שמא תאמר והלא הקדוש ברוך הוא יודע כל מה שיהיה קודם שיהיה ידע שזה צדיק או רשע או לא ידע אם ידע שיהיה צדיק אי אפשר שלא יהיה צדיק ואם תאמר שידע שיהיה צדיק ואפשר שיהיה רשע הרי לא ידע הדבר על בוריו ארוכה מארץ מדה ורחבה מני ים וכמה עיקרים גדולים והררי הרים תלויים בה אבל צריך אתה לידע ולהבין בדבר זה שאני אומר כבר ביארנו בפרק שני מהלכות יסודי התורה שהקדוש ברוך הוא אינו יודע בדעה שהיא חוץ ממנו כבני אדם שהן ודעתן שנים אלא הוא יתברך שמו ודעתו אחד ואין דעתו של אדם יכולה להשיג דבר זה על בוריו וכשם שאין כח באדם להשיג ולמצוא אמיתת הבורא שנאמר כי לא יראני האדם וחי כך אין כח באדם להשיג ולמצוא דעתו של בורא הוא שהנביא אמר כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי נאום השם וכיון שכן הוא אין בנו כח לידע היאך ידע הקדוש ברוך הוא כל הברואים ומעשיהן אבל נודע בלא ספק שמעשה האדם ביד האדם ואין הקדוש ברוך הוא מושכו ולא גוזר עליו לעשות כך ולא שלא לעשות כך ולא מפני קבלת הדת בלבד נודע דבר זה אלא בראיות ברורות מדברי החכמה ומפני זה נאמר בנבואה שדנים את האדם על כל מעשיו כפי מעשיו אם טוב ואם רע וזה העיקר שכל דברי הנבואה תלויים בו כתב אברהם לא נהג זה כמנהג החכמים שאין אדם מתחיל בדבר ולא ידע להשלימו והוא החל בשאלות ובקושיות והניח הדבר בקושיא והחזירו לאמונה וטוב היה לו להניח הדבר בתמימות התמימים ולא יעורר לבם ויניח דעתם בספק והוא אשר אחז יבא הרהור בלבם על זה.
So what's the Ra'avad's masik? The Rambam seems to say at the end of the day we don't understand, we don't understand how yedias Hashem and bechira chofshis coexist. So if you don't understand, so what do you have to raise the question for? Emes is this hasagas haRa'avad is hard to understand for the following reason. Just the pashtus in the Rambam is as follows. When we ask the question of how can it be that we have bechira chofshis and Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows whether I'm going to daven Mincha today. He knows whether I'm going to have kavana for Mincha. So why do we think that that encroaches upon that precludes bechira chofshis? Lichora for the following reason. How do we know anything? How do I know the how do I know there's a table here? So how do I know there's a table here? Because the table is. So I know what is. How do I know that it's that it's daytime? Because since I can see through the the crack in the window blinds there, it is daytime. So a person knows what is. So if that's the case and we transpose that onto knowing the future, so it means that it already is. Right? If Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows that I'm whether I'm going to daven Mincha, so that is. Okay, we're not privy to that inside information, but but then it is, so then how is it bechira chofshis? So that's the question. So what the Rambam is saying is that the question... presupposes that we're transposing onto Hakadosh Baruch Hu the way we have knowledge onto Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The way we have knowledge again, so there's the knower, there's the yodeia, and there's the davar hayadua. And the way a person knows is again because it is. I know there's a table because there is a table, because I see, I know this external reality. What the Rambam is saying is that once we realize that by Hakadosh Baruch Hu knowledge doesn't mean the same thing that it means by us, that by us again knowledge means again there's the yodeia and the davar hayadua are two separate things and that's why the deia is something which is chutz mimenu. So then mimaileh we takeh can only know what already is, which means that it's determined that it is. So for us yediyah takeh has to mean that something already is in an absolute sense. By Hakadosh Baruch Hu we don't understand how Hakadosh Baruch Hu's knowledge works because by Hakadosh Baruch Hu is Hu vdaato echad. So mimaileh it's true that we don't understand how yediyah and bechirah coexist, but the point is that we can't even ask the question. It's not that we have a specific question on yediyah and bechirah, but since we're not capable of comprehending what yediyah means for Hakadosh Baruch Hu, we're not capable of understanding again how daas operates by Hakadosh Baruch Hu because since Hu vdaato echad, the same way we can't understand Hakadosh Baruch Hu we can't understand Hakadosh Baruch Hu's daas. So then mimaileh that preempts the question. So it's true that the Rambam isn't answering the question, but on the other hand, it's not that he's just leaving it with the same lack of understanding as it is when he presents the question. When he presents the question, so the assumption is that there's a certain assumption that we understand how knowledge by Hakadosh Baruch Hu works and because of that we have a tarty desasri and what the Rambam accomplishes is saying that since we don't understand how Hakadosh Baruch Hu's knowledge works, because of that we can't begin to ask anything because we don't have the basis to ask. And that's what I think the Avodas Hamelech comments on this halacha, there's a difference between saying there's a question and we don't know the answer to and between saying that something is beyond the realm of human inquiry. So it's not that you have a question that you can't answer, it's that it's sufficiently beyond us that we can't ask a question and that the Rambam feels is a tremendous toeles in explaining to people that difference. What does the Rambam mean when he says towards the end of the halacha ולא מפני קבלת הדת בלבד נודע דבר זה אלא בראיות ברורות מדברי החכמה?
So he says in Perush Hamishnayos the Rambam also has this discussion in Shmonah Perakim and there too he says specifically that he has in mind in Greek philosophy. So I don't know what the Rambam's referring to, Rav Saadia Gaon hamaisah discusses it and Rav Saadia Gaon says the following and it could be that this is part of what the Rambam has in mind. Rav Saadia Gaon assumes that there's one assumption to Rav Saadia Gaon's proof. Again the Rambam is saying that basically one can logically prove... demonstrate that there is Bechira Chofshis meaning that Yedias Hashem does not determine or dictate what's going to happen. So Rav Saadia Gaon says, I'll just read you a few lines, Rav Saadia Gaon says the following: Ushma yomar od, this is in Maimar Harevi'i in Emunos V'Deios, ושמא יאמר עוד כיוון שהוא יודע במה שיהיה לפני שיהיה וכבר ידע שהאדם ימרה דברו הרי מוכרח הוא האדם להמרות כדי שתתקיים ידיעתו.
Uveur ta'us zos says Rav Saadia Gaon, יותר פשוט מן הראשונה, the previous thing he discussed here. והוא שהאומר כן אין לו ראיה שידיעת הבורא את הדברים הוא סיבת הווייתם ואינו אלא דבר שנדמה לו או שאמרו בזדון.
Rav Saadia Gaon says either he doesn't have very good analytical skills or aderaba he's looking for an excuse to excuse because if a person believes everything is predetermined so it gives him license to do whatever he wants, he does whatever he wants and says well obviously it was nigzar that I had to do because Hashem knew I was going to do it, so obviously it was nigzar. That's what he says, o she'amoro b'zadon. וביאור ביטול דבר זה. Okay, but what's lemaiseh, what's the sort of the logical refutation here? כאילו ידיעת השם את הדבר היא סיבת היות הדבר כי אז היו הדברים קדומים שאין להם ראשית כיוון שאין ראשית לידיעתו אותם.
Nechama. כאילו ידיעת השם את הדבר היא סיבת היות הדבר כי אז היו הדברים קדומים שאין להם ראשית כיוון שאין ראשית לידיעתו אותם.
Rav Saadia Gaon claims if it would have been true that Yedias Hashem is causative, so then he says logically it would have had to be that that causation would be instantaneous. And the rayah that Rav Saadia Gaon puts forth is that if it were true that Yedias Hashem were causal, so then everything would have happened already. The future wouldn't be the future, but everything, everything would have happened. The understanding that Yedias Hashem is causative meaning what is it that according to Rav Saadia Gaon, again this isn't how the, this is not how, well maybe, I'll take that back. If one were to maintain that Yedias Hashem were causal that by virtue of Hashem knowing that makes Everything that is going to be would have would have been already. So that's how that's how Saadia Gaon deals with the shaylah. Could be, I don't know. Could be that that's one of the things that the Rambam has in mind. Okay, let's see a little bit in perek vav. פרק ו'. פסוקים הרבה יש בתורה ובדברי נביאים שהן נראין כסותרים עיקר זה, ונכשלים בהן רוב האדם, ויעלה על דעתן מהן שהקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על האדם לעשות טובה או רעה ושאין לבו של אדם מסור לו להטות לכל אשר ירצה. והריני מבאר עיקר גדול שממנו תדע פירוש כל אותן הפסוקים.
I guess you see in the Rishonim here a tremendous Mussar Haskel. It's just they're not lich'ora not even that's not their point. It just just emerges minei ubei. Without the the correct hadracha and the correct understanding, a person can get messed up, can mess himself up in learning. It's not just that a person can get messed up and mess himself up by learning other disciplines, but a person minei ubei in learning, if he doesn't have the correct understanding, if he doesn't have hadracha to get to the correct understanding, he can mess himself up in the process of learning. The Rambam says פסוקים הרבה שנכשלים מהן בני אדם like the Ra'avad said earlier in perek gimmel about the people who who erroneously think that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a בעל גוף לפי מה שברוב במקראות ובדברי האגדות. It's a no davar hu, it's a gvaldig Mussar Haskel. והריני מבאר עיקר גדול שממנו תדע פירוש כל אותן הפסוקים. בזמן שאדם אחד או אנשי מדינה חוטאים, ועושה החוטא חטא שעשה מדעתו וברצונו כמו שהודענו, ראוי להיפרע ממנו, והקדוש ברוך הוא יודע היאך ייפרע. יש חטא שהדין נותן שייפרעו ממנו בעולם הזה בגופו או בממונו או בבניו הקטנים, שבניו של אדם הקטנים שאין בהם דעת ולא הגיעו לכלל מצוות כקניינו הן, כתוב איש בחטאו יומתו עד שייעשה איש. ויש חטא שהדין נותן שייפרעו ממנו לעולם הבא, ואין עובר עליו שום נזק בעולם הזה. ויש חטא שייפרעו ממנו עליו בעולם הזה ובעולם הבא.
Hakadosh Baruch Hu tailors, rachmana litzlan, tailors the onesh to the cheit. במה דברים אמורים? בשלא עשה תשובה. אבל אם עשה תשובה, התשובה כתריס לפני הפורענות.
It's a shield before... it's a shield. וכשם שהאדם חוטא ברצונו ומדעתו, כך הוא עושה תשובה ברצונו ומדעתו. ואפשר שיחטא האדם חטא גדול או חטאים רבים עד שייתן הדין לפני דיין האמת שיהיה הפירעון מזה החוטא על חטאים אלו שעשה ברצונו ומדעתו, שמונעין ממנו התשובה, ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו, כדי שימות ויאבד בחטאים שעשה. הוא שהקדוש ברוך הוא אומר על ידי ישעיהו: השמן לב העם הזה ואזניו הכבד ועיניו השע פן יראה בעיניו ובאזניו ישמע ולבבו יבין ושב ורפא לו. וכן הוא אומר: ויהיו מלעיבים במלאכי האלהים ובוזים דבריו ומתעתעים בנביאיו עד עלות חמת ה' בעמו עד לאין מרפא. כלומר, חטאו ברצונם והרבו לפשוע עד שנתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה שהיא המרפא. לפיכך כתוב בתורה: ואני אחזק את לב פרעה. לפי שחטא מעצמו תחילה והרע לישראל הגרים בארצו, שנאמר: הבה נתחכמה לו, נתן הדין למנוע ממנו התשובה עד שייפרע ממנו, לפיכך חיזק הקדוש ברוך הוא את לבו.
The Rambam continues and applies this to Sichon and the Kna'anim, Yisrael bi-ymei Eliyahu, etc. Nimtzeisa omer, the last five six lines of the halacha, נמצאת אומר שאין הקל גוזר על פרעה להרע לישראל, ולא על סיחון לחטוא בארצו, ולא על הכנענים להלעיב, ולא על ישראל לעבוד עבודה זרה, אלא כולן חטאו מעצמן, ונתחייבו כולן למנוע מהן התשובה.
Okay, so that's what the Rambam says, that sometimes the onesh is that a person is deprived. of teshuvah. There is, I was recently told a the following he’arah. The he’arah is, the question is what what the conclusion to be drawn from it, but the he’arah is, is mamash a he’arah amitis here. There’s something in the Rambam which is which is missing here. So what’s what’s the ikar hagadol here which which explains all these psukim? So what’s the ikar hagadol that the Rambam puts forth? So yes, so what’s the ikar hagadol? I’m sorry? That when a person starts a bad path and starts doing big sins, he does the onesh of teshuvah. So so that means that again Rachmana litzlan, so Pharoah’s been doing what? Pharoah’s been, call it bein hayeled after va’avodum v’inu osam, so it even culminates in כל הבן הילוד היאורה תשליכהו. So for all that, he’s punished that that he can’t do teshuvah, right? But what does the chumash say? The chumash says right, ואני אחזק את לב פרעה ולא יתן אתכם להלוך ולא ישלח את העם,
right? That not only is Pharoah not going to do teshuvah al ha’avar, Pharoah’s not going to let you go. So isn’t the chumash saying more than the Rambam is is explaining? De’hainu, it’s not just that Pharoah can’t do teshuvah l’sha’avar, it’s not just that Pharoah doesn’t have the bechirah chofshis to do teshuvah l’sha’avar. L’chora, Pharoah could couldn’t Pharoah have sent them away without doing teshuvah? He could have sent them away without any charata l’sha’avar, without a kabbalah l’haba. He could have sent them away because he realizes that right now he’s he’s getting the the worst of of this battle and out of self-preservation he’s going to send them away. There wouldn’t be any teshuvah in so doing, and l’chora since there was no teshuvah it would still there would still be that הפרע ממנו על עבירה שעשה. So there’s something here in the Rambam that doesn’t add up. Let’s say in the other cases, וגם עליהם כולם חטאו ברצונם והרבו לפשוע עד שנתחייבו למנוע מהם התשובה שהיא המרפא.
So therefore what? So therefore we understand that to mean so they can’t do teshuvah, and the chata’im which which have accumulated until now without teshuvah to offset them ensure and demand their destruction. So that doesn’t seem to preclude, again, let’s say a person, Rachmana litzlan, for seventy years he’s marbeh l’fshoa. And then the last five years of his life, without or the ten or fifteen or twenty or whatever, without doing teshuvah, without a charata, without a kabbalah l’haba, he just he’s not he’s not poshea anymore. So mistama he still has that he has that whole reckoning to give, and none of those aveiros have been offset. So there’s something here in the Rambam that doesn’t add up. You have to say there’s one of two gevaldige chiddushim here in in the Rambam. So you have to say that that's one of two gevaldig chiddushim here in the Rambam. Either way there's a gevaldig chiddush here on the Rambam. Something devarim begoy. Possibility number one, this my son told me he heard from Rabbi Stern in Passaic, that he said the following: He said that the pshat in the Rambam, this gap that we're talking about in the Rambam, is that you see from the Rambam that the ability, the ability to change course is part of the koach hatshuvah. And that you see here in the Rambam that once Paroh forfeited his koach hatshuvah, so he forfeited the ability to change course. And that's how the Rambam adds up. So that's one possible... again, there's something, there's a big chiddush here because there seems to be a gap in what the Rambam is presenting to us. So that's one possibility. Is it that the koach to change and the koach to do teshuvah are two different kochos? The koach that Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave a person to change is the koach to do teshuvah. If a person is deprived of the koach to do teshuvah, so then mimeila he can't change. Even in a way that wouldn't constitute a full teshuvah. Even in a way just of self-preservation, even on that level. So I saw that the Rambam in Peirush Hamishnayot when he says this, is, gives us a hint, he adds a sentence to close the gap. כי פרעה ועבדיו המרו ברצונם בלא הכרח ולא אונס והרעו לגרים אשר היו בארצם ועשו להם עול מוחלט כמו שאמר בפירוש ויאמר אל עמו הנה עם בני ישראל הבה נתחכמה לו ומעשה זה עשו מרצונם וברוע מחשבתם ולא היה עליהם בזה הכרח והיה עונש השם להם על כך שמנעם מן התשובה כדי שיביא עליהם מן העונש מה שחייב צדקו שזהו עונשם ומניעתם מן התשובה הוא שלא ישלחו.
Noch amol. והיה עונש השם להם על כך שמנעם מן התשובה כדי שיביא עליהם מן העונש מה שחייב צדקו שזהו עונשם ומניעתם מן התשובה הוא שלא ישלחו.
Yishalchu, yishalcha, whatever. So pshut what did the Rambam add here? The Rambam seems to be addressing that question here with this sentence that seems, that seems very clear. What did he add? Sounds like he added... again, this is also a gevaldig chiddush of a very different sort. Meaning despite the fact that back in Perek Beis the Rambam defines teshuvah... In halacha beis in beis beis ומה היא התשובה הוא שיעזוב החוטא חטאו ויסירנו ממחשבתו ויגמור בליבו שלא יעשהו עוד וכן יתנחם על שעבר ויעיד עליו יודע תעלומות שלא ישוב לזה החטא לעולם.
Despite the fact that all these components comprise teshuva, you need them all to have a teshuva, sounds like what if it would be ya'azov hachotei chet'o and lemaiseh lo ya'aseihu od? Not with the, without a charata, without a yisnachem al she'avar, without a kabala lehaba. As if someone used to, ich veis, used to cheat be-middos u-ve-mishkalos, used to cheat his customers, and he stops doing it. He doesn't really have such a charata le-she'avar. You know, his summer home that he owns, he continues to enjoy, and he knows very well where, how he was able to buy that vacation home. But lemaiseh, he doesn't do it anymore. He's mikkan u-le-haba, he's scrupulous. So again, so we would have said based on beis beis he didn't do teshuva. Avada he didn't do teshuva, there's no, he wasn't misnachem al she'avar. So I don't know, it sounds like from this line is ein hachinami that's true, but something mitigating that would have been. It would have been something mitigating. I don't know, unless you say that this line is just saying what the first pshat is. That once he's nimna min ha-aveira, so then memaila he loses the koach to change and to send them away. I don't know, that probably makes more sense than the alternative. The Rav has in one of the drosjos which is printed in Al Ha-Teshuva, he has a tremendous yesod which lichora overlaps with this first mahalach in terms of the relationship between koach ha-teshuva and the koach to change. The Rav has the following. The Rav has in Perek Zayin, so the Rambam writes: הואיל ורשות כל אדם נתונה לו כמו שביארנו ישתדל אדם לעשות תשובה ולנער כפיו מחטאיו כדי שימות והוא בעל תשובה כדי שיזכה לחיי העולם הבא.
Halacha gimmel: ואל תאמר שאין התשובה אלא מעבירות שיש בהן מעשה כגון זנות וגזל וגניבה כשם שצריך אדם לשוב מאלו כך הוא צריך לחפש בדעות רעות שיש לו ולשוב מהן מן הכעס ומן האיבה ומן הקנאה ומן התחרות ומן ההיתול ומרדיפת הממון והכבוד ומרדיפת המאכלות וכיוצא בהן מן הכל צריך לחזור בתשובה.
So the Rav again, I don't think anyone commented on it until him, once, as is true of an emes'e chiddush, once you hear it, it's so, so compelling. The Rambam is repeating the chiyuv teshuva here. So why all of a sudden is he repeating the chiyuv teshuva? And number two, the Rambam now for the first time is expanding the scope of teshuva. The Rambam is now telling us that teshuva doesn't only relate to maiseh, but teshuva, teshuva also relates to deios ra'os. It's not only that if a person ate ma'achalos asuros he has to do teshuva, but a person has to do teshuva from the mida, from the dei'a of redifas ma'achalos. He doesn't only have to do teshuva if he stole, he has to do teshuva for the dei'a of redifas mamon. So how come the Rambam didn't mention that back in Perek Aleph? It could have been כל מצוות שבתורה and כל דעות שבתורה. So it sounds like until now we didn't know this. So the Rav says what happened in between? The Rambam had his discussion of bechira chafshis. In between the Rambam's first presentation of teshuva and this second go round, so the Rambam had So I think the Rav explains as follows. And then you have to be able to say it in another way or two, which is first understanding the Gemara, then being able to explain it in your own words. Teshuva can simply be the following. Teshuva can be, right, people, we have all kinds of conflicting inclinations, conflicting urges, conflicting desires, call it Yetzer Tov, Yetzer Hara, however however one refers to it. Person has again for whatever whatever the chet is, a person has a certain Yetzer Hara. Keneged ze, a person has a modicum of yiras haonesh, whatever whatever the counterforce is. So Teshuva can simply be that a person is mechazek, a person is pushing himself, a person is aligning himself with one urge as opposed to the other urge. He's being machria es hakav for one yetzer against the other yetzer. And that's basically the type of Teshuva the Rambam was describing until now. Then the Rambam says that we should know that bechirah chofshis is so complete and is so comprehensive and is so absolute, it's not only that a person has bechirah chofshis to, as it were, adjudicate between yetzarim, that the yetzarim that a person has are givens and that a person has a bechirah to adjudicate between them. No, a person can mold himself. The bechirah chofshis is so complete and so potentially revolutionary and so absolute that a person can remake himself. Not just that I can be machria and adjudicate between the Yetzer Tov and the Yetzer Hara and I have I have the koach to adjudicate in favor of the Yetzer Tov, but a person... That's what happened and that's why the Rambam interrupted Hilchos Teshuva with a discussion of bechirah chofshis. You could have had bechirah chofshis, ich veiss in Hilchos Avoda Zara. Rambam says there's bechirah chofshis whether or not you're going to be oveid avoda zara. It was nogaya, it was nogaya in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah that you have bechirah chofshis whether whether one chooses to recognize Hakadosh Baruch Hu, doesn't choose to recognize God. Bechirah chofshis you need for everything. That's what he says here. So vos epess that the Rambam interrupts in in the middle of Hilchos Teshuva? So that's what he's telling you. No, because the bechirah chofshis is not only again to adjudicate, but the bechirah chofshis again is to totally totally transform himself. Oh, says the Rambam, so once you understand what what the koach of bechirah chofshis is, so then now you're ready to hear that the chiyuv Teshuva relates not only to maasim, but the chiyuv Teshuva is even to address the underlying de'os ra'os within a person. So here too, be'emes be'emes, if you sort of apply what the Rav is saying, so it follows from what he says also this connection—and again I'm not expressing it well, maybe bli neder next week try to say it a little bit more lucidly—but this connection between the koach of bechirah, koach of Teshuva, it it emerges here as well. Again, I'm not not not explaining it appropriately at the moment. Just quickly Halacha Daled. ובענין זה שואלין הנביאים והצדיקים בתפלתם מהשם לעזרם על דרך האמת
kemo she-amar David Horeini Hashem darkecha כלומר אל ימנעוני חטאי דרך האמת שממנה אדע דרכך ויחוד שמך וכן זה שאמר
Ve-ruach nediva tismecheni כלומר תניח רוחי לעשות חפצה ואל יגרמו לי חטאי למנעני התשובה אלא תהיה הרשות בידי. עד שאחזור ואבין ואדע דרך אמת ועל דרך זו כל הדומה לפסוקים אלו.
And this is an absolutely incredible halacha. I think the Itzla talks about this in the Kochvei Or. This is mamash mind-boggling. According to the Rambam, David Hamelech was davening that he shouldn't be in the class of Pharaoh and Sichon and all these who forfeited their koach hatshuvah. אל ימנעוני חטאיי ובעניין זה אל ימנעוני חטאיי דרך האמת שממנה אדע דרכך ויחוד שמך.
I mean the mussar shemues that follows in the Kochvei Or is obvious. But it's a remarkable thing. Ayen sham. Okay, then we'll continue.