Transcript

Let's back up to the very end of last week's Parsha that we didn't get to last week and then פרק א' פסוק ט' a few lines into the Ramban

והנה בכתוב הזה טעם הקרבנות והנה בכתוב הזה טעם הקרבנות שהם אישי ריח ניחוח לה' ואמר הרב במורה הנבוכים כי טעם הקרבנות בעבור שהמצרים והכשדים שהיו ישראל גרים בארצם מעולם היו עובדים לבקר ולצאן כי המצרים עובדים לטלה ולשור והכשדים עובדים לשדים אשר יראו להם בדמות שעירים ואנשי הודו עד היום לא ישחטו בקר לעולם ועל כן ציווה לשחוט אלו השלושה מינים לשם הנכבד כדי שיוודע כי הדבר שהיו חושבים כי הם בתכלית העבירה הוא אשר יקריב לבורא ובו יתכפר העוונות כי כן יתרפאו האמונות הרעות שהם מדוי הנפש כי כל מדוי וכל חולי לא יתרפא כי אם בהפכו אלו דבריו ובהם האריך. והנה הם דברי הבל ירפאו שבר גדול וקושיא רבה על נקלה יעשו שולחן ה' מגואל שאיננו רק להוציא מליבן של רשעים וטיפשי עולם והכתוב אמר כי הם לחם אישי לריח ניחוח וגם כי לפי שטותם של מצרים לא תתרפא מחלתם בזה אבל תוסיף מכאוב כי מחשבת הרשעים הנזכרים לעבוד למזל טלה ולמזל שור שיש להם כוח בהם כפי מחשבתם ולכן לא יאכלו אותם מפני כוחם ויסודם אבל אם יזבחו אותם לשם הנכבד זה כבוד להם ומעלה להם ואף כך הם נוהגים כמו שאמר ולא יזבחו עוד את זבחיהם לשעירים ועושי העגל זבחו לו והרב מזכיר שהיו מקריבים ללבנה בכל ראשי חודשיהם ולשמש בעלותה במזלות הידועים להם בספריהם ויוסיף תתרפא המחלה באוכלנו מהם לשובע שהוא אסור להם ומבוזה בעיניהם ולא יעשו כן לעולם. והנה נח בצאתו מן התיבה עם שלושה בניו אין בעולם כשדי או מצרי הקריב קרבן וייטב בעיני ה' ואמר בו וירח ה' את ריח הניחוח וממנו אמר אל לבו לא אוסיף לקלל עוד את האדמה בעבור האדם והבל הביא גם הוא מבכורות צאנו ומחלביהן וישע ה' אל הבל ואל מנחתו ולא היה עדיין בעולם שמץ עבודה זרה כלל ובלעם אמר שבעת מזבחות ערכתי ואעל פר ואיל במזבח ואין דעתו עתה לשלול ממנו אמונות רעות ולא נצטווה בכך אבל עשה כן לקרבה אל האלהים כדי שיחול עליו הדיבור ולשון הקרבנות את קרבני לחמי לאשי ריח ניחוחי וחלילה שלא יהיה בהם שום תועלת ורצון רק שלילת עבודה זרה מדעת השוטים.

The Ramban is sort of bit confusing in that the Ramban is without necessarily waving a red flag to us is really addressing is commenting on the Rambam's approach to two different questions. There's one question of can we understand a rationale for which minim the Torah. Why is it that the boker and tzon, even within behemos tehoros and ofos tehoros, the Torah doesn't allow for all minim. The Torah only allows for specific minim to be olos on the mizbeiach. That is one issue. Then another issue is the whole institution of hakravas korbanos. The Ramban when he, and the Ramban is clearly, the Ramban seems to be in a sense suggesting that the rationale for why these minim is also the rationale for why you have the whole institution of hakravas korbanos. The Rambam says that these minim, the kesav and the izim, the parim, the boker, were all minim that had been adopted as objects of avoda zara. And yet when the Ramban asks questions from Noach and from Hevel, so the questions can be not only to why were they limited to those minim, but

והנה נח בצאתו מן התיבה אין בעולם כשדי או מצרי הקריב קרבן וייטב בעיני השם,

so he clearly seems to be understanding that the rationale is not only that the Rambam is citing, is not only the rationale for these minim, but the broader rationale for why you have the whole institution of korbanos altogether. The whole thing is laafokei from the pagan avoda zara big belief. And he understands the Rambam to be saying that the whole institution of avoda zara is reactive in a sense, that the Torah is reacting to avoda zara and it is laafokei avoda zara. That is what the whole institution of korbanos is, says the Ramban. So how do you understand why there was korbanos before there was ever avoda zara in the world? Avoda zara begins bimei Enosh and already bimei Hevel you have korbanos. Avoda zara, certainly the particular format of avoda zara of kasdi o mitzri is exactly what Rambam was holding as we know. But the Ramban says that נח בצאתו מן התיבה אין בעולם כשדי או מצרי. And yet it is a little hard to understand because when you look in the Rambam, what seems to emerge is the following: Earlier, before the Rambam comments on the pirtei halacha of korbanos, dehainu why the kesav and the se'irim, so earlier the Rambam says as follows:

ובכמה הנהגה זו עצמה מאותו מנהיג יתרומם ויתעלה נאמרו דברים הרבה בתורתנו לפי שאי אפשר לצאת מן הקצה אל הקצה הנגדי בבת אחת.

Person can't effectively make extreme dramatic adjustments. Same way a baby's digestive system, so first the baby subsists just on the mother's milk and then gradually you can as the digestive system allows for it so then you can gradually introduce soft strained foods and eventually you can gradually make your build your way up until the baby has a solid diet as well. Change has to happen gradually. Change can't happen radically, extremely, instantaneously. So that's true not only in terms of physical change, but it's also true in terms of psychologically, emotionally as well.

ולפיכך לא יתכן כפי טבע האדם שיעזוב כל מה שהורגל בו בבת אחת. וכאשר שלח השם את משה רבנו לעשותנו ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש בידיעתו יתעלה כמו שביאר ואמר ואתה הראת לדעת וידעת היום והשבות אל לבבך ושנתייחד בעבודתו כמו שאמר ועבדו בכל לבבכם ואמר ועבדתם את השם אלוקיכם ואמר ואותו תעבודו והיה הנוהג המפורסם בעולם כולו הרגיל אז.

The universal religious practice in the world then was והעבודה הכללית שגדלנו עליה, which even Bnei Yisrael prior to Matan Torah were used to,

היתה הקרבת מיני בעלי חיים באותן ההיכלות שמאמינים בהן הצורות.

And the universal religious practice at that time was to have hakravas korbanos. U'lefi'kach, skipping a few lines, ולפיכך בחכמתו יתעלה וניהולו הגלוי בכל ברואיו, Hakadosh Baruch Hu in his chochma, in how he exercises his providence, didn't see fit

שיצוונו בעזיבת כל מיני העבודות הללו ולהניחם ולבטלם לפי שזה היה אז מה שלא יתכן לקבלו לפי טבע האדם שהוא נינוח תמיד במורגל.

He's comfortable. V'haya na'asa az ze az

כמו אילו בא נביא בזמננו הללו וקרא לעבודת השם ואמר הנה השם ציווה אתכם שלא תתפללו לו ולא תצומו לו ולא תשועו לפניו בעת צרה אלא תהיה עבודתכם מחשבה בלי מעשה כלל. ולפיכך הניח יתעלה אותנו ממיני העבודות והעבירה מהיותם מן הדברים ולדברים דמיוניים שאין להם אמיתות לשמו יתעלה ציוונו לעשותם לו יתעלה.

So ostensibly the Rambam here is takeh saying what the Ramban says that well the Torah couldn't really be oker avoda zara, the avoda zara-dik practice of hakravas korbanos, so instead Hakadosh Baruch Hu redirected that avoda zara-dik practice, right? Ostensibly that's what the Rambam seems to be saying that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, again Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't tamper with human nature. The Rambam proves that from the pasuk in the beginning of Parshas Beshalach,

ולא נחם אלוהים דרך ארץ פלשתים כי קרוב הוא כי אמר אלוהים פן ינחם העם בראותם מלחמה ושבו מצרימה.

If Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants us to go to Eretz Yisrael, so why didn't he just give us the fortitude that even if we'll encounter a milchama that we won't? Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't tamper with human nature. He created people the way he saw fit to create people and then Hakadosh Baruch Hu gears the Torah and gears his hashgacha to people ba'asher hem sham. So the same way the Rambam says it's a mefurash pasuk in Parshas Beshalach that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, again, he coordinates. His Torah, he coordinates his hashgacha with the way he chose to design human nature. So human nature is that a people that've been slaves for two hundred and ten years v'rau milchama if Mitzrayim is close they'll run back to Mitzrayim so Hakadosh Baruch Hu says I'm not interested in tampering with human nature I'm not interested in tampering with the bechirah chofshis so instead לא נחם אלקים דרך ארץ פלשתים so says the Rambam הוא הדין והוא הטעם that at the time of Matan Torah the universal practice that we also took for granted is that religious worship includes avodas hakorbanos so Hakadosh Baruch Hu did instead of being mevatel avodas hakorbanos Hakadosh Baruch Hu redirected it to legavoah that's how the Rambam explains why there's such an emphasis by mikdash and korbanos of lishmah veasu li mikdash

מזבח אדמה תעשה לי אדם כי יקריב מכם קרבן להשם

vechihenu li the element of lishmah here is even more critical than in any other context because it's that which is redeeming and it's that which is so so central. Ulefi mei'ata here too this is open to the hasaga of the Ramban so how do you understand Noach how do you understand Hevel they weren't coming la'apukei avodah zarah ela mai it's clear and again this doesn't respond to the first part of the Ramban about which minim it's responding to the Ramban's broader question on the rationale for korbanos as a whole that it's clear that what the Rambam is saying is the following. The Rambam is saying that people naturally in terms of their religious impulse they have a natural religious impulse to makriv korbanos and a person also has a natural religious impulse to tefillah. Kayin and Hevel bring korbanos because there is such a natural religious impulse. The Rambam is not saying that the practice of korbanos is a result of the twisted and distorted beliefs of the avodah zarah no it's a natural religious impulse. Tefillah is also a natural religious impulse. In abstract in theory which of those natural religious impulses is more l'chatchilah is more on target? So the Rambam says the one which is really more on target and the one which is more l'chatchilah as a natural religious of those two again both of them are natural religious impulses the one which is more l'chatchilah is tefillah because ultimately all the ma'asim that the Torah commands us they're all supposed to refine our character which helps us refine our deyos and helps us connect Hakadosh Baruch Hu via the seichel. Tefillah is obviously much closer to that ultimate connection to Hakadosh Baruch Hu than avodas hakorbanos is. So again to repeat the Rambam doesn't mean the Rambam never says that the whole idea of hakravas korbanos is just a result of the twisted pagan beliefs of ovdei avodah zarah. What the Rambam says is this. He says that there are two natural religious impulses hakravas korbanos and tefillah. I think the Ibn Ezra says I think it's the Ibn Ezra on the pasuk of vayevei Kayin right vayevei Kayin so Kayin brings. So we just think the pasuk okay so we take that's the idiom you bring a korban. But why do you bring a korban? Where are you going? What bring means you bring from point A to point B. So what what What does he bring? He should on the spot just so the Ibn Ezra says something amazing. He says that Kayin brought the korban to the place where he used to daven. Kayin had a maybe we're talking about the back end of Parshas Bereishis but Kayin had a makom kavua l'tefilla and vayavei Kayin, boom, it's not just reflecting the idiom of you bring a korban. No, the idiom of bringing a korban is because he takeh we bring it to the Beis Hamikdash. You don't just offer it in your backyard, you bring it to the Beis Hamikdash. So Kayin also he was bringing, where was he bringing? He was bringing to the makom tefilla. Now, how takeh bring it to the makom tefilla? No, because there were those two natural religious impulses. The reason Noach and the reason Hevel, those Kayin and Hevel, those are psukim and according to Chazal, Adam Harishon as well brought korbanos is דווקא ממש לאפוקי עבודה זרה. There was no mitzvah, there was no custom, it wasn't l'afukei avodah zarah, it was in response to that natural religious impulse. Says the Rambam, the Torah would not have included that were it not for the fact that at that time we were so accustomed and therefore dependent upon being able to respond to and express that religious impulse of hakravas korbanos. So that's why the Torah includes it even though tefilla is much closer to the mark than korbanos. And that's why the Rambam says the Torah has all kinds of constraints on korbanos that you don't have by tefilla. Tefilla you can daven wherever you want and tefilla is not limited by not only by place, it's not limited by time, הלוואי שיתפלל אדם כל היום כולו and wherever a person finds himself he can daven and of course korbanos the Torah restricts. Because tefilla is more interesting. Davening is closer to the mark, the Rambam says, than hakravas korbanos. Then as a detail within that scheme, that's why there is hakravas korbanos again, it's not a pagan practice, it's a natural correct religious impulse, not as correct, not as l'chatchila, not as close to the mark as tefilla. There's nothing pagan about that instinct, about that religious instinct or impulse to be makriv korbanos. But the Rambam is saying here that the religious world of that time, the religious world was the world of avodah zarah, that's what was rampant. The religious world was totally again dependent upon and the custom to expressing and acting on that religious impulse. And Hakadosh Baruch Hu again, for the same rationale as לא נחם אלקים דרך ארץ פלשתים כי קרוב הוא, Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't tamper with human nature as He created it, Hakadosh Baruch Hu chooses then to operate within it. There is another assumption here that needs to be articulated, we're not really going into it now, just to recognize it for this to make sense is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants that the mitzvos HaTorah should all be eternal and absolute. Otherwise the question would be so why not the days of Moshiach then maybe now already we've grown up, right? We've all kicked the habit of hakravas korbanos. So why is it that when Moshiach comes so then all korbanos will be returned as the Rambam writes in Hilchos Melachim? So that's because all mitzvos HaTorah are absolute and eternal and that's for different reason, different cheshbon but the Rambam wasn't unaware of that either. So the pshat is that the Rambam's answer to the Ramban is that no, I never said that the whole institution of hakravas korbanos is l'afukei avodah zarah. The institution the practice of hakravas korbanos is a natural religious impulse, that's what you see by Noach, that's what you see by Kayin and Hevel. The relevance of the background of avodah zarah is relative to two things: number one, heyos that this religious impulse isn't as refined and isn't as l'chatchiladig as tefilla so why have it? If it's more of a kavanna shniya than a kavanna rishona, why have it? And B, how do you understand which min the Torah chose for the hakravas korbanos? So that l'chora is the havana within the Rambam. Ramban says on his Ta'am HaMitzva of the Korbanos.

ויותר ראוי הטעם שאמרו בהם כי בעבור שמעשי בני אדם נגמרים במחשבה ובדיבור ובמעשה.

But a person, when a person acts, it's a composite of three things: his thought, his speech, and his action. Tziva Hashem כי כאשר יחטא יביא קרבן. So to sort of represent all those elements, the Torah says that whenever a person sins he brings a korban.

יסמוך עליו ידו סמיכה כנגד המעשה ויתוודה בפיו כנגד הדיבור וישרוף באש הקרב והכליות שהם כלי המחשבה והתאווה והכרעיים כנגד ידיו ורגליו של אדם העושה כל מלאכתו ויזרוק הדם על המזבח כנגד דמו בנפשו.

It's a vicarious form of atonement. Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't want that a person should be makriv himself literally, so he provides for this vicarious form of atonement. כדי שיחשוב האדם בעשותו כל אלה, the attitude, the approach, the perspective on the hakravas korbanos is כי חטא לאלוקיו בגופו ובנפשו. Veha'emes hi וראוי לו שישפך דמו וישרף גופו. One's life is not his own. It's Hakadosh Baruch Hu.

אין נפשו של אדם קנינו אלא קניין הקדוש ברוך הוא.

לולי חסד הבורא שלקח ממנו תמורה וקיבל הקרבן הזה שיהיה דמו תחת דמו נפש תחת נפש.

Skipping a few lines, ואלו דברים מתקבלים מושכים את הלב כדברי הגדה. This is sort of the nigleh-dika ta'am for korbanos that the Ramban says. I think the Seforno here at the beginning of Vayikra also operates with this approach, and then he explains that that's how you understand, everyone struggles with the psukim in Yeshayahu and Yirmiyahu where overly simplistically the psukim seem to say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu via Yeshayahu Yirmiyahu says I never told you to bring korbanos, I'm not interested in your korban. So everyone struggles, what's the pshat in the psukim? So the Seforno basically says in this Ramban a very very beautiful pshat. He says if when a person has the hachna'a, the appropriate hachna'a in response to hakaras hacheit, so then hakravas korbanos is sort of the kasuv hashlishi between on the one hand

יחשוב האדם שחטא לאלוקיו בגופו ובנפשו וראוי לו שישפך דמו וישרף גופו.

One's life is not his own. It's Hakadosh Baruch Hu.

אין נפשו של אדם קנינו אלא קניין הקדוש ברוך הוא.

A person is ממרה את פי הקדוש ברוך הוא, so he really forfeits his right to life. וראוי לו שישפך דמו וישרף גופו. Ella mah, Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't want that. Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants that we should do teshuva and that we should continue to live. So what's the kasuv hashlishi? So the kasuv hashlishi is this vicarious form of kappara. But if you just engage in that vicarious form of kappara without that mindset, without that hachna'a, so it's like trying to cover up for whatever you do by writing a check. You take advantage of people, then you try to write a check to paper things over and as a way of sort of evading. So you see that but again that by Korbanos the mindset, the approach is not just a mitzvah min hamuvchar but it really determines what it is you're doing. Is it that a person rachmana litzlan was mezalzel b'Shabbos and he wasn't careful on Shabbos, he did a melacha on Shabbos, fine, I'll write a check, buy a behema, bring a chatas, fine? Okay, so the Ribono Shel Olam says I'm not interested in that. I'm not interested in your thinking that you can be very cavalier about Shabbos and all you have to do is come to the Beis Hamikdash and be makriv a chatas. That's what the pesukim in Navi where Hakadosh Baruch Hu is disparaging Hakravas Korbanos, that's what it reflects. But when it's done with this mindset what the Ramban says and recognizing that this is accepted in lieu of what really should happen and recognizing that that's a חסד הקדוש ברוך הוא, so then the Korbanos are reiach nichoach l'Hashem. Let's mention another Ramban, not in Vayikra which we've looked at for three weeks already but in Parshas Re'eh on the phrase of lechem oni. So the Ramban explains as follows,

ואערך כאן דברים נאמנים כי הזכיר במצה שתהא לחם עוני והגיד כי צוה לזכור שיצאו בחפזון

as the pasuk itself says כי בחפזון יצאת מארץ מצרים but also

והיא עוני זכר כי היו במצרים בלחם צר ומים לחץ והנה תרמוז לשני דברים.

Meaning the Ramban says that the ki bechipazon sort of accounts for the fact that it's matzah but then it's almost accidental or coincidental that it was lechem, lechem oni. It's just, let's say you have someone who's a rich person, he doesn't have time to put the jam on the peanut butter and jam on the bread so he's eating dry bread, so you wouldn't so much, I don't know if you maybe it should be designated lechem chipazon rather than lechem oni. Lechem chipazon so כי לא יכלו להתמהמה. So why are you why do you name it lechem oni? It's true that it corresponds to lechem oni but that's almost misleading in the sense that the result of it corresponding to lechem lechem oni wasn't because of aniyus per se, it was because of chipazon. So call it instead of calling it bread of affliction, call it bread of haste, bread of acceleration, whatever is going to be catchy and corner the marketplace. So vos eppes that it's lechem oni? So that's what Ramban says no, the Torah is telling us that really there's a double association with matzah. There's the association again that

מצה זו שאנו אוכלים על שום מה שלא הספיק בצקם להחמיץ

the reason that the pasuk says ki bechipazon. but the fact that it's called lechem oni hints to a second association which was that we used to eat matzah in Mitzrayim also throughout the years of shibbud. Matzah is harder to digest than chametz and food that's harder to digest so it stays in the stomach longer and a person has a little bit of a feeling of being satiated longer than he does with a food that's more easily digested. So because of that the diet matzah was prominent in the diet of an eved because an eved was given very little to eat so to try to get the maximum out of that very little he was given matzah rather than chametz because it's harder to digest so again that little bit that he was given would feel its impact for a little longer. והנה תוספות משנה שני דברים v'chein omer seder haRamban and this is what's reflected in the Haggadah הא לחמא עניא די אכלו אבהתנא בארעא דמצרים. So clearly the Baal HaHaggadah is telling us that lechem oni is not only what we had to eat when we left Mitzrayim because of the chipazon but it's what we ate throughout the years in Mitzrayim itself. הא לחמא עניא די אכלו אבהתנא בארעא דמצרים. V'yitachen that again the Ramban doesn't I can't dibrei Ramban I don't know if the Ramban tips his hand as to how one should understand this but what's takeh the pshat that it's the same food which represents both the shibbud and the geulah? Right? So kumt aus according to the Ramban that there's really a double what matzah represents and signifies is almost two opposite ideas. It represents avdut in the sense of that that's the lechem tzar that an eved subsists on and then also represents geulah in the sense of כי בחפזון יצאת מארץ מצרים. So v'yitachen that the idea that the Torah is teaching us is that the correct relationship between geulah and galus suffering avdut whatever it is that preceded the geulah is not just that geulah represents the termination of the avdut the escape from the avdut but that in Hakadosh Baruch Hu's plan it was through the crucible of the avdut Mitzrayim that paved the way for the geulah. So it's not that galus and avdut and geulah are sort of two opposites and the geulah represents overcoming and terminating the avdut but they're two different stages in one organic process and the geulah represents the culmination rather than the reversal of what preceded it. And that's why the Torah says the same matzah which represents the הא לחמא עניא די אכלו אבהתנא בארעא דמצרים it has to be the same matzah which will represent the geulah of כי בחפזון יצאת מארץ מצרים.