So bli neder im yirtze hashem from now through Yom Kippur Thursdays the kvias will be in Hilchos Teshuva. There's so much in the Rambam Hilchos Teshuva that when we begin the beginning we never get much beyond Perek Alef Perek Beis so maybe this time we'll begin in Perek Chamishi and proceed from there. רשות כל אדם נתונה לו. See in this context the meaning of the word reshus doesn't mean permission. It rather means the ability, the capacity. Right similar to the way the word reshus is used in Pirkei Avos when it says Al tisvada la'reshus so there it means reshus means authority. It means the authorities again the same idea those who have the ability capacity in terms of sovereignty so that's what the word reshus means in this context it means everyone has the capacity, the ability. אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה ולהיות צדיק הרשות בידו ואם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך רעה ולהיות רשע הרשות בידו.
Hu shekasuv batorah הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו לדעת טוב ורע. Klomar הן מין זה של אדם היה אחד בעולם ואין מין שני דומה לו בזה העניין שיהא הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ ואין מי שיעכב על ידו מלעשות הטוב או הרע וכיון שכן הוא פן ישלח ידו.
So the topic of Perek Chamishi right quite clearly is Bechira Chofshis. Free will. I think if we had been asked to sort of give a rough operating definition of free will it means that a person decides what to do. A person is not genetically unalterably programmed to do something. He's not there's no other societal or any other force which absolutely dictates and determines a person's behavior. A person has the ability to do what he wants. But lemaiseh what the Rambam presents the yesod bechira chofshis he says much much more than that. He doesn't only say that. Again initially the Rambam says אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה ולהיות צדיק הרשות בידו אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך רעה ולהיות רשע הרשות בידו
but look further on in the halacha raboisai. He says adam is unique in the bria אין מין שני דומה לו בזה העניין. Now look at these next several words שיהא הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ. ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ
corresponds to the definition that we usually give for Bechira Chofshis. The Rambam expands it considerably by saying that a person A has the ability to discern and discriminate tov from ra and then B if he so chooses to then act accordingly. So it's not only de hynu the Rambam says that the reshus again that capacity of Bechira Chofshis is not only a capacity to if he's spoon-fed this is it's a nice thing to share and it's a bad thing to steal. If he's spoon-fed that so now the person has the Bechira Chofshis to decide whether he's gonna do the nice thing or whether he's gonna do the bad thing says the Rambam no שיהא הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע. and identify tov and ra respectively, and then to be able to act on that. So the question is, I mean clearly the Rambam doesn't think that a person on his own was gonna be mechaven to issur kilayim, right? And so the Meiri in Yuma with the distinction between mishpatim and chukim. He doesn't mean שיהיה הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו. If you put a person on a desert island, so the Rambam isn't saying that he would be mechaven to issur kilayim and that he would be mechaven to that part of the avodas Yom HaKippurim should be throw the sa'ir la'azazel. He clearly isn't claiming that. So how much is he, so what's included then in tov and ra in this context? Because it becomes crucial. Because basically, basically this Rambam has profound implications for just how much of a defense 'I don't know, no one ever told me, I was never taught, I never had a chance to learn' really is. The Rambam says שיהיה הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע. So whatever the Rambam is subsuming under tov, so then that defense, you know, is off the table. So itachen as follows. If you go back, if you have the Rambam, for those who didn't bring the Rambam because they know it al peh, so let's slip in your mind and go back to the beginning of Hilchos De'os. So the Rambam here in perek aleph of Hilchos De'os begins ka-yadua with presenting the midah ha-beinonis. And he gives all the illustrations of what the midah ha-beinonis is. Let's look at some examples in halacha daled. Keitzad. לא יהיה בעל חמה נוח לכעוס ולא כמי שאינו מרגיש אלא בינוני.
Shouldn't be so quick to get angry and provoked, on the other hand, a person shouldn't be totally apathetic. Fine. וכן לא יתאוה אלא לדברים שהגוף צריך להם ואי אפשר לחיות בזולתם כעניין שנאמר צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו.
A person shouldn't be looking for pleasure, on the other hand, a person should have an appetite, he should want to eat that which he needs to keep himself healthy. וכן לא יהיה עמל בעסקו אלא להשיג דבר שצריך לו לחיי שעה כעניין שנאמר טוב מעט לצדיק
etc. לא יהיה מהולל בשחוק ולא עצב ואונן אלא שמח. Person shouldn't be light-headed, he shouldn't be down, person should be, should have a sense of serenity and happiness about him. V'chein she'ar de'osav. Shoneh. Says the Rambam at the end of halacha hei, take a look rabosai, מצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינונים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים.
Shenemar vehalachta bidrachav. So the Rambam says that the midah habeinonis is tov. Right? That the drachim habeinonim, the Rambam defines that as being tov. Yitachen when you juxtapose these two Rambams that that's at least a major, major part of what the Rambam has in mind when he says שיהיה מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ.
You can add to this the following ha'arah. And this is not my ha'arah. Let's say... Hilchos Tefillah begins מצות עשה להתפלל בכל יום. Hilchos Krias Shema פעמיים בכל יום קוראין קריאת שמע בערב ובבוקר שנאמר ובשכבך ובקומך.
For instance, in Hilchos De'os. This is- hear this, rabosai. In Hilchos De'os, the Rambam doesn't begin with מצות עשה ללכת בדרכים הטובים והישרים and then explain what they are. First he has his whole arichus about דעות הרבה יש לכל אחד ואחד and there are extremes at different ends of the spectrums and then there's the middle calibrated expression of the midah. So when does the Rambam begin by saying mitzvas asei? I mean, there too after he tells you mitzvas asei lehispalel, he has to tell you tefillah consists of shevach, bakashah, hoda'ah. He could have said איזהו תפילה עומד ושבח בקשה והודיה and omed nochach Yerushalayim and then he could have said and מצווים אנו להתפלל תפילה פעם אחת ביום. He doesn't say that. He says mitzvas asei lehispalel and then he tells you what it is. Another place where the Rambam does again what would actually, when you think about it, be the more surprising way is in the beginning of Yesodei HaTorah. He has it there also. So the Rambam begins in Yesodei HaTorah right very famously יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל הנמצא וכל הנמצאים משמים וארץ ומה שביניהם לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת הימצאו. אם יעלה על הדעת שהוא אינו מצוי אין דבר אחר יכול להימצא. אם יעלה על הדעת שאין כל הנמצאים מלבדו מצויים הוא לבדו יהיה מצוי ולא יבטל הוא בביטולם. הוא שהנביא אומר והשם אלוהים אמת. הוא לבדו האמת ואין לאחר אמת כאמיתת אמתתו. המצוי הזה הוא אלוה העולם אדון כל הארץ והוא המנהיג הגלגל בכוח שאין לו קץ ותכלית ובכוח שאין לו הפסק שהגלגל סובב תמיד ואי אפשר שיסוב בלא מסובב והוא ברוך הוא המסובב אותו בלא יד ובלא גוף.
And then finally on halacha vav, וידיעת דבר זה מצות עשה שנאמר אנכי השם אלוהיך. So the same the same structure as you have in Hilchos De'os, not like you generally have. These are the exceptions. The rule is more the example that we gave from Hilchos Tefillah, Hilchos Krias Shema. So I heard the following ha'arah from a student of my father's zichrono livracha, Professor Septimus. He said the following and I think it's ממש אמיתה של תורה in the Rambam. That when the Rambam holds that even without the tzivuy it's something that a person... can and should know on his own, so the Rambam presents it and then says and the Torah also reinforced this with a tzivui. Yedias Hashem, the Rambam says, is something which is basic and compelling and obligatory even without a mitzvah. So that's why he begins, it's not that all this is a chiddush of the mitzvah. No, all this is what it is and it's also a mitzvah. So אם כן עם דברים אלה, so then lichora this he'arah and what we're suggesting in terms of the correlation between what the Rambam is saying in Hilchos Teshuva that הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו כמבין ביודע הטוב and that the Rambam describes the drachim habeinoniyim here in Hilchos Deos as tov. So those two he'aros reinforce itself that it comes out that the Rambam basically then is telling us that when it comes to middos, when it comes to middos, a person has the innate ability רשות לכל אדם נתונה לו. A person has that to... does a person have an innate ability to be mechaven to masachtas kalayim? No. Does a person have an innate ability and is there therefore a tvi'ah on the person that he should exercise and that... that innate ability? Does a person have an innate ability to be yodea hatov and distinguish it from ra? And tov, hevei omer, the drachim hatovim. So there the person does and that's takeh why when the Rambam presents... that's what we're... what we're commenting on now in Hilchos Teshuva is what underlies the format that the Rambam adopted earlier here in Hilchos Deos. It is a shtikel kasha here from what the Rambam says in the second half of Halacha Vav, a shtikel kasha. Or maybe let's read all of Halacha Vav. כך למדו בפירוש מצווה זו והלכת בדרכיו מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום מה הוא נקרא קדוש אף אתה היה קדוש ועל דרך זו קראו הנביאים לאל בכל אותן הכינויים ארך אפיים ורב חסד צדיק וישר תמים גיבור וחזק וכיוצא בהן להודיע שאלו דרכים טובים וישרים הם וחייב אדם להנהיג עצמו בהן ולהידמות כפי כוחו.
So without this whole hakdama we gave, so mistama we would have understood Halacha Vav to say, okay, so vehalachta bidrachav is a very nice mitzvah, but you have to tell me what the דרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא are, and that's what the Rambam says, that's pshat in all the descriptions of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. All the descriptions of Hakadosh Baruch Hu have the same purpose to tell us what it is that we're supposed to emulate, what it is that we're supposed to cultivate. So without the hakdama we gave, so you could have understood this to mean that otherwise we wouldn't have known anything and otherwise vehalachta bidrachav would have been ich veis the same way the issur melacha in Shabbos without the Torah shebe'al peh you wouldn't know what to do with it. So you wouldn't know what to do with vehalachta bidrachav either. So the pshatus is in light of this again, these other he'aros, that's not the implication here. Smucham lekach, even minei uvei, that's not what the Rambam means here in Halacha Vav in Hilchos Deos is that even when you... But even when you have these descriptions of gibbor. Okay, so what does it mean tachlis in terms of what the middah beinonit of gevurah is? Every time you see a table, that's the gevurah. No, every every third table, so it'll be more of a middah beinonit. So ayen sham exactly in terms of pshat here in Aleph Vav. But lechora that's what the Rambam is telling us here in פרק ה הלכה א. Why is it then especially in light of the he'arah about how the Rambam structures not only the beginning of Hilchos De'os but Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, why doesn't the Rambam emphasize Yedi'as Hashem as well? Why does the Rambam only say שיהיה הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע? Rambam should have said Yedi'as Hashem ve-yodea ha-tov ve-ha-ra, especially in light of everything everything we're saying. So the answer lechora is pashut. Again you have to... sometimes we misunderstand or we miss things in the Rambam because we learn the Rambam differently than he intended to be learned. The Rambam it's clear intended the Yad to be studied consecutively, continuously. He didn't intend us to look up in the Ein Mishpat and parachute into a particular halacha. The Rambam wrote it that people should learn Rambam consecutively and mimmela you would then we would then see everything in context. When we sort of parachute in and then get lifted out of a halacha in the Rambam so you don't see the context. So if you jump ahead to Perek Zayin for a minute, so where's the Rambam going with all this? So and we'll talk more there are other very important yesodos here that we're not going to talk about but just to come back to this question. So in פרק ז הלכות א וג הואיל ורשות כל אדם נתונה לו כמו שביארנו ישתדל אדם לעשות תשובה ולנער כפיו מחטאיו כדי שימות והוא בעל תשובה כדי שיזכה לחיי העולם הבא.
Skip to Halacha Gimmel. ואל תאמר שאין התשובה אלא מעבירות שיש בהן מעשה כגון זנות וגזל וגניבה.
No, כשם שצריך אדם לשוב מאלו כך הוא צריך לחפש בדעות רעות שיש לו ולשוב מהן. מן הכעס ומן האיבה ומן הקנאה ומן התחרות ומן ההיתול ומרדיפת הממון והכבוד ורדיפת המאכלות וכיוצא בהן מן הכל צריך לחזור בתשובה.
So it's clear right that the Rambam in Perek Hey is laying the foundation for what he wants to tell you in Perek Zayin. And in Perek Zayin the Rambam is not you know the famous joke notwithstanding the Rambam is not addressing an atheist here right in Hilchos Teshuvah he's addressing someone who's a ma'amin. And it's quite clear that the Rambam in Perek Hey is laying the groundwork for the chiyuv Teshuvah when it comes to deos and middos. And that's why he's emphasizing here within the context of the bechirah chofshis again that capacity to not only choose what to do but also שיהיה הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע because the yodea ha-tov ve-ha-ra that's what the Rambam is following up here in Zayin Gimmel again meforash in terms of the דעות רעות שיש בו. Okay. Halacha Beis. אל יעבור במחשבתך דבר. אל יעלה במחשבתך דבר זה שאומרים טפשי האומות ורוב גולמי בני ישראל שהקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על האדם מתחלת ברייתו להיות צדיק או רשע.
It's not worth... it's not worth pondering. Some things like in Halacha Hei in this Perek, some things are taka good questions. Okay, they have answers, but they're good questions. This is... this is stam narishkeit. Ein hadavar kein. אלא כל אדם ואדם ראוי להיות צדיק כמשה רבינו או רשע כירבעם,
chacham o sachol, vrachman o achzari, או כילי או שוע וכן שאר כל הדעות. So the nosei keilim here taka about chacham o sachol. That... that seems to be the one example that doesn't quite... fit. A person doesn't... doesn't choose his IQ. Ribono Shel Olam chooses a person's IQ. Rachman o achzari, yeah, generous or... or tightfisted. But what about chacham o sachol? So the Kesef Mishneh already says who's he... what's he quoting? What... the Ramach? דמרי הרב ר' מאיר תירץ דהכא הכי פירושו לאחוז בחכמה ובסכלות.
A person can have... a person can be bright and... act and choose to act foolishly. A person can not have the highest IQ ever recorded and can act very prudently and... so okay, so that's a pshat here in... in או חכם או סכל. What does the Rambam mean tzaddik k'Moshe Rabbeinu? ממש ממש צדיק כמשה רבינו? So... one of two things. Either... ein hachi nami, the Torah just said לא קם נביא בישראל כמשה עוד. A person can't... equal Moshe Rabbeinu's level of nevuah. But Moshe Rabbeinu's level of tzidkus, yeah. And the Rambam means it pshuto k'mashmao. Take a look in the... the Or Somayach in Perek Alef of Hilchos Talmud Torah. Very, very yesodis that Or Somayach. So he taka talks about how each and every one of us not only has different intellectual capacity, but that each and every one of us also has a different moral capacity. And he says that even in terms of the perfection of our middos, Hakadosh Baruch Hu has a sliding scale according to... the neshama with which He imbued this person. And he says that's why you don't find explicit tzivuim about middos in the Torah because they're not shavos l'chol nefesh. And he says that's why Chazal in the Gemara in Yoma interpret לא תקם ולא תטור as davka a davar she'be'mamon, all... all from this yesod. So according to the Or Somayach, I'm not sure that that's a tenable reading. So then how can you say that the Rambam thinks that a person can be a tzaddik k'Moshe Rabbeinu? Okay, so maybe he's disagreeing with the Rambam. Alternatively, if you take a look, there's a Gemara that appears in a couple of places. One of them is in the first perek of Sanhedrin. The Gemara says that they heard a bas kol, and the bas kol said יש כאן אחד שראוי שתשרה עליו שכינה כמשה רבינו. That's what we have printed in... in our... in our Gemaras. On the side, so I think there's a note that the Maharsha is magia and says it can't say k'Moshe Rabbeinu. How can you say שראוי שתשרה עליו שכינה כמשה רבינו? So the Maharsha says, no, the correct girsa should be that יש כאן אחד שראוי שתשרה שכינה, that there really is... someone in this assembly, in one case it meant Hillel ha'Zaken, the Gemara says, that there really is someone who who is worthy of nevuah. But it can he can't say that the girsa is k'Moshe Rabbeinu. So then also the note on the side, I think it's on the Masoret ha'Shas, says, but if you look in the Rambam's Shmonah Perakim, the Rambam has that girsa. The Rambam quotes the Gemara with that girsa in the end of perek shevi'i of Shmonah Perakim, the Rambam quotes the girsa as we have it printed in the Gemara and the Rambam says pshat in the girsa. He says what what's a good mashal? Just one minute. Let's say you'd you'd have someone who was such a talmid chacham, mamash l'eila l'eila, in nigla, in nistar, in כל רז לא אנס ליה, כל רז לא אנס ליה,
and you'd say, oh, he's like the Vilna Gaon. He's like the Vilna Gaon. So what would you mean by saying that? That he's mamash the equal of the Vilna Gaon? Hard to imagine. But you would mean in terms of his hekef, that the the breadth of of what he knows is just so phenomenal that that you you describe how outstanding the person is by giving an exaggerated comparison. So that's what the Rambam says is pshat in the Gemara in Sanhedrin, it appears elsewhere also, when you say ראוי שתשרה שכינה כמשה רבינו, means that that the Hillel ha'Zaken was so outstanding in terms of his anavah, he was so outstanding in terms of his chochmah, he was so outstanding in terms of his middos, that he was ra'uy shetishre shechina. He was so outstanding, ra'uy, again, it's an exaggerated comparison to to make a point, but that's that's the way, it's not only the way we talk, but even Chazal. It's an an acceptable and a correct way to talk. So itachen that that could be what the Rambam means also. It means tzaddik k'Moshe Rabbeinu, means a person can be an outstanding tzaddik. Is he mamash gantz un gar a tzaddik on Moshe Rabbeinu's level? No, perhaps not. Maybe he doesn't, maybe he doesn't have that that capacity to be a tzaddik to that degree of Moshe Rabbeinu, but a very big tzaddik a person can be, and that's the the exaggerated comparison. Okay, so those are two possible havanos here in the Rambam. ואין לו מי שיכפהו ולא גוזר עליו ולא מי שמושכו לאחד משני הדרכים, אלא הוא מעצמו מדעתו,
again the same emphasis that we saw at the end of halacha aleph, אלא הוא מעצמו מדעתו נוטה לאיזו דרך שירצה. hu she'Yirmiyahu omer, the pasuk in Megillat Eicha, מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. כלומר אין הבורא גוזר על האדם לא להיות טוב ולא להיות רע.
So the Rambam learns pshat in the pasuk מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב that ra'os and tov are describing human behavior, describing what's done, what's perpetrated in this world. And Yirmiyahu is saying Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't doesn't pull the strings in terms of how we behave, and if rachmana litzlan a person is guilty of ra, that wasn't mipi elyon. He's responsible for it. Conversely, if a person did tov, so he also deserves the credit and the reward for having done tov. אין הבורא גוזר על האדם לא להיות טוב ולא להיות רע.
Rashi in Eicha says that ra'os and tov mean the the events that happen in the world, ich vais, if if there's a natural disaster. natural catastrophe. So מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב, it’s a rhetorical question, meaning don’t think that this is accidental, don’t think that this is happenstance. No, this is all be’hashgacha and the way Rashi reads the pasuk, it’s a rhetorical question, מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. Then the Nefesh Hachayim reads the pasuk as follows: he reads the pasuk like the Rambam in the sense that it’s benichusa, not betmiya. It’s not a rhetorical question. But on the other hand, he reads it like Rashi in the sense that raos and tov are not describing what we do but what befalls us, and he explains as follows: that the same way, let’s say derech mashal, in the physical world on a natural plane, if a person rachmana litzlan runs into the street in front of an oncoming car and then rachmana litzlan gets hit by the car; if a person is a chain smoker for 40 years and then rachmana litzlan comes down with lung disease, we don’t say that there was some supernatural divine intervention. We say that that was a natural consequence, a natural outcome of what he did. We don’t say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu had to supernaturally intervene to punish him for his recklessness in running out into the street. No, we wouldn’t have to. So too, the Nefesh Hachayim says that the spiritual world functions the same way, that the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, שכר מצוה מצוה שכר עבירה עבירה means again, the same way the act of smoking rachmana litzlan has a deleterious effect on a person and you don’t have to look for again, supernatural intervention, that’s the way the world is created. So the same is true on a spiritual level in terms of all mitzvos and aveiros. That mitzvos just naturally result in tov, aveiros rachmana litzlan the opposite, and that’s what it means, מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. The emes is the Netziv in last week’s Krias Hatorah at the beginning of Parshas Re'eh quotes a Midrash from the beginning of Parshas Re'eh which says mamash that explicitly. That the Netziv has a Midrash that the Midrash says from the time Hakadosh Baruch Hu said ראה נתתי לפניכם היום את החיים ברכה וקללה, so from that point on, מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. From the time Hakadosh Baruch Hu said that ראה נתתי לפניכם היום ברכה וקללה, from that point forward was mekuyam מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב, meaning that once Hakadosh Baruch Hu said, "This isn’t just a mitzvah, it’s not just a good deed, no, it’s a cheftza shel bracha," de'hainu if a person does it, naturally, automatically, the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu designed the world, bracha ensues. And rachmana litzlan an aveirah is not just a rebellion and is not just something wrong and bad, it’s all that, but it’s also a cheftza shel klala and that naturally, obviously without the intervention of teshuva, that naturally rachmana litzlan klala ensues. I think that’s what Rav Chaim Kanievsky has in his sefer Orchos Yosher, that that’s what it means in Birkas Rosh Chodesh which comes from the Gemara in Berachos when we talk about yiras shamayim and yiras cheit. So what does yiras cheit mean as distinct from yiras shamayim? Doesn't yiras shamayim just express itself as yiras cheit? So Rav Chaim Kanievsky says that’s the pshat. That yiras cheit means that when a person looks at a cheit, so he should see like the Mesillas Yesharim says, he should see a person sees neveila, he sees safek neveila, he has a shayla about it, he should see poison. He shouldn't just see a potential do or don't, he shouldn't just see a potential transgression, but he should see a potential poison. He should see not only a again a cheftza shel mitzvah or aveirah, but he should see a cheftza shel bracha or klala, and that takeh generates a tremendous yira in a person, a tremendous pachad in a person. I mean, maybe it shouldn't be that way, but lema'aseh if every time we ate something which on some level we know is questionable for some reason. If we thought it was a questionable poison, not just a questionable aveira, we would takeh be deterred. And that's what it means: yiras shamayim, yiras cheit. וכיון שכן הוא נמצא זה החוטא הוא הפסיד עצמו לפיכך ראוי לו לבכות ולקונן על מה שעשה לנפשו וגמלה רעה
and that's the hemshech of the pesukim in Eicha, hu shekosav achar, מה יתאונן אדם חי גבר על חטאו. Exclamation point. וחזר ואמר הואיל ורשותנו בידנו ומדעתנו עשינו כל הרעות ראוי לנו לחזור בתשובה ולעזוב רשענו שהרשות עתה בידנו,
hu shekosav acharav, נחפשה דרכינו ונחקורה ונשובה עד השם. A little bit what the point that we were ma'arich on before about שהוא מעצמו בדעתו ומחשבתו יודע הטוב, there's a little bit of overlap. Again, the Rambam is saying much more than the Ramban is talking in a different context. He doesn't have occasion, could be he'd agree with all of it, but there is some overlap when the Ramban says, I think it's in Parshas Noach, he quotes Chazal that כי מלאה הארץ חמס לפניהם, but all the aveiros of which the Dor Hamabul was guilty, so לא נחתם דינם אלא על הגזל, so Ramban says because it was a mitzvah sichlis. Mitzvah sichlis. And that there's a greater tveia when a person violates a mitzvah sichlis.