Chovos Halevavos continues that you can sort of divide Torah into two areas: Chovos Haivarim and Chovos Halevavos. He says that Chovos Haivarim, that which can be again sort of viewed externally, which involves action, in turn can also be subdivided into mitzvos sichliyos and mitzvos shimiyos. That distinction of course is from Chazal in the Gemara in Yuma, the distinction between mishpatim and chukim. But there is a major, major machlokes within the Rishonim, the precise definition of that division of mitzvos into mishpatim and chukim. Again mishpatim with regard to the chukim shebahem. From Rashi in Yuma is mashma that chukim don't have a reason. It's not only that the reason is unknown to us, but there isn't a reason. There isn't a reason. The Rambam argues very, very strongly against such an understanding and says that you can't, he says it's a sign of chochma, it's a reflection of chochma, that a person does things that a baal chochma does things purposefully, not stam. And therefore he says that chukim, it's not that chukim don't have reasons, but the distinction between mishpatim and chukim is that the reasons for mishpatim are intuitive and we were created with an intuition for lo sigzol, v'lo tignov, v'lo sirtzach, we were created with an intuition, but we weren't created with an intuition for בגד כלאים שעטנז לא יעלה עליך. There is no innate intuition. After that we develop a, because we know it represents an issur so we develop a feeling for it, but there's no innate moral religious intuition about בגד כלאים שעטנז לא יעלה עליך. What does the Chovos Halevavos think on this machlokes? The lashon again to be medayek in learning and translation, the lashon sounds just the description is: האחד חובות שהשכל מחייבם ואף אם לא נאמר חיובם בכתוב.
Right, sechel would have been mechayev even if we wouldn't have had a pasuk. החלק השני מצוות שמעיות שאין השכל מחייבן ולא שוללן. Like איסור אכילת בשר בחלב ולבישת שעטנז וזריעת כלאים בכרם כיוצא באלו ממה שנעלם ממנו טעם איסורם וטעם חיוב מה שנתחייבנו בהם.
So from the lashon here is mashma that he is more in the Rambam's camp in terms of his understanding of chukim. Not that they don't have reasons, but that the reasons are at least initially rechokim mimenu. The Rambam then proceeds to give what he thinks are the reasons for chukim. Then the Chovos Halevavos continues and says that חובות הלבבות הרי כל יסודותיהן מושכלות. Unlike Chovos Haivarim, again the lo saaseh, the aseis and lo saaseis not pertaining to what a person is supposed to believe and feel, etc. But unlike the Chovos Haivarim which are comprised of mishpatim and chukim, shimiyos and sichliyos. So the Chovos Haivarim, the Chovos Halevavos he says they're all mitzvos sichliyos. אבל חובות הלבבות הרי כל יסודותיהן מושכלות כפי שעבר בעזרת השם יתברך.
Fine, we're going to come back in one minute beli neder now. Rabbeinu Bachye then continues and says I'll list for you some of the Chovos ha-Levavos: לדעת שיש לעולם בורא בראו לא מיש לא מיש that HaKadosh Baruch Hu created the world from from nothing. No no pre-existing no no matter or pre-existing anything. וכן ליחדו בכל לבבנו יחוד השם ושאין מאומה כמוהו וכן קבלתנו עבודתו בלבבנו
that we should be inwardly dedicated to Avodas Hashem. ללמוד על מציאותו בדרך החשבון וההתבוננות בנבראים bli neder in future weeks maybe we'll come and talk about these. But right now just to get a feel for what what he means by Chovos ha-Levavos the the obligation to to learn about to infer to derive to to know about HaKadosh Baruch Hu's existence by reflecting upon the briyah. ve-chein livtoach alav chiyuv bitachon וכן הכניעה והענווה לפניו a sense of submissiveness and and humility קבלת יראתו והפחד מפניו yiras Hashem yiras ha-onesh והבושה ממנו שהוא צופה על נגלינו ומצפונינו and again a sense of bushah because everything is is exposed וכן התשוקה לעשות רצונו וליחד מעשינו לשמו וכן לאהוב אוהביו כדי להתקרב אליו
etc. See here there's a question which I don't know maybe we we need to sort of just keep in mind bli neder as as we progress. Is there a Bava Basra there maybe in the back? And also Brachos? Thank you. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. You want to have this the end of the first perek in Bava Basra. אמר רבי יוחנן חמש עבירות עבר אותו רשע באותו היום.
Oso rasha referring to Esav. בא על נערה מאורסה הרג את הנפש כפר בעיקר כפר בתחיית המתים שט את הבכורה.
Okay so five aveiros chamuros that Esav was over in that one day. Tosfos has a kasha here. ואם תאמר והללו נצטוו בני נח על נערה המאורסה כדאמרינן בפרק ארבע מיתות ולעזבה יש להן נכנסת לחופה ולא נבעלה אין להן.
There is no no notion of or din or stage of erusin by Bnei Noach. Bnei Noach have ishus. ishus which is generated by be'ulas ba'al but there is no counterpart to erusin. So Tosfos is not looking to to instate Esav amongst the lamed-vav tzadikim but Tosfos wants to know what's up with חמש עבירות עבר אותו רשע באותו היום? How can you indict him for naarah me-orasah? ואמרי דאף על פי שלא נצטוו מכל מקום מכוער הדבר אף על פי שאינו מצווה על כך.
Tosfos says the same thing as one of the שבע מצוות בני נח not to be בוזה את הבכורה that אף על פי כן he's he's held accountable. Held accountable. What does it mean? So forget in in what context but in in some context in in one of the Rav Chaim Kanievsky מפי השמועה ספרים he talks about the he juxtaposes these two marei mekomos. I forget in what context he was talking. But in the hakdamas of Nissim Gaon's printed in in Shas right before maseches Brachos. Sorry just one minute. D'havei anu poshtim. It's towards the beginning of the hakdama of Nisim Gaon. D'havei anu poshtim דהוי אנו פושטים אלו תשובת הטענות ונאמר כי כל המצוות שהן תלויות בסברא ובאובנתא דליבא.
Right. All mitzvot which depend in the sense of derive from sevara from understanding כבר הכל מתחייבין בהם מן היום אשר ברא אלוהים אדם על הארץ עליו ועל זרעו אחריו לדורות דורות. המצוות שהן נודעות מדרך השמועה מדברי הנביאים.
So then that depends upon to whom Hakadosh Baruch Hu directed the tzivui. So Nisim Gaon says an incredible yesod. He says anything which hasechel mechayve is universally binding. It's binding on Bnei Noach also. That's the context in which Nisim Gaon is talking here. That's the taynas to which he is referring when he says teshuvas elu hataynos. He says anything which is again self-evident in sevara in the sense of שהשכל מחייבם אפילו אם לא נאמר חיובם מהכתוב. So Nisim Gaon says so that's מן היום אשר ברא אלוהים אדם על הארץ. So everyone is mechuyav them. Hakol mitchayvin bahem. And b'emes this and that lichora is what Tosafot in Bava Batra means as well by the ויבז עשו את הבכורה. No, it's not you can't find it in שבע מצוות בני נח. You don't have to find it in שבע מצוות בני נח. Ribono shel Olam gives a present, gives a zechut of bechora to do avodah. So avodah you can't be mevazeh the bechora. You don't have to have a mitzvah, you don't have to have a direct tzivui to davar hatoluy b'sevara. The pshitas is the Rishonim also have it. We just had last week in Parshat Noach. Right? The Ramban talks on כי מלאה הארץ חמס לפני. So Rashi quotes from Chazal that לא נחתם גזר דינם of the Dor Hamabul ela al hagezel. Even though they were guilty of ותשחת הארץ לפני האלוהים as well, but when Hakadosh Baruch Hu says what the basis for the ultimate gezar din was, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu says כי מלאה הארץ חמס לפני. So the Ramban says why this is interesting for other reasons as well that we're not going into. Ramban says, so why the gezel more than other hashchasot? He says because it's a mitzvah muskelet. It's a mitzvah muskelet, so there's even less... it's the aveira is compounded. Mitzvah muskelet. So it's quite clear that again he's saying that in the context of Bnei Noach that the mechayev sechel is there by Bnei Noach. When you have the famous Rambam... one second... thank you. Rambam in there's a famous Rambam in the end of perek yud chet of Hilchot Sanhedrin where the Rambam comments on that גזירת הכתוב היא שאין ממיתין בית דין ולא מלקין את האדם בהודאת פיו אלא על פי שני עדים,
right? That אין אדם משים עצמו רשע. A person confesses to a capital crime, he confesses to a chiyuv malkus, so beit din doesn't give him misa, they don't give him malkus on hoda'as piv. וזה שהרג יהושע עכן ודוד לגר עמלקי בהודאת פיהם הוראת שעה הייתה או דין מלכות הייתה.
So Rambam gives two possible pshatim in those incidents in Tanakh. Either it was a hora'as sha'ah or no, they did it mi'din melech. A melech has a right to, has the prerogative to kill. when he thinks it's justified. אבל הסנהדרין אין ממיתין ולא מלקין המודה בעבירה says the Rambam שמא נטרפה דעתו בדבר הזה. Maybe he's meshuga. שמא מן העמלים מרי נפש הוא המחכים למות שתוקעים החרבות בבטנם ומשליכים עצמם מעל הגגות שמא כך זה יבוא ויאמר דבר זה שלא עשה כדי שיהרג.
And maybe he's nebach he's sick mentally. He wants to die and that's why he's confessing to some capital crime. Then the Rambam says כללו של דבר גזירת מלך היא. But at the end of the day he says after all the sevaros it's gzeras hakasuv. The shaila is given the fact that klala shel davar the first word is the gzeras hakasuv and the final word is the כללו של דבר גזירת מלך היא so why did the Rambam sort of provide this albeit very fascinating sevara? Why does he bother doing it? So the Rav's father suggested that the nafka mina for the sevara where the sevara does seem applicable, appropriate is Ben Noach. That's the nafka mina of the sevara. That's why the Rambam is engaging in this sevara agam that the first word and the last word is gzeras hakasuv, gzeras melech. But says the Rambam there seems to be a sevara also, the nafka mina being that where that sevara seems, this is what Rav Soloveitchik said, where that sevara is correct so then it would be by Ben Noach as well. Okay, this isn't quite as powerful as what the Rav Nissim Gaon says and what seems to be implicit in the Ramban because l'maiseh this is only an example of sevaros sort of within application of a din so lav davka this is mamish a raya that the Rambam would say the same but it's a good Rambam to know. So then the shailas like this. The shaila is again just putting the question out not the answer for today. How much of Chovos ha-Levavos does the Rabbenu Bachya think is incumbent upon Bnei Noach? Given this background assuming that he agrees with it, assuming that he also subscribes to this idea that what's ha-sechel mechayev what Rav Nissim Gaon says and then he says everything I'm telling you in Chovos ha-Levavos all belongs to that category. Chovos ha-Levavos belong exclusively to that category. So it's a big question, big question. And I think we perhaps mentioned just in passing מענין לענין באותו ענין that the mashma'os in the Rambam which is also very big chiddush in פרק ג הלכות תשובה the simple reading of the Rambam is that he thinks that the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim in Perek He'lek you don't get this impression but in Mishneh Torah it's pretty pretty clear just about unequivocal that he thinks that Yud Gimmel Ikkarim everyone has to believe. That it's not only Jews have to believe but he thinks everyone has to believe. The smichus between Halacha Hey and Halacha Vav וכן חסידי אומות העולם יש להם חלק לעולם הבא ואלו הן שאין להם חלק לעולם הבא
and then the examples of... the examples that the Rambam gives of some of the ikkarim for which a person forfeits his chelek le-olam haba. He gives examples from the Notsrim and it's not mashma that he means a Jew who has such a belief. He then gives some examples of lavin, or lo ta'asehs, which pertain to Chovos Halevavos. אבל עשות חובות הלבבות הרי מהן הפך כל מה שהזכרנו.
Things which are the antithesis of the asehs of Chovos Halevavos. Ve-ma-hen, some of those mitzvos lo ta'aseh which pertain to Chovos Halevavos, ha-kina, הנטירה והנקימה על אנשי תורתנו, כמו שאמר הכתוב לא תקום ולא תטור את בני עמך.
Then the mashma'us, again, the Chovos Halevavos characterizes the, again, the Chovos Halevavos as כל הדומה לכך ממה שכלול ומצפון האדם ושאין משקיף עליו זולת הבורא יתעלה.
So whether a person has kina or doesn't have kina, not necessarily is it the case that anyone else can know, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu, only Hakadosh Baruch Hu can discern. So the mashma'us in, I think in learning Hilchos De'os a little bit once we discussed it, when Chazal sort of, the question is are they defining or illustrating nekama and netira, right? So Rashi quotes the Toras Kohanim that nekama is איני משאילך כדרך שלא השאלתני and netira is that הריני כמותך ואף על פי שלא השאלתני אני משאילך. So the shaileh is what happens if a person takeh, let's take the netira case, it's even a little bit more dramatic, he does lend, right, he doesn't respond the same way, he does lend, but he does it with, he's noter eiva belibo when he's lending. And the thing is he was able to bite his tongue, he doesn't articulate it. But the emes is he's noter eiva belibo. Or what happens with nekama? Let's say the person doesn't give and instead of saying איני משאילך כדרך שלא השאלתני he makes up a credible cover story, or he doesn't say anything. So it's clear from the Chovos Halevavos that the amira is Chazal just mean to express what the sentiment is that's accompanying the action because otherwise, if you would hold that saying something to that effect is an intrinsic part of the lav, I'm not sure whether given his description of Chovos Halevavos, whether or not he would have included the nekama and netira in that. And he goes on, he has a very interesting sort of survey of what types of sefarim have been written, he's sort of surveying... The Torah literature that's available to his day. He says you have some seforim on Chumash which explain content, yet others more focused such as Rav Saadia, others more focused on the dikduk like Ibn Janach. That's one type of sefer, and another type deals with mitzvos, dinim, halachos, such as the Halachos Gedolos etc. And the third he says is more philosophy and especially with a polemical bent in terms of responding to philosophical challenges. And again, as he mentions, the leading example he has in mind is Rav Saadia's Emunos V'deos. And he says and there's a big vacuum that there's no sefer on Chovos HaLevavos. A little later on in the hakdama he's critical of people who neglect focusing on the Chovos HaLevavos and it's very reminiscent, right? When you read it you sort of hear echoes of this several hundred years later in Ramchal's introduction to Mesillas Yesharim where he too bemoans the neglect of focus on Chovos HaLevavos. We'll continue Chovos HaLevavos next week.