Rabbenu Yonah divides his classic sefer Shaarei Teshuva into four parts, into four sections, and he devotes one entire section, albeit the sections are not of equal length, but he devotes one entire section for דרכי סיבות התעוררות לתשובה. What is it in a person's lifetime, what situations, what times of the year, what times of life that can awaken and galvanize a person to do teshuva? Rabbenu Yonah speaks of encountering adversity and suffering, personal adversity and suffering. He speaks of old age with its associated decline and infirmities, hearing mussar from chachamim, studying the mussar in Nach, Aseres Yemei Teshuva, and finally awareness of one's mortality and the frailty of life. Now admittedly the Rambam's Yad Hachazaka is a very different type of work. We generally file Shaarei Teshuva under the heading of Sifrei Mussar, the Rambam's Yad Hachazaka obviously under Sefer Halacha, and one does find a little bit of this question of hissororus l'teshuva in the Rambam. The Rambam quotes the Chazal in Perek Zayin of Hilchos Teshuva of שוב יום אחד לפני מיתתך. The Rambam writes לעולם יראה אדם את עצמו כאילו הוא נוטה למות, a person should always see himself as though he were in a situation where death, rachmana litzlan, might be approaching, v'shema yamus b'shaito, and perhaps, rachmana litzlan, death will be imminent, v'nimtza omeid b'chata'ov, and unless he acts immediately with a sense of urgency, he'll be caught mired in cheit. לפיכך ישוב מחטאו מיד, consequently a person should never delay doing teshuva, a person should always do teshuva immediately. In Hilchos Ta'aniyos the Rambam speaks about a tzibur encountering adversity, but all these are very understated. So let's perhaps focus on a halacha which I can't necessarily justify this question that we have to find this theme dealt with in the Rambam, how a person awakens to teshuva, what is it that galvanizes a person to teshuva, but somehow or other there's a chush that the question is too basic, too fundamental that it doesn't find its answer somewhere in the Rambam's Hilchos Teshuva. In Perek Hei, Hilchos Teshuva, Halacha Beis, the first excerpt that you have in front of you, the Rambam writes: אל יעלה במחשבתך דבר זה שאומרים טפשי אומות העולם ורוב גולמי בני ישראל.
The following error, the following distortion which is put forth by the foolish, ignorant nations of the world and those of Bnei Yisrael who are confused. An error can be due to foolishness, an error can be due to confusion. And what is that error? שהקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על האדם מתחילת ברייתו להיות צדיק או רשע,
that HaKadosh Baruch Hu decrees, it's predetermined whether a person will be righteous or evil. Ein hadavar kein, this is not so, אלא כל אדם ראוי להיות צדיק כמשה רבינו או רשע כירבעם, או חכם או סכל, או רחמן או אכזרי, או כילי או שוע, וכן שאר כל הדעות. וכן שאר כל הדעות ואין מי שיכפהו ולא גוזר עליו,
no one, there is no force, there is no inexorable force that coerces him, there's no one that's decreeing upon him, ולא מי שמושכו לאחד משני הדרכים, no one is is pulling him in either direction, אלא הוא מעצמו ומדעתו, rather he of his own accord, נוטה לאיזה דרך שירצה. He goes in whichever direction, along whichever path he chooses. Hu she-Yirmiyahu amar, this is what Yirmiyahu says in Megillas Eichah: מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. Bad actions, Rachmana litzlan, good actions don't come, are not decreed by Hakadosh Baruch Hu, they're not mipi Elyon, they're not from the one upon high. כלומר אין הבורא גוזר על האדם להיות טוב ולא להיות רע,
the Creator doesn't decree, it's not predetermined whether a person will be good or evil. ve-keivan she-ken, וכיון שכן הוא נמצא זה החוטא הוא הפסיד את עצמו.
So consequently, the sinner is responsible for his own actions. ולפיכך ראוי לו לבכות ולקונן על חטאיו, he should cry, he should lament his sins, ועל מה שעשה לנפשו וגמלה רעה. hu she-kasuv acharaiv, with an exclamation point, it's not an interrogative but an exclamatory: מה יתאונן אדם חי, מה יתאונן אדם חי גבר על חטאיו,
how much should a person bewail and lament his sins? ve-chazar ve-amar, then Yirmiyahu concludes: ho-il ve-reshuseinu be-yadeinu, since we have the capacity, we have the wherewithal, ומדעתנו עשינו כל הרעות, and we knowingly, voluntarily perpetrated all the evil, ראוי לנו לחזור בתשובה, we need to repent, ve-la'azov rish'einu, and to abandon our evil, she-ha-reshus atah be-yadeinu, because we have that ability. hu she-kasuv acharaiv, and this is that last pasuk in the sequence of pesukim that the Rambam is interpreting: נחפשה דרכינו ונחקורה ונשובה עד ה'. The key word here to hear and a little bit appreciate the Rambam's message is what the Rambam tells us that ראוי לו לבכות ולקונן and especially ראוי לנו לחזור בתשובה. The word ra'ui has different shades of meaning, it has different nuances, and let's try be-ezras Hashem to pinpoint its precise meaning, at least these, he used it earlier in the passage but these last two usages of ra'ui lo livkos and especially ראוי לנו לחזור בתשובה. To do so, let's take a look at the next excerpt you have in front of you from Perek Aleph in הלכות דעות הלכה ג. The Rambam is describing how on the spectrum of character traits and dispositions there are extremes and the Rambam says that שתי הקצוות הרחוקות זו מזו בכל דעה ודעה, that the extremes, the ends of the spectrum, einan derech tovah. That's not the derech of tovah, it's not the good, proper, appropriate path, it's not the character trait that a person should cultivate and ואין ראוי לו לאדם ללכת בהן ולא ללמדם לעצמו. Again the same phrase, it's not ra'ui for a person to go along the end of either spectrum. Now in Halachah Hei, the Rambam tells us that there's nothing optional, that this isn't just recommended, but the Rambam tells us that מצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינוניים. We're commanded to go along the middle path. So what then was the sense when he said earlier in Halacha Gimmel that אין ראוי לו לאדם ללכת בהן? Clearly ra'ui doesn't have the connotation of something that's recommended, something that's good. Clearly ra'ui is entirely consistent with it being obligatory. Another indication of how the Rambam at times uses the word ra'ui, if you take a look at the next Halacha we have here from פרק ב' הלכה ג', so the Rambam, as you'll recall, famously gives his two exceptions to the rule of the mida habeinonis. He says that when it comes to ga'ava and when it comes to ka'as, when it comes to arrogance, to haughtiness, and when it comes to anger, so then a person is obligated to go to the other extreme. He's not supposed to chart the middle course; he's supposed to go to the other extreme. V'yaish de'os, writes the Rambam, שאסור לו לאדם לנהוג בהן בבינונית. He shouldn't conduct himself along the middle path, אלא יתרחק מן הקצה האחד עד הקצה האחר. Rather, he should distance himself from one extreme all the way to the other extreme. The first of the two exceptions is v'hu gova lev, and then skip down three lines, vechein haka'as. The second of the two exceptions, anger. Similarly, anger is a מדה רעה היא עד מאד, is a very corrupt, insidious trait, וראוי לאדם שיתרחק ממנה עד הקצה האחר. And again, that same word, that same characterization, it's ra'ui that a person should distance himself to the other end of the spectrum. And this again, clearly in the context of having told us that it's asur to do anything less than that. So clearly what ra'ui connotes within the Rambam is a natural, intuitive, self-evident moral religious obligation. And that's what the Rambam says that even before, back to פרק א' הלכות דעות, even before we come upon the pasuk of v'halachta bidrachav, so we know just mitzad the sechel, the intuition that Hakadosh Baruch Hu provided us, so we know intuitively, naturally, we understand that the extremes are to be avoided and that one is obligated to chart the middle path. Same usage over here. It's asur lo l'adam because it's ra'ui l'hisrachaik because again, it's overwhelmingly self-evident, natural, intuitive moral religious obligation. The same usage, there are... we'll just give one more example. The same usage, lich'ora, you have here in the bottom passage here on the first page, the Rambam's biography of Avraham Avinu. So the Rambam describes that after Avraham Avinu was weaned, already he was precocious already at a young age, so he... his... he was exploring. He realized that the avoda zara approach was wrong. The Rambam describes that after many many years of persistent, relentless searching, so the fourth line from the bottom, ובן ארבעים שנה הכיר אברהם את בוראו. Avraham Avinu was 40 years old when he discovered Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Keivan shehikir v'yada, excuse me, Keivan shehikir v'yada, once he recognized Hakadosh Baruch Hu and knew the truth, החל להשיב תשובות על בני אור כשדים. He began to engage in disputations and began to refute the idolatrous beliefs of the surrounding people in Kasdim. ולערוך דין עמהם ולומר שאין זו דרך האמת שאתם הולכים בה,
that the path that you're on is false. ושיבר הצלמים והחל להודיע לעם שאין ראוי לעבוד אלא לאלוהי העולם ולו ראוי להשתחוות ולהקריב. ולנסך כדי שיכירו כל הברואים הבאים וראוי לאבד ולשבר כל הצורות כדי שלא יטעו בהן כל העם.
Avrom Avinu was able to figure all this out. Avrom Avinu was able as it were to be mechaven to all, all these principles of of the Torah even though he he he wasn't taught because again, they're natural, they're intuitive. So ra'uy. The Rambam uses often in the sense to describe, to characterize an obligation, a moral religious obligation which is natural, which is intuitive. ראוי לנו לחזור בתשובה. ho'il v'rshusenu b'yadenu. We have the capacity. ומדעתנו עשינו כל הרעות and we knowingly, voluntarily sinned. ראוי לנו לחזור בתשובה. The obligation to do tshuva is is something so basic, so natural, so intuitive. If if a person rachmana litzlan is hemorrhaging, if a person rachmana litzlan is in acute pain, it's the natural instinctive intuitive reaction to call the doctor, to call hatzalah rachmana litzlan. He he doesn't need any kind of hisorerus. A person doesn't need to some kind of, he doesn't need to be given incentive, doesn't need any any motivation. The awareness of one's predicament and the understanding that one has the ability to do something about it is what impels, propels a person to do tshuva. It could be that this, this understanding that the obligation to do tshuva is similar to what the way Chazal characterize mishpatim that אלמלא נכתבו דין הוא שיכתבו even if, even if you don't have a pasuk, one knows on one's own the obligation. The famous Gemara in Eruvin of אלמלא ניתנה תורה היינו למדין צניעות מחתול גזל מנמלה ועריות מיונה
that even if we didn't have a Torah, we should, we would have been obligated to derive the principles of tnius, the prohibition of, of theft, the prohibition of arayos from the natural example, the examples that we find in the natural world. Tshuva is such an obligation, so basic, so elemental, so elementary. And yitachen that this would give us an approach to a vexing question. If you take a look in the beginning of the second page, so the Rambam begins Hilchos Tshuva by writing that כל מצוה שבתורה בין עשה בין לא תעשה אם עבר אדם על אחת מהן בין בזדון בין בשגגה כשיעשה תשובה וישוב מחטאו חייב להתוודות לפני האל ברוך הוא.
So the Rambam speaks of tshuva for mitzvos d'oraisa. There's no mention of mitzvos d'rabanan. Now, it's, it's obvious that there is a chiyuv to do tshuva for if rachmana litzlan a person violates something which is d'rabanan, a person also has an obligation to do tshuva and yet there's no mention of that in in this Rambam. Yitachen in light of what we're discussing that that the approach... approach to this question is that a few years ago we discussed the age old question in terms of the Mitzva Viduy, the Mitzva of Teshuva. The Rambam's formulation suggests that the Mitzva Mechudeshes in the Torah, what the Torah instructed us to do is to be Misvadeh, is to articulate the Teshuva. And Itachen that what the Rambam has in mind here is that he doesn't mention Mitzvos Derabbanan because the Rambam's only dealing with that additional obligation of Viduy. And maybe that the Rambam for some reason thinks doesn't pertain to Mitzvos Derabbanan, but the core obligation of a Chiyuv, that's derived from the ראוי לנו לחזור בתשובה, ראוי לאדם לבכות ולהתחנן, Livkos Ulekoneh, that natural היינו למדין צניעות מחתול, the same way we could have derived the principle of modesty from the behavior of a cat and the same way we would know on our own the prohibition against Gezel and Shefichas Damim, against stealing and murder, a person knows on his own the Chiyuv of Teshuva. That's not the new mitzva the Rambam is introducing here. The mitzva the Rambam is introducing here is a Chiyuv Viduy, and maybe that for some reason, that Takeh doesn't pertain to Derabbanan's. It's interesting, in our Al Cheit, so we have an Al Cheit ועל חטאים שאנו חייבים עליהם מכת מרדות. If you take a look in the next excerpt that you have here on page two, in the Rambam's Siddur at the end of Sefer Ahava, so the Rambam you'll take a look, על חטאים שאנו חייבים עליהם חטאת עולה אשם ודאי אשם תלוי עשה לא תעשה שניתק לעשה מיתה בידי שמים כרת מלקות.
Rambam doesn't have an Al Cheit for עונש שחייבים עליהם מכת מרדות. Okay, parenthetical comment. But Lichora this idea that we're discussing, that the notion of Teshuva, the Mitzva of Teshuva, the efficacy of Teshuva is something natural and intuitive would seem at first glance to be contradicted by a very, very famous passage in the Yerushalmi. The last passage that you have here on page two, על כן יורה חטאים בדרך שמורה דרך תשובה. The Pasuk in Tehillim describes Hakadosh Baruch Hu as guiding, instructing sinners along the path. Chazal explain Shemoreh Derech Teshuva that Hakadosh Baruch Hu instructs sinners along the path of Teshuva. שאלו לחכמה חוטא מהו עונשו, what's the fate which awaits a sinner? The question was posed to Chochma, to wisdom. אמרו להם חטאים תרדוף רעה, sinners are going to be pursued by the evil that they've perpetrated. שאלו לנבואה חוטא מהו עונשו, Nevu'ah, prophecy was asked, what's in store for a sinner? אמרו להם הנפש החוטאת היא תמות, a sinner dies. שאלו להקדוש ברוך הוא חוטא מהו עונשו, the question was finally posed to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, what's the fate, what destiny awaits a sinner? אמרו להן יעשה תשובה ויתכפר לו, let him do Teshuva and he'll have atonement. So doesn't this Yerushalmi seem to suggest that the whole idea of Teshuva, the Mitzva of Teshuva, the efficacy of Teshuva is a tremendous Chidush as it were Gizeiras Hakasuv that Hakadosh Baruch Hu allows for Teshuva? So is that consistent with the Rambam's Ra'uy approach, that it's something which is so... It may be that it is. Chokhma in this context signifies wisdom focusing on the human realm. Actions have consequences. One of the basic laws of the natural world: for every action there's an equal and opposite reaction. It's not only a law of physics but it's a law which governs human behavior and human accountability as well. So chokhma said, what's the fate of the sinners? Their chickens are gonna come home to roost. They're gonna suffer because of their sin. Nevuah - the mitzvah was communicated by Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Rashi and Tosafot in Sanhedrin explain: the Gemara has a phrase מלכות במקום מיתה עומדת that when a person gets the onesh of malkus of lashes that really that's in lieu of misa because if a person violates the word of God, so then nevuah says - this was communicated bederekh nevuah from Hakadosh Baruch Hu - a person is violating it הנפש החוטאת היא תמות. What did Hakadosh Baruch Hu answer? First in Tehillim kapitel nun Hakadosh Baruch Hu says אם ארעב לא אמר לך כי לי תבל ומלואה. If I were to get hungry kaveyachol, I wouldn't tell you, I wouldn't need to ask you to help me out, because the entire cosmos belongs to me. And when you bring korbanos, think for a moment האוכל בשר אבירים ודם עתודים אשתה, do I eat, do I consume the flesh of bulls, and do I drink the blood of goats? What's the idea that Dovid Hamelekh is expressing? If you take a look on page three, this is part of the Ramban's discussion of ta'amei hamitzvos. He endorses the Rambam's approach that all mitzvos have reasons, goals. The Rambam struggles with a couple of ma'amarei Chazal which on his reading seem to present a view that mitzvos don't have reasons, and the Rambam concedes that it's a dispute amongst Chazal. And then the Ramban picks up the discussion from there. If you see where the arrow is: אבל אלו ההגדות אשר נזכרו על הרב. Those ma'amarei Chazal which the Rambam found difficult, כפי דעתי עניין אחר להם, they mean something different than the way the Rambam took them. Sheratzo lomar, what Chazal were expressing when they said עושה מידותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים ואינן אלא גזירות,
for instance, when they said that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's mitzvah of sending away the mother bird before taking the chicks, it's not rachamim, but it's a gezeira, it's a decree. What they intended is not that it's a decree that has no reason, but rather רצו לומר שאין התועלת במצוות להקדוש ברוך הוא בעצמו יתעלה אבל התועלת באדם עצמו.
The purpose of the mitzvah doesn't serve Hakadosh Baruch Hu, Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't gain anything from our mitzvos. Hatoyeles, the purpose of the mitzvah be'adam atzmo, is for the person: למנוע ממנו נזק או אמונה רעה או מידה מגונה, to keep him away from harm, to keep him away from some false belief or corrupt character trait or to remember the miracles. ונפלאות הבורא יתברך ולדעת את השם וזהו לצורף בהן v'chen Chazal said לא ניתנו מצוות אלא לצרף בהן את הבריות. It doesn't mean that they have no reason and they're just given as a test, but rather sheyiheyu kechesef tzuruf, it should be as pure silver, ki hatzoref hakesef, one who purifies silver, אין מעשהו בלא טעם, he's not acting without reason, אבל להוציא ממנו כל סיג, it's to remove any impurity. וכן המצוות להוציא מלבינו כל אמונה רעה, so too the mitzvos are oriented towards us, not oriented towards Hakadosh Baruch Hu, they're oriented towards us, להוציא מלבינו כל אמונה רעה ולהודיענו האמת ולזכור תמיד. Again, to uproot from us any false, corrupt belief, to teach us the truth that we should constantly remember the truth, remember Hakadosh Baruch Hu. ולשון זו ההגדה עצמה הוזכר בילמדנו בפרשת זאת החיה. וכי מה איכפת לו להקדוש ברוך הוא בין שוחט בהמה ואוכל או נוחר ואוכל. כלום אתה מועילו או כלום אתה מזיקו?
Do you benefit Hakadosh Baruch Hu if you shecht the animal properly in accordance with hilchos shechita or if you kill it not in accordance with hilchos shechita? Do you confer benefit from him upon him? Do you harm him? ומה איכפת לו בין אוכל טהורות לאוכל טמאות? Is Hakadosh Baruch Hu's status affected by whether we eat kosher species or, chas v'shalom, non-kosher species? Im chachamta chachamta lach, הלא לא ניתנו המצוות אלא לצרף בהן את הבריות. The mitzvos are oriented towards us. שנאמר אמרת ה' אמרות טהורות ונאמר כל אמרת אלוה צרופה.
Hinei meforash b'chan, says the Ramban, שלא באו לומר שאין התועלת אלוה יתעלה שיצטרך לאורה כמחושך מן המנורה ושיצטרך למאכל הקרבנות וריח הקטרת כנראה מפשוטיהם.
It doesn't mean that Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't need the light of the menorah, Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't need the korbanos, he doesn't need the pleasant fragrance of the ketores. אין התועלת לו רק שנדע אנחנו האמת. That's what Dovid Hamelech says also, האוכל בשר אבירים ודם עתודים אשתה, you're not bringing the korbanos for me. It's about you, it's not about me. Let's revisit this question of the Yerushalmi. If I break my neighbor's window, it's intuitive that I should have to pay damages. If I park illegally and I get a ticket, it's also intuitive that whatever remorse I have notwithstanding, whatever resolve about the future notwithstanding, that I should have to pay the ticket. But what about the following scenario? Let's say a person goes to the doctor and the doctor prescribes a certain regimen, a certain diet, a regimen of exercise, and tells him that it's absolutely critical that you follow my advice, it's absolutely critical that you take the following medications, and he doesn't, he doesn't, and he takeh finds himself in a much worse place and position because of that. So against whom did the patient sin? He sinned against the doctor because he ignored the doctor's prescription and the doctor's advice? He sinned in going against what the doctor said, but he sinned not against the doctor, he sinned against himself. then a person should, if he's in a position to be able to make amends and do teshuva. When one sins against oneself, then teshuva becomes intuitive. Sha'alu lachochma as long as one, as long as one asks wisdom viewing things just within the human realm, so teshuva is not intuitive. Even nevuah teshuva is not intuitive. שאלו להקדוש ברוך הוא kavyachol when we view it from the divine realm, when a person sins rachmana litzlan, he sins in going against the word of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, going against devar Hashem, the tzivui Hashem, but he sins against himself. He's not sinning against Hakadosh Baruch Hu. אם רעבתי לא אמר לך כי לי תבל ומלואה האוכל בשר אבירים ודם עתודים אשתה וכי מה יכפת לו להקדוש ברוך הוא,
a person sins against himself. If my, if the person that I wronged ultimately is myself, then teshuva becomes intuitive. Now let's reread that opening passage we read from the Rambam. הוא שירמיהו אמר מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב כלומר אין הבורא גוזר על האדם להיות טוב ולא להיות רע.
Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't decree that a person should be good, he doesn't decree that a person should be evil. וכיון שכן הוא נמצא זה החוטא הוא הפסיד את עצמו.
Right, listen to that emphasis of the Rambam. What happens, what's the fallout from cheit? The fallout from cheit is הוא הפסיד את עצמו. He destroyed himself. Cheit is self-destructive behavior. לפיכך ראוי לו לבכות ולקונן על חטאו, he should cry, he should lament his sins, ועל מה שעשה לנפשו. A person sins by going against the word of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but he sins against himself. על מה שעשה לנפשו וגמלו רעה. I don't have to appease the doctor for ignoring his advice. I didn't do anything to the doctor. I have to settle accounts with myself. There it's intuitive that a person can and should do teshuva. Vechazar ve'amar the Rambam says, הואיל ורשותנו בידנו ומדעתנו עשינו כל הרעות ראוי לנו לחזור בתשובה ולעזוב רשענו שהרשות עתה בידנו, הוא שכתוב אחריו נחפשה דרכינו ונחקורה ונשובה עד השם.
But there's one more element that the Rambam is emphasizing for us here. Lest we think that even though we bear full and sole responsibility for our own actions, but that we're too weighed down by cheit to be able to reverse direction and to be able to do teshuva, says the Rambam no. Whatever negative momentum there might be as a result of cheit, whatever habits, whatever may have become entrenched, all of that notwithstanding. Ha-reshus ata be-yadenu, that capacity to do teshuvah remains unimpaired. The capacity to choose, to chart one's own course, and to ultimately determine one's own destiny, that capacity remains fully, fully intact, formidable challenge of cheit notwithstanding. The Ramban reads the pesukim in this morning's kerias ha-Torah, כי קרוב אליך הדבר מאד בפיך ובלבבך לעשתו, talking about the mitzvah of teshuvah. Ki karov eilecha doesn't necessarily translate as it's easy. There may be something at hand which weighs two pounds, it may weigh fifty pounds. It doesn't necessarily imply that it can be accomplished with ease, but the point is that it's at hand. It's accessible. The goal is attainable. That reshus, that capacity which the Rambam described for us in the beginning of the perek, הרשות לכל אדם נתונה לו, that incredible power and prerogative that a person has, להטות עצמו לדרך טובה ולהיות צדיק או להטות עצמו לדרך רעה ולהיות רשע,
that reshus remains intact and remains unimpaired regardless of whatever cheit rachmana litzlan has accumulated. The hisorerus for teshuvah according to the Rambam just lies in self-awareness. A person has the capacity ממנו לדעת טוב ורע. A person has the capacity to know whether he, she is living truthfully, properly, correctly in all areas or not. A person has that capacity to differentiate, to recognize right and wrong. A person knows that whatever choices he's made were his own for which he bears sole and full responsibility. And thus a person knows that hifsid al nafsho. He knows that the sin has been self-destructive. מה שעשה לנפשו וגמלה רעה. The sin isn't against Hakadosh Baruch Hu, the sin is violating the word of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but the one who suffers from the sin is the person himself. When that combines with the knowledge that a person has the capacity to undo, to reverse that self-inflicted damage, there's no more powerful awakening or arousal to teshuvah than that.