to do teshuvah. Ribono shel Olam stands ready to help us. הבא ליטהר מסייעין אותו. But אין הדבר תלוי אלא בנו to understand, to understand the magnitude of cheit, to understand the vital need that we have for teshuvah, to understand that the chiyuv teshuvah is embedded within every mitzvah. Because every mitzvah says take dvar Hashem seriously. Not cavalierly, not casually, dvar Hashem is something to be taken seriously. That is life, the purpose of life, that is life. Habits are hard to break, they're hard to overcome. But if only we reflect and we adopt, we internalize this understanding, we can be ba'ei litaher, we'll want to, there's not going to be any sluggishness, there's not going to be any sleepwalking. And in that zchus we should all be zocha to be chozer betshuvah sheleimah and to a gut yohr and ksiva vachasima tova.