We left off in perek aleph. The Rambam says הדרך הישרה היא מדת הבינונית שבכל דעה ודעה מכל דעות שיש לו לאדם והיא הדעה שהיא רחוקה משני הקצוות ריחוק שווה ואינה קרובה לא לזו ולא לזו לפיכך ציוו חכמים הראשונים שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד ומשער אותן ומכוון אותן בדרך האמצעית כדי שיהא שלם.
The Rambam's interpreting a Gemara in Masechet Sotah and Moed Koton that ושם דרך אראנו בישע אלהים אל תקרי ושם אלא ושם
that a person has to be shom darko. So the Rambam interprets that this ma'amar Chazal is basically presenting the chiyuv of the derech ha'emtza'it and the shuma, the assessment, is to make sure that what a person's doing is balanced, that he's not being nohteh towards either of the shnei k'tzavot. Rashi, meyuchas to Rashi in Moed Koton, understands the Gemara differently, that the Gemara is that it means הוי מחשב שכר עבירה כנגד הפסדה or שכר מצוה כנגד הפסדה, that the shuma, the calibration, that what you're calibrating is not lav davka to make sure that a person is be'derech ha'emtza'it, but in terms of a general mahalach in life of נתתי לפניך היום את החיים ואת הטוב ואת המות ואת הרע.
The Rambam kidarko v'shitaso interprets it as here. Keitzad? לא יהיה בעל חמה נוח לכעוס ולא כמת שאינו מרגיש אלא בינוני. לא יכעס אלא על דבר גדול שראוי לכעוס עליו כדי שלא ייעשה כיוצא בו פעם אחרת. וכן לא יתאוה אלא לדברים שהגוף צריך להם ואי אפשר לחיות בזולתם כעניין שנאמר צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו.
Meaning no more, no less. And lifi zeh, so you wonder a little bit about the proof-text here. Okay, that's what a tzaddik does, but maybe so I should be able to eat a little bit more. That's the Rambam's telling us halacha psuka here. He's writing a Shulchan Aruch for all of us, he's not writing a Shulchan Aruch for just tzaddikim. Same thing about the next one. וכן לא יהיה עמל בעסקו אלא להשיג דבר שצריך לו לחיי שעה שנאמר טוב מעט לצדיק.
But the emes is, the emes is that l'chora, the simple pshat in the Rambam is as follows: Mesillat Yesharim has in the beginning of perek yud gimmel. Perek yud gimmel he begins midas haprishus. Dehainu that in perek yud bais he concluded his discussion of neki'us with the in perek yud aleph he basically has a kitzur Shulchan Aruch going through so many dinim and halachos. And then in perek yud bais is kidarka kinyas haneki'us. And then he says in perek yud gimmel as follows: הפרישות היא תחילת החסידות ותראה שכל מה שביארנו עד עתה,
which in the earlier prakim he characterized as just the protim of halacha, of Shulchan Aruch, right? He says that first a person has to have zerizus and zehirus in a more general sense, and then he can come to the protim, but still all what's ikkar hadin. He says: ותראה שכל מה שביארנו עד עתה הוא מה שמצטרך אל האדם לשיהיה צדיק ומכאן ולהלן הוא לשיהיה חסיד.
Or in other words, Mesillat Yesharim says that everyone has a chiyuv to be a tzaddik. So we think a tzaddik is a tzaddik and where and so maybe de facto that's correct, but l'mayseh in terms of what our chiyuvim are, so he says beferush that what tzaddik connotes, that a person a tzaddik connotes that a person is mekayem... the mitzvos. And is nizhar from aveiros. He's m'kayeim the mitzvos l'fi dikdukei hilchoseihem and is nizhar on on aveiros l'fi dikdukei hilchoseihem. That's what he went through in nikius. And that's something that we're all mechuyav in. So to be a tzaddik, it may be that l'maiseh, it may be de facto that it's a rare breed, but but in terms of if we're talking on a level of of chiyuv, so it's a chiyuv which relates to all of us. And that's the simple pshat here in the Rambam. That's why a pasuk which is describing the hanhaga of a tzaddik is is how the Rambam is telling us the halacha. Since the Rambam defines derech Hashem as derech hamimutza, so it's a balance between two extremes that both of them are bad. So the only way to, you may say the only way to go is to calibrate it exactly. The main, the same way with we can't say that we should be more megusham because we don't have the chiyuv to be so parush because we're but then we're moving to, we're not only moving towards gashmius, moving too far away from prishus. We're giving up the, it has to be a calibration. So, if it's we, if it's just a, we want to get towards a goal, so we don't have to go so far towards the goal. But if it has to be in the middle, so then the only way to go is is in the middle. Because the same way for too parush, that's wrong. We don't say that's that's tzidkus. So for too megusham, it's also not tzidkus. So so a tzaddik is someone who calibrated it correctly. I I hear you so that's a different, no I I I'm just but just the the last step, I'm sorry I didn't follow. So in terms of how that that's relating to the pasuk or or or not. We can't be more, and somebody can be good and somebody can be more good. But that's only if, that's only if there's a goal ahead of us you're closer to the to the goal. But if if we need and there's, but if there's a goal in both directions, so then you have to, have to go, you have to the only way to meet is in the middle. Okay, correct, a hundred percent. But again, but but you're but you're maskim the basic the, right? the point, the Rambam's point in quoting the this pasuk is that the term tzaddik is a something that, it's if I think maybe this is just my my mistaken notion coming in and and I'm just saying what what what's obvious to everyone. But I think that sometimes if you ask people, so people say I'm, you know, I I try to be a Shulchan Aruch Yid. I try to be a Shulchan Aruch Yid. I don't I don't claim to be a tzaddik. You know, you see you want to meet a tzaddik so they'll point go go you can go meet so and so he's a tzaddik. And you know, halevai I would be that someday, but you know, ba'asher hu sham I'm just trying to be a Shulchan Aruch Yid. And basically what the term tzaddik means, the Mesillas Yesharim says, is a Shulchan Aruch Yid. So on that you're saying a different hesber in terms of that or just I think your point is correct. I'm just. The middos, there's no such thing as by by middos, there's no such thing as lifnim mishuras hadin. Oh, but but there is in but that's a complicated thing here in halacha hey which, can, I mean we're going to skip, I mean the Rambam does have, does have lifnim mishuras hadin. No no no I don't know I don't I'm not able to, I don't understand it to be able to, I don't understand this so I can't explain it. But eich shehu the Rambam does have lifnim mishuras hadin here. So that's a, whatever whatever what I tell you won't be too enlightening so I'll save you time. Maiseh he does have lifnim mishuras hadin, however however we should understand that. It talks about in Shemona Perakim also, I don't know. But in other words you're saying that maybe I see I see so you're saying that that maybe the identification between a tzaddik and the Shulchan Aruch Yid is only in this context of of deios. But but elsewhere and lav davka that the Rambam is going as far as Mesillas Yesharim in, okay okay so I understand. I'm just thinking for a minute. No but, so why is this behavior if a tzaddik is distinct from a Shulchan Aruch Yid and ochel l'sova nafsho is something that a Shulchan Aruch Yid is supposed to be doing and haraya the Rambam's quoting it here. Az a Tzadik! He put on Tefillin this morning and he layned Krias Shema and he even maybe even said Shir Shel Yom. So that's no. So if the Ochel l'sova nafsho, if there's takeh a distinction between the two, so then let's ask according to the Rambam, so what's the pshat in the posuk? If you hold that Ochel l'sova nafsho is something that we have to be doing, agam that we're only at the moment only setting our sights on being a Shulchan Aruch Yid and being a Tzadik is beyond us, so then this behavior shouldn't have been predicated of a Tzadik. That's misleading. But if you say like Ramchal, so the teretz is yeah, maybe befoal a Tzadik is a rare breed, but in terms of what should be normatively, it's basically what we're all supposed to be. I don't know if this is adding to what you're saying, but you see that the Rambam quotes in Hilchos Deos that different halachos about how to go to the bathroom let's say. So that he quotes that a Tzadik should do this, a Tzadik should do... a Tzadik or a Chacham? Maybe what was the lashon? In Perek Hey? Yeah. Maybe a Chacham. Does he use Tzadik there also? I think he talks about Chacham. Talmid Chacham. Talmid Chacham more than... both. He goes back and forth between the two. Right. So it's a little similar I think it's much of what you're saying is that the Shulchan Aruch quotes these halachos even though not everybody's a Talmid Chacham. So that's so... right, so shtei teshuvos badavar. You have to be m'ayein in each case. You have to be m'ayein in each case. I mean, is it the Shulchan Aruch is disagreeing with the Rambam? Yitachen. Or the Shulchan Aruch means, let's say there's in Siman Beis, Shulchan Aruch, I think it's Siman Beis, talks about not wearing short sleeves. So Rav Moshe has a teshuva and says that's not me'ikar hadin. Doesn't mean... and there are pictures of Rav Moshe in short sleeves. The Rav also wore short sleeves. So he apparently also understood that... so the question is what the inference is. The inference in Shulchan Aruch could be that the Mechaber is disagreeing with the Rambam, or the inference could be that Shulchan Aruch is quoting things. When you learn Siman Beis in the Mishna Berura, you don't get this impression. It looks like it's me'ikar hadin. And then when you look in Igros Moshe, he says it's certainly not me'ikar hadin. So in Shulchan Aruch you have to know. Could be the Shulchan Aruch without clearly indicating it necessarily quotes things which are middos chasidus. But I think your point I think reinforces what we were saying. The very fact that this is Perek Alef and not Perek Hey, and that Perek Alef is דבר השווה לכל נפש and in Perek Alef the hanhaga of the Tzadik is what's being held up as normative, so I think that reinforces the point that lechora the Rambam's using the term the same way the same way Ramchal is. Same way Ramchal is. I think the Chofetz Chaim also when he has the different classes in terms of being dan l'kaf zechus and other things which are nogeiah, so he talks about someone who's a yerei shamayim. It's... so we hold again a yerei shamayim is... we like to think that maybe we would be called that. So I don't know, in the Chofetz Chaim a yerei shamayim, he doesn't do aveiros. He's... anyway, lechora that's the pshat here. The end of Halacha Hey ומצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינונים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו.
Halacha Vav כך למדו בפירוש מצוה זו מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום מה הוא נקרא קדוש אף אתה היה קדוש ועל דרך זו קראו הנביאים לקל בכל אותן הקינויין.
So the lashon of the Rambam is a lack of symmetry here. The Rambam should have said מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה תיקרא חנון or alternately he should have said מה הוא חנון אף אתה היה חנון. And the Rambam again has this disparity, it's מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון. So it's quite clear, quite clear, that the Rambam here is reflecting something that he explains in the Moreh. He says that all the Yud Gimmel Middos, any, any description of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, whether in the Yud Gimmel Middos or elsewhere in Sifrei HaNeviim, so the Rambam says that all these are not descriptions of Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself. Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself doesn't have different middos. Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself is echad pashut and beyond our comprehension. So we can't, we can't use middos to define Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Whenever we talk about middos, it's how, it's middos that we perceive in how Hakadosh Baruch Hu acts, in how Hakadosh Baruch Hu interacts with the world. When we see a person who feeds the poor, so we think he's a rachum vechanun, so we see that Hakadosh Baruch Hu set up the world providing משביע לכל חי רצון and providing for everyone and everything, so therefore we describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu in his interaction with the world as being rachum vechanun. But that's again, not, that's not presuming to say who, what Hakadosh Baruch Hu is. That presumes to be a description of his actions, of how he interacts with the world, but it's not a description of him. Mah she'ein kein, the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav is not only, the Rambam says in Halacha Zayin, כיצד ירגיל אדם עצמו בדעות אלו עד שיקבעו בו. That clearly the mitzvah is not just that a person should always act bederech habeinonit, but that these deios should be nikba'im bo. So a person is not just supposed to be able to consistently act bederech rachamanus, bederech chanina, a person has to be a rachum, he has to be a chanun. And that's what the Rambam says so meduyak, מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון, and מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום. So let's take a look at Halacha Zayin again. כיצד ירגיל אדם עצמו בדעות אלו עד שיקבעו בו. יעשה וישנה וישלש במעשים שעשה על פי הדעות הממוצעות ויחזור בהן תמיד עד שיהיו מעשיהן קלים עליו ולא יהיה בהן טורח ויקבעו הדעות בנפשו.
So the Rambam here says in terms of whether or not a life of Torah, so a life of Torah is onerous, a life of Torah is burdensome. So the Rambam says initially the answer can be yes. Initially the answer can be that it's burdensome because as long as a person is out of sync, as long as his character is not refined and is out of sync with what the Torah wants, so then it'cha nami, right? Then at that stage there will be torach, there will be tircha. I guess משל למה הדבר דומה. Let's say you tell someone it's very important to exercise regularly and three, four times a week he should walk a mile, should walk two miles. Okay, so if when he begins this exercise regimen he's out of shape, overweight, out of shape, etc., then avada there's going to be a tremendous tircha associated with this regimen. If he'll get himself into shape and he'll lose some weight and he'll get himself into shape. There won't be a tircha associated with it. So ein hachi nami, the Rambam says yeah, at times we might experience that there's a tircha in Torah, but the tircha is not in the Torah, the tircha is in the disparity, is in our being spiritually out of shape. You find in the seforim two complementary approaches in terms of deos, midos. The Rambam here is emphasizing that the way a person is msakein his deos, his midos, is through a behavioral approach. So if I want to learn how to become a baal tzedaka, so even though it doesn't come naturally to me, I just have to force myself to give and to give and to give and to give and gradually through those actions it changes me until I want to give the amount that I'm supposed to be giving. The Ramban in his igeres is also using that type of behavioral approach when he tells us that the way to be nitzol min hakas is to train oneself to always speak softly. So again, it's he's not appealing to you should realize that anything or almost anything that you'd be prone to get angry about is probably really divrei hevel v'havai and it's אין כדאי לכעוס עליהם and ein kedai to get all agitated about. He says, no, just train yourself, he says, never to raise your voice. He says, and that, again, that behavioral approach will save a person from kas. So that's one approach. The אחרי הפעולות נמשכות הלבבות approach. There is the approach which goes in the opposite direction, again, not an opposing approach, a complementary approach, which is that a person seeks to internalize certain beliefs and values and then that will dictate conduct, right? Not using conduct as a way of instilling values, but using the internalizing values as a way of determining how a person will act. So when the Remo quotes from the Rambam, taka from the Rambam in the beginning of Shulchan Aruch, that כל שכן כשישים האדם אל לבו that a person has to take to heart, a person has to reflect and think time and time again about שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד until he internalizes it, and then miyad, miyad he becomes a yarei and בפחד ה' יתברך ובושה ממנו תמיד something along those lines. So by trying to internalize certain values, and the internalization is like Ramchal says and other seforim as well, is just by the thinking and rethinking time and time again those basic ideas. Again, they're complementary. Basically, Mesillas Yesharim comments on that. אמנם התבוננות שכמו שפרק ז' שכמו שהזריזות הוא תולדות ההתלהטות הפנימי,
meaning if a person has that hislahavos, so that will generate zrizus, he'll be a zoreiz. כן מן הזריזות יולד ההתלהטות. On the other hand, even if a person doesn't naturally feel the zrizus, but through the zrizus... If he'll push himself to be a zoyriz, that will create the inner, the inner hislahavos, the inner hislahavos. So it it goes in in both directions. He says you see it in the Sefer Hachinuch himself, because the Sefer Hachinuch himself, besides the famous אחרי הפעולות נמשכות הלבבות that he has, so the which again, which basically is the approach the Rambam's emphasizing here in Hilchos Deos. So I think he also said, I think it's by lo sechanem. He says, why does the Torah say לא תחנם להם חן? He says because if he says really that per se, he says it's a type of siyag d'Oraisa. He says that per se maybe the Torah wouldn't have been so makpid about. But if I'm I'm admiring that person, so then that admiration is going to lead to an imitation, to an emulation of the of the actions. So also it goes in in for the Sefer Hachinuch it also goes in in both directions. I mean the the easier of the two, I don't know if that's an entirely adequate explanation for why it's the only thing the Rambam mentions here. The easier of the two is simply the behavioral approach. It's much relatively speaking easier to control one's behavior because it's external than to internalize beliefs and values. Okay. Perek Beis, halachos aleph and beis, the Rambam has his his moshel. Again, he discussed it earlier in Shmoneh Perakim about the same way in in trying to counteract physical illness a person can have to go to an extreme, so too in in trying to counteract spiritual illness a person also would go go to an extreme. Okay, fine. Halacha gimmel: יש דעות שאסור לו לאדם לנהוג בהן בבינונית אלא יתרחק עד הקצה האחר והוא גובה הלב שאין דרך הטובה שיהיה האדם עניו בלבד אלא שיהיה שפל רוח ותהיה רוחו נמוכה למאוד ולפיכך נאמר במשה רבנו עניו מאד ולא נאמר עניו בלבד.
Thank you. ולפיכך ציוו חכמים מאוד מאוד הוי שפל רוח ועוד אמרו שכל המגביה לבו כפר בעיקר שנאמר ורם לבבך ושכחת את ה' אלוהיך ועוד אמרו בשמתא דאית ביה גסות הרוח ואפילו מקצתה וכן הכעס דעה רעה היא עד למאוד וראוי לאדם שיתרחק ממנה עד הקצה האחר וילמד עצמו שלא יכעס ואפילו על דבר שראוי לכעוס עליו וכן אם רצה להטיל אימה על בניו ובני ביתו או על הציבור אם היה פרנס ורצה לכעוס עליהם כדי שיחזרו למוטב יראה עצמו בפניהם שהוא כועס כדי לייסרם ותהיה דעתו מיושבת בינו לבין עצמו כאדם שהוא מדמה איש בשעת כעסו והוא אינו כועס. אמרו חכמים הראשונים כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה זרה ואמרו שכל הכועס אם חכם הוא חכמתו מסתלקת ממנו ואם נביא הוא נבואתו מסתלקת ממנו בעלי הכעס אין חייהם חיים.
The leshonos of the Rambam are difficult to to be mayshav all of them, but okay k'midumeh. What does the Rambam mean that ילמד עצמו שלא יכעוס אפילו על דבר שראוי לכעוס עליו?
If ka'as is דעה רעה היא עד מאד and ראוי לאדם שיתרחק ממנו עד הקצה האחר. So then what that really means is if, if ka'as is something which is so, such a deiah ra'ah. So then what that really means is that lich'ora it's a contradiction to say that there are דברים שראויים לכעוס עליהם. No, there are דברים שראויים למחות כנגדם. דברים שראויים להחרים אותם. But if ka'as is such a דעה רעה היא עד מאד. So what does it mean that there are, that there are דברים שראויים לכעוס עליהם, but a person shouldn't be ko'es on them? So I'm not sure, but itachen, let's see in the end, towards the end of the halacha, if this, if this fits there as well. But itachen the Rambam means as follows. If this is in theory, again, this is the stira that we mentioned last time, the famous stira which exists both regard to ka'as as well as gaiva. In theory, ka'as really should have been governed by the mida habeinonis. And by the mida habeinonis in the same way that other midos are governed by it. And like the Rambam said in alef daled, a person לא יכעס אלא על דבר גדול שראוי לכעס עליו. But then a person should be ko'es. A person should be ko'es. אל זועם בכל יום. וחרה אף ה' בכם. So a person, a person should be. Ella mai? Right? So Chazal tell us that even Moshe Rabbeinu, when he was ko'es, was ba lidei ta'os, was ba lidei aveira. So what does it mean? It means that even Moshe Rabbeinu wasn't getting angry that someone steered the agala and they cut him off when he was trying to, when he was trying to go straight and had the the right of way. Moshe Rabbeinu was getting angry at Klal Yisrael's lack of emuna. Moshe Rabbeinu was, was getting angry that the pekudei hachayil hadn't carried out ratzon Hashem. What was he getting angry at? דברים גדולים שראויים לכעוס עליהם. ואף על פי כן, he was, chochmaso histalka mimenu, and he was ba lidei aveira. So it's almost as if the Rambam is telling us that the emes is in theory ka'as should have been governed by the mida habeinonis the same way other midos are, but ka'as, when it comes to other midos, you can tell a person look, you should gather so much money, not more, not less. You can tell a person you should eat so much, not more, not less. And with enough self-discipline a person can implement that. Ka'as is such a poisonous, volatile emotion. The lack of yishuv hadaas which it creates is so destabilizing that, that we can't deal with that even bederech beinonis. we can't deal with it even bederech beinonis. And mimaila that's what it means that there are דברים שראויים לכעוס עליהם. Lich'ora if in theory, if we could control it. Like משל למה הדבר דומה. Sometimes if the, the handle on the faucet, the, the mechanism is wearing out, so if you'll open it one more time, so then the whole thing's gonna give way, you're not gonna be able to close it. You're not gonna be able to open it gradually and then, and then before you know it the, the, the sink is, is flooding. So that's what ka'as is. That we can't control it. Can't control it. So the emmes is in theory that there are דברים שראויים למלוך עליהם. However, since befoal נבואתו מסתלקת ממנו חוכמתו מסתלקת ממנו וכולי וכולי is ילמד עצמו שלא יכעס. So there's more towards the end of the halacha but I think it's consistent with this. I don't know, ayin alav. Okay, so maybe bli neder next time then we'll begin with the exception of the first half of Halacha Gimmel and then bli neder we'll do that and then continue from Halacha Dalet.