Transcript

I'm looking at Parashat Vayera a little bit differently than what we usually talk about, perhaps a little bit less not as much l'ma'aseh perhaps, but to my mind it's important nevertheless.

ויגש אברהם ויאמר האף תספה צדיק עם רשע. אולי יש חמישים צדיקים בתוך העיר האף תספה ולא תשא למקום למען חמישים הצדיקים אשר בקרבה. חלילה לך מעשות כדבר הזה להמית צדיק עם רשע והיה כצדיק כרשע חלילה לך השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט.

So seemingly Avraham Avinu says to the Ribono Shel Olam chas v'shalom how can it be that you

השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט. השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט.

So this pasuk is sometimes quoted k'dimani erroneously, that it's, that it's very much a mistake, but it's sometimes quoted as saying, I mean how can how can Avraham Avinu question what the Ribono Shel Olam is doing. If the Ribono Shel Olam, if what he does is the source of all morality, so how can by definition, so how can you question what HaKadosh Baruch Hu does. How can you say השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט. What is mishpat and what isn't mishpat is itself determined by the ratzon Hashem. So what kind of external standard is Avraham Avinu holding the Ribono Shel Olam to. So it is said, but I don't think correctly, that this is an indication that there's such a thing which is called natural morality. That there are certain certain moral obligations we have which are just implicit in nature, and kavyachol Avraham Avinu is challenging HaKadosh Baruch Hu that if he won't consent to spare the five cities in the merit of the chamishim tzaddikim, that he would be guilty of going against this natural morality. And l'chora it sounds like that. It sounds like Avraham Avinu is holding the Ribono Shel Olam to some standard, to some standard. But the emmes is that if you just, if you learn through to the end of the parsha, just Chumash with Rashi, so you see that that's not the pshat at all. Avraham Avinu keeps asking until he gets down to אולי ימצאון שם עשרה. And the Ribono Shel Olam says ויאמר לא אשחית בעבור העשרה. So how come Avraham Avinu doesn't continue, he's on a roll here, I mean everything he says the Ribono Shel Olam agrees to. 50, 40, 30, 20, 10, so keep on going. I mean it seems to be an eis ratzon. How come he doesn't press onward and ask HaKadosh Baruch Hu even for a lower number of tzaddikim. So Rashi says על הפחות לא ביקש. Less than asarah Avraham Avinu knew that it was a bracha l'vatalah.

אמר דור המבול היו ח' נח ובניו ונשיהם ולא הצילו על דורם.

So I already know from precedent that even when there are eight and with HaKadosh Baruch Hu nine, that that's not enough to save the world. That only the yechidim will be saved in their own merit, but their merit isn't great enough to save the world. ועל תשעה על ידי צירוף כלל לא ביקש. When Avraham Avinu asked for ten, he meant ten with the Ribono Shel Olam, you with them, so nine plus you. And he knew already that eight plus the Ribono Shel Olam wasn't enough. So you see explicitly in Rashi that what Avraham Avinu means when he says השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט means that you're violating your own standard of mishpat, not chas v'shalom that there's any external standard of mishpat to which Avraham Avinu is kavyachol holding the Ribono Shel Olam accountable. By your standards, by your standards, shouldn't shouldn't this be a zechus, and therefore once Avraham Avinu knew that by Hakadosh Baruch Hu's standards there wasn't enough to be a zechus, by the time he got down to less than ten, so he knew that that by the Ribbono Shel Olam's standards that's not enough of a zechus to save the city, and v'haraya it didn't in the dor hamabul. So mimela Avraham Avinu stops to ask. So it's clear, clear that the pshat, that the pshat here is השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט, means that Avraham Avinu is saying isn't it true, am I not correct in understanding that לפי דרכי השם חמישים צדיקים should be enough of a zechus, and that's what his taina was to the Ribbono Shel Olam. We all know that the Rambam begins Mishneh Torah with Yud-Kay-Vav-Kay, יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות. The Rav zichrono l'vracha had a very interesting observation, which I think usually eludes us here: לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון, belief in the Ribbono Shel Olam who creates and sustains the world. So that's what, that's the יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות. Okay, so it's certainly the יסוד היסודות ועמוד האמונה and it's the amud hadas, but what's interesting is that the Rambam says it's also amud hachachmos, also amud hachachmos, meaning that any, any chachma which is not an attempt to discern what the ratzon Hashem is, that somehow or other is totally unrelated to the Ribbono Shel Olam, so there is no such thing, there is no such chachma. That's what the Rambam says, that that belief in the Ribbono Shel Olam is not just a yesod hayesodos, not just amud haemunah, amud habitachon, amud of everything else, it's also amud hachachma, and that without that there's no real chachma either, without that there's no real chachma either. So that's also the pshat what we're saying: there can't be, there's nothing, nothing exists, nothing exists without the Ribbono Shel Olam. Aye, the famous Gemara in Eiruvin which is discussed, that אלמלא ניתנה תורה היינו למדים that even if Torah hadn't been given, so certain moral principles we could have inferred from the briah. We could have inferred tzniyos from a chasul, etc., the famous Gemara in Eiruvin. So the pshat in that is not because the existence of the briah per se would have been mechayev us, but rather since the Ribbono Shel Olam created the world, and mimela his ratzon is also imprinted on the briah, so mimela that's why we could have, the same way we, the same way the ratzon Hashem which is revealed in the Torah is mechayev us, so too the ratzon Hashem which would be revealed in the world also would have been mechayev us. But not that the pshat is that on a totally natural level without Hakadosh Baruch Hu as the metzaveh, היינו למדים צניעות מחתול. No, what it means is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu who's the metzaveh in Torah is also metzaveh through the world, also metzaveh through the world. And even if we hadn't received certain tzivuyim in the Torah, we could have received those tzivuyim through the world. That's what the correct pshat is in that Gemara in Eiruvin. And that's the pshat what the Rambam is saying also: יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות, that there is no, no natural chachma which exists. How can there—nothing exists besides the Ribbono Shel Olam. Nothing, nothing exists. So how can there be any kind of chachma, any kind of morality, any kind of right and wrong which exists without him either? It can't be. What's this—what's the pshat though? Here's another interesting... so we say the pshat in the Gemara in Eiruvin then is again that that the ratzon Hashem would have been conveyed to us through the briah in terms of tzniyos and derech eretz, certain other yesodos would have been conveyed to us. Similarly, a similar distinction we know from Rav Saadia Gaon that mishpatim on the whole are mitzvos and dinim which our seichel dictates and chukim that's not the case, chukim that's not the case. So here too, even in Rav Saadia Gaon, it doesn't mean that we would have been chayav to follow our seichel because our seichel means anything, but it means that our seichel was also formed by the Ribono Shel Olam and that too would be a way for us to discern what his ratzon is. So it's interesting, there are some in some cases the ratzon Hashem is only known to us through the Torah, meaning that it's something which isn't logically intuitive to us, it's a chok, it's not a mishpat, it isn't something which we find in the bria. The ratzon Hashem is known to us only through the Torah. And in other cases what Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells us in the Torah he also tells us through other means. He implanted within us an instinct that that murder is wrong and that stealing is wrong and he and we could have derived that tznius is important even if it hadn't been written in the Torah, he communicated to us this other ways as well. So what's the pshat that in these cases it's redundant as it were that Hakadosh Baruch Hu taught us the same thing twice? What's the significance or is there any significance, not a why but is there any what significance, is there any conclusion, is there any practical importance to the fact that that an issur such as retzicha so not only do we know it through the Torah but Hakadosh Baruch Hu also communicated to us that our instinct tells us it's wrong, whereas an issur such as shatnez Hakadosh Baruch Hu only communicated to us through the Torah but he didn't give us an instinct that it's wrong? So lichora with this question in mind we can understand the a little more of the pshat in the Rambam's famous distinction in Shemonah Perakim. Rambam in Shemonah Perakim quotes the ma'amar Chazal that אל תאמר אי אפשי לאכול מאכלות אסורות. A person shouldn't say that I really have no interest in eating ma'achalos asuros, ela efshi ve'efshi. The truth is that mista'ama it's very tasty and I would like to partake of it but ma e'eseh that the Ribono Shel Olam gozar on me not to do it? So the Rambam says that the philosophers say no, that a person shouldn't just overcome his yetzer hara but a person should should that it's a greater ma'alah if he's a chasid mitiv'o, a person shouldn't just not kill because he's able to stop himself from killing but a person should should internalize the value that he doesn't want to. So are these is the ma'amar Chazal and this conventional wisdom are they a tartei desasrei or can they be reconciled? So the Rambam says that yes they can be reconciled. And the chiluk hashlishi is that there's a difference between mishpatim and chukim. That mishpatim a person should not say that be'emes I'd like to knock your brains out because you stepped on my toe, but ma e'eseh that the Avi shebashamayim gozar on me that I shouldn't do it? No, here a person a person should a person should internalize the value, he should be a chasid mitiv'o, he shouldn't want to do it, not just that he bends his ratzon to the ratzon Hashem but that his ratzon is the same as the ratzon Hashem, that he doesn't want to do it. Mah she-ein kein when it comes to observing chukim so then there is no such inyan that a person should say that I I find this repulsive. No, the only reason it's repulsive to me, I have no instinct which says that bosor becholov is repulsive. It's just because I've heard the issur in the Torah lo sivashel gedi so that's why I don't want it. But otherwise it wouldn't be repulsive. So be'emes this distinction of the Rambam it really fits beautifully. So then what we commented before that in some instances the ratzon Hashem is known to us in two ways. It's known to us through the Torah and it's also known to us either because Hakadosh Baruch Hu implanted it in the bria, the Gemara in Eruvin or he... implanted it within us that we have an instinct that the thievery and killing is wrong. We have such an instinct and other things Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't. There's nothing in the world that's meramez that that we see that's meramez to us that shaatnez is no good. We have no instinct against shaatnez. We just know it because we know the pasuk in the Torah. The ratzon Hashem is only revealed to us there. So now according to the Rambam comes out the significance of that is as follows. Where Hakadosh Baruch Hu revealed it to us, not just through the Torah, but also that it's a mishpat, that it's something where the instinct he implanted within us also dictates it, so the message he was sending is that these mitzvos we're supposed to observe the way the Rambam says as a chasid mitivei. That these mitzvos, the ideal is not to give tzedakah but to remain a cruel person on the inside, but that a person should become a rachaman, rachamanim bnei rachamanim. The and and the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu again indicated that is, that's why I'm making clear my ratzon to you not just in the Torah, not just in the Torah, but it's in the briah, it's in the instinct which I'm giving you because here what Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants from us is not merely that we should do as we're commanded but we should internalize it. We should internalize it. Not just that we that we give tzedakah but that we should be rachamanim. Not just that we abstain from retzichah but that such achzariyus is inconceivable to us. That we should recoil at the thought of it. And that's the significance of the fact that his ratzon is known to us not only through the Torah. Mah she'ein kein by chukim, so there as the Rambam says there is no such ideal. There's no ideal that a person independent of the pasuk in the Torah should have an instinct against shaatnez. There's no such ideal. The way kach gazarah chochmato, that the way the issur of shaatnez should be observed is different from the way the issur of gezel should be observed. That issur gezel should be observed that a person shouldn't have the middah in him that he would want to steal. The issur of shaatnez should be observed that a person doesn't do it because mah e'eseh the Torah asar it. No, it's a beautiful suit. It's a beautiful suit. Mah e'eseh the Torah asar it. I can't do it. Mah she'ein kein and that's the that's the gezeiras hakasuv. That's why some things are mishpat and some things are chukim. It reflects the fact that how we're supposed to observe these mitzvos and issurin differ. מענין לענין באותו ענין. The Rav always used to say, so he used to say very often in drashos that unless a person has the quote blind absolute obedience which is necessary for chukim, that a person can't observe the mishpatim either. And that even those mitzvos and issurim which seem to us that again that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's having conveyed the ratzon Hashem through our instinct or through the briah would have been sufficient, so it's not true. And there's no kiyum unless, kiyum in the sense that it won't last, that our observance of mishpatim won't last unless we observe them as chukim as well. Unless we observe them as chukim as well. And when you look around the society we live in is just full of so many examples of that. So one so the most basic mishpat is certainly lo sirtzach. The the most basic mishpat is certainly lo sirtzach. If that were left just as a mishpat, so you see how people can rationalize and how even a mishpat can be undermined and undone. but by people's rationalizations. First there's euthanasia, and then there's abortion, and once you're logically consistent, so what's the difference between a late-term abortion and the killing a helpless infant? So if there's no element of absolute obedience that we observe at the Torah's chok as well, so as a mishpat it wouldn't last either. As a mishpat it wouldn't endure unless it had the dimension, unless our observance of it had a dimension of chok as well. And you see that basically the issur of lo tirzach has been chipped away at very greatly in contemporary society. Euthanasia happens all the time. It's maiseh bechol yom. It's not just when this Kevorkian in Royal Oak out in Detroit kills people. It happens maiseh bechol yom, but it usually happens with a little bit more tact as it were. It happens more covertly. But doctors all the time, it's known in hospitals, that they all the time when you have a patient who's suffering, so they prescribe a dosage of a drug, not euthanasia. This is to make the patient, it's a painkiller. But they know very well that the dosage they're prescribing is one which the patient in his state cannot withstand. So it's sort of done covertly, so it doesn't create the stir and the debate and outrage which a more overt action does. But euthanasia is practiced a lot in our society. Euthanasia is practiced very much in our society. And it's just an illustration of what the Rav always used to talk about that the Torah's tzivuy for mishpatim is not redundant. It's not just that we need to know all the pratim. The Saadia Gaon talks about that in Emunos VeDeos, that we wouldn't know all the pratim in pirtei pratim of every mishpat without the Torah. But be'emes, even the basic yesodos of the mishpatim, so you see that people rationalize and people justify, sometimes sincerely, sometimes insincerely, out of self-interest. Clearly a world which has as many problems as ours, a person whose number one priority is to help people kill themselves is it's certainly not sincere misplaced rachmanus. But whether sincere or insincere, that's what the Rav always used to emphasize, that without the dimension in our observance, without chok, unless we observe mishpatim as chok, so be'emes they wouldn't endure, they wouldn't last even as mishpatim. A few minutes to comment on one or two things on the parsha. So it tells us

וישב יצחק ויחפר את בארות המים אשר חפרו בימי אברהם אביו ויסתמום פלשתים אחרי מות אברהם ויקרא להן שמות כשמות אשר קרא להם אביו

that Yitzchak went back and he redug the same be'eros which Avraham Avinu had dug and he gave them the same names which Avraham Avinu had given. The Torah tells us so little about the life of Yitzchak Avinu, so obviously the Torah here is not describing simply be'eros mayim. So the Ramban already explains the symbolism of the be'eros mayim, Remez to the Beis HaMikdash perhaps. representative of something much more profound than simply digging Be'eros Mayim. The question is what exactly does it represent? מעשה אבות סימן לבנים, the yesod which the Ramban quotes from the Midrash in Bereishis Rabbah, doesn't merely mean that what happened to the avos foreshadows what happened and what continues to happen throughout Jewish history. It means that also. But מעשה אבות סימן לבנים also means that they tell the story of the Beis Yosef, that the Beis Yosef had tremendous difficulty understanding pshat in a certain mishna. And he worked arduously day and night, was mispallel that he should have siyata d'shmaya in understanding the mishna. Finally, finally, finally, after what seemed like interminable yegia, finally understood pshat in the mishna. The next day, he was going for a walk, and he overheard this young boy, this little kid learning mishnayos. And the kid's learning the mishna, and he hears the kid, the kid says the mishna, and the kid teitches the mishna, and he gets up to this mishna which the Beis HaLevi just worked on for months, the Beis Yosef had been working on for months, and finally mastered, and he hears this little kid the next day, this little kid תינוק של בית רבן, says the same pshat. Just the simple pshat, that's the simple pshat. So he was astounded. So then the Maggid who used to come to the Beis Yosef came to him and said that don't think that all your work was in vain and don't think that the mishna wasn't as difficult as it seemed to you. In reality, it was. But when a person understands a sugya, what a person does has repercussions. And what the Beis Yosef had succeeded in doing was that he released into the world a spiritual, call it a spiritual energy, that now that mishna had become intelligible to people. Ad kedei kach that this little boy, this tashbar, now very easily, without any strain, without any difficulty, was able to learn pshat in the mishna. So when a person does something, it also releases a certain energy. And what מעשה אבות סימן לבנים means is that if it was true in the case of the Beis Yosef, so it was uniquely true of the avos, that what the avos did and the kochos hanefesh which they developed and which they cultivated, that in so doing they introduced those kochos into the world and made them available and accessible for all future generations. And that's part of what מעשה אבות סימן לבנים means. It doesn't just mean that it foreshadows and forecasts what will happen to the bonim, but it also means that it's the Ma'aseh Avos which introduced these kochos into the world which the bonim can then draw upon. That there's now a reservoir of these kochos which the bonim, which all future generations draw from. That's also part of what מעשה אבות סימן לבנים means. Each of the avos contributed to this reservoir of kochos hanefesh, of emunah, avodah, bitachon, which are available and accessible to all of us in the course of all generations. Avraham Avinu is easy. Avraham Avinu discovered the Ribbono shel Olam on his own, the Rambam describes. He had no teacher, he was self-taught, he discovered the Ribbono shel Olam. What was Yitzchak's unique contribution? What was it that Yitzchak as an ov, אין קורין לאבות אלא לשלושה, the Gemara... So what's the, what are we talking about, just an honorific title? So no, we're talking about this again, this unique trait that everything they did had repercussions lechol hadoros, so אין קורין לאבות אלא שלושה. What was Yitzchak's contribution? So part of that contribution was in order for the derech Hashem which Avraham Avinu had discovered to be perpetuated and to survive with the same vitality that it had for Avraham Avinu, it was crucial that every subsequent generation not merely accept it because this was the faith of Avraham Avinu. This is what Avraham Avinu taught us, so mimaila we accept it from him. But rather every generation has to rediscover for themselves. Our relationship with the Ribono Shel Olam is not supposed to be merely that he's Elokei avoseinu, אלוקי אברהם אלוקי יצחק ואלוקי יעקב, because if that's all there is, gradually each generation the bond gets weaker and weaker. משל למה הדבר דומה, of two people are best friends, and they're best friends for fifty years, their entire life. And then one of them rachmana litzlan dies. So there will still be a bond between his surviving children and the other friend who's still alive. Why? Because bizchus avihem, since they know that this was their father's best friend, and he knows that these are the children of his best friend, so mimaila there remains a certain bond. But the bond is not as strong as it was between the two friends because they're once removed. They don't have an immediate relationship but rather they try to maintain what their father had. But gradually that bond gets weaker and weaker, and it doesn't last too long. There's only so many generations it can last. It's only if the children forge their own independent relationship in every succeeding generation, so only then does the bond remain as strong. So Yitzchak Avinu understood, Yitzchak Avinu was the first second generation Jew, the first second generation Jew. Yitzchak Avinu understood that his avoda was, his avoda was not merely to rely on what Avraham Avinu discovered and what Avraham Avinu taught him, but that he had to experience the Ribono Shel Olam firsthand. He had to experience the Ribono Shel Olam immediately. His relationship had to be direct, not through Avraham Avinu. It had to be a direct personal relationship. It has to be Elokeinu ve'Elokei avoseinu. That lichora is the symbolism of

וישב יצחק ויחפר את בארת המים. אותי עזבו מקור מים חיים. וישב יצחק ויחפר את בארת המים,

so he couldn't merely continue to draw water just from the boros which Avraham Avinu had dug. He had to go back and redig them. And this doesn't mean of course, this doesn't mean chas veshalom, it doesn't mean that Yitzchak Avinu ignored what Avraham Avinu taught him. But what it means is that the maysora we have should be our guide in discovering and in encountering the Ribono Shel Olam for ourselves. Not that our maysora is that we know that avoseinu stood על מעמד הר סיני, and therefore we believe it and we accept it, so mimaila we'll do these mitzvos and we'll listen also, but rather the maysora which each of us receives should be our guide towards encountering the Ribono Shel Olam and to finding the Ribono Shel Olam. So it's not chas veshalom that we don't draw upon the maysora, that it's not critical for us that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's Elokei avoseinu, but that we're not content with that and we use that to try and forge. forge our own relationship with Ribono Shel Olam. What does this mean halacha l'maaseh? What does it mean halacha l'maaseh? So what it means is this. When we do mitzvos just superficially, mitzvas anashim melumada, so basically then everything is in a bechina of elokei avoseinu. That really a person is not, it's not a very fulfilling experience and a person doesn't really, doesn't really feel any sense of kedusha in being involved in the mitzvos, ela mai I know, I know I was brought up that on Sukkos you sit in the sukka and you take a lulav, so I do it also and I do it, I do it b'lev shalem, but I sort of do it by rote. Mitzvas anashim melumada, that's what you're supposed to do, that's what you're supposed to do. So that is, that would just be that Yitzchak, that would be a bechina where Yitzchak Avinu would continue to draw water from the boros, from the be'eros which Avraham Avinu had done. And the Torah says that's not enough because eventually b'meshech hadoros and we see it, b'meshech hadoros and sometimes it happens, it doesn't take that many generations to happen, a person's kiyum hamitzvos has to be much more profound. Of course the Torah didn't rely that we could all be Avraham Avinus. Avraham Avinu was able to find Hakadosh Baruch Hu without a masora. All other generations have the masora, but the point is that it's through the masora that we're supposed to find Hakadosh Baruch Hu ourselves. And the way we do that practically is not to do mitzvos very perfunctorily, automatically, but to do mitzvos in a more profound sense with thinking about it, awareness and searching for the Ribono Shel Olam. So then we use the elokei avoseinu, we use our masora, we use our kabbala to enable us to find the, to find firsthand the Ribono Shel Olam. Yitzchak Avinu didn't go and dig new be'eros, I mean if the Plishtim had sitmun, had filled these up, so maybe he would have been well advised to go to a different area further away from the Plishtim. So the answer is no. Yitzchak Avinu had to rediscover, but he didn't do that by looking for new ceremonies, he didn't look at it by trying to invent, but rather using the masora וישב יצחק ויחפר את בארת המים. So we need the masora. It's through the Torah and mitzvos which we have that we can find the Ribono Shel Olam, but the point is that we're not supposed to just do it mitzvas anashim melumada that since I know that avoseinu stood at the foot of Har Sinai, so that's why I do it, no, we have to do it in a more profound way that we're searching for the Ribono Shel Olam within Torah and mitzvos and that way we can accomplish this bechina of Yitzchak of וישב יצחק ויחפר את בארת המים. You know in the Elokai Netzor which the Gemara quotes in Berachos on daf yud zayin, the Gemara quotes the various tefillos which different of the Amoraim used to say at the conclusion of the Shemoneh Esrei. So one of them is the Elokai Netzor which then we universally adopted. So there are different girsaos. Some, I think the girsa which we have printed in our Gemara is not ואחרי מצותיך תרדוף נפשי, but is u'v'mitzvosecha tirdof nafshi. U'v'mitzvosecha tirdof nafshi. So what does it mean u'v'mitzvosecha tirdof nafshi? I think ke'dumani that's the girsa which we have in our Gemaras. So what does that mean? So when you have tirdof with a beis, so the beis is not the object of your pursuit. You can say lirdof acharei, so that signifies the object of your pursuit. When you say tirdof with a beis, so in Lashon Kodesh, so it means is תרדוף באף ותשמידם מתחת שמי ה' right from the seder. Tirdof b'af u'tshmideim. So tirdof with a beis means that what's with the beis is not the object of your pursuit but rather is how you're pursuing them. Tirdof b'af doesn't mean you're chasing after anger, it means that you're chasing with anger. We say u'v'mitzvoscha according to some girsa'os, u'v'mitzvoscha tirdof nafshi. So then the Gemara is telling us something that with mitzvos, so it doesn't mean, it's not that the bakasha is that we should chase after mitzvos, but rather the bakasha is that with mitzvos that we should be, we should pursue the Ribbono shel Olam, that we should constantly be looking and searching with mitzvos, not just to do the mitzvos automatically, but to do the mitzvos looking, searching, and pursuing as it were the Ribbono shel Olam through the mitzvos, with the mitzvos. And if we do that, u'v'mitzvoscha tirdof nafshi, so then we're taking advantage of that koach which Yitzchak Avinu released into the world that even when a person is bequeathed an emunah, so he's supposed to use that, he's supposed to use that yerusha as a way of then with that mesorah, as a way of rediscovering and experiencing it for himself. And that's the pshat in

וישב יצחק ויחפר את בארת המים ויקרא להן שמות כשמות שקרא להן אביו.