So Hovos HaLevavos begins, I'm reading from from Rav Kapach's more modern translation. If you have the other one, that's also that's also very good. Amar Hamechaber the Ibn Tibbon translation. Amar Hamechaber ישתבח שם אלוקי ישראל האחד במושגו האמיתי האמת הקדמון במציאות שטובו תמידי אשר יצר את הנמצאים להורות על אחדותו וברא את הנבראים לעדות על יכולתו וחידש את המחודשים להאיר על חכמתו וטובו הכולל כמאמר החסיד עליו השלום דוד המלך דור לדור ישבח מעשיך וגבורותיך יגידו ואמר יודוך השם כל מעשיך וחסידיך יברכוך ואמר כבוד מלכותך יאמרו וגבורתך ידברו להודיע לבני האדם גבורותיו וכבוד הדר מלכותו.
Again, it's it's very hard when you when you when there's a point that requires dikduk gadol, it's just we're very handicapped when we have to deal with translations. So it's very hard to know whether I don't know if we could read the original whether whether we would be grappling with this point. But lichora the simple reading of of what Rabbeinu Bachya says here at the outset is that he's explaining what the purpose of berias haolam is. The simple translation of the Hebrew translation asher yatzar hu formed hu created הנמצאים להורות על אחדותו וברא את הנבראים לעדות על יכולתו וחידש את המחודשים להאיר על חכמתו.
If that's what he means so then that that would put him at odds with the Rambam who says that we can't ascribe a reason to berias haolam. All we can say is Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world le-maan retzono. Hakadosh Baruch Hu willed to create the world. The reason we can't ascribe a reason to berias haolam is because it's beyond our comprehension. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is totally and and this is even without the Rambam the following yesod is very very important. Sometimes people understandably but very very erroneously in a very very profound way erroneously humanize Hakadosh Baruch Hu and and speak in in human terms without the disclaimer that it's an anthropomorphism and and that it doesn't really mean what it seems to mean. Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't doesn't need anyone or anything. Berias haolam didn't respond to some need of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is perfect, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is self-sufficient, Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't didn't need or lack anything that berias haolam came to came to provide. So why does Hakadosh Baruch Hu create the world? So the Rambam says that le-maan retzono. The emes is it goes deeper than that also. Sometimes when we hear those kinds of explanations, so the cynic inside of us thinks that it's a cop out. Yeah, whatever you can't explain you say, yeah, we don't understand. But the emes is like this. Let's forget any particular question which interests us. Let's forget the question of why Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, any other question which might be of interest. And let's try to understand what a person can expect to understand, what are the limits of human knowledge. Again, not in context of any particular question, but let's try to understand what the parameters of human knowledge can possibly be. If you want to say it in the leshon of the Ramban in hakdama laTorah, what belongs to the Mem Tet Shearim which are accessible to people, and what belongs to the Sha'ar HaHamishim which is totally beyond and totally inaccessible to people. So there is a lashon from the Rishonim that ilu yedativ hayisiv. Right? If I fully knew and understood Hakadosh Baruch Hu, I would be Hakadosh Baruch Hu. ilu yedativ hayisiv. So what does that mean? It means like this. The Rambam writes in Hilchos Teshuvah among other places that hu veda'ato echad. That unlike people, that the person and his knowledge are two different things. We learn things, we forget things, we... but by Hakadosh Baruch Hu, hu veda'ato echad. For a person to have to fully apprehend, comprehend Hakadosh Baruch Hu, ilu yedativ hayisiv. So what then do we know? And it's that type of knowledge that the Rambam is talking about, the knowledge of ilu yedativ, when the Rambam has his famous formulation that the goal of all knowledge is to know that we don't know. Meaning that there are different dargos in that understanding. So that what then do we know? I mean, even that formulation of the Rambam that the goal of all knowledge is to know that we don't know says that there's knowledge. It's not an agnostic statement, rachmana litzlan. So the teretz is that what we do know is we do know about how Hakadosh Baruch Hu reveals himself in the world. That what we know is about how Hakadosh Baruch Hu is misgaleh in the world, how Hakadosh Baruch Hu was megaleh chochmaso in the world. That's open to us, that's available to us. But Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself is beyond comprehension. It doesn't mean that we're going to understand every hanhaga in the world. It doesn't mean that. But it means that the only thing that possibly we can understand is within the world, but not Hakadosh Baruch Hu as he is beyond the world. That's beyond the limits of human knowledge and mistama that's what Chazal mean when they say in the Gemorah Chagigah that a person's not supposed to ask what was lefnim and when Chazal say there are certain questions a person is not supposed to ask. A person is not supposed to ask questions which pertain to what's beyond the possible limits of human understanding. To ask why Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world doesn't belong to a giluy of Hakadosh Baruch Hu within the world. That seeks to understand הקדוש ברוך הוא כשהוא לעצמו beyond the world. So by definition, that question is one which a person can't expect an answer to. So we can't say why Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world. To be able to say why Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world would be an understanding in Hakadosh Baruch Hu k'she-le-atzmo beyond the world. That's ilu yidativ heyisiv. Does that mean Chovot HaLevavot has a different scheme? So the emes is, minei u-vei in Chovot HaLevavot, how do these pesukim from Tehillim LeDavid, how do they prove what his point? Again, what does he say? יתברך השם אלוקי ישראל אשר skipping a line אשר יצר הנמצאים להורות על אחדותו ברא הנבראים לעדות על יכולתו חידש המחודשים להורות על חכמתו וטובו הכלל.
He formed everything that exists to reflect, to indicate unity of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, he created all creatures as testimony, as testament to his omnipotence, to his yacholto, and gave life to things to again, to point out his chochma. So what does the pasuk say? דור לדור ישבח מעשיך וגבורותיך יגידו. So how do we know that that was the purpose? Pasuk doesn't say that was the purpose. That's an assumption that people are doing what they're supposed to be doing. But even that wouldn't prove the way we originally read it. So yitachen that the correct understanding in Chovot HaLevavot is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, why Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, we don't know, le-maan retzono. He created the world in such a way, now we're talking about within the world, we're not talking about before the world, why Hakadosh Baruch Hu is creating the world. He created the world in such a way that the world is moreh al achduso, that the world is me'id al yacholto, that the world is me'ir with an ayin al chochmaso. Ve-ha-raya that's the case, you see that דור לדור ישבח מעשיך וגבורותיך יגידו. You see that looking into the world, we're able to be meshabeach Hakadosh Baruch Hu, we're able to be maggid gevurotav etc. Lechora that's what the Chovot HaLevavot means. Okay. Then he continues and says that one of the greatest tovos Hakadosh Baruch Hu bestowed is that not only do we have a sechel, an intellect, but we also then are able with that to amass knowledge. And then he describes sort of three types of knowledge, there's call it more theoretical knowledge of the different bodies in the world, the second branch of knowledge is more applied knowledge, and the third one is religious knowledge, knowledge of Hashem, knowledge of his Torah. By and large the Chovot HaLevavot, the Rambam didn't know of or to the degree that they knew of didn't have much use for what we call humanities or social sciences. That wasn't their cup of tea to understate things. The Rambam Yesodei HaTorah talks about science and metaphysics. He doesn't have, again, some of these branches weren't even identified, but what was he doesn't have any use for. The Chovot HaLevavot continues and he contrasts that whereas that second branch of knowledge, sort of the applied knowledge, he says the whole point of that is for to'aliyos ha-olam. is to sort of harness that knowledge to our benefit. And he says ma she'ein kein, by contrast, he says that studying what he calls in Rav Kappach's translation mada Eloki, religious knowledge about Hashem, about his Torah, there it can't be for any mundane practical purpose, for any secular practical purpose. למדהו כדי להשיג בו תועליות העולם האסורה כמו שאמרו קדמונינו עליהם השלום תניא לאהבת השם אלהיך לשמוע בקולו ולדבקה בו שלא יאמר אדם אקרא כדי שיקראוני חכם אשנה כדי שיקראוני רבי אשנה כדי שאהיה זקן ויושב בישיבה אלא למד מאהבה וסוף הכבוד לבוא ואמרו עשה דברים לשם פועלם ודבר בהם לשמם ואל תעשם עטרה להתגדל בהם ולא קרדום לחתוך בהם ואמרו אשרי איש ירא ה' במצוותיו חפץ מאד אמר אלעזר במצוותיו ולא בשכר מצוותיו כדתנן אל תהיו כעבדים המשמשים את הרב על מנת לקבל פרס אלא היו כעבדים המשמשים את הרב על מנת שלא לקבל פרס ויהי מורא שמים עליכם.
So what's very interesting is that let's say for purposes of contrast, if you look in Perek Yud of Hilchos Teshuva, so the Rambam quotes a lot of these same ma'amrei Chazal. The Rambam adds the disclaimer that לעולם ילמד אדם תורה, לעולם יעסוק אדם תורה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.
The Rambam juxtaposes that ma'amar Chazal of מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. Chovos HaLevavos quotes all these without- without that juxtaposition. So I don't know, tzarich iyun, tzarich iyun. So I don't know. One possibility is- I don't know though. In that ma'amar of מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה, so the pshat that we're used to because that's the pshat which you find in Tosafos al hadaf, in the Rishonim, is that mitoch shelo lishma- I'm sorry, that's the mashma'us in the Rambam also like Tosafos, are some of these kavanos of kedei she'ehye ashir, kedei sheyechabduni. You know, these kind of ulterior motives. That's shelo lishma. That's shelo lishma. So that's takeh you're not supposed to, but if- but at the initial stages even if a person realizes that that's what's motivating him, that's okay because מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. Mesilas Yesharim and the Gra say no. When Chazal said מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה they weren't takeh talking about that. They weren't giving us a hetter for that. The Gra says that the only thing Chazal meant by מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה is that some things you can do with an ulterior motive- kedei she'ehye ashir, kedei sheyechabduni. You can do lishma, you can do leshem Hashem, mitoch ahavas Hashem, leshem haTorah, you can do lishma. Or you can sort of do it on automatic pilot. You get up every- every- every morning, you go davven with a burning ahavas Hashem, halevai, but not all the time. Kedei sheyechabduni, that- that I'll be an ashir. No, I'm not- I'm not looking for any kavod by going to minyan this morning and- and there certainly doesn't seem to be any- any bags of gold going to be given out after- after the final kaddish. I sort of do it just I've built that into my routine. So the Gra says that's what it means shelo lishma. That's what it means shelo lishma means not that you're actively doing it with a wrong kavana but you're not consciously bringing to bear the right kavana. Which would then mean if you learn like the Gra, again Tosfos, the Rambam don't learn like that and that's presumably what we certainly assume l'halacha is like Tosfos understands it. But if you don't learn like the Gra, so then the Chovos HaLevavos you don't have any kashya here. Because the Chovos HaLevavos began with אבל למודו כדי להשיג בו תועלת העולם אסורה. Learning again religious knowledge about Hashem about his Torah is assur to attain again mundane purposes. So according to Ramchal and according to the Gra the meimra of מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה doesn't really modify that. It's not really a caveat to that. According to the way we're used to understanding על פי תוספות וכולו, so that so that מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה is a caveat. According to the the the Gra and according to to Ramchal it's not a caveat to אבל למודו כדי להשיג בו תועלת העולם אסורה. Then the Chovos HaLevavos continues in in lots of things, he's in the in the footsteps as as he sometimes refers to of Rav Saadia Gaon. He says there are three sources of knowledge. Before he talked about branches of knowledge and now he talks about sources of knowledge or in the translation here שערים אשר פתחם השם לידיעת דתו ותורתו. Three sources of knowledge for for for religious knowledge. האחד הם השכלים השלמים מכל פגע, seichel hayashar. The second is Torah shebiksav and the third is Torah shebe'al peh. האחד הם השכלים השלמים מכל פגע, השער השני ספר תורת השם האמיתי שנתבשר בו השליח
meaning Moshe Rabbeinu, והשער השלישי המסורת המקובלת בפי קדמונינו מפי הנביאים עליהם השלום וכבר קדם בביאורו מפי רבנו סעדיה.
So what a person understands misvara is is a source of knowledge Chovos HaLevavos says. Now this actually has very very far-reaching consequences but maybe we'll we'll pick up with that next week. So if you can try to try to prepare the I don't imagine that we're going to finish the hakdama next week but try to try to learn and prepare ahead and if possible to bring it doesn't make a difference which which copy if you can if you can try to bring a copy on on Thursdays.