Regular Thursday's shiur. The Gemara we had just now at the end of אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו, אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו
is a prime example of how there are certain preconditions for understanding Torah properly. And the danger for entirely possibly innocent misunderstanding when a person studies Torah but isn't acclimated or oriented to the way of Torah thinking, to Halakhic thinking, so you can end up simply falsifying what it says in Gemara, what it says in Gedolim. And our Gemara today is a prime example of that. Just to amplify with a case which is very timely. Much has been made of the fact that although the Rav zichrono l'vracha always, without exception, opposed the women's tefillah groups, so much has been made of the fact for some reason which escapes me, sometimes when people came to ask him about the women's tefillah groups, so he said, "No, absolutely not. You shouldn't do it." For some reason, the conversation didn't end at that point and it continued, "But Rebbe, is it assur? Is it really assur?" And the truth is that the Rav was reluctant and at times even refused to say assur. He just said, "I told you not to do it. You shouldn't do it." So people infer, well, obviously, since the Rav was reluctant and at times even refused to use the term assur, so apparently he really thought that me'ikar hadin it was mutar and me'ikar hadin it's not wrong, ela mai, so why did he say not to do it? Because it was his non-binding suggestion for public policy which they respectfully declined to follow. And the emes is when you hear it at first, when you hear it at first, so you think, well, I don't know, I mean, the Rav was reluctant to use the word assur. But ela mai, ela mai if a person is a little bit more attuned to leshonos in Chazal, to categories, both conceptual and juridical categories within Chazal, so then you understand that Chazal, when Chazal wanted to classify something and clarify whether or not it was appropriate or legitimate, so Chazal didn't speak in only two categories of mutar and assur. There were many, many categories, some of them have subtle differences, in between mutar and assur. And the category of אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו is a prime example of that. So the question is what exactly does אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו mean? That it's still, that it's mutar but it's not so nice, you won't get shishi, you won't get the maftir Yonah for it? What exactly does אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו imply? What does it translate into halacha l'maaseh? So if you take a look at the sugya hacha in the sugya of mechusrei amana where the Gemara says that even though there's no kinyan devarim and therefore if I say I'm going to give you a present, so it's certainly not binding and you can't be motzi the matanah, but nevertheless Rabbi Yochanan says יש בהם משום מחוסרי אמנה and אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו. Later the Gemara has a stirah that Rabbi Yochanan himself. So what does the Gemara answer? The Gemara answers no. One is talking about matana mu’et, one is talking about matana meruba. Matana meruba, if I told you oh come up to me after shiur and I’m going to give you $10,000, so you know I’m bluffing. If I say come up to me after shiur and I’ll give you a quarter, so you think, all right, he’s not that cheap, maybe he’ll give us a quarter. So you think, so samcha da’ata, maybe, maybe I’m going to deliver. But the matana meruba you know that I’m not going to give. So therefore there was no, there’s no mechusarei amana, and therefore it wasn’t be-chlal אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו. So the Gemara says meforash. The Gemara says meforash that אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו does not mean mutar but but there’s a non-binding suggestion for the realm of public policy that it’s that it’s inadvisable. The Gemara says meforash that if it’s אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו, it doesn’t translate into mutar. Or in in in English, in simple terms, there is clearly a category in Chazal which is wrong. Wrong, halachically wrong, unequivocally, absolutely wrong, but for whatever reason, and it depends, it’s not so hard to figure out why, but it depends for certain reasons, nevertheless Chazal will not label it with assur. They don’t put the label of assur on it. It’s it’s it’s different, and it’s labeled as אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו. But if you take a look in in Chazal in mem ches, mem tes, so it’s clear, it’s clear that אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו is at odds, is at odds with saying mutar. Is at odds with saying mutar. We had it also, we had it earlier this year also. If you if you look at the cases Rav mangid. Rav mangid. So what in what instances was Rav mangid? What was he mangid? If you look at them, in virtually all of them, you look them up in the Rambam, the majority of cases the Rambam doesn’t say these things are assur to do. Either he says ein osin kein, or in some cases he just says that if you do it, so then makin oso. Makin oso. So Rav mangid אמאן דמקדש בביאה and mekadesh belo shiduchin and mekadesh be-shuk. Rav mangid. So if if people would have come to Rav and they would have said to him, Rebbi, is it assur? Is it assur? He wouldn’t have said assur. He wouldn’t have used that word, because there are categories in halacha. Not everything is mutar or assur. That’s not the only, those aren’t the only two categories in halacha. There’s a whole spectrum of categories. And there are things which are clearly halachically, unequivocally, absolutely wrong, but which nevertheless Chazal don’t call assur. Rav mangid in these cases it’s clear, it’s clear. The Rambam doesn’t say that it’s אסור לקדש בלא שידוכין. That that if you didn't get engaged first, that you can’t be mekadesh. It doesn’t say it. But it’s wrong. And aderaba, what you see in Chazal is that sometimes Chazal responded even more vigorously to these cases which were wrong but don’t have the label assur than they do than they did to things which were outright assur. If you’ll check the cases, if you’ll check the cases of layet ala, you’ll see the same thing. That many of the cases of layet ala, so layet ala, I don’t know, is not such a tolerant thing to do. What do you mean layet ala? So Rav Chisda, Rav Chisda cursed. Who did he curse? Who did Rav Chisda curse? Who did he curse? Rav Chisda cursed someone who when it was time to say Kriyat Shema was running to wash his hands, netilat yadayim. That’s who Rav Chisda cursed. And Abaye in one context, this doesn’t work in every case of layet ala, doesn’t work in every case, but it works in many of them. Who did Abaye curse? Who got Abaye’s goat? Abaye used to curse man de-matsli havi’einu. So I don’t know. What do you mean cursed? Just say it’s assur. Well it’s not a nice thing to layet ala, just say that it’s assur. So the Torah says, no, he couldn’t have said it was assur. These things taka technically are not assur, but they’re wrong. They’re wrong. And if anything, you see that Chazal responded to these things more vigorously and with sharper condemnation than things which were simply wrong. And perhaps, I think it’s easy to understand, because the the risk and the dimension of distortion was so much greater. When you do something which is labeled assur, everyone knows it’s assur. Okay, everyone knows it’s assur and they know that I’m no good. That I’m no good. But if I do something which is not labeled assur but is halachically wrong, but is halachically wrong, so then the danger of distortion is much greater. And I think Chazal recognized that and that's why they responded so vigorously in these kinds of cases. Most of the cases of Rav mangid, the Rambam doesn't say they're assur. And most of and many of the cases of Lati Alah, it's very difficult to say that it's assur. Very difficult to say that it's assur. It's assur to daven Havineinu? I don't know if it's assur to daven Havineinu when you can say a Tefillas Shemoneh Esrei, but it's wrong. It's wrong. So there's a very great danger if a person parachutes in to a certain sugya within Halacha. There's a particular topic in Halacha which interests me. So I go ahead and I research that topic in Halacha. And I say okay good, so I don't profess to be an expert on other areas of Halacha. I don't profess to know anything else but I'm going to research this and you know now with the Bar Ilan database, so then it's very easy to track down everything you need to know. And then I'll work through this and I'll sift through this and then I'll be an expert. But it doesn't work that way because you can't begin to know how to understand or how to interpret all the data which the Bar Ilan computer base can give us if a person is not attuned to what the halachic categories are and what they represent and what the halachic thinking is and if a person is not able to think the same way. And a case in point are the distortions which abound on the Rav's position here because he was hesitant to say the word assur. And at times he didn't want to say assur, he didn't want to say assur. And he said no, you want to contrast assur and mutar, it's mutar, it's mutar. But I'm telling you not to do it, but I'm telling you not to do it. And it's just an injustice and a falsification to say that what that means is that he held that it was really mutar. No, what that means is that the Rav knew, that the Rav knew that there are different categories and some things are wrong but Chazal didn't call them assur. I don't if Rav, I'm willing to guarantee you that if someone would have gone to Rav and would have had the same approach and would have said, but Rebbe, is it assur to be mekadesh belo shidduchin? Is it assur to be mekadesh belo shidduchin? So I'm willing to guarantee you that Rav would have said no. But I'm telling you not to do it, but it's wrong. And the Rav was saying the same thing. Is it assur? No, I'm not telling you it's assur. You want to contrast assur and mutar, so you call it mutar. If you're going to contrast assur and mutar, I can't tell you it's assur. If the only alternative in the lexicon to assur is mutar, so then I gotta tell you it's mutar. But I'm telling you it's wrong, it's wrong. And if you look once you're sensitive to this you'll see this all over Shulchan Aruch. You'll see this all over Shulchan Aruch. And if you're going to say that anything Chazal don't use assur but use clear terms which are wrong, so you're going to have to throw away a large percentage of Shas and Rambam and Shulchan Aruch. And the Gemara of אין רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו is a prime example. ואתה אם נא מצאתי חן בעיניך הודעני נא את דרכך ואדעך למען אמצא חן בעיניך וראה כי עמך הגוי הזה.
Ribbono Shel Olam tells him גם את הדבר הזה אשר דברת אעשה כי מצאת חן בעיני ואדעך בשם.
So Moshe Rabbeinu's first request is הודעני נא את דרכך. Then Moshe Rabbeinu has a second request of הראני נא את כבודך. This the Ribbono Shel Olam tells him is לא תוכל לראות את פני כי לא יראני האדם וחי. וראית את אחרי ופני לא יראו.
So what were the two requests here which Moshe Rabbeinu made of the Ribbono Shel Olam? The first one was granted, the second one was denied. So the Rambam explains as follows. The first הודעני נא את דרכך so Moshe Rabbeinu wanted to understand as much as is humanly possible the actional attributes of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. How we perceive Hakadosh Baruch Hu as he acts, as he interacts with us in the world. Hakadosh Baruch Hu's actional attributes. הודעני נא את דרכך. Let me understand the darkei... And that Ribbono Shel Olam told them גם את הדבר הזה אשר דברת אעשה. But then Moshe Rabbeinu said Hareini na kevodecha. Moshe Rabbeinu wanted to understand the essential attributes of the Ribbono Shel Olam. Wanted to understand who the Ribbono Shel Olam is, not just what the Ribbono Shel Olam does, but the essential attributes of who the Ribbono Shel Olam is. And the Ribbono Shel Olam told him that that's beyond human comprehension. But that request could not be fulfilled because that's beyond human comprehension. The Rambam says that be-emes this is a Gemara in Berachos. The Gemara says ההוא דנחית קמיה דרבי חנינא, I forget the name of the Amora, and he was ma'arich, הגדול הגיבור והנורא והעיזוז והאדיר etc. etc. And then he was when he finished, for whatever reason he didn't interrupt him, that's stama question in pshat in the Gemara, why didn't Rabbi Chanina, whoever it was, interrupt. He didn't interrupt him. And when he finished, so then he rebuked him and says סיימתינהו לכולהו שבחי דמרך. And were it and even Hagadol Hagibbor V'hanora which we say that אלמלא דאמרינהו משה רבנו באורייתא ואתו אנשי כנסת הגדולה ותקנינהו
we couldn't say that either. So the obvious question is I don't understand, הגדול הגיבור והנורא אל עליון, we don't stop there. גומל חסדים טובים וקונה הכל וזוכר חסדי אבות ומביא גואל לבני בניהם עוזר ומושיע ומגן.
Why are these things any more acceptable and why was what the talmid who was serving as the shliach tzibbur doing any more objectionable than what we say. So the Rambam says that's exactly the pshat. When you say Gadol Gibbor V'nora so you're claiming to describe who Hakadosh Baruch Hu is, not just what He does and how we perceive Him through His actions, but we claim to be describing what who Hakadosh Baruch Hu actually is. And that he told him were it not for the fact that Moshe Rabbeinu was commanded to write this down in the Torah and were it not for the fact that the Anshei Knesset HaGedolah then gave us license to incorporate it into our tefillah we couldn't even use these apparently essential attributes even. But you certainly can't embellish upon them. Lecha dumiyah tehilla. On the other hand, the actional attributes, so that we are allowed and that's exactly what the difference is. The Rambam says that be-emes this distinction is really hinted at in that Gemara in Berachos. So this is what gives rise to the what's known as the Rambam's theory of negative attributes that we don't really speak positively about Hakadosh Baruch Hu because we can't define who Hakadosh Baruch Hu is, that's beyond our comprehension. But we say that we know אינו גוף ולא ישיגוהו משיגי הגוף, but we can't really define who He is because that's beyond our comprehension. That's beyond our comprehension to define Hakadosh Baruch Hu. We can only define Him negatively, to say what He's not. But le-chora what the Rambam says in this context underlines another very important statement of the Rambam as well. I don't think the Rambam associates the two, but le-chora it's the same approach. And that is, the Rambam writes that if a person asks the question, why was the world created? Why did Hakadosh Baruch Hu create the world? So the Rambam says the only answer to that can be lema'an retzono. That it was His will to do so and we can't say anything more. We can't say anything more than that. We don't know more than that, we can't say anything more than that. It was lema'an retzono. Others say no, others give more exact and what would seem to be more insightful reasons. Some say that mi-midat ha-tov le-heitiv. That a person who is, that someone who is intrinsically, inherently good wants to, it's his midah lehaitiv la'acherim to bestow goodness on to others. The Rav, Rav used to tell the story how Reb Chaim was once waiting to meet someone and was flipping through a Sefer and he came across this discussion about why the world was created and it said that mimidahs hatov lehaitiv for such a reason and Chaim said it's wrong, but the pshat is like the Rambam says in Moreh Nevuchim that it's l'man ratzono because of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's inscrutable will. Question is, why was the Rambam and Reb Chaim equally so, why were they so adamant about insisting that all we can say is l'man ratzono? So the Rambam devoted many many perakim to Taamei Mitzvos. Hakadosh Baruch Hu said don't do X, Y, and Z. So there the Rambam entertains the question of well why did Hakadosh Baruch Hu tell us not to do it? And the Rambam has a whole whole system of Taamei Mitzvos, which is... so why is this question, why do we respond to this question just by saying l'man ratzono whereas we do presume to give reasons for the mitzvos, Taamei Mitzvos? So l'ichora the answer is as follows. When you give Taamei Mitzvos, you're not really giving any ultimate answers. You're not really giving ultimate answers. If a person discusses why there's tzedakah, if a person discusses why, as the Rambam does, why there's an issur shaatnez, why there's an issur shaatnez, so you're not giving an ultimate answer. What you're basically doing is you're saying that Hakadosh Baruch Hu commanded us to give tzedakah because Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants us to feel compassion for other people or because Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants us to recognize that really what we have doesn't belong to us anyway and it really comes from Him, etc. etc. But when you stop and think about it, none of those are ultimate answers. You're just correlating one tzivui of Hakadosh Baruch Hu with some other value which Hakadosh Baruch Hu has established. You're not claiming to give an ultimate answer. You're not claiming to give an ultimate answer. And therefore that is legitimate to try to organize mitzvos and to try to understand what it is Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants us to get out of the mitzvah. So that is not only legitimate but is very important. When you ask the question why did the Ribbono Shel Olam create the world, so then you would be claiming to give an ultimate answer. And the ultimate answer you would be claiming to give is you'd be somehow defining Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And that's what it says in this week's Parsha לא תוכל לראות את פני that that is beyond us. That's why the Rambam, even though the Rambam analyzed all mitzvos and gave Taamei Mitzvos for all mitzvos, but you can't give taamim for why the world was created because the very minute you say something like mimidahs hatov lehaitiv so that means that we can at least partially define the Ribbono Shel Olam and that you can't do. Again, we know what His actional attributes are of מה הוא רחום מה הוא חנון etc. but we can't presume to define who or what Hakadosh Baruch Hu is. I think that what we were discussing underlies margla b'fumei d'Rav. The Rav always used to say that we can ask the question of what but you can't ask the question of why. Because ultimately there is no answer to why, because ultimately that would mean that you would be able to fully understand the Ribbono Shel Olam. since none of us can do. So there are no ultimate answers to the question why. So the question which a person always has to ask and which is always supposed to guide us, whether it's when we're studying Torah, when we're studying halakha, is not why, but rather what. What is the Torah telling us, what is HaKadosh Baruch Hu communicating to us? The why we can never satisfactorily answer. We can push it back a few notches. We can say why this mitzvah because HaKadosh Baruch Hu wants this. But that doesn't give an ultimate answer to the why question. The why question is not a valid question because we're simply unable to understand to that depth what HaKadosh Baruch Hu does. And it's a very, if a person internalizes that, so it should generate in a person a sense of anavah, a sense of humility. A person doesn't approach Torah asking why, a person doesn't approach Torah judgmentally, a person doesn't approach Torah with his own norms and values and then try to see well how does Torah answer to it? A person begins, the only question you have is what. What is the Torah teaching us, what is the Torah's conception of what's right and what's wrong, and what is the Torah's assignment for me, for you, for each of us? A person can't, a person can't ask the why question of well why, and I don't think that's right and I don't know, that's not a valid question, that's beyond us. And it's very, very important that when we approach Torah, it should not be with a why, it should not be that the Torah has to somehow or other answer to our values, and the Torah has to measure up to our standards, but we have to approach Torah asking what. And we have to try to construct our standards and our values from what's the Torah telling us. Not coming with certain preconceived notions of this is right, this is wrong, now why should the Torah say differently? So that's a wrong approach, that's a very, very wrong approach. A person has to come and say what does the Torah say and what kind of system of religion and ethics and morality is the Torah teaching and is the Torah dictating? And then mimaileh I see that the, that this is the right path, that this is the right path. But a person can't come with a why, with his own norms, with his own values questioning. A person has to come with what does the Torah want from each of us and we have to try to implement that as best as possible. Problems and at times the problems are very great and overwhelming and frustrating and at those times we always have to come back to this pasuk. We always remind ourselves in our personal lives collectively in the life of Klal Yisrael of the moments of וירא ישראל את היד הגדולה and that will then enable us to proceed with vaya'aminu ba'Hashem as well. I want to discuss at the beginning of this week's parsha a little bit inyanei of Shabbos. I think we're reviewing something we once discussed in a different context. ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה and then uvayom hashevii Shabbos. So in this context the Torah says ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה, the Torah doesn't say ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה. The Torah formulates it in a passive. So what's the significance of that fact? So l'khora as follows. When a person is shoveis m'melacha on Shabbos. The emunah which he professes is that it's not his efforts which determine his fate in the world and that his sustenance and his livelihood don't result directly from his efforts but rather because the Ribbono Shel Olam provides us with what we need. The Ribbono Shel Olam chooses to work through natural channels, so mimaila we're called upon to make a hishtadlus to support ourselves vechulu. But we should never make the mistake of believing that there's a direct immediate cause and effect between what we do and what we earn, what we gain. And the way a Jew constantly professes this emunah is that on Shabbos he withdraws. On Shabbos he withdraws and nevertheless we see that a Jew continues to live and he doesn't follow up on his business interests and nevertheless a Jew does it knowing full well that his livelihood is not going to be compromised. We say in L'cha Dodi and kayaduah, L'cha Dodi is all al pi Torah, nigla, nistara, that לקראת שבת לכו ונלכה כי היא מקור הברכה. That Shabbos is the mekor habracha and that b'emes the source and the wellspring for bracha is not the hishtadlus which a person does all week but rather is the bracha ויברך אלקים את יום השביעי ויקדש אתו, so part of the bracha of Yom HaShvii is that Shabbos is really the mekor habracha for the rest of the week. So the true relationship between Shabbos and Sheshes Yimei HaMaaseh is inverted from that which we think. We think that well if you earn enough money during the six days you can afford to take the seventh day off and in truth the Torah says ויברך אלקים את יום השביעי ויקדש אתו that the relationship is inverted, that it's Shabbos which is the mekor habracha for the Sheshes Yimei HaMaaseh. And it's because of Shabbos that during Sheshes Yimei HaMaaseh so Hakadosh Baruch Hu allows us and channels to us what we need. But really the source for it is the bracha of Yom HaShabbos. So mimaila that's what the Torah here is underscoring ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה. If a person truly understands what Shabbos represents and truly appreciates the relationship between Shabbos and Sheshes Yimei HaMaaseh, so then a person understands that it's not really ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה. It's not that you're doing the melacha all six days and that you are controlling your fate and that you are determining your own destiny. But b'emes a person who keeps Shabbos, a person who is a shomer Shabbos, so he realizes that all week it's ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה, that the work is just being done and that what results from the work is coming from the Ribbono Shel Olam. It's not something a person can attribute to himself. And that's what the Torah is saying that an authentic full fledged shmiras Shabbos expresses itself also in a person's attitude during the Sheshes Yimei HaMaaseh as well and that a person should have the understanding and the awareness that all week it's not ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה. It's not that he is again responsible in a direct cause and effect for what's happening but it's ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה. What he's doing is only hishtadlus and then the melacha is done, is completed and perfected because of the Siyata Dishmaya because the Ribbono Shel Olam gives it to him as a present. And that's the pshat ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה that only with that attitude is it consistent with. A true and genuine shmiras Shabbos. Because once a person realizes that even his sheishes yemei hama'aseh, all the melacha that he did was really te'aseh, was really being done by the Ribbono Shel Olam, then he can truly have a יום השביעי שבת לה' אלקיך. Then it's a Shabbos which is kodesh. Then he can truly rest because he's not worried about what he didn't get done or what he has to do next week, because it's all in the hands of the Ribbono Shel Olam. And that is the yesod, that is the ikkar of shmiras Shabbos. And that's why the Gemara says, and Chazal say, כל המשמר שבת כהלכתו אפילו עובד עבודה זרה כדור אנוש מוחלין לו.
Why? What's the connection between shmiras Shabbos and avodah zarah? Because avodah zarah is the belief that there's some other power in the world other than the Ribbono Shel Olam. And shmiras Shabbos, the way we've explained it, is the ultimate bitul of that idea. It's the ultimate recognition that there is no other power, ein od milvado. And therefore, when a person keeps Shabbos properly, he is mevater, he is mevatel any shemetz of avodah zarah that he might have had. And that's why it's such a powerful mitzvah. That's why it's the os, it's the sign between Hashem and Bnei Yisrael.