So a good morning and welcome back. Before we pick up where we left off with Perek He, I just wanted to come back to one he'ara in Perek Alef me'inyana deyoma. We discussed the stira between Perek Alef and Perek Beis in terms of the Ikkar HaVidduy. And we suggested, and basically most of the mahalach that the Rav said already in the Igros, that the Rambam has a Vidduy of Kapara, meaning it's not the mitzva of Teshuva, but the Vidduy which is needed to accompany a davar hamichaper, be it a korban, be it Yom Kippur. And then there's the Vidduy of Teshuva. Okay, fine. And in terms of fine-firing the stira, so I think it, l'chora, it answers the stira very well. The question that remains, however, is that b'ma'aseh, the Vidduy of Teshuva is me'akeiv in Kapara, as the Rambam says meforash in פרק א הלכה א, the Vidduy of Teshuva is me'akeiv in Kapara. So how is it that we don't say this Vidduy on Yom Kippur? Nicha that we can explain, that we can sort of describe what the Vidduy is that we do say on Yom Kippur. So that, based on again the resolution of the stira, so that we can describe, we can say what it is we're saying. But that doesn't answer why we don't have the Vidduy of Perek Alef. Why don't we have the Vidduy of Perek Alef? We spend the whole day in shul, the whole day davening, say Vidduy ten times, and not once do we say clearly... not once do we say clearly kabbala l'haba. So we have b'havla'a a bakasha shelo echtah lefanecha, but that's a bakasha, that's not a kabbala. So that's just shifting it to the Ribbono shel Olam as it were. So I don't know, it's l'chora a very, very, very kasha, no? You spend the whole day davening in shul on Yom Kippur and עיקר חסר מן המחסר in terms of being able to be polel. So I don't know, this is mamash, I don't know, לו דמו עמדו מושלם, so I don't know, but l'da'ati mastapeina, or maybe as follows. If you have the Rambam, let's take a look in Perek Alef. Let's review Halacha Alef and let's review Halacha Gimmel. כל מצות שבתורה בין עשה בין לא תעשה אם עבר אדם על אחת מהן בין בזדון בין בשגגה כשיעשה תשובה וישוב מחטאו חייב להתוודות לפני האל ברוך הוא שנאמר איש או אשה כי יעשו מכל חטאת האדם והתוודו את חטאתם אשר עשו זה וידוי דברים וידוי זה מצות עשה כיצד מתוודים אומר אנא השם חטאתי עויתי פשעתי לפניך ועשיתי כך וכך והרי ניחמתי ובושתי במעשי ולעולם איני חוזר לדבר זה וזהו עיקרו של וידוי וכל המרבה להתוודות ומאריך בענין זה הרי זה משובח וכן בעלי חטאות ואשמות בעת שמביאים קרבנותיהן על שגגתם או על זדונם אין מתכפרים בקרבנם עד שיעשו תשובה ויתודו וידוי דברים שנאמר והתוודו אשר חטא עליה וכן כל מחויבי מיתות בית דין ומחויבי מלקות אין מתכפרים במיתתם או בלקייתם עד שיעשו תשובה ויתודו וכן החובל בחבירו והמזיק ממונו אף על פי ששילם מה שחייב לו אינו מתכפר עד שיתוודה וישוב מלעשות כזה לעולם שנאמר מכל חטאת האדם.
Fine. So vidduy is me'akeiv, and it's me'akeiv not only in teshuvah, it's also me'akeiv in the kapara of misos beis din, of malkos, of chattos va'ashamos, of tashlumin, etc. Very good. Fine. Then as we discussed, Perek Alef is then sort of devoted to kapara, to mechaperim, to kapara rather than to teshuvah. And in Halacha Gimmel, the Rambam has as follows: בזמן הזה שאין בית המקדש קיים ואין לנו מזבח כפרה אין שם אלא תשובה תשובה מכפרת על כל העבירות אפילו רשע כל ימיו ועשה תשובה באחרונה אין מזכירים לו שום רשע. וביום שובו מרשעו ועצמו של יום הכפורים מכפר לשבים שנאמר כי ביום הזה יכפר עליכם.
So the question is, there is a problem in Halacha Gimmel, but leaving that aside, the question is why didn't the Rambam add Yom Kippur to the list in Halacha Aleph? The Rambam is listing how everything, even Misas Beis Din which potentially is a mechaper, even Malkus which potentially is a mechaper, even Chatas and Ashamos which are a kappara, even Tashlumin Lachaveiro which is potentially a source of kappara, so the Rambam makes a point, doesn't leave anything to the imagination, he repeats it one by one that each one is only mechaper together with the vidui, and clearly it means the vidui of Perek Aleph. We haven't heard of the vidui of Perek Beis yet. So the Rambam should have added one more se'if katan here in Halacha Aleph. He should have added Yom Kippur also. The Rambam doesn't mention Yom Kippur. So yitachen, again, it needs more explanation and elaboration than is going to be offered, but yitachen that here in the Rambam you see asmach for what we do. Dehinu the Rambam, again, very conspicuously, doesn't say that the vidui of Teshuva, which is mechakev everything, is mechakev in Yom Kippur. So you could taina that maybe, maybe the diyuk is no diyuk, and that maybe it's because he said in the beginning of Halacha Aleph that Teshuva needs vidui, and that in Halacha Gimmel he doesn't really distinguish Yom Kippur from Teshuva. Because in Halacha Gimmel, minei u'vei there is a tension here, right? Because the Rambam begins by saying אין לנו מזבח כפרה אלא תשובה, which sounds like there's nothing else other than Teshuva because there's no sa'ir hamishtale'ach and there's no this, there's no that, and then he turns around and says and Yom Kippur is mechaper. So if you learn like that, so then, then the question is miyushavus. Dehinu, since Yom Kippur isn't a mechaper which is distinct from Teshuva, and the Rambam already said that the vidui is mechakev in the kappara of Teshuva. In which case the he'ara which we're saying here in the Rambam, again, it reinforces something about the relationship between Yom Kippur and Teshuva, which is very important ke-she-le-atzmo, but doesn't necessarily give us any help with this question of why don't we have the vidui of Teshuva on Yom Kippur? If you say no, if you don't think that that's an adequate answer for why the Rambam doesn't mention Yom Kippur in Halacha Aleph, so then yitachen that smuchim lachakein in the Rambam, that the Rambam has already said that there is one exception to this rule that doesn't require the vidui of Teshuva, and that's Yom Kippur. And that our Seder Tefilla reflects this Rambam. Again, the counterargument to not to accept the pshat we just said is that in Halacha Aleph the Rambam sort of has consistently distinguished between Teshuva and vidui, right? The Rambam says כשיעשה תשובה חייב להתוודות. And ba'alei chatos have to be ya'asu teshuva ve-yisvadu. So throughout Perek Aleph he is using Teshuva and vidui, he has delineated, he's distinguished the two, in which case maybe it's not so pashut to say that when he said Teshuva here in Halacha Gimmel he means Teshuva with vidui. In which case yitachen that the fact that the Rambam doesn't mention Yom Kippur in Halacha Aleph is as you see, yitachen according to this possibility you would see that chiddush atzum which would account for our Seder Hatefilla that the kappara provided by the itzumo shel yom of Yom Kippur doesn't require the vidui of Teshuva. Ayen lamed vov, ayen lamed vov. Okay, let's see a little bit here in where we left off in Perek Hey. Just review a little bit in Halakha Bet for a minute. Okay, Halakha Bet. אל יעלה במחשבתך דבר זה שאומרים טיפשי אומות העולם ורוב גולמי בני ישראל שהקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על האדם מתחילת ברייתו להיות צדיק או רשע אין הדבר כן אלא כל אדם ראוי לו להיות צדיק כמשה רבינו או רשע כירבעם או חכם או סכל או רחמן או אכזרי או כילי או שוע וכן שאר כל הדעות ואין לו מי שיכפהו ולא גוזר עליו ולא מי שמושכו לאחד משני הדרכים אלא הוא מעצמו ומדעתו נוטה לאיזו דרך שירצה.
Right, so again, absolute bechira. Person has absolute bechira. Now even though the and again in Halakha Gimel, hakol masur lahem, the final words in Halakha Gimel. Even though the Rambam doesn't say it here and I don't know, maybe if we only had the Rambam here maybe we would erroneously come to that conclusion, Rambam doesn't deny that people have predispositions to certain middos and certain de'os, and that people are more naturally inclined, some people are more naturally inclined to anger and some people are more naturally inclined to chemdas mammon and some people more naturally inclined to this, to that, but when the Rambam says אין לו מי שיכפהו it means that that's only begeder an inclination, only begeder a predisposition, but it's not something which is machriach. How do you know it? Rambam himself says it elsewhere meforash in Hilkhos De'os in Perek Alef. So there the Rambam indicates meforash that he recognizes I guess what we would call genetic predisposition to certain middos. Rambam in alef alef in Hilkhos De'os: דעות הרבה יש לכל אחד ואחד מבני אדם וזו משונה מזו ורחוקה ממנה ביותר יש אדם שהוא בעל חמה כועס תמיד ויש אדם שדעתו מיושבת עליו ואינו כועס כלל יש אדם שהוא גבה לב ביותר ויש שהוא שפל רוח ביותר יש הוא בעל תאוה ויש הוא בעל לב טהור מאד
etc. Then the Rambam says in Halakha Bet: לכל הדעות יש מהן דעות שהן לאדם מתחילת ברייתו לפי טבע גופו.
So the Rambam here right recognizes what we also just intuitively feel that the Rambam's not saying that everyone begins on the same spot. Rambam's saying that whatever spot a person begins in, a person has an absolute bechira chafshis. So whatever netiya a person may have because he's a ba'al chema, because he's govah lev, because he's a ba'al ta'ava, because he's a ba'al lev tahor etc. whatever natural inclination, predisposition a person has, it's not machriach him. Okay. He doesn't spell it out here but it's quite clear in that's what he means in Hilkhos De'os and in Shmona Perakim also when he talks about these inyanim in Shmona Perakim he also makes a point of saying that: אפשר שיהיה אופיו בטבע מוכן למעלה או מגרעת שיהיו פעולות אלו יותר קלות עליו מפעולות זולתו.
Okay. There in that Rambam in Hilkhos De'os there is a absolutely remarkable he'ora from רב יעקב משה חרל"פ. He has in one of his volumes of Mei Marom, I think there's a volume of Mei Marom on Shmona Perakim, so he has a remarkable he'ora there in the beginning of Hilkhos De'os. Again if you take a look the Rambam we just read that יש אדם שהוא בעל חמה כועס תמיד ויש אדם שדעתו מיושבת עליו ואינו כועס כלל ואם יכעס יכעס כעס... בכמה שנים יש שהוא בעל תאוות שפלות נפשו מהלוך בתאווה ויש שהוא בעל לב טהור מאוד ולא יתאווה אפילו דבר מעט שהגוף צריך לו ויש בעל נפש רחבה שלא תשבע נפשו מכל ממון העולם כעניין שנאמר אוהב כסף לא ישבע כסף ויש מקצר נפשו שדיו אפילו דבר מעט שלא יספיק לו ולא ירדוף להשיג כל צרכו
etc. So Rav Yaakov Moshe Charlap says there's something missing here. When the Rambam describes different types, different typology, the Rambam never describes anyone who mitchilas briaso is not a baal taavah, he's not such a בעל לב טהור מאוד, but he's me'uzan. He's balanced. He מתאווה לדברים שהגוף צריך להם but no more but no less. The Rambam doesn't have that middle category. So Rav Yaakov Moshe Charlap says that the Rambam is telling us no one is created on target. No one's created right on center. Everyone's off-center. Everyone is in either direction everyone is off and everyone is given a task of tikkun hamiddos. Whatever bechochmaso Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives different tasks of tikkun hamiddos to different neshamos. But everyone has and we shouldn't delude ourselves into thinking that some people ich veis they become big tzaddikim they didn't really have to work on tikkun hamiddos. Everyone has to work on tikkun hamiddos. Again they may be coming at it from the opposite direction that we are. That can be but everyone has that everyone has that. Okay in Shmonah Perakim when the Rambam talks about this inyan again about how we have such absolute bechirah chafshis so he misyaches to the maamar Chazal of הכל בידי שמים חוץ מיראת שמים and says so does that imply a more restricted bechirah is that against what I'm telling you? He says no. He says Harbei Toum Bo this is in the last paragraph of Shmonah Perakim. הרבה תועים בו בני אדם וחשבו על מקצת פעולות האדם אשר הוא בחירי בהם שהוא מוכרח עליהם.
Some think based on this maamar that what a person really has bechirah for he's muchrach. For instance kegon liso ploni who a person will marry. He says וזה אינו נכון לפי שהאשה הזאת אם לקחה בכתובה וקידושין והיא מותרת לו ונשאה לפריה ורביה הרי זו מצוה ואין השם גוזר על עשיית מצוה. אם היו נשואיה ברשע הרי זו עבירה ואין השם גוזר על עבירה. אלא כל פעולות האדם שהם מסורות בידו בהן בלי ספק תמצא המשמעת והמרי. והנה אמרם הכל אין הכוונה בכך אלא על הדברים הטבעיים אשר אין לאדם בחירה בהם כגון היותו ארוך או קצר
person is tall or short או ירידת גשם או בצורת whether it's going to rain or not or the air is polluted achirus ha'avir the air quality zakuso וכיוצא בזה מכל מה שיש בעולם חוץ מתנועות האדם ותנוחותיו.
The Rambam here says something which is more famously I think associated with the Chovos Halevavos but emes is the Rambam said it afterwards also. Chovos Halevavos I think the יסוד ושורש העבודה quotes from the Chovos Halevavos also says that basically we sort of divide what we do into mitzvos into issurim and then dvar reshus and dvar reshus. So the יסוד ושורש העבודה quotes from the Chovos Halevavos and says that middle category doesn't exist. Doesn't exist. Why? At least maybe the details shebo exist but the category keshelatzmo doesn't exist. When you daven it's a mitzvah rachmana litzlan a person is engaging in oniyas devarim that's an aveirah. Let's say a person is stam talking about neither divrei Torah dvar mitzvah nor dvar assur so that's reshus? No it's not reshus. Says the Chovos Halevavos, so if a person needs a break and he needs to relax and he's conversing to relax, so then that's a mitzvah. So then that's a mitzvah. If he should be learning, so then that's an aveira. So at the end of the day, says everything is going to really be, okay, if you the detail shebo will remain a reshus, meaning the mitzvah shebo and how a person dresses, does he dress bekavod-dik, does he dress properly? Within that, ich veis whether he, I don't know, whether he has a white stripe in his suit or doesn't have a white stripe in his suit, so I don't know that the Rambam is saying or the Chovos Halevavos is saying that there's a mitzvah component to that, but in terms of once the etzem action itself is nitpas in mitzvah, so then the whole thing is subject to his bechira. That's the Rambam's point. And basically that's what the Rambam says אלא כל פעולות האדם שהן מסורות בידו בהן בלי ספק תמצא המשמעת והמרי.
So the question is, the Rambam says it as does the Chovos Halevavos. Question is like this, it doesn't always seem possible to us to know to the second exactly how we should be using our time, Mamash to the second. So let's say I need to relax, do I need five minutes and thirty-four seconds of relaxation or do I need five minutes and thirty-three seconds of relaxation or five minutes and thirty-five seconds of relaxation? You can make yourself meshugeh which is not a mitzvah either. That also clearly something which lends itself to mishmas and meri and it's not a mitzvah to make yourself meshugeh. So mistama practically, there is a certain range. There is a certain range. Does that contradict this vort? I don't know, Ayin u'lam. Maybe yes, maybe no. Practically, obviously there has to be a certain range and the person can't, unless he's a very very very big baal madreiga, isn't always going to be able to be meshayer things to the second. But certainly on a more macro scale again, so relaxing when warranted is a mitzvah, is a mitzvah. And mistama practically we have to assume there's a certain range that a person should keep to, and as long as he's in the range it's a mitzvah. And I don't know as a person climbs madreigos, maybe maybe he can be mechaven more and more to less of a range and to a point. In halacha daled and halacha hey, so the Rambam poses two questions which are precipitated again by his insistence of, again, the ikar gadol which is the amud hatorah vehamitzvah of the just the unlimited bechira we have. So one is how is that consistent with the pasuk כל אשר חפץ השם עשה בשמים ובארץ? How is it consistent with that? So the Rambam says that's gufeh ratzon Hashem, right, ratzon Hashem is that we should have the bechira to do what we choose to do. And then in halacha hey of course he touches on the question which we'll come to shortly bli neder, the question of how one reconciles or why there's no contradiction between Hashem's knowledge of the future and our bechira. But the impression you get throughout from the Rambam is the following. If you take a look for instance in the Sefer Hachinuch... Sefer Hachinuch has on the mitzvah of lo sikom in Parshas Kedoshim. Sefer Hachinuch says that the shorshei hamitzvah of lo sikom is not because it's a bad middah. Stam he agrees with that fact, but that's not what he emphasizes. He says the reason the Torah ossurs nekama is because it represents a distorted hashkafa, a dangerously distorted hashkafa, because if a person wants to take nekama, so that means that if someone inflicted pain on me, if someone caused me financial loss, chas v'sholom, and I want to then take revenge, so that means that I think he's the ultimate cause of what happened to me and that if not for him, I wouldn't have suffered this pain, I wouldn't have endured this financial loss. And the Sefer Hachinuch says that's a major, major mistake because כל סיבה שתבוא עליו על האדם, כל אשר יקרה מטוב ועד רע,
anything which happens to a person, mitov v'ad ra, הוא סיבה שתבוא עליו מאת השם יתברך הוא. The ultimate cause of anything that befalls a person, the Sefer Hachinuch says, is from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And that if Hakadosh Baruch Hu hadn't willed it, so then your bechira chofshis couldn't cause someone else to suffer pain or to endure financial loss. That's what the Sefer Hachinuch says. Dahinu, the Sefer Hachinuch clearly, again obviously there are many other Rishonim who line up here, but just to contrast the two positions, the Sefer Hachinuch clearly says that a person's bechira chofshis cannot impact another person if it's not willed, not decreed by Hashem. There's no such thing as my bechira chofshis affecting someone else unless that's סיבה שתבוא עליו מאת השם יתברך הוא. That doesn't mean that I'm muchrach in what I'm doing. If it's bashert that someone should incur financial loss through my bechira chofshis, and I don't want to pickpocket him, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu will make him have a hole in his pocket. Harbe shluchim lamakom. If I'm not interested in pickpocketing him, so he'll get a hole in his pocket. But the Sefer Hachinuch certainly very significantly limits the success or the effect of our bechira chofshis outwardly, externally. If Ruven is trying to kill Shimon, if it's not bashert that Shimon should die, then the gun is going to misfire or the gun is going to jam and he's not going to be able to do it. The impression you get from the Rambam here, and it's certainly consistent with when the Rambam develops his shittos about hashgacha pratis, the impression you get from the Rambam is the Rambam doesn't agree with that. And the Rambam thinks that it can happen. It can happen that a person—it's not necessarily the case that what one person does to another is something that was decreed by Hashem. Because certainly the whole feel that you get here for bechira chofshis is that it's totally unlimited. And I don't know if there were this—now again, if this were true, we would have expected to see it here in perek ches. It's not so much—I don't know if the Rambam says anything mefurash against it, because le'mayseh the Sefer Hachinuch agrees that we don't do anything involuntarily. So it's not that the Sefer Hachinuch thinks that Hakadosh Baruch Hu uses us as a puppet to carry out his designs for someone else. He doesn't say that at all. He says Hakadosh Baruch Hu will only let us carry out our designs when they converge with his designs. So even though there's nothing black and white here mefurash in the Rambam against it, the whole sense you get for bechira chofshis is again not only can we do... do what we want, but nothing is going to limit its effect either. Okay, maybe let's see bit Halacha Hey. שמא תאמר והלא הקדוש ברוך הוא יודע כל מה שיהיה וקודם שיהיה ידע שזה יהיה צדיק או רשע או לא ידע אם ידע שיהיה צדיק אי אפשר שלא יהיה צדיק ואם תאמר שידע שיהיה צדיק ואפשר שיהיה רשע הרי לא ידע הדבר על בוריו.
So if Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows it definitively, so then it's predetermined. If he doesn't know it definitively, so then we're denying Hakadosh Baruch Hu's knowledge of the future. דע שתשובת שאלה זו ארוכה מארץ מדה ורחבה מני ים וכמה עיקרים גדולים והררים רמים תלוים בה. אבל צריך אתה לידע ולהבין בדבר זה שאני אומר. כבר בארנו בפרק שני מהלכות יסודי התורה שהקדוש ברוך הוא אינו יודע מדעה שהיא חוץ ממנו כבני אדם שהוא ודעתם שנים אלא הוא יתעלה שמו ודעתו אחד ואין דעתו של אדם יכול להשיג דבר זה על בוריו. וכשם שאין כח באדם להשיג ולמצוא אמתת הבורא שנאמר כי לא יראני האדם וחי כך אין כח באדם להשיג ולמצוא דעתו של בורא. הוא שהנביא אמר כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי. וכיון שכן הוא אין בנו כח לידע היאך ידע הקדוש ברוך הוא כל הברואים והמעשים. אבל נדע בלא ספק שמעשה האדם בידו של אדם ואין הקדוש ברוך הוא מושכו ולא גוזר עליו לעשות כך.
Omar Avraham, לא נהג זה המחבר מנהג החכמים שאין אדם מתחיל בדבר ולא ידע להשלימו והוא החל בשאלות קושיות והניח הדבר בקושיא והחזירו לאמונה וטוב היה לו להניח הדבר בתמימות התמימים ולא יעורר לבם וינוח דעתם בספק ואולי שעה אחת יבוא הרהור בלבם על זה.
So the Ra'avad says, what did the Rambam, so the Rambam raised the question but doesn't answer it. So what's the point of raising the question? The question is already asked by Rav Sa'adia Gaon. Sa'adia Gaon in Emunot ve-De'ot poses this question in Ma'amar Revi'i. שמא יאמר עוד כיון שהוא יודע במה שיהיה לפני שיהיה וכבר ידע שהאדם ימרה דברו הרי מוכרח הוא האדם להמרות כדי שתתקיים ידיעתו.
Anu be-daya, this is the answer. First he says, which I'm skipping for now, he shows how the other position is untenable, that Hashem's yediyah is machrachas is logically untenable. And then he turns on and says, אנו בדעה שהוא יודע כל הדברים כפי אמתת הישות וכל דבר מהם שהוא ממציאו כבר ידע שימציאהו וכל דבר מהם שיבחרהו האדם כבר ידע שהאדם יבחרהו ואם יאמר וכשידע השם שהאדם ידבר האם יתכן שישתוק אמרנו בלשון ברורה כי האדם אם היה שותק במקום שידבר אנו מניחים יסוד הדבר כי השם ידע שהאדם ישתוק ואי אפשר שנניח שהוא ידע שהאדם ידבר לפי שהוא יודע הפעולה הסופית מפעולות האדם הנעשית לאחר כל מחשבה מצדו והקדמה ואיחור.
So basically Rav Sa'adia Gaon gives what seems to be a very glatt answer. He just says, no. He says Hashem's... Hashem knows what a person will do with his bechira chofshis. There's nothing causal. There's nothing determinative about Hashem's yediyah. What does Hashem know? Hashem knows what it is I'm gonna do with my bechira chofshis. Hashem can see the future. The Rambam clearly doesn't say that. The Rambam clearly does not say that. There's a certain omkos that we're not going to go into now. The question is, what do you do with the Ra'avad's hasaga? What did the Rambam think he accomplished? When you begin the halacha, you don't know how to reconcile the two, and when you finish the halacha, you don't know how to reconcile the two. Mishneh Torah was big enough, and the Rambam didn't... sometimes you have an English assignment and it has to be so many words, you have to draw it out. The Rambam, he wasn't getting paid by the word here, he didn't have to... he wasn't looking to inflate... inflate Mishneh Torah. So the Avodas HaMelech suggests the following. He says that there's two different concepts. There's one notion of nimna, I guess what we would call something which is a self-contradiction, and then there's something else which is למעלה מגבול ההשגה, something which is beyond human capacity to understand. And what the Rambam intended, again, there's a certain omik that we're omitting here, but I don't think it's... I think it's consistent with what we're discussing. What the Rambam intended to do is that the question as posed... and for whatever reason the Rambam is not content with Rav Sa'adia's answer. The question as posed says that it's a stira. It's a stira. And then... that it's a stira. Generally, we know... let's say I know that there's a Shas on this table. How do I know there's a Shas on the table? Because there it is. In order for me to know it, it has to be. I know that it's daytime out, that it's not nighttime. Why? Because I look outside, I see. It is. I know that yesterday was Rosh Hashanah because it was. So if I know the future, that must mean that the future is also... so the future must be predetermined. Again, there's more to it than this. So lichora, that's a stira. A stira can't be. So if that's the case, then there's no room for bechira. So what the Avodas HaMelech explains very beautifully is that the Rambam's taking it out of the class of a stira and saying that it's למעלה מגבול ההשגה because once we realize that Hashem doesn't know the way we know things. So we only know, again, this hagdara of yediya that a person knows what is and therefore if I know the future, the future must be... is already. So then it has to be predetermined. So the Rambam is saying, no, you can't transpose the way we know to the way Hashem knows, because with Hashem knowledge works differently than it does with us. Once we realize that we can't transpose the way we know and what deya means for us to what deya means for Hashem... so if we don't begin to know what deya means for Hashem, how it works, how it functions, so then is it a stira? No, we just don't understand. It's not a stira anymore. Meaning the question begins as a stira. It begins as something which is nimna. And it ends up, after the Rambam's explanation, as something which is למעלה מגבול ההשגה. As something which the Rambam has explained... no, I'm not... at the end of the day, the Rambam says, I'm not explaining to you how this works. No, I'm not. At the end of the day the Rambam says I'm not explaining to you how this works, but what I am doing, the Rambam says, is I'm showing you that you think it's a stira, it's not a stira. It's not a stira because we don't begin to understand כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי so we can't be masig. Let's say משל למה הדבר דומה. So we hear stories about certain gedolim who could take a pen in each hand and write two different ideas simultaneously. Simultaneously. Okay. So I think most of us can't be masig doing that. So obviously their minds function on a level that our minds don't function on. And we understand, okay, so they're blessed with certain capacities that we don't have. So the fact that I can't do that, it defies understanding to me but clearly I recognize that their minds they work differently than mine does. I can't conceive of doing that, but I have no trouble understanding, or not understanding, acknowledging that their minds are of a different order and therefore they have capacities which for me can't be, for me is impossible, but for them it works. For them it works. Right. So if that mashal is helpful, so that's what the Rambam is saying, that's what the Rambam is saying. I'm not answering the question. I'm telling you that there are many, many things obviously that we can't understand. There are many, many things כי לא יראני האדם וחי which are beyond, right, Chazal say that a person's not supposed to ask about what was before briat haolam, this, that. There are certain things where our minds are not equipped to understand. So that's what the Rambam is saying, it's not a stira anymore because a stira has to be I have to be able to define this and define that, and then I have a stira. If I don't begin to understand this, I can't say that it's a stira. I just say that this is something which is beyond our understanding. That's what the Avodat Hakodesh here says pshat in the Rambam. Okay. Bli neder tomorrow and Wednesday the plan is to continue in Hashkafot HaTorah and Thursday try to do some more of Hilchot Teshuva first perek vav, probably vav and zayin, and then if we have time, bli neder, go back to perek daled. Okay.