The Rambam begins: יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל הנמצא וכל הנמצאים משמים וארץ ומה שביניהם לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת המצאו.
The Kessef Mishnah points out that the idiom sheyeish sham is an Arabic idiom. Sham doesn't connote place in this context, but it just, it's an idiom meaning there is. Not sham in the sense that we would ordinarily encounter it, but just means that there is. So it's the foundation of all foundations, it's the pillar of all wisdoms, to know that there is a eternal and rishon and eternal not just in one direction but eternal in the other direction also. והוא ממציא כל הנמצא, and everything that exists in heaven and earth, in the sky and the earth, in heaven and earth, all exists from Him, through Him, from Him. Okay, so there's a lot, a lot to talk about here. First thing, I once heard a very, very beautiful he'arah. I think it's, I think it's emmet. If you think a look in most places in the Rambam... The Rambam then continues in Halachot Bet, Gimmel, Dalet, and Hei and tells us more about Hashem, more about the relationship between the world and Hashem. And then he says in Halacha Vav: ידיעת דבר זה מצוות עשה. The more customary style that the Rambam has in presenting mitzvos is that he should have begun, he should have begun with מצוות עשה לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון etcetera. Now, granted then he wouldn't have been able to begin with Yud-Kei-Vav-Kei. I don't know whether that's an entirely satisfactory answer. So it seems a little backwards. First the Rambam gives the whole, the whole definition, then he says and even says leyda, he talks about knowing it, and then at the end he says and all this is a mitzvah. All this is the mitzvah of Anochi Hashem Elokecha. You have a similar, you find something similar in Halachot De'os. Halachot De'os also, Rambam tells you the whole, he has this whole arichus about the two extremes and the mida habeinonis. And it's not until the end of Halacha Hei the Rambam tells you, "Yeah, and all this that I've been telling you is a mitzvah." ומצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינונים והן הדרכים הטובות והישרות
etcetera. Look at the Rambam's presentation of other mitzvos, it doesn't go this way. The presentation of other mitzvos is what you would expect it to be. He begins by saying the Torah says there's a mitzvah asei, quote the pasuk, and what this mitzvah asei entails is A, B, and C. And here he gives, he has this whole presentation at the end, the conclusion of the presentation is that it's a mitzvah asei. So what's pshat? So this is a very famous Gemara in Eruvin on daf kuf that אמר רבי יוחנן אלמלא לא ניתנה תורה היינו למדים צניעות מחתול גזל מנמלה עריות מיונה דרך ארץ מתרנגול שמפייס ואחר כך בועל.
So Rabbi Yochanan says that even if we hadn't been given Torah and mitzvot, so we would have been expected to learn basic middos tovos. Basic middos tovos and the examples, again, tznius, gezel, etc. We would have been expected to learn this. So what's the idea? The idea is that there's a certain, call it, natural morality that the Torah... there's... I'm just trying how to express it carefully and accurately. There's a certain natural morality, natural in the sense that it's something that a person should be able to recognize and discern on his own. Like mitzvas lulav, there's no expectation, Avraham Avinu notwithstanding, there's no expectation that a person should naturally be mechaven to mitzvas lulav. The Torah says ולקחתם לכם ביום הראשון. That's our only connection, our only access, our only basis of understanding, of knowledge. The Torah says ולקחתם לכם ביום הראשון and the Torah she'ba'al peh provides all the details of what that mitzva of ולקחתם לכם ביום הראשון entails. The Gemara in Eruvin here says that's not true when it comes to certain basic middos. Not true when it comes to certain basic middos. There's something very natural about it in the sense that it's something which sechel ha'adam should recognize on his own. Now it just so happens that the Torah also commanded it. The Torah didn't leave it entirely exclusively in that realm, but it also belongs to that realm. So what the Rambam in Hilchos Deos, the reason the Rambam in Hilchos Deos doesn't begin with מצות עשה והלכת בדרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא ואיזה הם דרכיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא הם הדרכים הבינונים
is that the Rambam is reflecting this idea that the middah habeinonis, again, is a natural morality in the sense that yes, the mitzvah confirms, the mitzvah elevates it again, not only to something that we infer and discover on our own but is an actual tzivuy as well. But it's not as if we don't know it or we shouldn't have known it or for that matter, perhaps would even have been obligated in it even if the Torah hadn't been included in the minyan taryag. And that's That maybe that that tznius is part of v'halachta bidrachav, it's relevant to know it anyway. I can tell it to you already anyway. It's not true for most mitzvos. Well, it's certainly not true for all mitzvos she-baTorah. L'chora, again according to this mahalach, again this is the he'ara I heard once, according to this this mahalach, so that's what the Rambam is reflecting over here also. If there wouldn't be a mitzvas aseh of Anochi Hashem Elokecha, so then it wouldn't be the יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות that that Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists and that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, that's the reality. That's the reality, again, whether whether it's formally, technically, elevated to the status or or given the status of a mitzvas aseh, that that's the reality. The Maharal has a comment, I think it's in Tiferes Yisrael and ayen alav how much overlap there is between this and what we're talking about in the Rambam. There's certainly a lot of overlap, but but not necessarily identical. Maharal says, why is it that the mitzvah Anochi Hashem Elokecha, the Torah doesn't formulate it be-lashon tzivuy? Why isn't the mitzvah formulated in the imperative? Again, most, not all, but most mitzvos she-baTorah are formulated in ba'erev tochlu matzos. You should eat matzah. It's formulated in the imperative. Here it's just a statement of fact. It's a declarative statement, Anochi Hashem Elokecha. It's not formulated in in be-lashon tzivuy. So that's where the Rambam takeh proves from the Gemara in Makkot of תורה צוה לנו משה that that Anochi and לא יהיה לך מפי הגבורה שמענום, so you see that Chazal did consider Anochi a mitzvah, and Chazal did have a tradition that Anochi is a mitzvah, even even despite the fact that it's not formulated in in the imperative. So why not? So the Maharal says because by other mitzvos, he says, there's nothing factual about the mitzvos in the sense that if Tes Vav Nisan comes and goes and I don't eat matzah, so then I didn't eat matzah. It was a chiyuv that that a person neglected, but it's not that the mitzvah is not a fact. The mitzvah is a chiyuv. The mitzvah doesn't, the mitzvah isn't isn't a fact. The mitzvah is a chiyuv. There's an obligation to eat matzah Pesach night. There's an obligation to sit in the sukkah Tes Vav Tishrei. There's an obligation to hear a kol shofar on Aleph Tishrei. It's not only an obligation to believe to recognize to to know Hashem. It's a fact that Anochi Hashem Elokecha. It's not just the mitzvah to believe to know that אנכי ה׳ אלקיך אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים. Again, that's that's the fact. That's the reality. Whether a person whether a person complies or rachmana litzlan doesn't comply with that, it remains that that's the reality. That's what the Maharal says. That's what the the Torah is reflecting by not formulating this mitzvah be-lashon tzivuy in in the imperative. It's not as if okay, so I so the person chose not to eat matzah, okay, then he takeh didn't eat matzah. A person chooses not to believe, it's not it's not the case that Anochi Hashem Elokecha isn't true. It's true that he didn't eat matzah, but it's not the case that Anochi Hashem Elokecha isn't isn't true for him. And that's why the Torah writes the mitzvah just as a simple statement of fact. This is the this is the fact. Again, recognizing, acknowledging, knowing that fact is a mitzvah, but it remains a fact, it remains a reality, it remains true, that it's not it's not a reality that a person opts out of. And and the very similar idea is what you have in the Rambam when when he presents everything about the mitzvah and only at the end tells you that ידיעת דבר זה מצות עשה. Again, that a person is supposed to put on tefillin is because it says וקשרתם לאות על ידך והיו לטטפות בין עיניך. But that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is that it's the יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לדעת שיש שם מצוי ראשון is even if it wouldn't be a mitzvah. That's the that's the reality, that's the reality of of of existence. And in the very first issue of the journal Mesorah in the Divrei Torah in Piha Shmuel they quote from the Rav, so they quote the following he'arah. There is a famous question of girsos in the Rambam in Hilchos Melachim. The Rambam talks about a nochri who observes the שבע מצוות בני נח but does it because of his own hechrech hadaas. He doesn't link it up with HaKadosh Baruch Hu and Moshe Rabbeinu, but he has a hargashah that ever min hachay is not a good thing to do and he has a hargashah that shefichas damim is not a good thing. כל המקבל שבע מצוות ונזהר לעשותן הרי זה מחסידי אומות העולם ויש לו חלק לעולם הבא. והוא שיקבל אותן ויעשה אותן מפני שציווה בהן הקדוש ברוך הוא בתורה והודיענו על ידי משה רבינו שבני נח מקודם נצטוו בהן. אבל אם עשאן מהכרע הדעת אין זה גר תושב ואינו מחסידי אומות העולם
and then the question is whether the next word is velo or ela mechachameihem. That's the question. So I think the standard dfus prints velo mechachameihem. I think the more recent ones based on kisvei yad print ela mechachameihem. I think that's what the Frankel one prints. I think that's what Rav Kapach has in his as well. So they quote the he'arah from the Rav that he said that based on the lashon of amud hachochmos that there is no chochmah independent of HaKadosh Baruch Hu. That a person can't have, like a person can't, all chochmah is chochmah only because ich veis, science is chochmah because that reflects HaKadosh Baruch Hu's, it reflects HaKadosh Baruch Hu's chochmah. So he suggests the way it's quoted there in Mesorah based upon the amud hachochmos that he thinks that the more correct girsa should be velo mechachameihem. And his point remains valid even if you have the girsa ela mechachameihem. That it's no chochmah if a person ultimately, that it's not chochmah if a person doesn't think that it traces back to HaKadosh Baruch Hu. I mean, that's clearly what the Rambam is saying here, that it's amud hachochmos. That a person can be the most brilliant physicist in the world, but ultimately if he doesn't realize that it all comes from HaKadosh Baruch Hu, so ultimately that link is indispensable. Could be still that the girsa here might be ela mechachameihem because let's say he believes in HaKadosh Baruch Hu but doesn't believe that HaKadosh Baruch Hu communicated that על ידי משה רבינו or something. So the he'arah again is a very important he'arah again in the sense that there's no chochmah independent of HaKadosh Baruch Hu. Chochmah means something which is from HaKadosh Baruch Hu. It means grasping something which is chochmas Hashem. So that's what the definition of chochma is, grasping something which which is chochmas Hashem. And that's why the Rambam says יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון. And that ultimately, ultimately what what gives it the status of being chochma is only the fact that it is chochmas Hashem, that it is chochmas Hashem. This, this idea again that we were talking about which is reflected in where the Rambam writes the mitzvas asei. So I think what we've commented on this, but if if you have a Rambam in front of you take a look at it for a minute in perek hei of hilchos teshuvah. Rambam says רשות כל אדם נתונה לו. The the ability, the the control is given to everyone. אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה ולהיות צדיק הרשות בידו.
If he wants to to incline himself to to a derech tova and to be a tzaddik so he has that ability and control. ואם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך רעה ולהיות רשע הרשות בידו. הוא שכתוב בתורה הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו לדעת טוב ורע.
Klomar. Look, let's look very carefully at this rabosai. הן מין זה של אדם היה אחד בעולם ואין לו מין שני דומה לו בזה העניין שיהא הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ ואין לו מי שיעכב על ידו מלעשות הטוב או הרע וכיון שכן הוא פן ישלח ידו.
So the Rambam, this is the Rambam kayadua, this is the Rambam's presentation of bechira chafshis, right? That we have free will. But the Rambam says it in a remarkable fashion. Generally when we talk about the yesod of bechira chafshis, so we think bechira chafshis means that that we have freedom of will, that I can choose what to do. I can choose to pick up this machzor and give it a kiss. I can choose to push it off the table and knock it onto the knock it onto the onto the floor. I can I can put on tefillin, I can not put on tefillin. I can be nice to people, I can be not nice to people. That's what free will means, right? But what does the Rambam say? Rambam says much more than that. The Rambam says that the that the capacity for free will that Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us is not only to choose what to do, it's also the ability to identify and to discern what's right and what's wrong. Right? The Rambam doesn't simply say that that you're a free agent to do what you want. You're a free agent to eat matzah at the seder or not to eat matzah at the seder. You're a free agent to again to talk nicely, to be to be good to people or to act otherwise rachmana litzlan. No, the Rambam says much much more than that and he emphasizes it. שיהא הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע. Again not only that he has a capacity to be taught. שיהא הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע. Again this is sort of the other side of the coin of of of that diyuk we mentioned in the beginning of Yesodei HaTorah. Rambam says that part of this the capacity Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us bechira chafshis, what good is bechira chafshis if a person doesn't know to discern right from wrong? What's the point of giving of giving someone free will to do what he wants? If you don't give a one year old free will to do whatever whatever he wants, the parents don't say to the one year old you can do whatever you want. He doesn't know that he shouldn't run into the street rachmana litzlan. You you don't give free will unless unless someone is is as says the Rambam unless someone is is bar hachi to discern. So the Rambam says and and that means not only that a person can be taught, not only that he has a a capacity to be taught and to receive instruction, but שיהא הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע. And certainly part of that again is is that diyuk that we had in the beginning of Yesodei HaTorah and in the beginning of De'os that the Rambam mentions the mitzvah afterwards. That that it also reflects again this שיהא הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע. So a tremendous mechayev when you think about it. That that formulation of... implications in terms of what a person's capacities are and what expectations are. Now clearly again when the Rambam says שהוא מעצמו בדעתו ומחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע, again he doesn't mean that a person knows on his own that the chaser by an esrog is posul on Yom Tov Rishon. The Rambam doesn't mean that. But lachora what he does mean is there is an expectation of Perek Aleph of Yesodei HaTorah, there's an expectation of Hilchos De'os, in ayin elav to draw the exact parameters of what's within tov v'ra in this context. But there's only so much mileage that the Rambam thinks he can get out of the excuse 'well no one ever told me and no one ever taught me'. Okay it's still gonna be good maybe it's gonna be good in some places but it doesn't go nearly as far as sometimes maybe we would like it to go. Yonatan, did you have? What does the tzivui of yedias Hashem add if it's mistaber? Like without the tzivui we should know anyway so what does the tzivui add? First let's ask your question is excellent and very important but maybe let's ask another one as well. I mean does it have to add anything? Could it just be that so the Sefer HaChinuch certainly has the idea that the fact that something is an individual mitzvah doesn't have to add anything. Sefer HaChinuch has right that the Rishonim, the Acharonim, you know, address what's the pshat in ר' חנניא בן עקשיא: רצה הקדוש ברוך הוא לזכות את ישראל לפיכך הרבה להם תורה ומצוות.
So why is it a zechus to have a ribui Torah u'mitzvos? Now we think life would be easier with less. So what does it mean רצה הקדוש ברוך הוא לזכות את ישראל לפיכך הרבה להם תורה ומצוות?
A lot of very, very really fundamental interpretations. Sefer HaChinuch says that what it means is the following: he says that by שבע מצוות בני נח, he says when you start counting, it's more than sheva. He says one of שבע מצוות בני נח is arayos. But there's only one ervah for Bnei Noach? There's a machlokes Tannaim exactly what the arayos are to Bnei Noach. Everyone agrees there's more than one ervah for Bnei Noach. Everyone agrees there's eishess ish and there's mishkav zachar and everyone agrees that there's more than one ervah. So what do you mean you count that as one? And avodah zarah. There's only one form of avodah... So what it means is that all of these things are subsumed into one. And and whichever mitzvah bnei Noach really means is seven categories of mitzvos, so it doesn't mean seven mitzvos, because when you count the pratim and you compare it to our minyan hamitzvos, you'll find more. Aye, but by our minyan hamitzvos you takke do find more. You don't find that there's one mitzvah arayos in in minyan taryag, you know, you have every ervah is listed individually. Says the Sefer HaChinuch, oh, that's the pshat. רצה הקדוש ברוך הוא לזכות את ישראל לפיכך הרבה להם תורה ומצוות
that that when a person is nizaher on all the arayos, then Hakadosh Baruch Hu says, oh, you were mekayem so many mitzvos, I'm going to give you s'char for so many mitzvos. Whereas if they had all been one mitzvah, then Hakadosh Baruch Hu would say, okay, you were mekayem one mitzvah, I'll give you s'char for one mitzvah. רצה הקדוש ברוך הוא לזכות את ישראל. So clearly according to the according to the Chinuch, it's not necessarily the case, the fact, again, obviously this isn't a direct parallel, but the fact that something is is counted individually doesn't necessarily, it's not being mechadesh anything. I I would think that without the mitzvah, I I think the the the I mean I think that about the Sefer HaChinuch is is true, but I think the the the real direct answer to your question is that the Rambam in the hakdamah to Perek Chelek where he lists the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim makes a point of saying that that a person complies with the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim even if he only believes without knowing. Let's say the first of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim which is Metzius Hashem. So let's say a person can't give this this sort of line of argumentation that the Rambam is about to present in Halachos beis beis through hey, primarily in in Halacha hey. Let's say a person can't reproduce that. But he believes, he believes that that Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists and that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the is the source of everything else, v'chulu v'chulu, so the Rambam says he's a sheine Yid. He's an ehrlicha Yid in full compliance with the with the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. He's not in full compliance with with the mitzvah of Anochi Hashem Elokecha, or or he'd be something missing in his fulfillment of Anochi Hashem Elokecha. So I don't know whether without again everything it's true, it's a fact. It's it's true that the Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the Matzui Rishon whether a person knows it or doesn't know it. Without the mitzvas asei, it would be enough for a person to sort of acknowledge it without knowing it. Knowing it according to the Rambam sort of means knowing it in a deductive fashion and and being able to prove and and argue and and in that fashion. And l'chora that wouldn't... Again, it's certainly not necessary to be to be in compliance with the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. I think what what confused things is the mashal that I gave from the Gaon on Eiruvin. But the impression you get from the Rambam in in the Perush Hamishnayos in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is that that a person has to know it comes from the mitzvas asei. Again, that it's it's the reality whether a person knows it or believes it. That that to to be a Jew and and to live as a Jew and to think as a Jew and to function as a Jew it's enough that a person believes it and to fulfill the mitzvah Anochi Hashem Elokecha a person has to know it. The Rav zichrono l'vracha used to call attention to the fact that that the The Rambam here on line two writes that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mamtzi kol hanimtza. That the Rambam writes in the present tense. He doesn't write in the past tense. He doesn't say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world תשע"ג ה'תשע"ג years ago, but he says Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mamtzi kol hanimtza in the present tense. Meaning that even after Brias Ha'olam, so the world then, the world doesn't continue to exist based on inertia. It doesn't continue to exist at that point on its own, but every second the world exists through Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The world exists through Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The difference between sheishes yimei bereshis and now is that now Hakadosh Baruch Hu sustains the world and during sheishes yimei bereshis Hakadosh Baruch Hu created different forms of life within the Briyah. And that's what it means that ויכל אשר ברא אלקים לעשות. That what ended in sheishes yimei bereshis is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu finished creating new forms of life. But it doesn't mean that at that point the world exists on its own. No, the world doesn't have its own existence. The world again is sort of like an electric appliance of which Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the electric generator. So the electric appliance was created during sheishes yimei bereshis, but the dependence on the generator to function as an electrical appliance, so that is ongoing. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mamtzi kol hanimtza. Again, every second the world exists only because Hakadosh Baruch Hu sustains it, only through Hakadosh Baruch Hu, only through his existence does anything else exist. The Nefesh Hachaim basically says the same thing. The Nefesh Hachaim says that that's what it means when we say in Davening המחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית. Again, it means the same thing. Not that the world now exists on its own, that the world exists because there's ich vays conservation of energy of matter and because of that the world continues to exist. No, the world continues to exist only because Hakadosh Baruch Hu sustains the world. And that's what it means that he's מחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית. And all of this is part of the when in Shema and קבלת עול מלכות שמים when we affirm our belief, acknowledgment of Hakadosh Baruch Hu and of הקדוש ברוך הוא אחד, so on a deeper level, it's not just that there is Hashem and Hashem is one. But on a deeper level, it means that there is Hashem and he's the only one. He's the only one that exists and everything else exists off of him and through him. And that's why in the Bracha of Yotzer Or we talk about this theme of המחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית because the Birchos Krias Shema are intended, they function as a commentary on Krias Shema. That's what the kiyum of Krias Shema u'virchoseha together is, that the Brachos function as a commentary on Krias Shema. So when we say, again, both at the beginning of the Bracha and the end of the Bracha of Yotzer Or that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is מחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית, that's a commentary on what it means שמע ישראל ה' אלקינו ה' אחד. Again, it means not only that Hashem exists Anochi Hashem Elokecha and the Hashem who exists is one, but it also means that he alone exists. He who is one, he alone exists and I but the world? Yeah, no, but the world doesn't really exist. The world only exists continuously through him, because of him. And that's what it means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mamtzi kol hanimtza and that he has to be מחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית. Now again, the Ratzon Hashem is that from second to second, from instant to instant, unlike sheishes yimei bereshis where constantly new forms of life were being created, so after sheishes yimei bereshis, ויכל אלקים מלאכתו אשר עשה וישבת מכל מלאכתו אשר ברא אלקים לעשות,
so after sheishes yimei bereshis, it is Ratzon Hashem that again that the mamtzi kol hanimtza doesn't bring new forms of life into being, but the mamtzi kol hanimtza is sustaining what was. Right, the mashal perhaps is as follows. Someone once explained to me that when you're looking at when you have an image on the computer screen. So we see that image there continuously, but in reality it's not the case. In reality the image is really being constantly, every second it's being reinforced, and when you shut the computer off you're not erasing what's there, you're just preventing that reproduction of what was there a second ago. But it's constantly, but it happens so quickly and so instantaneously and so seamlessly that we just see it as one continuous image, but in reality it's not that way. I mean that's what I think the, again, you have shaylas, so please ask that this is not halacha l'maaseh. But that's what the, in terms of whether or not there should be an issur mchikas Hashem on something that's on a computer screen. So if it's there and when and then it's really being erased, okay, so then yesh ladon, yesh ladon, is there a problem? But if it's not really there, so then again you have questions you have to ask a, I don't know, a posek. But that's the mashal. So we see the world as just continuously existing, but the truth is that it does continuously exist only because Hakadosh Baruch Hu so skillfully, as it were, and so seamlessly המחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית so we feel this sense of continuity. But it doesn't exist on its own. It doesn't exist by inertia. It doesn't, Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't give it its own generator. It remains as totally dependent upon the generator as it was when it was first created. And that's what the lashon hoveh of mamtzi kol nimtza is. Okay, let's continue.