Transcript

I think we left off with the Tanu Rabanan of maiseh b'nochri echad.

תנו רבנן מעשה בנכרי אחד שבא לפני שמאי אמר לו כמה תורות יש לכם אמר לו שתים תורה שבכתב ותורה שבעל פה אמר לו שבכתב אני מאמינך ושבעל פה איני מאמינך גיירני על מנת שתלמדני תורה שבכתב גער בו והוציאו בנזיפה בא לפני הלל גייריה יומא קמא אמר לו א"ב ג"ד למחר אפיך ליה אמר לו והא אתמול לא אמרת לי הכי אמר לו לאו עלי דידי קסמכת דעל פה נמי סמוך עלי.

Pshat says that Hillel is explaining to the ger the following. Generally we, correctly, correctly, when we explain to ourselves, explain to others how compelling the belief in Torah Sheba'al Peh is, so we comment on how Torah Shebichtav isn't practical without Torah Sheba'al Peh. So the Torah says not to do melacha on Shabbos, but it doesn't say, doesn't say what's considered, what's considered melacha. So it's not, it's not practical. So ela mai, it's clearly written in such a way that it's accompanied by a Torah Sheba'al Peh. That's the type of, I think, explanation we usually provide ourselves and others and it's correct. It's, it's true. I think Hillel is saying more than that. Hillel's saying something even more fundamental lichora. What Hillel is saying is that the whole distinction, the whole claim to accept Torah Shebichtav and not accept Torah Sheba'al Peh is, is artificial, is imaginary. How, how do you know, how do you know that these are the words of Torah Shebichtav? Like, how do you know that Torah Shebichtav begins בראשית ברא אלהים את השמים ואת הארץ? So that's what you want to, you want to swear your allegiance to Torah Shebichtav but not to Torah Sheba'al Peh. Okay, so how do you know that, that Bereishis Bara Elokim and how do you know that you don't. The only way you have a Torah Shebichtav is if you believe in a Torah Sheba'al Peh. What are you going to do? You're going to go check manuscripts and that way you're going to try to, so we don't have the Sifrei Torah that Moshe Rabbeinu wrote that the Torah tells us at end of Sefer Devarim. I'm not sure that we know where those are today to and how do you know? Even that's Torah Sheba'al Peh. Even that, you have to trust Moshe Rabbeinu that that's what Hakadosh Baruch Hu told him. Maximum what we heard directly were the Aseres Hadibros. Maximum what we heard directly. The rest was all Moshe Rabbeinu taking dictation from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So that's what Hillel is telling him, א"ב ג"ד. Then he tells him תשר"ק. He's saying there is no such thing as, as accepting Torah Shebichtav. So what are you going to say? So I'll accept as much of Torah Sheba'al Peh as I need that there should be a Torah Shebichtav. So that's already ridiculous. That's stam being arbitrary and capricious. Another thing that emerges both from the wording of the nochri as well as Hillel's response is that when we talk about belief or rachmana litzlan lack thereof in Torah Sheba'al Peh, so what that really means is belief or rachmana litzlan lack thereof in the Chachmei Torah. And the nochri understood that already when the nochri says to says to Hillel that Baal Peh eini maaminkha and then Hillel answers him smokh alai one can't talk about belief in Torah she'Baal Peh without a sense of trust and confidence in the חכמי תורה שבעל פה and in their and in their integrity. On the most basic level if a person doesn't believe a הלכה למשה מסיני of khatzi nezek tsrorot so he thinks someone at some point fabricated it. Okay he may depending upon who he's more fond of and less fond of so he'll decide who to indict for that fabrication. But le'maiseh that's what and the nochri understood this. The nochri said I don't believe you. That that belief in Torah she'Baal Peh can't exist doesn't exist without again a a sense of trust confidence in the חכמי תורה שבעל פה. The Rav very famously this lav davka emerges from this Gemara but the Rav very famously in his He'ora in the Lashon haRambam in Hilkhos Teshuva said that it goes goes further. Right the Rambam writes in perek gimmel of Hilkhos Teshuva when he says those who have no khelek in olam haba so the Rambam writes that שלושה הן הכופרים בתורה so one is הכופר בפירושה והוא תורה שבעל פה והמכחיש מגידיה. So again so we just explained it's hainu hakh there is no Torah she'Baal Peh without the מגידי תורה שבעל פה. So why does the Rambam have both phrases? So the Rav very famously explained that Kofer bePeirusha means that he's kofer again in khatzi nezek tsrorot. He says no such kabbala I don't believe it there's no such kabbala that for tsrorot you only pay khatzi nezek no regel should be nezek shalem. And then hamakhkhish magideha means that he doesn't accept the interpretations of the חכמי תורה שבעל פה of the hakhmei masora even those that they don't that they don't have bekabbala from Har Sinai even those that they're not transmitting but that they're authoritatively that they're authoritatively interpreting. And what about nowadays where it would be theoretically possible since they already like broke down a lot of the Torah she'Baal Peh be theoretically someone could say I believe in like Mishnah and Gemara but I don't believe in like contemporary talmidei khakhamim? How would one respond to that? Both halves of of that Rambam apply. No you're asking a very good question. Both halves of that Rambam apply. First of all not all of Torah she'Baal Peh was written down. Some of the most basic and elementary things were not written down. Right I think they point out that it doesn't say in Shulkhan Arukh you have to have a mekhitza in shul. So not all of not all of Torah she'Baal Peh was was written down. Okay so it's an interesting question to try to figure out you know what what's not written down and and why. Okay that's an interesting question. But first of all it's it's not the case that you know that that there no longer is and is need for a a living masora. It it obviously is true that that... that the mesorah being purely purely oral is obviously true that in light of the is lassos that that's not the case anymore but the other extreme that there no longer is an oral mesorah is not true and the mak'shish magideho is also as pertinent and as germane to today as it ever was you know the need for the responsibility of and the prerogative of davka chachmei mesorah to interpret and apply so so that has to be dor dor v'dorshov dor dor v'chachomov. One of the major major deficiencies that we see nowadays is in that understanding and in that recognition. Everyone everyone says whatever they want about everything as though משל למה הדבר דומה let's say in my kitchen a shayla in yoreh deah arises in my kitchen. Right. Okay. So I'm the only one who knows the facts and what's more I'm the only one who knows the full import or significance of the question because if this is ruled treif it may affect all my china and only I know what the financial situation is to know how much of a hit that's gonna be. Okay but there's one catch the catch is that I don't know yoreh deah and I'm not qualified to pasken. So the fact that the question arises in my kitchen and I'm the only one who knows all the again narrow facts and broader picture so that compensates for my ignorance? No it doesn't compensate for my ignorance it doesn't qualify me to do or make pronouncements on what I'm unqualified. What it says is that I should be the one to ask the question that I should be the one to present the question so that the qualified moreh horah will have again the narrow facts and the broader context and then he'll say whether or not hefsed merubah he'll know whether hefsed merubah is a cheshbon in this shayla or is not a cheshbon in in this shayla and he'll but the fact that the question arises in my daled amos whatever my daled amos happen to be whether my daled amos or my kitchen or use your imagination what what the analog to a kitchen can be doesn't elevate me to the status of a yodeia sefer and certainly not of a talmid chacham and certainly not of a of a of a moreh horah. So it remains equally true on both both aspects that there are things that remained Torah shebal peh even after Ravina and Rav Ashi wrote down the Gemara there are things that remained Torah shebal peh and and the the need for application interpretation implementation and and and to know how it applies how to apply it is in every other context in every other context people respect expertise. If rachmana litzlan there's a serious medical issue no one says you know I'm going to give my chavaz daas. What do you mean my chavaz daas? What do I know? What do I know about neurology? What do I know about cardiology? Rachmana litzlan about oncology. What do I know? I don't know anything about anything. No so the question came up in my daled amos I'm going to give my my chavaz daas in every other context. but you go to an expert and all of a sudden here everyone's everyone is a self-proclaimed expert. Rashi here raises an important question. Totzio B'nezifa. So Shammai throws the guy out.

התניא הבא לקבל דברי חבירות חוץ מדבר אחד וכן גר הבא להתגייר וקיבל עליו דברי תורה חוץ מדבר אחד אין מקבלין אותו

Maseches Bechoros. So the Braisa in Maseches Bechoros that Rashi is quoting so the Tanna Kamma says a Ger who comes to convert and says, you know, I buy it all but I cannot, will not give up my cheeseburgers. So then it says ein m'kablin. And then that's the Tanna Kamma and then Rabbi Yossi BeRabbi Yehuda, I forget the Tanna's name, says even if it's a דקדוק אחד מדברי סופרים, even if he says that he can't give up his chicken meat cheeseburgers, ein m'kablin oso. So Rav Moshe has multiple tshuvos as to whether or not that din in the Braisa in Bechoros is אין מקבלין אותו לכתחילה, but b'dieved is a Ger, or whether it means that even b'dieved he's not a Ger. So in most of the tshuvos, I don't know, for some reason this is also a parsha bifnei atzma that we're not going to go into, for some reason they print a stira between tshuvos. He didn't write the same thing in all the tshuvos and all the tshuvos are printed. In most of the tshuvos, so Rav Moshe says that the pshat in that Braisa is that even b'dieved he's not a Ger. That's what he writes, I think, at least three times. In one tshuva he thinks that no, that it's only a din l'chatchila and that b'dieved he would be a Ger even if there is something missing in the kabbalas mitzvos. Again, just to clarify as Rav Moshe does in these tshuvos, we're not talking about if the Ger is unaware of certain dinim. There's no presumption that the Ger knows every din. The chutz midavar echad means when he knows of a particular din and indicates or it's an anan sahadei that that's the case, that he does not intend on complying with that din. For instance, as we know that a woman wants to convert and go to the mikvah because she wants to marry a kohen. So we know that it's chutz midavar echad. We're not talking about that there's a davar echad that the Ger doesn't know about, but the Ger knows about it and or either way the Ger is בשום אופן ופנים not going to comply with something in the Torah. So in most of the tshuvos, Rav Moshe says even b'dieved he's not a Gerus. There's one tshuva where he thinks that no, that it's only l'chatchila and that b'dieved he would be a Ger even if there is something missing in the kabbalas mitzvos. In that tshuva, he thinks the pshat in this Rashi is as follows. He thinks that Rashi is only bothered with why Hillel was m'kabel him l'chatchila. That's what Rashi is farentfering. That b'dieved he's a Ger is not a question, but Rashi is dealing with the question of l'chatchila why was Hillel m'kabel him, and for that Rashi says that samach al chochmaso. Right, that סמך על חכמתו שסופו שירגילנו לקבל עליו. That's how Rav Moshe in that one tshuva understands it. He doesn't, as far as I'm aware and I might be wrong about this, he doesn't tell you what pshat in the Rashi is in the other tshuvos where he thinks that the din is that even b'dieved the Gerus is nothing because kabbalas mitzvos means all or nothing. There's no such thing as מצוה זו יפה בעיני and mitzvah zu, no, kabbalas mitzvos means all or nothing. Means veloikecha elokai. What Hakadosh Baruch Hu says, so I accept. So the lechora the pshat in Rashi is that Rashi is saying the following. What does Rashi mean when he distinguishes between

שלא היה כופר בתורה שבעל פה אלא שלא היה מאמין

or אלא מפני שלא היה מאמין? It's one of the achronim has a suggested hagah. Either way,

שלא היה כופר בתורה שבעל פה אלא מפני שלא היה מאמין

shehi mipi hagevura. What's the difference between those two? What's the difference between saying he wasn't kofer, just didn't believe? I'm not a kofer, I just don't believe in everything. So what's the difference? So lechora what Rashi means is the following. Let's come back, come back to our cheeseburger here. You have one person who says that I can't live without my cheeseburger and I can't subscribe, I can't commit to any religion that doesn't let me, that doesn't let me eat cheeseburgers and I'm willing to do everything else, but I plan on continuing eating cheeseburgers. That's one person. Another person says, I believe in the Torah unqualifiedly. I don't believe that the Torah assurs cheeseburgers. I don't believe it. I think that the pshat in לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו, if he knows the pasuk, is epes maybe davka basar gedi but not basar bakar. And let's say takeh again, I mean sometimes a person can say that and that's really just a front and that's really just a fake, it's an excuse, that really that's his way of saying he refuses to give up his cheeseburgers. But let's say that one could, one had a keen sense and knew that the second person takeh meant it that way. So the first one is a kofer in the mitzva. The second one is eini mamincha. In that, the כופר בתורה שבעל פה for Rashi means that I don't accept a religion in which you have to be kofuf to a mesora of the rabbis and their interpretations. I don't accept such a—I can't commit to such a religion. The other one says, I commit unqualifiedly to whatever Hakadosh Baruch Hu said. I don't believe this business of תורה שבעל פה. There's a difference. What's the difference? The difference is that the second one, again if you'll show him, if you'll convince him of the fact, what the pshat in לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו really is, if you'll convince him, if you'll show him, no there really is a תורה שבעל פה and it's ridiculous to think otherwise, so then basically you really do have a kabala, right? You have a kabala with a mistaken notion. That you have a kabala for kol hatorah kula with a mistaken notion that the Torah doesn't assur basar b'chalav. You have a kabala for ratzon Hashem with a mistaken notion that ratzon Hashem wasn't, isn't expressed through a תורה שבעל פה. So that's what Rashi is saying, that is a kabala. That's not chutz midavar echad. The chutz midavar echad is just a mistake. Again, lemaiseh, I mean other than presumably one has to have chochmas Hillel to be able to rely on one's own chochma to disabuse the prospective ger of that mistake. But that lechora is again if you understand like Rav Moshe holds most of the time in his tshuvas that even bedieved it's aino ger, so then what Rashi is saying is that be'emes there was a kabala here. There is a kabala to do everything the Torah says with a mistaken notion that I don't believe that what the Torah says is how it's explained in the תורה שבעל פה as opposed to saying I reject, I categorically refuse to accept, again, the authority of rabbis, I can't ever commit to such a religious system. Now the Maharsha, even though he's not commenting on this case, when the Maharsha gets to the Gemara's third case about the nochri who wants to be a Kohen Gadol, so at that point the Maharsha suggests, take a look, take a look, if you have the ama lei mikra, if you see that dibbur hamaschil in the Chidushei Agados, ama lei mikra:

ומעיקרא להביא בו הלל למימר הכי משום דלא הוה מקבל עליו לגייר ומהא קצת קשה האין מקבלין גרים משום שולחן מלכים ולא משום אישות.

Right? Again, even if someone will commit 100% to all de'oraisas and derabbanans, but you know that he's being prompted by some ulterior motive, shulchan melachim, kol Yisrael is flourishing, mishum ishus, נשא עיניו באיש או באשה. So ועוד זה שגייר עצמו משום כהונה שילבש בגדי כהן. So he thinks that those are really nice begadim to wear. Says the Maharsha:

וצריך לומר הדי דקאמר בא לפני הלל וגייריה לאו דווקא אלא דלא גייריה עד דבתר הכי שידע דגיר אסור בכהונה ומה דקאמר לעיל דגייריה אלא שקיבל עליו לגייר מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

So the Maharsha says, no, the pshat is that giyrei means he accepted him as a candidate for conversion. Doesn't mean that he was mal him and sent him to the mikva, it means he accepted him as a candidate for conversion. Why didn't—the fact that the Maharsha says it only here, so that means that only that he's only learning pshat in this case that giyrei means lav davka, או השתא דאתינא להכי? No, that's what it meant in the in our cases as well as the Torah she'biksav, the Torah she'bal peh. So itachen, again, the way we just explained in Rashi, that there was no hechreich, that l'maise the one who came and said שבכתב מאמינך שבעל פה אני מאמינך, so the way we explain, the way we understood Rashi, that really that was a proper kabala because again there was a commitment to I want to do whatever Hakadosh Baruch Hu said in his Torah. There really was such a commitment. So then there was no hechreich to say that giyrei meant that. Over here, in order to solve the problem of l'sheim ish, l'sheim isha, l'sheim shulchan melachim, so here there's a hechreich. But itachen, hashta d'asina l'hachi, that that is the pshat in the other cases as well. Ayin alef. Rebbe, so why wouldn't Shammai offer giyrei the same way Shammai rejected the candidate, he could just accept him as a prospective candidate and then tell him the deal like Hillel did, why Shammai, sorry, like Hillel did, Shammai rejected. Nu, so Hillel is a gvaldige chiddush, right? Hillel's a gvaldige chiddush. The pashtus is that someone who's a prospective ger is someone who comes and says, you know, from what I've heard about Yahadus, from what I've seen in Jews that I've met, so I'm convinced that this is, that this must be emes. So because of that, I'm interested in becoming a ger. Okay, so then even then, so שמאל דוחה וימין מקרבת, so we push away initially. Not excessively, but initially. But when when the original overture is coming and dictating conditions, I don't know the Hillel's gevaldige chiddush. I think most of us would have reacted like Shammai and said what are you dictating conditions? The impetus for geirus should be that that that Torah as we have it as we live it is emes. You're coming and dictating conditions of of but I don't believe in תורה שבעל פה and al regel achas. Even in the Tshuvos where Rav Moshe is of the opinion that bedieved it's not geirus, he talks about a case where a giyores after the fact confessed to the following and and wanted to know whether or not that had invalidated her geirus. That that she was misgayeres it was samuch le'Pesach. And she felt at the time she felt intimidated that if she would take off all the days of yom tov that she would lose her job. And the geirus was so close to Pesach that it wasn't really be-kedei she-ya'aseh to to get another job so quickly. So she confessed that her intentions were that that one time that she was going to go to the office on שביעי ואחרון של פסח. And and that subsequently she would never do it again and takeh didn't do it again. But she did have in mind to again she would try to be mima'et as much as possible ve-chulu ve-chulu but she did have in mind to to go to to go to work on שביעי ואחרון של פסח. So Rav Moshe says that's not chutz midavar echad. Again even again when he's assuming which is what he does in most of the Tshuvos that chutz midavar echad is me'akev the geirus, says that's not chutz midavar echad. That's knowing that a person is going to be nichshal once that that a person is not going to be omed benisayon is is not chutz midavar echad.

שוב מעשה בנכרי אחד שבא לפני שמאי אמר לו גיירני על מנת שתלמדני כל התורה כולה כשאני עומד על רגל אחת דחפו באמת הבנין שבידו בא לפני הלל גייריה אמר לו דעלך סני לחברך לא תעביד זו היא כל התורה כולה ואידך פירושה הוא זיל גמור.

Okay there are a few points here I'm not sure we'll get to all of them now but but we'll begin with with one of them. The Maharsha asks he says meila that that Hillel doesn't quote the posuk bilshon hakodesh but but presents it in Aramaic. He says even in Eretz Yisroel the vernacular was was Aramaic. It wasn't only in Bavel that the vernacular was was Aramaic. Even in Eretz Yisroel the vernacular at that point was was Aramis. He says but why does Hillel change it from the positive to the negative? Why does he change it from ve'ahavta lere'acha kamocha to דעלך סני לחברך לא תעביד? So he says because that is pshat in the posuk לא תטור את בני עמך ואהבת לרעך כמוך that the equation that you have to actually do for your rei'a what you would do for yourself is only true in lo sa'asehs. Meaning the same way you don't want someone to be nokem ve-noter against you so 100 percent you can't be nokem ve-noter against someone else. In terms of in terms of what you positively do for yourself, what you proactively do for yourself, not what you want to avoid but what you proactively do for yourself out of your self-love, so he says there he says it's not true that that you have to do for your friend what you do for yourself. Ve-ha-ra'aya he says חייך קודמין חייך וחיי חברך חייך קודמין. Emmes is the Ramban talks about the same issue kayaduah. When he comments on that pasuk. And so first the Ramban says ve'ahavta lere'acha kamocha is derech haflaga, that the Torah is intentionally like Chazal say in Maseches Chulin there are places where דברה תורה בלשון הבאי where the Torah intentionally speaks in hyperbole assuming that we will recognize that that's how it's intended. And that because the Ramban says first of all he says psychologically, emotionally he says there's no such metzius. No such metzius as loving anyone else as intensely and as deeply as one's self-love. There's no such metzius. And then he says and you see what's more in halacha he says it's also not true because chayecha v'chayei chavercha is chayecha kodmin, the same he'ara as this Maharsha. And then the Ramban says no, but you don't have to say that it's derech haflaga, you can say that's why it doesn't say ואהבת את רעך כמוך but ve'ahavta lere'acha kamocha. Elsewhere the Torah says va'ahavtem es hager, ואהבת את השם אלוקיך. So why isn't it ve'ahavta es re'acha or without the es re'acha? So the Ramban says because what it really means is you should love for your friend what you love for yourself. What do you love for yourself? You love for yourself that people should treat you nicely, that people should help you, that people should speak nicely about you, that they shouldn't speak badly against you. Those are all the things that you love for yourself. So you have to love your friend, you have to love your friend in all the same areas that you love yourself, but the Torah never said that you love your friend to the same degree as you love yourself. And that's the pshat of lere'acha rather than es re'acha. But when you look in the Rambam in Hilchos Deios doesn't sound like the Rambam is reading the pasuk again either like the Maharsha or the Ramban. In Vav Gimmel:

מצוה על כל אדם לאהוב את כל אחד ואחד מישראל כגופו שנאמר ואהבת לרעך כמוך.

So the Rambam I don't know maybe I don't know that it's le'afukei but the Rambam le'maise the Rambam changes it to לאהוב את כל אחד ואחד מישראל and then he says ke mamash with that equation. With that equation. So what does that mean? That the Rambam thinks no, that you can love everyone as much as you love yourself? I don't know, pretty tall order. Mameila, mameila I don't know a few people mameila but everyone? Everyone? Everyone who you think is a nudnik and everyone who you think is דרייסטו א קאפ and everyone who rubs you the wrong way, mamash everyone? So the teretz is like this. But the Rambam also says over here that מצוה כל אדם לאהוב את כל אחד מישראל not ke'atzmo kegufo. Kegufo. Mashma that the Rambam far'enferd again the Maharsha and the Ramban's kasha differently. And then the Rambam says לפיכך צריך לספר בשבחו ולחוס על ממונו. So it's a separate question here why everything the Rambam lists in Hilchos Aveil under the rubric of ve'ahavta lere'acha kamocha, hachnasas kallah, levayas hameis, etc., etc., why he doesn't allude to any of these things here. That's a very big question. But either way in the context of saying that the mitzvah is mamash to לאהוב כל אחד מישראל ke, but it's not as yourself, it's kegufo. Gufo is not yourself. Right, you're not, I don't think anyone, hopefully none of us think of ourselves as our guf. Right, the Chofetz Chaim quotes from the Shaarei Kedusha, where is it? A pasuk in Iyov or something about basar va'or talbisheni that Hakadosh Baruch Hu clothes us with flesh and with skin and then I forget the other half of the pasuk. same same idea. So yes, for the Rambam it is a it is a complete equation dilo ke'Abravanel ve'Maharshal, but not on the level that they rejected the equation because for the Rambam the the the domain of where the mitzvah ahavah is mamash kamocha is is very restricted. It means you should be as makpid on mamon chaverecha as on mamon atzmecha. Uvchdei she'aseh and you should be as makpid to speak beshivcham shel acherim as you would want people to speak beshivchacha. That's, so in terms of pshat in the possuk it's very different, in terms of the yesodos it's basically the same. Okay.