Transcript

I think we left off in the Hagdamah of Rabbeinu Bachya's sort of surveys what was available in the Sforim sale in his day. People spent a lot less money, life was easier. And he says the three types of Sforim you have, there are Sforim on Tanach, some of which focus on content, commentary and content, others more focusing like Ibn Janach on questions of dikduk, of grammar. Then you have Sifrei Halacha in different Sheilos uTshuvos in different inyanim. And the third area of Torah literature are books in philosophy, in polemics, such as Rav Saadia Gaon's Emunos VeDeos. But there is nothing on Chovos HaLevavos. So then he continues from there. If you have the Chovos HaLevavos in front of you, so in Rav Kafach's edition, at least the edition that I have in front of me is it's on the bottom of page Kaf-Chet. I don't know what standard in the Lev Tov. What page? Kaf-Chet? Okay, right, Kaf-Chet. So he says: לפיכך חקרתי על חובות הלבבות מן המושכל והכתוב והמסור. Right again referring back to what the Chovos HaLevavos says are the three sources of knowledge, the three sources of truth: Sechel, Torah Shebiktav, Torah Sheba'al Peh. האם הם חובה עלינו חובת מצוה אם לאו? Are the Chovos HaLevavos really imperative? Maybe they're optional, maybe they're a good idea, they're recommended, but maybe not mamash a chova. ומצאתי שהם יסודות כל המצוות. They're really the foundation of everything. Then the line here: ואם יארע בהם הפסד, this is the way Rav Kafach translates: לא תתקיים לנו שום מצוה ממצוות האיברים. That if a person will be missing in his Chovos HaLevavos, so he won't there won't be any basis for being mekayeim the mitzvos ha'eivarim. That's how Rav Kafach translates. According to that translation, as he comments in the note, so basically what he's saying is, lichora he's not referring to all Chovos HaLevavos. I mean you go through the list that he's provided earlier, the Rabbeinu Bachya, and that he's going to repeat again later, lichora he's not referring to all Chovos HaLevavos, but he is referring to things like like belief in Hakadosh Baruch Hu, Yichud Hashem, vekhayozei bazeh. And again according to this translation, according to this understanding what Rabbeinu Bachya's saying is the following very, very important yesod. That without emunah, and again, so this obviously then segues how much emunah, to what degree, how much knowledge and to what degree, but without a certain foundation of emunah and yediyah, which belongs to the realm of Chovos HaLevavos, so all other mitzvos are meaningless. If a person is very, very medakdek ובגד כלאיים שעטנז לא יעלה עליך, but he believes rachmana litzlan in the Trinity. So vas tegmer his zehirus in mitzvah shaatnez. Let's say a person even believes in Hashem Echad, but he thinks the way of being oved Hashem Echad rachmana litzlan is killing as many Jews as he can. So mistama there's no I don't know what that emunah is worth either. So that's what the Chovos HaLevavos is saying is that there's no... There is no kiyum hamitzvah if it's not rooted in a hakara of of of who the metzaveh is and to whom the kiyum hamitzvah is directed. That's why the Chazon Ish writes in in discussing the sugyas in Sanhedrin about שבע מצוות בני נח. So the Chazon Ish writes agam that really if you look superficially at שבע מצוות בני נח so he could be an atheist and and comply with them. Atheists don't go they don't go to church too often so he's not going to be over issur avodah zarah. If no one irritates him too much he won't kill anyone, you know, he might go through life without killing anyone and kahena v'kahena he could be he could be in compliance with שבע מצוות בני נח so the Chazon Ish says avada the kiyum of שבע מצוות בני נח has to be predicated upon a belief in the Ribbono Shel Olam. Emmes is it's that that's mefurash in the Rambam even more than that is mefurash in the Rambam. Rambam says not only does the compliance with שבע מצוות בני נח have to flow from emuna in Hakadosh Baruch Hu but it also has to be that that the compliance with sheva mitzvos is because this is what Hakadosh Baruch Hu tziva beSoraso al yedei Moshe Rabbeinu. That even how the the tzivuy was commanded.

הוא שיקבל ויעשו אותן מפני שציווה בהן הקדוש ברוך הוא בתורה והודיענו על ידי משה רבנו.

The lashon haRambam at the end of perek ches of Hilchos Melachim. So every for to be a kiyum hamitzvah so it has to it it assumes a certain again critical degree of emuna baHashem and and what our conception of of Hakadosh Baruch Hu is. And according to this translation that's what the Chovos HaLevavos is saying here that אם יערב בהם הפסד again he doesn't mean obviously this explanation we're giving doesn't cover all the Chovos HaLevavos that he has listed and that we'll list but in terms of some of them such as again emuna baHashem, yichud Hashem etc. So then לא תתקיים לנו שום מצווה ממצוות האיברים. The pashtus is that one would have said as follows and we'll see in a minute bli neder there is a I don't know a difficult line to come in the Chovos HaLevavos but the pashtus is one would have said that this notwithstanding lich'ora the klal of

אין הקדוש ברוך הוא מקפח שכר כל בריה ובריה שהקדוש ברוך הוא

doesn't withhold Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't begrudge schar lich'ora that applies even when the basis for kiyum hamitzvah is is absent. When Chazal say that that Og was rewarded for vayavo hapalit. So it seems to be that the mida of אין הקדוש ברוך הוא מקפח שכר כל בריה ובריה is again alongside this yesod that a kiyum hamitzvah it isn't but if objectively it it's responsible within the hishtalshelus hadvarim for something good so אין הקדוש ברוך הוא מקפח שכר כל בריה ובריה. That lich'ora is is what we would have said. Well im if if you turn the page skipping a little for a second where is it here in the Lev Tov edition? I think it's on page lamed beis yeah and in page lamed beis in the in the... The Leiv Tov again reading from the top from the lashon of Ibn Tibbon

וכן אמרו במי שעשה מצוה ולא נתכוין לעשותה לשם שמים שאינו מקבל עליה שכר.

So here, the Chovos HaLevavos, here he goes much further than what we just saw. What we just saw again is is a gevaldige yesod. And and I think we we can understand it. Over here, it seems to be that even if a person has emuna, but just isn't doing it, and Rav Kapach's translation is basically the same here, there's no doesn't seem to be any substantive difference.

במי שעשה מצוה ולא נתכוין לעשותה לשם שמים שאינו מקבל עליה שכר.

So first of all, how does that shtim again with, let's say, Og Melech HaBashan? It doesn't seem like he said hineni muchan u'mezuman. If he did say hineni muchan u'mezuman, it wasn't lekayem mitzvos Borei. What's more, let's say the for instance the Gemara in Pesachim in the beginning of Makom She'Nahagu. So the Gemara has like this. Tanu Rabbanan. יש זריז ונשכר ויש זריז ונפסד. Rashi translates zariz in this context as ba'al melacha. Yeish shaphel which in in this context doesn't mean shiphlus as anavah. It means more like atzlos. That he's low in the sense that he doesn't go anywhere, he's not doing anything. יש שפל ונשכר יש שפל ונפסד. So a person can be lazy and get schar. So the Gemara says, how can a person be lazy and and get schar? On Erev Shabbos again, he abstains from melacha. So there's an inyan Erev Shabbos achar mincha that a person should be already avoiding melachos which have nothing to do with hachanas Shabbos. So even though this person is is an atzel and really all week he doesn't doesn't break much of a sweat either, and that's why he's doing it, אף על פי כן אף על פי כן you get the reward. And Rava gives an example.

הני נשי דמחוזא אף אגב דלא עבדן עבידתא במעלי שבתא משום מפנקותא הוא.

Even though the fact that the women in Machuza aren't doing melacha in Erev Shabbos, it's because they're mefunakos, they're spoiled. דכל יומא נמי לא קא עבדן. They begin getting ready for Shabbos on Motzaei Shabbos. The whole week long, they're not doing melacha either.

דכל יומא נמי לא קא עבדן. אפילו הכי שפל ונשכר קרינא להו.

So it seems to be here quite mufurash. I mean, Rashi and Tosafos both say it mufurash, but it seems pretty clear that it's not that they're adding to the Gemara. It seems dictated by the Gemara. Rashi d'h

שפל ונשכר ואף על גב דלא לשום מצוה מכוין מצוה שלא לשמה מיהא הויא דאמרינן לקמן יעסוק אדם במצות אפילו שלא לשמה.

The shayla is, what does what does the Chovos HaLevavos have in mind with with that line? That's really really far reaching, and how does it shtim with the ma'amarei Chazal? One of the parallels where the Gemara talks about מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה and about mitzvah shelo lishmah is the Gemara in Horayos. So the Gemara in Horayos says that bischar the mem-beis korbanos which Bilam HaRasha brought, זכה ויצאה ממנו רות. That because of that, he was a zeidah of Rus bischar the mem-beis korbanos. What Bilam's mem-beis korbanos, again, not exactly what he was trying to accomplish wasn't exactly such a כונה רצויה בעיני המקום. אף על פי כן the Gemara describes that as mitzvah shelo lishmah and talks about schar for it. So I don't know. So the the that the line that we have here about lo yitachen. It's much harder to understand what the Chovos HaLevavos has in mind when he talks about that there wouldn't even be any schar. Okay back to where we were. It's a little confusing here again in terms of the how sechel, how sevara dictates that there have to be chovos halevavos. So again it seems given Rav Kapach's translation that at this point Rabbeinu Bachya is saying the first point is that without chovos halevavos, without chovos halevavos the chovos ha'eivarim don't mean anything without the foundation of emuna. But then he goes on to give other reasons as well, which is not, it's not a kasha that he gives other reasons especially in light of the fact that this one doesn't encompass all the chovos halevavos. It's just strange that he doesn't really indicate how many throughout the sefer and this was a style of writing and maybe I guess a style of thinking also which I mean you see it still not only in the zman of the Rishonim it's down to Ramchal and the Malbim. Everything is very sort of mathematical. There's so many, I'm going to give you the, throughout chovos halevavos I'm going to give you so many things which are mafsidim of such a mida. And over here there seem to be different arguments which aren't clearly delineated as such. So I don't know, I'm not sure what that's about. He seemingly goes on to make at least two other arguments. One is that hayos that a person is comprised of guf and nefesh, so avodas Hashem has to be comprised of guf and nefesh also. That it doesn't make any sense that avodas Hashem should only relate to part of a person and obviously the less significant part of the person and that avodas Hashem shouldn't encompass the other part, the essential and defining part of a person. כבר נתבאר לנו שהאדם מחובר מנפש וגוף. Skipping a line for a second. לפיכך חובה עלינו להשם יתעלה עבודה גלויה וצפונה. So corresponding to guf and nefesh are chovos ha'eivarim and chovos halevavos. So that seems to be another argument. Now the way he presents this argument anticipates or maybe is the first time he says what one of the most famous ideas in Chovos HaLevavos. So now reading it again without skipping. Hinei min hamuskal. Read it from the Lev Tov so you can follow along. Yeah, actually maybe going back even a little earlier what we were before is lamed. Going back even to the bottom of kaf ches. Again in the version of Ibn Tibbon min hasechel.

מן השכל שמעתי כי כבר נתבאר לנו כי האדם מחובר מנפש וגוף ושניהם מטובות הבורא עלינו ואנחנו חייבים לעבודתו בעבור זה עבודה גלויה ועבודה צפונה.

And again Rav Kapach's translation is basically the same. Dehainu, that already here the Chovos HaLevavos is putting forth his famous yesod that he thinks that the mechayev in avodas Hashem is hakaras hatov. Right? That's what it says here. ושניהם טובה מאת השם לנו. In fact that Hashem created us beguf venefesh is a tova to us and therefore lefichach, Rav Kapach has lefichach, the Ibn Tibbon has ba'avur zeh, and therefore we're obligated,

לפיכך חובה עלינו מחמתם להשם יתעלה עבודה גלויה וצפונה, ואנחנו חייבים לעבודתו בעבור זה עבודה גלויה ועבודה צפונה.

The fact that we exist beguf venefesh is a tova and mimaila, mimaila hakaras hatov is then mechayev us in avodas Hashem beguf venefesh, dehainu chovos ha'eivarim and chovos halevavos. What this What this approach of of the Chovas Halevavos assumes, what if a person says I don't get it? He says that that Chazal say that על כרחך אתה נולד. So what's the basis for saying that that all of avodas Hashem is is rooted in hakaras hatov? No one asked me. No one asked me. So I I didn't ask to be created. So why do I owe a debt of hakaras hatov having having been created? I think, I'm not sure, check this please. I think the Sefer Hachinuch in in talking about the I think it's the Sefer Hachinuch, but I'm not sure. In talking about the mitzvah of kibbud av va'em, also talks about the hakaras hatov that that a person owes to to his parents. Again, the same shayla. I didn't ask to be born. So why do I owe anyone a hakaras hatov for for participating in in that process? So lichora the answer is is is very compelling. Except in cases rachmana litzlan of extreme severe mental illness, rachmana litzlan, everyone else alive has such a strong instinctive desire and appreciation of being alive. That yeah, true, intellectually a person can can taina as we were talking about, but lemayseh instinctively instinctively we appreciate life. Whatever whatever however we may posture intellectually, it's pashut when when you even look inward or look outward, it's pashut that that people instinctively want life. And if a person instinctively wants life, so that's what Rabbeinu Bachya says that can be built on to say that the mechayev of of avodas Hashem is hakaras hatov. You can have a person who's rachmana litzlan a metzora, a mukei shchin, a suma, and the person wants to live. The person wants to live. Besides all the other possible halachic problems which are by no means minor, by no stretch of the imagination minor, but one of the big fallacies of all the living wills, why people make out these living wills that if I ever make it if I ever reach the point where I can't get my backhand over the net, that's it. So then DNR, don't want any further treatment, don't bother prescribing antibiotics or anything, that's it. If there's no more quality of life, if I can't get my backhand over the net then then life is no longer worth living. All right, so sometimes people tweak it a little bit. Not everyone plays tennis. Some people if they can't break par in golf, you know, there are other kevos chashuvim in in life also besides one's backhand in tennis. And and people make judgments. So when a person is is healthy, add to that when a person is is young and and in the prime and feels all the the vigor of youth, so then we are deceived into erroneously identifying that oh what I really want out of life is all these things which we describe as quality of life. But the emes is not like that because the emes is that when you see that when you take all that away from people, so 99.99 percent of people and and The .001 of people are either Rachmana litzlan mentally sick or have adopted some kind of philosophy of nihilism and maybe the reason they were they were open to that nihilistic philosophy was because of some mental illness also. But 99.99 percent of people when you take away the backhand and you take away the breaking par in in in golf, they want to live. They want to live. So when they when they fill out the the living wills, so then they think oh you know what life is about life is about all the again whatever the ta'anugei bnei adam that that we zero in on. And and we takeh and in a different obviously less crude sense we make the same mistake. We also make the the same mistake. But lemaiseh, then you see it, you see it when people are are in that situation if you listen to them, sometimes conveniently family members don't want to listen because it's a big burden to have someone who's who's lingering and and can't be independent anymore. But if you listen to them, so you see that people want to live. And you see that people really do have this instinctive desire and appreciation for life. And that's what the that's what Rabbeinu Bachya understood and that's what Rabbeinu Bachya says that the mechayev avodas Hashem can takeh be hakaras hatov that no matter what intellectual posturing we do, we do have again this innate instinctive appreciation for and desire of life and if that's the case, so then that translates into hakaras hatov to to Hakadosh Baruch Hu which the Chovos HaLevavos says is is the basis for avodas Hashem. It could be depending upon how you translate that the Ramban talks about this also. The famous Ramban in in the end of Parshas Bo about that אין לנו טעם אחר ביצירה ראשונה just that we should be nodeh lakeil shebaranu.

אין כוונת כל המצוות שנאמין באלקינו ונודה אליו שהוא בראנו והיא כוונת היצירה שאין לנו טעם אחר ביצירה הראשונה ואין קל עליון חפץ בתחתונים מלבד שידע האדם ויודה לאלקו שבראו.

The shaila is how to translate ונודה אליו שהוא בראנו which is the kavanos hayetzira and

אין קל עליון חפץ בתחתונים מלבד שידע האדם ויודה לאלקו שבראו.

Question is does yodeh just mean like לשון הודאת בעל דין to acknowledge? In which case it's it doesn't really pertain to to משנתו של רבינו בחיי. Or no, maybe nodeh also means like in modim anachnu lach like hoda'ah in the Amida it means maybe the Ramban also has the other meaning of hoda'ah involved, not just to acknowledge but to to thank Hakadosh Baruch Hu. If that's the translation or if that's part of the translation that that the kavana of all the mitzvos is that we should thank Hakadosh Baruch Hu that he created us, then that also again assumes this insight of the of the Chovos HaLevavos that we have this instinctive appreciation for and desire for for life. It it would be it would have been very interesting but there isn't such a thing to have a minyan hamitzvos from from Rabbeinu Bachya Chovos HaLevavos and to sort of compare the all the things that that he lists. Again here he gives us another listing of representative examples of chovos halevavos and see which of those are actually translated into discrete mitzvos within minyan hamitzvos, which not. Lav davka that they all would be there. Lav davka that they all would be there. There is a famous passage from Rav Chaim Vital in the Sha'arei Kedusha that after Rav Chaim Vital is much quoted, the Chafetz Chaim quotes it in the Hakdama, I think it's the Chafetz Chaim taka where he quotes it, but others also. It's a very, very yesodisticke passage and much, much quoted where Rav Chaim Vital explains, l'chora against the Rambam in Hilchot De'ot, that you don't have mitzvot in the Minyan Taryag about midot. You don't have an issur kaas in Minyan Taryag, you don't have an issur taiva, you don't have any of these things in the Minyan HaMitzvot. And he explains, Rav Chaim Vital explains why it is. So the mashal to understand what he's talking about, it's a little bit inyanei kabbalah, but the mashal to explain is the following. Let's say you open a catalog for medical school and you see the list of courses. And you see amongst the ich veis advanced immunology, whatever. And you see that amongst the courses hai itachen there's no basic chemistry, there's no basic organic chemistry, there's no basic biology. So what kind of medical school is this? What kind of, I'm not going to go to their doctors, what kind of, so then someone explains to you: No, the reason this isn't in the catalog is because the catalog is geared, the school is geared for people who are already on a certain madrega, and it assumes all these things. So it's not the fact that these courses are not listed in the catalog doesn't mean there's anything optional about them. If anything, it means that maybe they're even more basic and more mandatory than everything that is in the catalog, certainly no less mandatory. That's what the Sha'arei Kedusha Rav Chaim Vital explains, that there are sort of different levels or different aspects of the neshama, of nefesh, ruach, and neshama. Torah is geared to one level, midot stem from a lower level. And that's why Rav Chaim Vital says that you don't have mitzvot in the Torah which again which target the midot. Again, if anything, the absence of a mitzva points to the fact that it's certainly no less yesodisticke, no less mandatory, if anything, arguably more yesodisticke and more mandatory, the fact that it's not in Minyan HaMitzvot. And just sort of extrapolating more broadly beyond the explanation Rav Chaim Vital gives in this example, it's very fallacious to think that what's not in Minyan HaMitzvot or ich veis what's not a Siman Shulchan Aruch can't be that it's really a chiyuv, can't be that it's really an issur. It's a very erroneous conception. In terms of the Chovot HaLevavot, it's hard to know, it's hard to know. So so far, again, he has two arguments that min hasachel, that sechel is mechayev that there has to be Chovot HaLevavot. Again, one seems to be that without emuna in Hashem and without an emuna tzuva in Hashem, so the rest is וכל זה איננו שוה לי. Chovot HaEvarim become meaningless. The second one is that hayot that avodat Hashem should encompass the entire person and we're comprised of nefesh and guf, so how can it be that only the guf is drafted for avodat Hashem and the nefesh not? Then the third one seems to be a very interesting argument. I'm reading in the Leiv Tov on the paragraph that begins on page kaf tet:

וידעתי דעת ברורה כי חובות האיברים לא תשלמנה לנו כי אם ברצון הלב וחפץ הנפש לעשותן ותאוות לבנו לפעול אותן ואם יעלה במחשבתנו שאין לבותינו חייבים לבחור בעבודת השם ולחפוץ בה יסתלק מעל איברינו חיוב המצווה שאנו חייבים בהן מפני שאין מעשה נשלם.

Yeah, here there seem to be crucial differences between the translations, but the translation we just read seems to say as follows, also a fascinating perspective: that people aren't machines that that can be programmed. To get a person to do something, so his will has to animate him. There has to be animation. Without animation, people people don't don't do anything. There has to be something that drives a person, there has to be something that fuels a person. If there were no Chovos HaLevavos, if there was no chiyuv to appreciate Hakadosh Baruch Hu, recognize Hakadosh Baruch Hu, if there was no chiyuv to to love Hakadosh Baruch Hu, no chiyuv of any of these things, the chovos haevarim wouldn't be feasible. There wouldn't be that which would animate us, which would drive us, which would impel us to be mekayem mitzvos. So that yet seems to be a third argument miderech hasechel that there are not only chovos haevarim, but there have to be chovos halevavos as well. Then he continues, having having demonstrated that that the obligation of Chovos HaLevavos miderech hasechel, so then he quotes psukim illustrating from from Torah SheBikhtav as well. And and some of the psukim he quotes are very interesting. I think we already commented previously on the issur nekima and and netira, that he lists those as chovos halevavos. So apparently what a person says is is not the point. That even if a person will be noter without saying eini kamoscha, it's the de'ah, it's the it's the feeling. But it's also interesting that in this context of how many psukim there are which contain mitzvos which are chovos halevavos, so he mentions in the psukim, he mentions amongst the psukim Veahavta Lereacha Kamocha, which is very interesting. And then and then on the heels of that Veahavtem Et Hager as well. So both of these have the Veahavta Lereacha Kamocha. Yeah. So why is that interesting? The pashtus is according to the famous Ramban al hatorah, Ramban al hatorah, his havana in Veahavta Lereacha Kamocha probably would not allow him to classify Veahavta Lereacha Kamocha as chovos halevavos. Rather, Ramban says it obviously doesn't mean what it seems to mean, because Ramban says it's humanly impossible. Everyone's the greatest love that that we have for people is self-love, the Ramban says. And and you can't even have you can't even love anyone as much as yourself. And he says maybe that's takeh the pshat why it's Veahavta Lereacha Kamocha. What's the what's the lamed? Why why is it in the the dative? So he says veahavta, you should love, meaning you should love those things for your friend kamocha. That is, you should love for your friend if if your friend needs an etza, if your friend needs a tova, so then you should love that for your friend the same way you would love it for yourself. Not that you're actually loving your friend as much as yourself, but it's really translating it into a practical imperative, not one which has necessarily a the the inner definition. And he says and that's why Hillel translates it as he does for the ger of מה דסני לך לחברך לא תעביד. It's not that he's omitting this core of the mitzvah. Not the famous Ramban. So the Chovos HaLevavos lichora according to that, this wouldn't be an example of chovos halevavos. So emes is Mesillat Yesharim is meforash against it in I think it's in Sha'ar HaNekiyus, Mesillat Yesharim clearly understood Veahavta Lereacha Kamocha kipshuto. The Ramban we spoke about once in a different context. But either way, the pashtus is you see from this Chovos HaLevavos that that mistama he's on the same page as the as Ramchal in in taking it more what we think is kipshuto. Then he quotes ma'amorei Chazal which point to the need and the indispensability and the obligation of of Chovas Halvavos. So one of them's actually, I mean, the common, the wrong, but especially one of them he quotes that אמרו אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט ובלבד שיכוין לבו לשמים. Right? So the Gemara says in Berachos, maybe you'll say that you have better than your friend. You have 8 hours a day to learn, he is tarud to eke out a meager living, he only has four hours a day to learn. So maybe you'll say you're better than your friend. No, אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט ובלבד שיכוין לבו לשמים. So I think we generally understand it and maybe that's all the Chovas Halvavos is saying. We generally understand what that means is as follows: אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט provided that the mam'it is doing the best he can. It's not אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט that you spent an hour davening Shacharis this morning and I said Modeh Ani with groise kavonah for two minutes, mamash a two-minute Modeh Ani and that's enough shoy, אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט. אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט, so what I need the other 58 minutes for? Might as well save the time for a big breakfast. No, so it doesn't mean that. אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט ובלבד שיכוין לבו לשמים that the fact that a person is limited to miyut is so so circumstances dictate that, but if he could then he would do more and that's what it means ובלבד שיכוין לבו לשמים. So if you understand it that way, so does this illustrate the Chovas Halvavos's, does this, you know, demonstrate Chovas Halvavos? Maybe. Sounds like the Chovas Halvavos is אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט and then understood what we just said and then ובלבד שיכוין לבו לשמים isn't expressing that. What we just said is understood and either way you should know that whether you're marbe, whether you're mam'it and again, it's understood that the mam'it can't be I'm a Republican, I believe in less government, so I'm also, so I'm a Republican in in over here in this context also. No, that's understood. And then ובלבד שיכוין לבו לשמים means that whether you're marbe, whether you're a mam'it, either way it's not worth anything without the chavin libo lashamayim. It almost seems like the Chovas Halvavos understood it, understood it that way. Okay, bli neder we'll we'll continue. It obviously would be very helpful for everyone to have the Chovas Halvavos in front of them on Thursday.