Since the Ramchal writes that in order to achieve the goal, the purpose which the sefer serves, so it's not enough to learn the sefer once, but התועלת יוצא מן החזרה עליו וההתמדה. That one has to review it and constantly, almost perpetually be doing a chazara on the sefer. Why is that? כי יזכרו לו הדברים האלה הנשכחים מבני האדם בטבע וישים אל לבו חובתו אשר הוא מתעלם ממנו.
Now there is here in the Mesillat Yesharim, in these two lines, a whole manual in these two lines themselves for Avodas Hashem and that is as follows. There are many many Ikarei Emunah, many many yesodos in terms of middos, and we correctly realize that a person has to know these yesodos, he has to know these Ikarei Emunah, he has to know these yesodos in terms of middos. But the emes is that what the Torah asks of us is more than that, because the Torah says that it's not enough that we know them, but we have to internalize them. Let's give an example to concretize it. The famous discussion which the Ibn Ezra has on Lo Tachmod, agav it's a little difficult, lichora his discussion really is on Lo Tisaveh, not on Lo Tachmod, but it's in Parshas Yisro. So the Ibn Ezra says, how can the Torah legislate whether or not a person should be chomed? Again, so let's transpose it to how can the Torah legislate whether a person should be misaveh? Because taiva is purely belev. A person is over Lo Tisaveh even if he does nothing with it. Even if a person is misaveh for beis chaveiro, eshes chaveiro, whatever it is, and he does nothing, he doesn't try, it's not maybe the demayseh the way Lo Tachmod is, so he's over. And be'emes if we translate the Ibn Ezra's kasha or the question he quotes from others into our idiom, so isn't taiva in Lo Tisaveh, isn't it often just an instinctive reaction? It's an instinctive reaction. It's not something which is premeditated. A person doesn't say, "okay, let me stop and think, am I going to be misaveh, am I not going to be misaveh?" A person can stop and think, "if I'm misaveh, if I'm chomed, should I allow myself to act on that feeling of chimud?" But it's an instinctive reaction. Let's say you have a person who's nebbich lo yutzlach, a person he's very poor, never has enough money, he's always in debt, always has to worry about. whether he's gonna have money to pay next month's rent, whether he's gonna have food to eat for himself and his family the next day. And he walks through an affluent neighborhood. So it's not that he makes a premeditated conscious decision I'm going to be misaveh, it's an instinctive reaction. Oh, if only I could be in his place, if only I could live in comfort like that and not have to worry about having a roof over my head and having food on the table to eat. So it's an instinctive reaction. Mimeila the Torah can tell us don't act on it. Kovesh es hayetzer. How can the Torah say not to have an instinctive reaction? Doesn't the word instinct mean that it's involuntary? So basically if we understand the Ibn Ezra's kasha like this, and it should be understood that way, so what he answers again with his famous mashal with the ignorant countryman not considering the possibility of ever being able to marry the princess, but what the Ibn Ezra really answers is as follows: that these types of instincts ultimately are not involuntary. At the moment they takeh in terms of what one feels, what one is thinking, so they do express themselves again in a fashion which is not premeditated, not conscious, and at that moment perhaps involuntary. But the instincts a person has in this realm, that's very much subject to his bechira chofshis. How so? If a person believes, the Ibn Ezra says, and knows that there's hashgacha pratis and that Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives every person what he's supposed to have, and a little bit elaborating on the Ibn Ezra, and A, a person realizes and knows latova, and B, even if he doesn't realize it and doesn't know it, he knows that he can't overturn what Hakadosh Baruch Hu says. Mimeila says the Ibn Ezra, such a person is not going to be misaveh because he knows that that's not my portion, that my portion, the portion which the Ribbono Shel Olam wants me to have is what I have, is what I have. And the only way, the only way for a person to change that is derech tefillah or something, but he's not going to be misaveh. Okay fine, so that's if a person's going to stop and think about it. But again, isn't the taiva just an immediate instinctive reaction? So the answer is, if a person not only knows and believes in hashgacha pratis, but a person has internalized that, so then the way he reacts spontaneously reflects that emuna, that belief which he has internalized. And that's a yesod gadol bachayim, a yesod gadol bachayim, that it's not the case that such an instinct is purely involuntary. Again, at the time it's totally spontaneous. But what the person's reactions are are a reflection of what he has internalized until this point. And in that sense it's entirely voluntary, entirely voluntary, because it's a reflection again of what he has internalized and it drives home the point which is exactly what the Mesillas Yesharim is talking about here, that there are so many things again which it's not enough to know, but they have to be internalized. And this again is a perfect case in point. There are many many others, many many others, a yesod gadol in everything, in everything. Now that being the case, so then the obvious follow up question is: so how does a person internalize? How a person knows, so we know. A person sits, he studies, he thinks, he reads, he learns, he seeks out teachers. So we know how a person acquires knowledge. But how does a person internalize? And basically this idea is a posuk, right? וידעת היום והשבות אל לבבך. Right? The Torah doesn't say simply וידעת היום כי ה' הוא האלהים but וידעת היום והשבות אל לבבך, which is exactly this yesod. But how do you make that transition from the yediyah hayom to the vahasheivosa el levavecha? So that's where Mesillas Yesharim says, and again, it's profound in terms of its importance, it seems rather prosaic in in in terms of its implementation, which is התועלת היוצא מן החזרה עליו וההתמדה. That the way the person makes the transition from knowing to internalizing is just with constant reinforcement. The more a person thinks about something, the more he—that's the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu created us—the more it becomes impressed and embedded in his neshama, which translates into his consciousness, into his into his awareness. It comes through החזרה עליו וההתמדה, just the constant reinforcement of thinking again. So if if a person studies Chovos Halevavos once, all right, so then a person understands the yesod of hashgacha pratis. But then, okay, that's not going to help him, that's not going to help him comply with Lo Sisom. He knows it, but it's not it's not internalized. If a person then, okay, it's not a chiddush. The second time Mesillas Yesharim, so he says, it's not going to be a chiddush. Second, third, fourth, fifth time, a person reviews it again, 10 times a day, takes a minute out and tells himself this yesod, so then the result is—and and he chooses his words so carefully here, right? The result of החזרה עליו וההתמדה is that ישים אל לבו חובתו שהוא מתעלם ממנה. Yasim el libo means that that he internalizes it. And it's striking that that you find this same lashon in in exactly the same context when it's not enough to know yesodos, but they have to be internalized. You find this lashon of yasim el libo. For instance, the this another example of this, the Sefer Hachinuch says by the mitzvah by the issur of Lo Sikom, so he has a very, very important and explanation for shoreshei hamitzvah of Lo Sikom. He doesn't explain it in terms of middos megunos. Not to say that he doesn't consider it as such, but that's not how he explains it. He says the reason the Torah asurs nekamah is because if a person seeks revenge, so it reflects not a middah megunah, but it reflects a a fundamental flaw in his emunah. Because if a person—why does a person seek revenge? Because if I sense that you caused me financial loss, pain, embarrassment, whatever, okay, so then I want to get even. I want to take revenge and I want to even the score. Says Mesillas Yesharim, so why does the Torah asur? Because a person is supposed to know that כל אשר יקרהו מטוב עד רע הוא סיבה שתבוא עליו מאת השם יתברך.
Says Mesillas Yesharim, one person's bechirah chofshis only impacts another person to the extent that the Ribbono Shel Olam allows it to. And if the Ribbono Shel Olam, if the Ribbono Shel Olam allowed your bechirah chofshis to impact me, so that means that for whatever reason, maybe maybe I'm in a position to understand, maybe I'm not in a position to understand, but for whatever reason, הוא סיבה שתבוא עליו מאת השם יתברך, and if you hadn't been the instrument, there would have been another instrument. There would have been another instrument because harbei shluchim lamakom. It doesn't exonerate the person who did it because the person who did it wasn't programmed to do that and he was מלבין פני חבירו ברבים or he was he did cause hefsed mamon. But in terms of how the person on the receiving end is supposed to understand and process what happened, so this reaction of of not seeking revenge, again, is supposed to be a reflection of a person's emunah in hashgacha pratis. And if you look, the Chinuch in that context has the same phrase of yasim el libo. That a person realizes that nekamah is not just morally wrong but theologically wrong is is the Chinuch's point. He says if ישים האדם אל לבו, so then that undercuts any desire for for revenge. There's no you don't desire revenge when, okay, so if it hadn't been this instrument which caused me the embarrassment or the hefsed mamon, so there would have been another instrument. That means that you weren't the ultimate cause. You weren't the ultimate cause, so then a person has no has not the slightest the slightest. That's too often our problem that we sort of compartmentalize. We know one thing, but then we feel other things. And that's what the Chinuch says, no, it has to be ישים אדם על לבו. The other place, again, you find it in other places also, but you'll take a look when the Rema in Siman Aleph quotes the Rambam from Moreh Nevuchim about שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד, so there too he says that when a person not just knows that HaKadosh Baruch Hu is מלא כל הארץ כבודו and אם יסתר איש במסתרים ואני לא אראנו נאום ה', not just a person knows, but he uses a lashon ישים אדם על לבו. When ישים אדם על לבו, if a person doesn't only know it, but he internalizes it, so he feels it, so then that transforms everything a person does, says, thinks, vechulu. And these two yesodos right here in these two lines, that's Mesillas Yesharim telling us. A: That these yesodos we have to be som el lev, we have to internalize them. And B: That the method for the internalization is again very prosaic, hachazara alav veha'asmeda, which means that a person has to think about these things, that a person has to be misboded and misbonen about the yesodos again, which the Mesillas Yesharim is going to present, vechayotzei bo. Towards the end of the hakdama, he says that the pasuk in Parshas Eikev identifies the basic areas of chasidus, the pasuk of ve'ata Yisrael, and then says that Chazal sort of reorganized it in a different fashion in the braisa of Pinchas ben Yair. ומצאתי בחז"ל שכללו אלו החלקים האלה בסדר וחילוק אחר יותר פרטי ומסודר לפי ההדרגה המצטרכת בהם לקנות אותם על נכון והוא מה שאמרו בברייתא שהובאה במקומות שונים בש"ס באחד מהם בפרק לפני אידיהן מכאן אמר פנחס בן יאיר תורה מביאה לידי זהירות.
And then he says, and I decided that I would structure my sefer around that braisa. So here too, the Mesillas Yesharim is highlighting a very, very important yesod in one's Avodas Hashem. He says that Chazal organized, reorganized what the pasuk in Parshas Eikev says לפי ההדרגה המצטרכת בהם, according to the sequence and gradualism which is necessary in order to genuinely and correctly acquire these midos. So there is this inyan of hadroga, that there is a seder in Avodas Hashem, and that one can't skip to the perek of chasidus and prishus in Mesillas Yesharim if one hasn't learned the prakim of zehirous and zerizous, right? Obviously meaning that one can't practice prishus and chasidus meaningfully unless one has first ascended the other rungs of the ladder of zehirous, zerizous, etc. It's a very, very important yesod. So first of all, it underlines, you have it in halachos, right? When the Mishna in Brachos talks about the end of the second perek of לא כל הרוצה ליטול את השם יבא ויטול, it's saying a similar yesod. Or when the Mechaber writes in Shulchan Aruch that he says one should only put on תפילין של רבנו תם מי שלא יעשה כן אלא מי שמוחזק ומפורסם בחסידות.
Also, it's a similar, it's לפי ההדרגה המצטרכת בהם לקנות אותם על נכון. So what's the pshat? What's the pshat? So again, we're talking about midas chasidus, right? Obviously we're not talking... not talking about if I overslept this morning and missed zman krias shema that I should say well I don't want to be inconsistent so I'll you know l'chazor l'osan I'll have to oversleep tomorrow and miss zman krias shema also right? That's not what we're discussing. But in terms of middos chasidus, in terms of going beyond the very דברים השוים לכל נפש which the Torah requires, that's what we're discussing. And again, case in point, biyemei Chazal, a chosson volunteering for krias shema, תפילין של רבינו תם. Another moshal just to sort of concretize what we're talking about and also to help us understand why that is. I mean, what's so terrible if someone is not muchzak umfursam bechasidus, so what's such a terrible thing if he puts on תפילין של רבינו תם? Stumble about, there are worse things to do in life than, why what's so terrible? Has to be muchzak umfursam bechasidus. The Rav once said that Reb Chaim was asked why he didn't put on תפילין של רבינו תם. So he said, because it says in Shulchan Aruch, לא יעשה כן אלא מי שמוחזק ומפורסם בחסידות. So he doesn't put on תפילין של רבינו תם. So but why is it that the Mechaber, why is he objecting to it? So again, to give another illustration of what we're talking about and to help us understand why this is. So take the following, right? We're all familiar with the story from the Gra's biography, how his sister came to visit him. He hadn't seen his sister in, I don't know, a quarter of a century, half a century. So he came out and said Shalom Aleichem and spent two minutes with her and said, sorry, but I have to, I'm already turning white. He pointed to his white hairs and said that that's the reason a person turns white is that it's a reminder to him of his mortality. That's why a person's hair changes color. And says, and I'm going to have to give a din vecheshbon for my time, I have to go back and learn. A famous maiseh of the Gra. So okay, so that's a gevaldigeh maiseh rav in terms of hasmada. So what would be if we'll proveh the same thing with our family members? Okay, so you're not old enough not to have seen your sister for 25 or 50 years, but we'll proveh the same. So clearly, kama meguchach hadavar, right? Not only is that not a midas chasidus, but it's a caricature of a midas chasidus. It's grotesque. It's not a midas chasidus, it's the exact opposite because it takes what for the Vilna Gaon, in the context of the Vilna Gaon, is a beautiful anecdote, a beautiful anecdote of what it really means to be an eved Hashem that he felt that every minute was not his own time and he lived his whole life that way. So that's the most inspirational story a person can read or hear. But if we, who waste time, who are not on that level of chasidus, so for us it's a distortion of Torah. It's not a midas chasidus, but again, but it's grotesque. It makes a caricature of Torah. If a person's gonna be, some people are to highlight Rosh Chodesh as a special day, so they dress differently on Rosh Chodesh than they do ordinarily. But they're not makpid on Shabbos. They're not makpid on Shabbos to wear a suit all the time, to wear a suit and a hat, but they're makpid on Rosh Chodesh. So whatever the inyan might be to highlight Rosh Chodesh and give it its rightful due, but kama meguchach hadavar when it's not done consistently, all sincere intentions notwithstanding. And that's what the Mesillas Yesharim is talking about, it's לפי ההדרגה המצטרכת בהם. That's what the Mechaber has in mind also. So the Mechaber says, so a person has to put on תפילין של רבינו תם. rov minyan u'vinyan only puts on tefillin shel Rashi. Fine. So if a person in terms of his hasmada in learning... Terms of his kavanah in tefillah and in terms of his kavod habriyos, so he surpasses the rov minyan u'binyan, so by all means he should, by all means he absolutely should. But if when it comes to hasmadah, nu nu, and when it comes to kavanah in tefillah, so he davens like the rest of us, and when it comes to being makpid on kavod of the zulas, also not, no one suspects him of being one of the lamed-vovniks. So what is the punkt, punkt for תפילין של רבינו תם? So that's what the Mechaber says, so it distorts the middas chasidus, לפיכך לא יעשה כן אלא מי שמוחזק ומפורסם בחסידות. So therefore what it means is not chas v'shalom that a person shouldn't be, shouldn't have she'ifos to be oleh ma'alah ma'alah, but what it means is that the she'ifos have to begin again in these areas, in with to keep sedarim as conscientiously as possible, to daven with as much kavanah as one can muster, to be makpid on feelings of others and kavod habriyos and shmiras halashon. And then a person, a person is makpid on these things, a person can move beyond them. If someone is raised with such chumros or middas chasidus, that's a different story. That's a different story. If it's a minhag in the family, that's a different story, then it's not something he's being mekabel on himself, and that's, you're absolutely right, that's not what we're talking about. We're talking about what the Mechaber is talking about, is a person who's being mekabel it on himself. The question you'd have to ask, but it's not nogeia to us, so let's not get sidetracked, is so to what extent will that minhag in the family, should that be considered a valid minhag if it doesn't seem to shtim with what Mechaber says? But that's a different discussion. So certainly what we're saying is not that a person, a person has a minhag from his father, from his grandfather, whether it's תפילין של רבינו תם, we're absolutely not talking about that. I believe the Mesillas Yesharim in another place stresses the idea that external actions will influence the way we think and what we do. So wouldn't there be some merit to pushing ourselves to do something even when we're not really there, you know our goal is to get there and to fill in the gap almost and through doing that? So you're a hundred percent right, he does. I think the first time is actually going to be quite soon that we get to it. But I think the answer to that is that there's enough, you know just in the three areas, על התורה עבודה גמילות חסדים, there's enough room for hasmadah before one does it on the cheshbon of his system. There's enough, we have mistama, well, I have enough other areas in which I can improve my hasmadah before I have to improve my hasmadah that way. So you're absolutely right, a person does have to push himself. And again, please, it's good you're asking, let's try to be as clear as possible on that point. Again, we're not saying that a person doesn't, of course a person has to push himself. He has to feel like he's going beyond himself, because otherwise a person never grows. The way a person grows is by pushing beyond what what comes easily. If a person only does what comes easily, so then he never realizes his potential. Of course he has to push himself, but again, the pushing himself is can always be done by definition if I'm on this level, so there's enough for me to, I don't have to reach up here to be, you know, going beyond myself to improve. On my level, I'll be reaching. What about places where halachah, the poskim bring down המחמיר תבוא עליו ברכה, or Rav Moshe's famous psak about chalav Yisrael of a ben Torah being makpid? So those be geder chumrah or middas chasidus or just how does one approach those? Certainly again by definition not everything is going to be b'chada machta. In that same teshuvah in Yabia Omer that... Rav Chaim Vital says that the Arizal told him that he saw בהקיץ ולא בחלום that in בית דין של מעלה there was a gadol echad who was supposed to be elevated to yet a higher level in Gan Eden and at that point he was being nidon because once on Shabbos some dirt had gotten into his shoe and he had walked ד' אמות ברשות הרבים without taking his shoe off and shaking the dirt out. So Rav Ovadia Yosef makes a cheshbon of why this is מותר על פי דין for so many different reasons why it's absolutely muttar. But the point is that apparently this person because of u-seviva nis'ara me'od that because of the madreiga he was on and because of the madreiga to which he was now going to be elevated in Gan Eden, so then this now became a midas chasidus that even he should have been nizhar. So again, המחמיר תבוא עליו ברכה, you know, can be said in that context as well, but that's not going to be the same המחמיר תבוא עליו ברכה as Rav Moshe's teshuva about Cholov Yisrael. So the first thing is that there's no one answer for all the המחמיר תבוא עליו ברכה. There is lekhorah a common denominator and that would be ein hachi nami. For instance, let's say again, leaving aside where it's a family kabbala and the like, so let's say, right, there are many different kashrus agencies and there are some which are very widely recognized to be very reputable and very reliable and then there are others where there's יש אומרים ויש אומרים and then there are yet others where there's just yesh omrim, right? So lekhorah if a person is still relying on the יש אומרים ויש אומרים and על אחת כמה וכמה if he's relying on just the yesh omrim, so then yeah, so then what we're talking about would apply to Rav Moshe's teshuva on המחמיר תבוא עליו ברכה that if in if he's relying on what most most reputable rabbanim think is an unreliable hashgacha on meat that he eats, so then yeah, so then it would apply even to Rav Moshe's teshuva of המחמיר תבוא עליו ברכה. On the other hand, obviously you don't have to be on the same madreiga to follow Rav Moshe's teshuva on Cholov Yisrael as you have to be to be worried about, you know, halevai that should be our biggest problem of that din ve-cheshbon that this chassid ve-gadol had to give for the, you know, the afar which which which came into his shoe. But ein hachi nami, the common denominator is that again, the lower the midas chasidus, the hopefully the more likely it is that it's something which is appropriate for us. I mean, hopefully then that, but in theory they all have to be measured against it. Should one take every area of growth individually or holistically? A person knows he needs to work on kavana b'tefilla, but they feel ready to take on Cholov Yisrael, should one impact the other? My mushag rishon, to think about it some more beli neder, my mushag rishon is that there are separate techumim and let's say the moshal we were giving in terms of the maybe questionable hashgachos, so that that is relevant. I don't know that that's an inconsistency minei ubei. Yeah, there is an inconsistency minei ubei, so that's what I'd be inclined to think. Okay, bli neder next week we'll continue. I'm not sure if we'll get to perek bais as well, but certainly with some inyonim in perek aleph. So how many people are going to be here Sunday night im yirtze Hashem? Grab by show of hands. Okay, now if we stop as was originally planned for chazarah and don't have shiur, how many people are going to be here Sunday? The same number of people gonna be here in the beis medrash? I can't tell, the same number? Okay, so then we're going to, as planned, then we'll have, we'll stop for a couple of days of chazarah. Well let's say lechol hapachos through ad v'ad b'chal Tuesday of next week and then bli neder either Wednesday or Thursday, we'll see, we'll begin from the mishnah in Hamaznia I think on צדי א עמוד ב.