I thought of something in the parsha, it's actually we're reviewing something we discussed in a different context once. Rashi quotes on Bereishis Bara Elokim בתחילה עלה במחשבה לפניו to create the world be'middas hadin and then ראה שאין העולם מתקיים ושיתף עמו מידת הרחמים v'hada d'chsiv ביום עשות ה' אלקים ארץ ושמים. So not just the shem Elokim of middas hadin is mentioned, but the שם הוי"ה of middas harachamim is also mentioned. So the obvious question is what does it mean בתחילה עלה במחשבה לפניו? There's obviously no hava minnas and maskanas by the Ribbono Shel Olam. So what is it that, obviously it's not intended literally, so what is it allegorically that Chazal are trying to convey by saying that בתחילה עלה במחשבה לברא עולם במידת הדין and later the Ribbono Shel Olam changed it? The p'shat is as follows. If the Torah would have just said Bereishis Bara Hashem, not Elokim, so we would have thought that all we're supposed to strive for is to justify ourselves according to the middas harachamim. And that we shouldn't really strive for perfection. V'ha'raya the world wasn't created lefi middas hadin, so there is no notion or expectation or even goal of living according to middas hadin. What does middas hadin mean? Middas hadin means perfection, it means no compromises, no compromises, perfection. So we would have thought that the ideal is that okay we push ourselves but we're not really striving to perfect ourselves. Kam Chazal and say Bereishis Bara Elokim. Bereishis Bara Elokim בתחילה עלה במחשבה לפניו לברא עולם במידת הדין means to tell us that the ideal is, the goal for which we're supposed to strive is that we should be able to stand before the Ribbono Shel Olam and justify ourselves lefi middas hadin, that we're supposed to strive for perfection. We're not supposed to say, oh okay, so I learned, I had a good morning seder, so if I have a free hour in the afternoon, okay, so maicha teise that I should push myself some more. Maicha teise I'm a little bit tired at night so why should I push myself, constantly push myself? Bereishis Bara Hashem ושיתף עמו מידת הרחמים. Comes the Torah and says no, the ideal which Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants for us is that we should strive to live according to middas hadin. We should strive to live according to middas hadin. It's true that the Ribbono Shel Olam will and does judge us with a combination of מידת הרחמים והדין, but that's not something which we're supposed to take into account in our efforts to better ourselves and to perfect ourselves. In our striving, so we have to be guided by Bereishis Bara Elokim. The Ribbono Shel Olam is guided by ביום עשות ה' אלקים ארץ ושמים, but we're supposed to be guided by the fact that Bereishis Bara Elokim and we're supposed to aspire to live and match up to those standards of Bara Elokim of perfection. And the truth is, the truth is... This we discussed once that this idea is also manifest in Aseres Yemei Teshuva. We discussed then what's the reason or what's the remez that initially Rosh Hashanah is a Yom Din, right? And it's din kasha, din kasha. And then later Yom Kippur is a Yom Rachamim. That Rosh Hashanah is din, maybe with a little bit of rachmin badin, but it's primarily din. And only later Yom Kippur is rachamim with din within the rachamim, but the dominant characteristic of the day is rachamim. Because the answer is you can't have a Yom Kippur right away. If you have the Yom Kippur right away, so then your senses, that's all the Ribono Shel Olam asks of us. No, the Ribono Shel Olam asks more of us. Initially the din is Rosh Hashanah. We have to know, we have to know what the middas hadin asks of us, we have to know what to strive for 100% ourselves, that ultimately the Ribono Shel Olam says that yes, I am gomel chesed and ultimately I judge you according to rachamim, but that's not supposed to be what guides you in your striving. So this is a tremendous mussar haskel for us. We go through life constantly making compromises l'chatchila, not just when we have no choice, but l'chatchila we constantly have the sense of oh well, you know, what can I really expect from myself? I can't expect that much from myself. And we all know from experience that if a person doesn't strive for perfection, so then he won't even, not only won't he achieve the perfection, no one does, but he won't even come as close as he could. And it's only when a person feels answerable and accountable to Breishis Bara Elokim that he will fully achieve what he is capable of achieving. So it's very important that a person should never say who am I, what am I, no one really expects anything of me. When a person says bishvili nivra haolam, so it's not an inyan of gaiva or self-centeredness. Bishvili nivra haolam means if the whole world was created for me, so look what must be expected of me. If so much was done for me, bishvili nivra haolam, so for me to justify that, the more that was undertaken on a person's behalf, so the more a person has to respond. If a person earns a larger salary, so he's expected to respond accordingly. Bishvili nivra haolam is meant to instill within us a sense of achrayus for how much we can and should strive to accomplish. And it's a very, very important mussar haskel at every stage in life, during years in yeshiva, afterwards, that we should always, always be striving to perfect ourselves and this mentality of compromise and complacency of okay, so I learned a little bit, so Sunday I have off from work, so I'll learn for an hour, I'll learn for an hour, good, so now I did. No, a person always has to be looking to see how much he can do, how much more he can do in his avodas Hashem, in his tikkun hamiddos, he should always hold himself accountable to a middas hadin, and then the Ribono Shel Olam from His end only holds us accountable to a combination of din and rachamim. I just thought of something from the parsha, a little bit differently than we usually talk about, perhaps a little bit less l'maise perhaps, but to many it's important nevertheless. ויגש אברהם ויאמר האף תספה צדיק עם רשע אולי יש חמישים צדיקים בתוך העיר האף תספה ולא תשא למקום למען חמישים הצדיקים אשר בקרבה חלילה לך מעשות כדבר הזה להמית צדיק עם רשע והיה כצדיק כרשע חלילה לך השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט
So seemingly Avraham Avinu says to the Ribono Shel Olam, Chas v'sholom, how can it be that you השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט? And השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט. So this posuk is sometimes quoted, kimidomeini, erroneously, that it's, that it's very much a mistake, but it's sometimes quoted as saying, I mean, how can, how can Avraham Avinu question what the Ribono Shel Olam is doing? If the Ribono Shel Olam, if what he does is the source of all morality, so how can, by definition, so how can you question what Hakadosh Baruch Hu does? How can you say השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט? What is mishpat and what isn't mishpat is itself determined by the retzon Hashem. So what kind of external standard is Avraham Avinu holding the Ribono Shel Olam to? So it is said, but I don't think correctly, that this is an indication that there's such a thing which is called natural morality. That there are certain, certain moral obligations we have, which are just implicit in nature. And kaveyachol, Avraham Avinu is challenging Hakadosh Baruch Hu that if he won't consent to spare the five cities in the merit of the chamishim tzadikim, that he would be guilty of going against this natural morality. And lichora it sounds like that. It sounds like Avraham Avinu is holding the Ribono Shel Olam to some standard, to some standard. But the emes is that if you just, if you learn through to the end of the parsha, just Chumash with Rashi, so you see that that's not the pshat at all. Avraham Avinu keeps asking until he gets down to אולי ימצאון שם עשרה. And the Ribono Shel Olam says ויאמר לא אשחית בעבור העשרה. So how come Avraham Avinu doesn't continue? He's on a roll here, you know. Everything he says the Ribono Shel Olam agrees to. 50, 40, 30, 20, 10. So keep on going. I mean, it seems to be an eis ratzon. How come he doesn't press onward and ask Hakadosh Baruch Hu even for a lower number of tzadikim? So Rashi says על הפחות לא ביקש. Less than asarah, Avraham Avinu knew that it was a beracha l'vatala. אמר דור המבול היו ח'. Noach u'vanav u'neshav. ולא הצילו על דורם. So I already know from precedent that even when there are eight and with Hakadosh Baruch Hu nine, that that's not enough to save the world. That only the yechidim will be saved in their own merit, but their merit isn't great enough to save the world. So ועל ט' על ידי צירוף לא ביקש. When Avraham Avinu asked for ten, he meant ten with the Ribono Shel Olam, you with them, so nine plus you. And he knew already that eight plus the Ribono Shel Olam wasn't enough. So you see explicitly in Rashi that what Avraham Avinu means when he says השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט means that you're violating your own standard of mishpat, not chas v'sholom that there's any external standard of mishpat to which Avraham Avinu is kaveyachol holding the Ribono Shel Olam accountable. No, that's not the pshat at all. You see the pshat is השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט meaning that you by your standards, by your standards shouldn't, shouldn't this be a zechus? And therefore once Avraham Avinu knew that by Hakadosh Baruch Hu's standards there wasn't enough to be a zechus, by the time he got down to less than ten, so he knew that by the Ribono Shel Olam's standards that's not enough of a zechus to save the city. Veharayah it didn't in the dor hamabul. So mimaila Avraham Avinu stops to ask. So it's clear, clear that the pshat here is השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט means that Avraham Avinu is saying isn't it true, am I not correct in understanding that lefi darkei Hashem chamishim tzadikim should be enough of a zechus? And that's what his tainah was to the Ribono Shel Olam. We all know that the Rambam begins Mishneh Torah with יקוק יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות. The Rav zecher l'vracha had a very interesting observation which I think usually eludes us here. לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון, belief in the Ribono shel Olam who creates and sustains the world. So that's what that's the יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות. Okay. So it's certainly the יסוד היסודות ועמוד האמונה and it's the Amud HaDas. But what's interesting is that the Rambam says it's also Amud HaChachmah, also Amud HaChachmah, meaning that any any chachmah which is not an attempt to discern what the ratzon Hashem is but somehow or other is totally unrelated to the Ribono shel Olam, so there is no such thing, there is no such chachmah. That's what the Rambam says that that belief in the Ribono shel Olam's not just a Yesod HaYesodos, not just Amud HaEmunah, Amud HaBitachon, Amud of everything else, it's also Amud HaChachmah. And that without that there's no real chachmah either. Without that there's no real chachmah either. So that's also the pshat we're saying there can't be there's nothing, nothing exists, nothing exists without the Ribono shel Olam. Ay, the famous Gemara in Eruvin which is discussed that אלמלא ניתנה תורה היינו למדים that even if Torah hadn't been given, so certain moral principles we could have inferred from the briah. We could have inferred tznius mechatul etc., the famous Gemara in Eruvin. So the pshat in that is not because the existence of the briah per se would have mechayiv us, but rather since the Ribono shel Olam created the world and mimmela his ratzon is also imprinted on the briah, so mimmela that's why we could have, the same way the ratzon Hashem which is revealed in the Torah is mechayiv us, so too the ratzon Hashem which would be revealed in the world also would have been mechayiv us. But not that the pshat is that on a totally natural level, without Hakadosh Baruch Hu as the metzaveh היינו למדים צניעות מחתול. No. What it means is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu who's the metzaveh in Torah is also metzaveh through the world, also metzaveh through the world. And even if we hadn't received certain tzivuyim in the Torah, we could have received those tzivuyim through the world. That's what the correct pshat is in that Gemara in Eruvin. And that's the pshat what the Rambam's saying also יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות that there is no no natural chachmah which exists. How can there nothing exists besides the Ribono shel Olam? Nothing, nothing exists. So how can there be any kind of chachmah, any kind of morality, any kind of right and wrong which exists without him either? It can't be. What's this what's the pshat though? It's another interesting... So we say the pshat in the Gemara in Eruvin then is again that that the ratzon Hashem would have been conveyed to us through the briah in terms of tznius and derech eretz, certain other yesodos would have been conveyed to us through the briah, through the briah. Similarly, a similar distinction we know from from Rav Saadia Gaon that mishpatim on the whole are mitzvos and dinim which our sechel dictates, and chukim, that's not the case. Chukim, that's not the case. So here too, even in Rav Saadia Gaon, it doesn't mean that that we would have been chayav to follow our sechel because our sechel means anything, but it means that our sechel was also formed by the Ribono shel Olam and that too would be a way for us to discern what his ratzon is. So it's interesting. There are some in some cases the ratzon Hashem is only known to us through the Torah, meaning that it's something which isn't logically intuitive to us, it's a chok, it's not a mishpat, it isn't something which we find in the briah, the ratzon Hashem is known to us only through the Torah. And in other cases, what Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells us in the Torah, he also tells And we could have derived that tzniut is important even if it hadn't been written in the Torah, he communicated to us this other ways as well. So what's the pshat that in these cases it's redundant as it were that Hakadosh Baruch Hu taught us the same thing twice? What's the significance or is there any significance, not not the why, but is there any what significance? Is there any conclusion? Is there any practical importance to the fact that an issur such as retzicha, so not only do we know it through the Torah but Hakadosh Baruch Hu also communicated to us that our instinct tells us it's wrong, whereas an issur such as shatnez, Hakadosh Baruch Hu only communicated to us through the Torah but he didn't give us an instinct that it's wrong? So lichora, with this question in mind, we can understand the a little bit more of the pshat in the Rambam's famous distinction in Shemonah Perakim. Rambam in Shemonah Perakim quotes the אל תאמר אי אפשי לאכול מאכלות אסורות. A person shouldn't say that I really have no interest in eating ma'achalot assurot, ela efshi ve'efshi. The truth is that mistama it's very tasty and I would like to partake of it but מה אעשה שהריבונו של עולם גזר עלי not to do it. So the Rambam says that the philosophers say no, that a person shouldn't just overcome his yetzer hara, but a person should should that it's a greater ma'alah if he's a chasid mitivo. A person shouldn't just not kill because he's able to stop himself from killing but a person should should internalize the value that he doesn't want to. So are these is the ma'amar chazal and this conventional wisdom, are they terei deshateri or can they be reconciled? So the Rambam says that yes, they can be reconciled and the katuv hashelishi is that there's a difference between mishpatim and chukim. That mishpatim, a person shouldn't say that be'emet I'd like to knock your brains out because you stepped on my toe but מה אעשה שאבינו שבשמים גזר עלי that I shouldn't do it. No, here a person should internalize the value, he should be a chasid mitivo, he should not want to do it, not just that he bends his ratzon to the ratzon Hashem but that his ratzon is the same as the ratzon Hashem, that he doesn't want to do it. Mah she'ein ken when it comes to observing chukim, so then there is no such inyan that a person should say that I find this repulsive. No, the only reason it's repulsive to me, I have no instinct which says that basar bechalav is repulsive, it's just because I've heard the issur in the Torah lo tevashel gedi, so that's why I don't want it, but otherwise it wouldn't be repulsive. So be'emet, this distinction of the Rambam, it really fits beautifully. So then what we commented before that in some instances the ratzon Hashem is known to us in two ways. It's known to us through the Torah and it's also known to us either because Hakadosh Baruch Hu implanted it in the beriah, the Gemara in Eruvin, or he implanted it within us that we have an instinct that thievery and killing is wrong. We have such an instinct and other things Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't. There's nothing in the world that's meramez that we see that's meramez to us that shatnez is no good. We have no instinct against shatnez. We just know it because we know the pasuk in the Torah. The ratzon Hashem is only revealed to us there. So now according to the Rambam, it comes out the significance of that is as follows. Where Hakadosh Baruch Hu revealed it to us not just through the Torah but also that it's a mishpat, that it's something where the instinct he implanted within us also dictates it, so the message he was sending is that these mitzvot we're supposed to observe the way the Rambam said as a chasid mitivo, that these mitzvot, the ideal is not to give tzdakah but to remain a cruel person on the inside, but that a person should become a rachman, rachmanim bnei rachmanim. The and and the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu again indicated that is that's why I'm making clear my ratzon to you not just in the Torah, not just in the Torah but it's in the beriah, it's in the instinct which I'm giving you because here what Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants from us. is not merely that we should do as we're commanded, but we should internalize it. We should internalize it, not just that we give tzedakah, but that we should be rachmanim. Not just that we abstain from retzichah, but that such achzariyus is inconceivable to us, that we should recoil at the thought of it. And that's the significance of the fact that His ratzon is known to us not only through the Torah. Mah shekein bechukim, so there as the Rambam says there is no such ideal. There's no ideal that a person independent of the pasuk in the Torah should have an instinct against shatnes. There's no such ideal. The way kach gazra chochmaso, that the way the issur of shatnes should be observed is different than the way issur gezeilah should be observed. That issur gezeilah should be observed that a person shouldn't have the middah in him that he would want to steal. The issur shatnes should be observed that a person doesn't do it because מה אעשה התורה אסרתה it. It's a beautiful suit. It's a beautiful suit. מה אעשה התורה אסרתה it. I can't do it. Mah shekein and that's the gzeiras hakasuv. That's why some things are mishpatim and some things are chukim, it reflects the fact that how we're supposed to observe these mitzvos and issurim differ. מעניין לעניין באותו עניין. The Rav always used to say, he used to say very often in drashos that unless a person has the, quote, blind absolute obedience which is necessary for chukim, that a person can't observe the mishpatim either. And that even those mitzvos and issurim which seem to us, which seem to us that again, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's having conveyed the ratzon Hashem through our instinct or through the beriah would have been sufficient, so it's not true. And there's no kiyum unless, kiyum in the sense that it won't last, that our observance of mishpatim won't last unless we observe them as chukim as well, as we observe them as chukim as well. And when you look around, the society we live in is just full of so many examples of that. So one, the most basic mishpat is certainly Lo sirtzach. The most basic mishpat is certainly Lo sirtzach. If that were left just as a mishpat, so you see how people can rationalize and how even a mishpat can be undermined and undone by people's rationalizations. First as euthanasia, and then there's abortion, and once you're logically consistent, so what's the difference between a late-term abortion and and killing a helpless infant? So if there's no element of absolute obedience that we observe it as chok as well, so as a mishpat it wouldn't last either. As a mishpat it wouldn't endure unless it had the dimension, unless our observance of it had a dimension of chok as well. And you see it, you see that basically the issur of Lo sirtzach has been has been chipped away at very greatly in contemporary society. Euthanasia happens all the time. It's ma'aseh bechol yom. It's not just when this nivvel in Royal Oak out in Detroit kills people. It happens, it happens ma'aseh bechol yom, but it usually happens with a little bit, a little bit more tact as it were. It happens more covertly, but doctors all over Not euthanasia. This is to make the patient, it's a painkiller. But they know very well that the dosage they're prescribing is one which the patient in his state cannot withstand. So it's sort of done, it's done covertly so it doesn't create the stir and the debate and outrage which a more overt action does. But euthanasia is practiced a lot in our society. Euthanasia is practiced very much in our society. And it's just an illustration of what the Rov always used to talk about, that the Torah's tzivui for mishpatim is not redundant. It's not just that we need to know all the pratim. Rav Saadia Gaon talks about that in Emunos V'Deos, that we wouldn't know all the pratim and pirtei pratim of every mishpat without the Torah. But be'emes, even the basic yesodos of the mishpatim, so you see that people rationalize and people justify, sometimes sincerely, sometimes insincerely out of self-interest, out of self-interest. Clearly a world which has as many problems as ours, a person whose number one priority is to help people kill themselves is, it's certainly not sincere, misplaced rachmanus. But whether sincere or insincere, that's what the Rov always used to emphasize, that without the dimension in our observance, without chukim, unless we observe mishpatim as chukim, so be'emes they wouldn't endure, they wouldn't last even as mishpatim. We're all familiar with the Midrash that says that Rivka, in the events of Parshas Chayei Sarah, was only three years old at the time. Similarly, the Midrash has one view, again Rashi quotes, עקב אשר שמע אברהם בקולי, that אברהם אבינו הכיר את בוראו when he was three years old. So it's obviously, it's something hard to understand, difficult to relate to, and surely it reflects something about the tremendous gap between us and the Avos and Imahos HaKedoshim, and what we're saying is not instead of that. Obviously, when all's said and done, what the Avos, what Avraham Avinu was capable of at age three, what Rivka Imeinu was capable of at age three, is a reflection of the very great and special neshamos which they obviously possessed. But kimdumani that that perspective notwithstanding, that there's another yesod here in Chazal as well, there's another message which Chazal are communicating, and that is that we have, that to recognize the Ribono Shel Olam and to live a life of Torah basically is something instinctive for us. It's not something which has to be and which is a purely intellectual decision based upon reflection, but rather the Ribono Shel Olam implanted within us that instinctively we respond to Torah, instinctively we respond to mitzvos. Now of course that doesn't mean, and it doesn't in the least bit clash with the Rambam's לפי הדעה תהיה האהבה. The instinct should be our impetus for involvement in Torah and mitzvos, but of course we're supposed to make our commitment even more profound, and that requires לפי הדעה תהיה האהבה. But it's very important to recognize that this natural instinct for Torah and mitzvos is something which Clearly, clearly you can't begin to understand or fathom the whole phenomenon of Chazara B'Tshuva which we witness without recognizing this instinct. You take, you take a person with a totally secular upbringing and you sit him down, and in some of the, some of the the places where they engage in Kiruv, so they don't begin talking about Hashkafa. Some of them they sit him down and they learn a Blatt Gemara with them. They learn a Blatt Gemara, they learn Kiddushin or something or other. And intellectually it doesn't really make sense. The truth is, intellectually it doesn't make sense that that experience somehow or other, okay, so if if you learn the Gemara well, so it's very Geshimak and it's very profound, but that that experience that a person should abandon his previous way of life and embrace Torah and Mitzvos can only be understood when you recognize that this instinct for Torah and Mitzvos is something what the Sefarim call this Ahava Tiv'is which the Ribono Shel Olam endowed us with is something which is within each and every Jew. And it's that which accounts for most, if not all of the the Chazara B'Tshuva. But it's relevant to us as well, even if a person was blessed with an upbringing Al Pi Torah, it's relevant for us as well. And that is many people, whether they articulate it and confide in someone else or not, go through a Tkufa where they have questions and doubts. And they begin to wonder whether my whole life I've been doing things just because I was taught, and do I really understand, do I really believe, and all of a sudden before they know it they're, they're drowning in Sfeikos. And a lot of people undergo that experience, and it's a very frightening one and it's a very, can be very overwhelming. One thing which we have to bear in mind at such a moment is that no matter what questions all of a sudden arise, no matter what we, we can't seem to make sense of, a person has to continue not just davening the way he used to daven, a person has to daven even with more Kavana, even with more Hislahavus, even with more enthusiasm, because even if a person for some reason intellectually loses his bearings and all of a sudden feels totally inarticulate and inadequate in explaining, but that instinct is still there, that primal instinct which the Ribono Shel Olam gave us to point us in the right direction how to spend our life, that instinct is always there. And very often if a person will just in such a moment of crisis, a person will not Chas V'Shalom say well since I'm not sure, so am I really being honest with myself at doing things, no, go ahead, continue davening. You'll never, it doesn't, it's not that you're trying to ignore your questions, it's not that you're trying to silence your questions or censor your questions, but the point is that if a person will only nourish this instinct, so the questions may or may not be answered, but there's a world of difference between knowing for a fact that what the Torah says is true but I don't understand it, and between wondering Chas V'Shalom and the presence of this instinct, again most dramatically evidenced in the cases of the Avos and the Imahos, of this instinct which a person has to recognize the Ribono Shel Olam and to follow his Torah, so at all times and especially at a time when a person may be confronted with a personal crisis, that instinct has to be nourished. At the beginning of, of his essay, Lonely Man of Faith, so the Rav writes that he's not, he's not bothered with questions of age of the world. And evolution and biblical criticism and that's not what he's going to discuss in in this essay. So what what does he mean there? I don't think that he I don't think that he was hinting that he knows all the answers. I don't think so. I don't think so. What he was saying is that if a person knows because he experiences Torah and he nourishes that instinct, a person just knows just so directly and experiences so immediately the truth of Torah, so wonderful, zol zain that a person will go and read all the books of biblical criticism that he wants and he'll find the he'll find the question that he has no answer to. The question isn't the question doesn't bother him. As a matter of fact, it might even totally bore him. It might even totally bore him because okay, so I so I don't understand why why such and such. I don't understand how to account for all the all the evidence which scientists say they have for evolution. Okay, good. So maybe I do, maybe I don't know. So let it be that I don't know. But if a person has experienced the truth of Torah and again by nourishing that instinct, that primal instinct which we have, we all can experience, so then it will always be in the class of okay, it's something intellectually I don't know, but it's not something which in the least bit mitigates my experience of the truth of Torah and the truth of the way of life of Torah. So none of us are pure enough that we're totally dominated by that instinct, the way Avraham Avinu was, the way Rivka Imeinu was, but we all have that instinct. We're all blessed with that, we're all endowed with that. The Ribono Shel Olam didn't just throw us into the world, into a maze and tell us try to figure out the way. He gave us a tracking system, and part of that tracking system is this instinct. And it's therefore very important at every stage of our life, and befrat if a person ever feels troubled, that we constantly nourish that instinct, and bizchus that the Ribono Shel Olam should be mekayem for us always הבא ליטהר מסייעין אותו.