Generally on Thursdays bli neder b'ezrat Hashem but as we mentioned this week we're doing today instead of for Thursday. So we'll begin from Perek Heh of Hilchos Teshuvah and we'll see how far we get before Yom Kippur בעזרת השם בלי נדר. רשות כל אדם נתונה לו. So reshus here means more than just permission but it means the ability, the capacity. When it says in Pirkei Avos hevei zahir berashus meaning governmental authority, meaning those who have the power, the ability to so the same thing reshus here again it means not only permission but it means the capacity, the ability. רשות כל אדם נתונה לו. רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה ולהיות צדיק הרשות בידו, ורצה להטות עצמו לדרך רעה ולהיות רשע הרשות בידו. הוא שכתוב בתורה הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו לדעת טוב ורע,
klomar הן מין זה של אדם היה אחד בעולם ואין לו מין שני דומה לו בזה העניין שיהיה הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ ואין מי שיעכב בידו מלעשות הטוב או הרע, וכיון שכן הוא פן ישלח ידו.
There are two, at least two remarkable points here in this halacha. First of all the Rambam's presentation of what bechira chofshis entails. So when we think of the yesod of bechira chofshis so we think that as the literal translation conveys that a person has freedom of choice and a person can choose which course of action to embark upon, to be nice, not to be nice, and so on and so forth. A person has freedom of choice. The Rambam says that part of the capacity, part of the endowment for bechira chofshis is not just freedom of choice, but the ability to discern what's good and what's bad, what's right and what's wrong. That it's not only that we have bechira chofshis and now if we're spoonfed and we're told that this is good and this is bad so we have the freedom of choice to act upon that information. No, the Rambam is saying again רשות כל אדם נתונה לו. רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה ולהיות צדיק הרשות בידו. רצה להטות עצמו לדרך רעה ולהיות רשע הרשות בידו.
Now look at how the Rambam now elaborates that, how he amplifies it. הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע. Again, the first layer or element of the capacity for bechira chofshis is that a person has the ability to be discerning and discriminating and understanding what's tov and what's ra. And then he has the ability ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ. Then he has the ability to act accordingly. When you think about it, it makes a lot of sense that the capacity for bechira chofshis should bring with it, again, this capacity to understand and to recognize, to appreciate. משל למה הדבר דומה. What good does it do? You go and you have a child and you go, you buy him ice skates. So wonderful. But if you don't teach him how to ice skate, you don't give him lessons on ice skate, you don't so vos toig that you bought him ice skates? What is it worth? Of what value is it? Rambam says no, the capacity for bechira chofshis again begins as a capacity to understand, to appreciate, to discern tov from ra. At least partially, and probably be an overstatement to to cite this as a full source, but I'd say when Chazal said that the din of yehareg v'al ya'avor by shfichas damim, so כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש כן הדבר הזה.
So how do we know that arayos is yehareg v'al ya'avor? Because the Torah compares it as a hekkesh to shfichas damim. So the Gemara says okay, but where does it say in the Torah that shfichas damim is yehareg v'al ya'avor? Sevara. There is no pasuk. It's a sevara that מאי חזית דדמא דידך סומק טפי דלמא דמא דההוא סומק טפי.
So you see that Chazal are telling us that Torah is is building on this מעצמו בדעתו ומחשבתו יודע טוב ורע. The Torah is is building on on that foundation. It also confirms our our intuition. When people talk about what degree of culpability German population had for the for the Holocaust, not only the German population, the Eastern European population, the Ukrainians and the Poles and and all of these, the their hands are are dripping with with they dripped with with Jewish blood. Everyone was doing it or they were just following orders, those are the sort of arguments which are advanced to somehow or other if not exonerate, at least at least mitigate. So when Chazal say that sevara hu, that yehareg v'al ya'avor is a sevara, so I think the Mishneh LaMelech writes in in Hilchos Melachim, that even though the Gemara in Sanhedrin either has an ibaya d'lo ifshita or the Gemara is poshet that a ben Noach is not mechuyav in yehareg v'al ya'avor for mitzvos bnei Noach, of different yesodos the rishonim have in what the Gemara at the end of the eighth perek does with that ibaya. But when it comes to yehareg v'al ya'avor for shfichas damim, so that ben Noach is mechuyav in. Ben Noach is mechuyav. Why? It's not a chiyuv in the Torah which is just imposed חוקה ומשפטה של ישראל. Something is a mitzvah in the Torah, okay, so meheicha tesei that it's part of mitzvos bnei Noach? Something which is a sevara, something which is so fundamental, something which is so elementary that it's a sevara, so then that's that's binding on on bnei Noach as well. The other again bein hayeter remarkable feature here is how the Rambam is learning pshat in the pasuk here in Parshas Bereishis of הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו לדעת טוב ורע. So the way Rashi takes the pasuk, which is the way the ta'amei hamikra, the way the trop would support something along these lines is that k'achad mimenu goes together. I think it's munach zakef katon on k'achad mimenu and Rashi comments on the pasuk. הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו הרי הוא יחיד בתחתונים כמו שאני יחיד בעליונים ומה היא יחידותו לדעת טוב ורע מה שאין כן בבהמה ובחיה.
So what does Rashi see the equation that הרי הוא יחיד בתחתונים כמו שאני יחיד בעליונים? The meforshim of Rashi explain that that achad here Rashi understands like when Avimelech says כמעט שכב אחד העם את אשתך. So achad ha'am Rashi there explains doesn't mean any one person from amongst the nation but achad ha'am means meyuchad sheba'am. So Rashi here is teitshing the pasuk that HaKadosh Baruch Hu kavyachol is talking to the malachim that HaKadosh Baruch Hu is addressing himself to the malachim and he says hen ha'adam, right, behold Adam understood batachtonim is ke'achad mimenu like the unique one capital O amongst us talking to the malachim and that's how and that's where Rashi sees that HaKadosh Baruch Hu is saying הרי הוא יחיד בתחתונים כמו שאני יחיד בעליונים. So ke'achad mimenu like the so according to Rashi the translation of that is like the unique one amongst us. That's the translation and the mimenu goes with achad. The Rambam clearly is understanding הן מן זה של אדם היה אחד בעולם. Right? He's one in the world. That there's a word understood in the pasuk here, right? The word that's understood in the pasuk is that it's as though the pasuk read הן האדם היה כאחד בעולם and then mimenu goes with the next phrase. mimenu goes ממנו לדעת טוב ורע. That it's from within him me'atzmo beda'ato umachshavto. It's within him to recognize to understand to discern tov vara. The Rambam in Perush Hamishnayos tells us where he got this pshat from. In Shmona Perakim in the last perek the metzuyad here also on the side of the Frankel Rambam. The Rambam says that Onkelos learn pshat in the pasuk this way. Because if you take a look Onkelos says האדם הוה יחידאי בעלמא. Right? That's where the Rambam gets the הן האדם היה כאחד בעולם. And then Onkelos says מיניה למידע טב וביש. That's exactly how the Rambam is presenting the pasuk elsewhere. You take a look here the Radak also also sees this notices how Onkelos teitched the pasuk also attention to it. אל יעבור במחשבתך דבר זה שאומרים טיפשי האומות ורוב גולמי בני ישראל שהקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על האדם מתחילת ברייתו להיות צדיק או רשע. אין הדבר כן אלא כל אדם ואדם ראוי להיות צדיק כמשה רבינו
o rasha k'Yerovam או חכם או סכל או רחמן או אכזרי או כילי או שוע וכן שאר כל הדעות ואין לו מי שיכפהו ולא גוזר עליו ולא מי שמושכו לאחד משני הדרכים אלא הוא מעצמו מדעתו נוטה לאיזה דרך שירצה.
So the Rambam here is not denying that we have internally predispositions. He is not not denying that. He explicitly acknowledges that in the beginning of Hilchos De'os. He says people are certainly born with predispositions. Some people, efshar, naturally much more excitable and some people naturally much more low. Laid back, and it's mamish mitchallel b'yesod. My son has a friend who had twins and he told him the following. He told him when they took a sonogram of the twins, so they were both boys. So one of them inside is he's dancing, he's jumping, doing somersaults, and the other one's just, just laid back, very, very placid. So when they were born, that's exactly their personalities. So one of them was very, very energetic, very... the other one's much, much more laid back. So there certainly are predispositions, that's what the Rambam writes, אם מוצא טבעו נוטה לאחת מהן in Deos Aleph Gimmel או מוכן לאחת מהן, yachzir atzmo l'mutav. But what the Rambam is saying is that there's no external control. He's saying there's not nothing, no one externally is in a position to be pulling strings in terms of our behavior. Internally again, not in any deterministic sense obviously, but there certainly are predispositions that a person has to be aware of and modulate and channel and refine accordingly. Hu she'Yirmiyahu omer מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. So the pasuk in Megillas Eichah according to the Rambam means that מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב, that when good and bad, when good and evil in human actions doesn't come from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, that comes from bechirah chofshis. שאין הבורא גוזר על האדם להיות טוב ולהיות רע. וכיון שכן הוא נמצא זה החוטא הוא הפסיד את עצמו.
A person who sins, it was his own self-destructive behavior. ולפיכך הוא ראוי לבכות ולקונן על כל מה שעשה לנפשו וגמלה רעה.
Hu she'kasuv acharav in Eichah מה יתאונן אדם חי גבר על חטאיו. Meaning the mah is not a question, right? It's like Yaakov Avinu says מה נורא המקום הזה. So מה נורא המקום הזה is how awesome this place is! Exclamation point. It's not a it's not an interrogative, it's not introducing a question. So too also מה יתאונן אדם חי גבר על חטאיו, how much does a person have to, again, bemoan and mourn his own sins! Exclamation point, not not question mark. V'chazar v'omar and again Eichah continues הואיל ורשותנו בידנו ומדעתנו עשינו כל הרעות ראוי לנו לחזור בתשובה ולעזוב רשענו שהרשות עתה בידנו.
Hu she'kasuv acharav נחפשה דרכינו ונחקורה ונשובה עד ה׳. עיקר זה ועיקר זה עיקר גדול הוא והוא עמוד התורה והמצווה.
This this principle is a major, major principle and it's the a pillar which upholds all of Torah u'mitzvos. She'ne'emar ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים ואת הטוב ואת המות ואת הרע
and v'kasuv ראה אנכי נותן לפניכם היום ברכה וקללה, klomar shehareshus b'yedchem. וכל שיחפוץ האדם לעשות ממעשי בני אדם עושה בין טובים בין רעים. ומפני זה העניין נאמר מי יתן והיה לבבם זה להם.
So what's Hakadosh Baruch Hu wishing for? כלומר שאין הבורא כופה בני האדם ולא גוזר עליהם לעשות טובה או רעה אלא לבם מסור להם.
Yitachen that according to the Rambam the translation of r'ei in both of these psukim that he quotes given what What he said in Halacha Alef, ha-bechira chafshis means that ממנו לדעת טוב ורע. That Re'eh, so we know that Re'eh often means to, again, when you speak not in a physical sense, but you speak in an intellectual sense, it means to understand, to have in Chazal a lashon רואה אני את דברי אדמון, like hadvarim nir'im li. So what does that mean? It means it makes sense to me. It means it's miskabel al hadaas. So the pshat is that Re'eh means not only see in the sense that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but see in the sense of understand. Use your capacity of ממנו לדעת טוב ורע to understand that אנכי נתן לפניכם היום את החיים ואת הטוב ואת המות ואת הרע.
Rambam describes this as an ikkar gadol, amud hatorah ve'hamitzva, that the whole, the whole system of Torah and mitzvos is built on this foundation, as the Rambam's about to explain in Halacha Daled, because what's the point of mitzvos if we don't have bechira chafshis? Where's the justice of sachar va'onesh if we don't have bechira chafshis? So all of Torah only makes sense in light, in light of this yesod. So here the question which, which one of the questions which is dealt with is how come the Rambam didn't find room for this in the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim? This is, he and he mamash uses the lashon ikkar and ikkar gadol and says that this is what underlies and and this is, this is a foundation for all of Torah and mitzvos and you can't imagine Torah and mitzvos otherwise. So the the answer is as follows, that it just, it's not an ikkar by itself like that. So it's sort of, it's implicit. It's implicit, for sachar va'onesh to, again, for sachar va'onesh to be legitimate, so then this has to be true. It's certainly true, but the question is does that, does that, is that going to satisfy us as to why the Rambam doesn't spell it out? Because le'maiseh the Rambam's, it seems to have been the way Rav Chaim explains a guiding principle within the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim that the Rambam was spelling out even things which logically you could have derived, he spells out explicitly in the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim. Meaning the Sefer Ikkarim famously asks on the Rambam, why does he call them Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, he should have called it Hakadosh Baruch Hu, Torah, and sachar va'onesh. Techiyas hameisim is part of sachar va'onesh, it's an element of sachar va'onesh, and so all of the five first ikkarim of the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, they're all different details as it were about Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So the Rambam, the Ikkarim says the Rambam should have streamlined it. It's really three ikkarim, says the Inyana d'Yoma, so that's what in the Rosh Hashanah Shemoneh Esrei, Malchiyos, Zichronos, and Shofaros is k'neged those those three ikkarim. That Malchiyos is Hakadosh Baruch Hu, and Zichronos is sachar va'onesh, and Shofaros is Torah. אתה נגלית בענן כבודך על הר קדשך לדבר עמם. So he says those are the three yesodos. Ein hachinami there are details within those yesodos. Why does Rambam call them 13? So Rav Chaim answers and and says, okay, but the Rambam's whole point is that what distinguishes the... So that's one kasha on the Rambam. The other kasha on the Rambam they ask is that a person's not allowed to deny anything in Torah. So why... So from the other end the Rambam is questioned also. So Rav Chaim says no, it's one answer to both questions and that is avada if a person opens a Chumash and says no, Rachmana litzlan says no, what it says in this pasuk isn't true. So avada that's kfira. Doesn't have to be but let's say a person doesn't know something that it says in Chumash. You ask him how many sons did Noach have? And he doesn't know how many sons Noach had. So he's not lacking in emuna, he's lacking in yedi'as haTorah. He's lacking in yedi'as haTorah. Ma she'ein kein what the Rambam details, what the Rambam specifies in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, what a person is lacking there he's not just lacking in yedi'as haTorah, he's lacking in emuna. And that's what Rav Chaim says is the answer to both questions. That's what's unique about the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim as opposed to all of Torah. If a person Rachmana litzlan frontally brazenly denies anything in Torah, he's told, he knows, and in the Torah it says A and he says not A, so avada that's kfira Rachmana litzlan. But if a person doesn't know that it says A in the Torah and he just doesn't know, he doesn't know. How many sons did Noach have? I don't know. So he's lacking in yedi'as haTorah. Is Hakadosh Baruch Hu is He a ba'al guf? Is He not a ba'al guf? He's not just lacking in yedi'as haTorah, but his emuna is deficient. So Rav Chaim says that's why the Rambam also couldn't streamline things the way the Ikkarim suggested, because then you wouldn't have known which details about Hakadosh Baruch Hu are tacke indispensable for adequate emuna. So that being the case, it's not so simple to say that it's sort of implicit in s'char va'onesh. Tzarich iyun if the teretz is still nitan lehei'amer. It's yitachen that what the teretz is is that when the Rambam gave the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim he didn't intend to tell us ikkarim of all of Torah, of Torah, of all of Torah. That's why we would have thought that bechiras Yisrael is very very fundamental. Bechiras Yisrael is not in the Rambam's Yud Gimmel Ikkarim either. So apparently the Rambam's Yud Gimmel Ikkarim are all about Hakadosh Baruch Hu. It's defining all about Hakadosh Baruch Hu. S'char va'onesh is again, that's an ikkar because it's defining how Hakadosh Baruch Hu governs and relates to the world. The same thing Moshiach is an ikkar, not because it's an ikkar, because it's again it's an ikkar about Hakadosh Baruch Hu in how He will bring the world to perfection, to its ultimate fulfillment, vechulu vechulu. As absolutely indispensable as bechira chofshis is for all of Torah and mitzvos, it's not an ikkar about Hakadosh Baruch Hu. It's not an ikkar about Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And that's the Rambam wasn't looking in Yud Gimmel Ikkarim to list all ikkarim. He was listing ikkarim about Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Halacha daled. אילו היה הקל גוזר על האדם להיות צדיק או רשע או אילו היה שם דבר שמושך את האדם בעיקר תולדתו לדרך מן הדרכים או למדע מן המדעות או לדעה מן הדעות או למעשה מן המעשים.
And again here by moshech the Rambam means deterministically, not just in terms of predisposition, but deterministically, כמו שבודים מלבם הטפשים הובי שמים. The way the tipshim, the astrologers, invent such a belief. האיך היה מצוה לנו על ידי הנביאים עשה כך ואל תעשה כך הטיבו דרכיכם ואל תלכו אחרי רשעיכם והוא מתחלת בריאתו כבר נגזר עליו או תולדתו תמשוך אותו לדבר שאי אפשר לזוז ממנו ומאי מקום היה לכל התורה כולה ובאיזה דין ובאיזה משפט נפרע מן הרשע או משלם שכר לצדיק השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט.
Okay, here the question is. Yeah, the question is, does the Rambam think, is there any limitation on our bechirah chofshis? Rav Dessler famously has in his Kuntres he talks about the Nekudas HaBechirah. Right? He gives his moshal that in a war, rachmana litzlan, so there's the battle line. There's the battle line, and behind the battle line is where each side's forces are lined up and amassed. But the battle is fought at the battle line. Okay, the battle line, as the war, rachmana litzlan, progresses, is likely to shift in either direction, but there's a battle line. That's his moshal. And he says that the battle line, the nimshal, is the Nekudas HaBechirah. And he clearly, clearly thinks that there are things which are beyond our control. Meaning that for one person, depending upon where his battle line is, where his Nekudas HaBechirah is, so he may have bechirah on this, but someone else, his Nekudas HaBechirah may be in a different spot, so not necessarily that he will have bechirah on this. There's no indication in the Rambam, the indications in the Rambam are to the contrary, that the Rambam doesn't seem to agree with that at all. That idea of Nekudas HaBechirah, again, which somewhat limits bechirah chofshis. Impression you get from the Rambam is that avada if a person has developed certain habits, he's going to increase the difficulty in making one of the two choices. He's going to have made one choice easier for himself, one choice more difficult for himself. But does there ever come a point where a person, where there is this Nekudas HaBechirah and as a result, a person doesn't have, I don't know, you don't see that here in the Rambam at all. Lichora. In Ramchal, you have it a little bit, but not in a sense that relieves a person of responsibility. Ramchal has this in more than one place, but one of the places is here in Perek Tes of Mesillas Yesharim. He's talking about Mafsidei Hazrizus. הם הם מולידי העצלה. What undermines zrizus is what increases laziness. Hagadol shebakulam, the most, the strongest factor again, which is antithetical to zrizus, which cultivates atzlus, is בקשת המנוחה הגופנית ושנאת הטורח ואהבת העידונים בתשלום כל תנאיה.
Is always wanting physical comfort and leisure and not exerting oneself. כי הנה האדם הזה ודאי שתכבד עליו העבודה לפני בוראו כובד גדול.
A person who develops again such traits, always wants ease and comfort and hates exertion, so for him, avodas Hashem is going to weigh on him very, very heavily. כי מי שירצה לאכול אכילתו בכל הישוב והמנוחה. A person wants to eat again as slowly and leisurely as possible. ולישון שנתו בלא טורד. He doesn't want to hear from an alarm clock. וימאן ללכת אם לא אטו. And he'll refuse to walk unless he can stroll slowly. הנה יקשה עליו להשכים לבית כנסיות בבוקר, how's he going to make it to minyan in the morning? או לקצר סעודתו מפני המנחה, or to abbreviate his seuda to get to mincha. Okay. So far he says yeekshe alav, maybe just means more difficult. And then he says no, מי שמרגיל עצמו למנהגים האלה, if a person creates these habits, איננו אדון בעצמו לעשות הפך זה כשירצה. He won't be able to, he gives away his sovereignty. He won't be able on the spot to overcome it, כי כבר נאסר הרצון במשאת ההרגל ונעשה טבע שני, because his will has been imprisoned by habit which has become second nature. Ramchal doesn't mean that he can't work on correcting that habit, but what he means is that on the spot he's not going to be able to do it. What he means is that if it's a question of getting up for minyan, going to seder, whatever it is, he can work on it and ultimately reverse it, but on the spot, in terms of today right now, so Ramchal says he won't be able to do it. So truth is this is again a little bit of a limitation in terms of that b'chira chofshit can't be fully exercised to accomplish anything on the spot. And our b'chira chofshit today is affected by our b'chira chofshit in the past. Again, not in the sense that a person can't recognize the atzlot and embark on a path of countering it and developing zrizut, but in the sense that right now he may not be able to move as fast and as quickly as the situation warrants. There's nothing about this that relieves us of responsibility because what Ramchal is depicting is that we put ourselves in that position. He's talking about מי שמרגיל עצמו למנהגים האלה. He's not suggesting that a person finds himself in that position due to circumstances that were beyond his control. But I don't know if the Rambam would agree with that either. I don't know if the Rambam would agree with that. Okay maybe we'll just finish halacha daled for now. ואל תתמה ותאמר היאך יהיה האדם עושה כל מה שיחפוץ ויהיו מעשיו מסורים לו וכי יעשה בעולם דבר שלא ברשות קונו ובלא חפצו והכתוב אומר כל אשר חפץ ה' עשה בשמים ובארץ.
So doesn't the pasuk describe that everything that happens is in accordance with ratzon hashem? So how does that leave room for our b'chira? Answers the Rambam, דע שהכל בחפצו יעשה ואע"פ שמעשינו מסורים לנו. Both are true. Everything that happens is in accordance with ratzon hashem and we have full b'chira. כיצד כשם שחפץ היוצר להיות האש והרוח עולים למעלה והמים והארץ יורדים למטה והגלגל סובב בעיגול וכן שאר בריות העולם להיות כמנהגן שחפץ בהם ככה חפץ להיות האדם רשותו בידו וכל מעשיו מסורים לו ולא יהיה לו לא כופה ולא מושך אלא הוא מעצמו בדעתו שנתן לו האל עושה כל שהאדם יכול לעשות.
The k'shisheya is that everything that happens is in accordance with ratzon hashem because it's ratzon hashem that we should have b'chira chofshit. Doesn't mean it's ratzon hashem in the sense that if we're doing bad Hakadosh Baruch Hu willed that we do bad, but it means that it's ratzon hashem in the sense that Hakadosh Baruch Hu wills that we should have b'chira chofshit to choose how we act. לפיכך דנים אותו לפי מעשיו אם עשה... לפיכך דנו אותו לפי מעשיו, אם עשה טוב מטיבין לו, ואם עשה רע מריעין לו. הוא שהנביא אומר: מידכם היתה זאת לכם, גם המה בחרו בדרכיהם. ובענין זה אמר שלמה: שמח בחור בילדותך, ויטיבך לבך בימי בחורותיך, ודע כי על כל אלו יביאך האלוקים במשפט. כל מה שיש בידך כח לעשות, לעתיד אתה ליתן את הדין.
Okay, so then on Thursday we'll continue with halacha hey and tomorrow we'll continue bli neder im yirtzeh Hashem in Eileh Ha-Nevuos.