Good morning again rabosai. Let's take a look here in Avos in Perek B, Mishna Aleph. Rebbe Omer, איזו היא דרך ישרה שיבור לו האדם כל שהיא תפארת לעושיה ותפארת לו מן האדם.
The derech yeshara, if a person chooses for himself the derech yeshara, it yields tiferes, it yields splendor for the person himself, leoseha, as well as from others. Excuse me. What does that mean? The Rambam: פשוט הוא כי דרך ישרה הם המעשים הטובים שביארנו בפרק הרביעי והם המעשים הממוצעים.
So the Rambam identifies the derech yeshara of this mishna with the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav to follow along the derech hamemutzaas, the middle balanced blended path. That's in Perek Aleph Hilchos Deios. If you have the Rambam on hand, take a look in Perek Aleph of Deios, Halacha Dalet. הדרך הישרה היא מדה בינונית שבכל דעה ודעה מכל הדעות שיש לאדם.
Again, it's the middle blended character trait. והיא הדעה שהיא קרובה משני הקצוות ריחוק שוה. It's equidistant from the two extremes. And then if you fast forward to the end of Halacha Hei, so the Rambam writes ומצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים האלו בדרכים אלו הבינונים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו.
So it's quite clear that yeshara, the derech hayeshara denotes for the Rambam, again, the path where a person's middos, what the Rambam calls deios, are memutzaos. Memutzaos lashon emtza, emtza in the middle, they're memutzaos, they're balanced. Maybe the pshat in just how the term yeshara—so yeshara means straight. So we sort of understand that in geometric ways and we understand that to be straight means to do the right thing, but how does that necessarily connote the mida hamemutzaas? So maybe it means like this. Let's say if you're in a rowboat and you're rowing. So if your stronger hand will be exerting a greater force as you row than the weaker hand, so then you're not going to be able to chart a straight course. You're going to veer in the opposite direction of the side that's because—so in order to go straight, if you're looking to propel yourself forward but along a straight line, so you have to make sure that if there are currents, that they're balanced, that in terms of whatever forces there are which could push you in either direction, that those two are balanced. Again, imagine that metaphor of the rowing. In order to go straight, you need to exert equal force on the right side and the left side to keep the rowboat on a straight course. So that's what the... The two extremes of the spectrum influence the person equally. Neither one has undue, neither one exerts undue influence on the person. The same way if as I'm rowing, so on the right side and the left side, so I'm applying equal force, so then I'll go straight. If on either side I'm applying more force, so then that's going to take me off center and it won't allow me to chart a straight course. Now the fact that the Rambam again interprets and identifies the derech hayesharah with the midah hamemutza'as, with this balance between not being a ba'al ta'avah but not being an ascetic, not being so disinterested in money that a person can't pay their rent and can't take care of his basic needs, but not being rodef achar habetza. That midah memutza'as is described as, is defined as the derech hayesharah. Yitachen and again the other adjective that the Rambam has for it, here again derech hayesharah we have here in our Mishnah as well, in the Yad, again at the end of Halachah Heh, מצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינונים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים.
It's also described as tov. Yitachen me'od that based on this we can reconstruct how the Rambam learned pshat in the pasuk of ve'asisa hayashar vehatov. The pashtus is, like the Ramban very famously says, ve'asisa hayashar vehatov, again it seems so generic as to not be meaningful. Right, if you just say be good, okay, so if you say you know clean up your room, do this, do that, so there's a clear pointed directive, but just sort of this very general be good, so what does it mean? There has to be a way of identifying the specific tochen for that to be a meaningful exhortation. So the Ramban very famously says in I think it's Va'eschanan, right? Ve'asisa hayashar vehatov. The Ramban very famously says that the pshat is as follows. The Torah, because we're finite, so the Torah needs to be finite. There have to be so many pesukim in Torah Shebichtav. If there was an infinite number of pesukim in Torah Shebichtav, so then we could never learn Chumash. So Torah has to be finite. The number of different situations that a person can find themselves in is almost, obviously not literally infinite, but almost infinite. It far exceeds the number of cases that can be specifically directly addressed in the Chumash because of our limitations. Right? The Torah can't have a hundred million scenarios in Chumash. If this scenario happens do this, if this scenario happens do that vechulu vechulu, we'll never make our way through it. So says the Ramban, so how does the Torah deal with that human reality and that human limitation? So the way the Torah deals with this, the Torah gives us many specifics of how we're supposed to conduct ourselves. The Torah has an issur ona'as mamon, it has an issur ona'as devarim, it has dinei shomer, it has dinei nezikin, it has many, many specifics in terms of what our bein adam lachaveiro has to be. And then the Torah says based on all these specific examples, so now you need to develop a sense, a very finely tuned and honed sense for what the Torah expects of you and now extrapolate from that ve'asisa hayashar vehatov in every other set of circumstances, in every other context. So ve'asisa hayashar vehatov, again, the Ramban says it's meaningful because ve'asisa hayashar vehatov tells us now extrapolate. extrapolate to recognize the values of yosher and tov which underlie and which embody all the specific dinim in the Torah? And then you'll know how to conduct yourself in any possible situation, in any possible set of circumstances that you'll find yourself based on those principles which inhere in all the specifics that the Torah gave us. So that's the significance of ve'asita hayashar vehatov. Very, very yesodistik. The Rambam pashta says understood ve'asita hayashar vehatov differently. For the Rambam, just in light of, again, the Rambam here in the Peirush Hamishnayos and supplemented and expanded by the Rambam Hilchos Deios where yosher and tov describes the mida beinoniss, the derech hamemutza. So lichora for the Rambam ve'asita hayashar vehatov means is to follow that, that middle balanced path. Now again on the one hand that's a very different pshat than the, than the Ramban, very different pshat than the Ramban, but m'idach gisa, in many ways it has the same effect, dehainu of it's a mandate or a principle that can be applied to just about every situation that a person finds himself in. And in that sense it's, it's very much like the, the Ramban. Again, albeit again, that on another level it's certainly a very, very different understanding of the pasuk. Okay, let's back to, back to the Peirush Hamishnayos. So what does the, the mishna says that the derech yeshara sheyavor lo ha'adam, if a person again opts for this derech yeshara, he places himself on that path, so then it's תפארת לעושה ותפארת לו מן האדם. What does the Rambam say? לפי שבהם תושג לאדם בנפשו תכונה נעלה. A person will bring himself to shleimus that way. It's tiferes for the person himself. ויטיבו הליכותיו עם בני אדם. And it will also ensure that all of his dealings with people על הצד היותר טוב. v'hu omro. And that's what the mishna says: תפארת לעושה ותפארת לו מן האדם. So here there's a very, very important perspective here in the Rambam's words in the mishna. When we, I don't know, whether it's when we think about different tchumim of avoda, different aspects of character development, so we distinguish very sharply between what, what, again it's not our coinage obviously, between what we call bein adam l'atzmo and bein adam l'chaveiro. And we see them, now on the one hand, so the Rambam on the one hand is sort of endorsing that, that's what תפארת לעושה ותפארת לו מן האדם means. One is talking about the bein adam l'atzmo, one's talking about the bein adam l'chaveiro. So on the one hand the Rambam seems to be endorsing that, but m'idach gisa, more significantly, the Rambam is saying but it's really one and the same approach, it's really one and the same avoda. Moreover, moreover, again if you have the Rambam Hilchos Deios there, rabosai, so take a look. Let's read halacha alef a little bit. דעות הרבה יש לכל אחד ואחד מבני אדם וזו משונה מזו. מזו ורחוקה ממנה ביותר. יש אדם שהוא בעל חמה כועס תמיד.
At the other end of the spectrum, יש אדם שדעתו מיושבת עליו ואינו כועס כלל ואם כעס יכעס כעס מעט בכמה שנים. ויש אדם שהוא גבה לב ביותר ויש שהוא שפל רוח עד מאוד. ויש שהוא בעל תאוה לא תשבע נפשו מהלוך בתאותו ויש שהוא טהור גוף ביותר לא יתאוה אפילו דברים מועטים שהגוף צריך להם. יש בעל נפש רחבה שלא תשבע נפשו מכל ממון העולם כענין שנאמר אוהב כסף לא ישבע כסף ויש מקצר שדי לו אפילו דבר מועט שלא יספיק לו ולא ירדוף להשיג כל צרכו.
So the first example was, I don't know, the spectrum from apathy to volatility, anger. That was the first spectrum the Rambam talked about. The next spectrum he talks about is from extreme humility to narcissism. Then the next he talks about is the spectrum of asceticism to hedonism. Then the Rambam says in Halacha Dalet that with regard to each of these examples that he gave us, maybe let's just finish Halacha Aleph. ויש שהוא מסגף עצמו ברעב וקובץ על ידו ואינו אוכל פרוטה משלו אלא בצער גדול ויש שהוא מאבד כל ממונו בידו לדעתו ועל דרכים אלו שאר כל הדעות כגון מהולל ואונן וכילי ושוע ואכזרי ורחמן ורך לבב ואמיץ הלב וכל כיוצא בהן.
Halacha Dalet: הדרך הישרה היא מדה בינונית שבכל דעה ודעה מכל הדעות שיש לו לאדם.
In each of these, the correct is neither end of the spectrum, but the middle of the spectrum. And then the Rambam applies that for the examples he gave us. Take a look one more example before we just try to understand and articulate the point. Take a look in פרק ב הלכה ז for a minute, rabosai. פרק ב הלכה ז: לא יהא אדם בעל שחוק והתל.
Person shouldn't be a lets. Shouldn't be in a constant state of frivolity. Me'idach gisa, velo atzev ve'onein. For those who appreciate literary allusions and are bekiyim in Winnie the Pooh, so a person's not supposed to be like Eeyore either. Person's not supposed to be constantly constantly... those who didn't understand that allusion clearly took the wrong major in college or high school kind of thing. Velo atzev ve'onein, a person is not supposed to be, is not supposed to be gloomy, it's not suppose everything's supposed to be gloom and doom, ela sameach. Kach amru chachamim: שחוק וקלות ראש מרגילין לערוה וצוו שלא יהא אדם פרוץ בשחוק ולא עצב ומתאבל אלא מקבל כל אדם בסבר פנים יפות.
What's the point here? The point is that there's another distinction which to us is so basic and fundamental that for the Rambam is irrelevant in this context. I'm not saying that the Rambam, it's not nogaya as to whether the Rambam does or doesn't know of it. The point is that it's irrelevant in this context, is that we distinguish between emotions and taivos. Right? So we would say that a person, ich veis, who there's anger... That spectrum of anger and apathy, so we wouldn't group that together with a person לא תשבע נפשו מהלוך בתאוות. We would say that there's an area, there's a realm of emotions. Ein hachi nami, a person can be emotionally extreme. And then there's also a realm of taivos, sort of the instinctive carnal urges and desires that we have. And we again I think clearly delineate that difference. There's emotions and there's urges, there's taivos. But for the Rambam, the Rambam goes back and forth between the two without showing his passport, right? So clearly they're not different for his purposes, they're not different realms, they're not different domains. And it's not only the Rambam, just to give another example, there's nothing idiosyncratic here. Just to give an example from a line in Nefesh HaChaim. In Nefesh HaChaim שער א פרק ד, the context now is not immediately relevant to us. So the Nefesh HaChaim writes וכן כל חטא אשר כל איש סם מכניס בלבו חס ושלום אש זרה בכעס או שאר תאוות רעות.
So what does the Nefesh HaChaim say? Either kaas or another taiva ra'a. He calls kaas a taiva. I don't know if we would have called that a taiva, no? When I take my fourth helping of ice cream, so I think that gets labeled a taiva. When I blow up at someone, we don't label that a taiva, we label that again volatility, whatever, bad temper vechulu vechulu. And for the Nefesh HaChaim no, it's all one category. But the point is that's the same thing the Rambam is doing in Hilchos Deios as well. So there are two distinctions that we think are so fundamental that we need to delineate. What are we talking about? Are we talking about middos in terms of bein adam le'atzmo and bein adam lachaveiro? Are we talking about dealing with emotions, dealing with taivos? And the Rambam's not interested. Again, point is not whether he knows of these distinctions. The point is that in this context they're not relevant. That he's not interested in them. He's crisscrossing back and forth between bein adam le'atzmo and bein adam lachaveiro, between again what we would delineate as emotions on the one hand, as taivos on the other, no, it's all the same. Because the vort is again without there's no again without oversimplifying, I think the following is true without oversimplifying. That the yesod which the Rambam, the Nefesh HaChaim, and again it's from if there is an aisle and there are two different sides of the aisle, so then it's from both sides of the aisle here. The perspective we're supposed to have on man, on ourselves, is that there's a sichli side to man and then there's a non-sichli side. Now the non-sichli side sometimes are what we call instincts, urges, desires, taivos. Sometimes it's what we call emotions. And again, there is a difference between them but there's also a commonality. And the commonality is that they're non-sichli reactions to a circumstance, to a situation, to a person, not driven by reflection, not driven by sechel, but driven by some other force other than sechel. And the reason for the Rambam the distinctions between what we call emotions as opposed to what we call taivos, the reason that's not relevant is because the yesod is the same. The yesod is that everything else that we have, an instinct, an emotion, all of that is supposed to be harnessed by the. sechel and directed by the sechel. Again a person is not supposed to be emotionless and a person is not supposed to be without instincts, he's not supposed to be instinctless. Don't spend too much time looking for that word in the dictionary, you may have a faulty dictionary. A person is not supposed to be not supposed to be lacking these things, but the point is they're not supposed to function as independent and autonomous forces in terms of pushing a person and determining how he acts, what he does. And in that sense and on that level the difference between emotion and taiva is not relevant on that level. On that level again, none of this is to say that there isn't the level and the context and a problem which may exist where it's important to focus on this difference. But on the level that we're talking now, in this sense, that's why the difference is not relevant, is not significant because the yesod is the same. The yesod is that a person should live reflectively. The yesod is that not to allow emotions to get ahead of reason, not to allow instinct to dominate reason. But on the contrary to be channeled by, to be harnessed by sechel. A person should have to give an example of maybe where a natural, call it, I'm blurring the difference now between the two, but emotional instinct kicks in. I once witnessed the following. I once witnessed the following. There was an adult siblings. The sister, a very frum woman with a very very nice Torah-dig family, had a brother rachmana litzlan who was intermarried. And hence in quotation marks his child, I mean al pi din obviously isn't, wasn't wasn't wasn't his child. And on a certain occasion even though there was no real regular contact but they happened to see each other. And sort of the emotional instinct kicked in and the same way one would I don't know caress you know one's nephew or niece who's one year old or two years old and that sort of speaks again not only to the innocence of a child but it speaks to the family bond and the sense of shear basar of kirva that a person feels. So this woman was guided by that instinct. So that's an example of an emotional instinct functioning autonomously, not being harnessed by and directed by sechel. Now for the most part when that emotional instinct even if it acts that way, it's going to act appropriately. You have to come up with an extreme case for that instinct to sort of steer a person wrong. But ultimately virtually any and every instinct will or emotion will if allowed to function autonomously sometimes end up propelling a person along the wrong course of action. And in that sense there taka is no difference in terms of what we're supposed to be doing. There's no difference between our emotional life and our instinctive life in the sense that both are supposed to be harnessed by, guided by, informed by the sechel which is that a person is living reflectively. And in that sense also there's no difference, it's the same yesod of that reflective life, that disciplined life because again the derech hamemutza means discipline, means discipline. Either extreme is easier you know. Either extreme is easier. It's easier total abstinence or total involvement, I believe, are both easier than balanced involvement, because that requires more of more of a discipline. But the the reflectiveness and the discipline is the same yesod in what we call bein adam l'chaveiro and what we call bein adam l'atzmo. And that's why there too, it's a distinction which is true in a different context. Excuse me. It's true in a different context, but it's not relevant in terms of if we're charting the correct way, the optimal way to function, so then the distinction isn't isn't relevant. It could be that when a person—could be is an understatement. It could be that that in sort of if we're dealing with abnormal psychology when a person knows a chesron knows that he has a very, very major chesron, so then ein hachi nami in terms of understanding the dynamics of that, all these things yitachen will become relevant. But in terms of understanding what the toras hamiddos is, so then these distinctions between what we call emotions and taivah on that level are not are not relevant and these distinctions between bein adam l'atzmo and bein adam l'chaveiro are are not are not relevant either. And and it's the same middah that that guides a person in what we call bein adam l'atzmo, whether I do or don't take that fourth cup of fourth cup of ice cream, it's that same middah in terms of how I interact with people, because it's the same middah of of the discipline and and and the balance and the reflectiveness. Okay, let's go a little bit in the mishna here. והוי זהיר במצוה קלה כבחמורה שאין אתה יודע מתן שכרן של מצות.
So the Rambam explains that whereas by mitzvos lo sa'aseh, the Torah actually does give us a barometer by which to measure which lo sa'aseh are relatively speaking more chamur and which lo sa'aseh are relatively speaking more kal. Again, which is not to say that a person rachmana litzlan can can be mezalzel in what's relatively speaking more kal, but a person is in a position to recognize the hierarchy of mitzvos. How so? So the Rambam explains right here in the Peirush HaMishnayos. He explains you look at the—והוי מחשב הפסד מצוה כנגד שכרה ושכר מצוה כנגד הפסדה—that
the way a person can recognize the hierarchy of mitzvos lo sa'aseh, if it's a לא תעשה שיש בו מיתת בית דין and what's more, of the ארבע מיתות בית דין the most chamur, sekila, so then that's the most chamur'dike mitzvos lo sa'aseh. Underneath that sreifa, underneath that hereg, underneath that chenek, underneath that kares, underneath that misa bidei shamayim, underneath that malkus. So the onesh the Torah prescribes is a reflection of the chomer ha'lo sa'aseh. Generally speaking, the Torah didn't reveal to us the sechar of mitzvos aseh, so because of that, we can't rank a mitzvah aseh. Then the Rambam has a fascinating thing. He says that's what's reflected in the din of עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה. He says lu yehei that you could know that this aseh is more chamur than that aseh, so then you wouldn't say עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה. Then then the the second mitzvah could encroach upon the first mitzvah if only you could—yeish ladun bezeh—but that's the implication here in the Rambam. יש לדון בזה הרבה. But that seems to be the implication here in the Rambam. Okay. But then the Rambam says some mitzvos aseh, he says you can reconstruct and create a hierarchy, because if the mitzvah aseh is a twin to a mitzvah lo sa'aseh, so then if you look at what the onesh for the mitzvah lo sa'aseh is and you know what its chomer is, it will also tell you what the chomer of the aseh is. So for instance, melacha and shabbos, so you have twin mitzvos, aseh and lo sa'aseh. It's an aseh to be shoves, it's a lo sa'aseh of not doing melacha. The lo sa'aseh of not doing melacha is is sekila rachmana litzlan, so the lo... The lo sa'asei is חמורה עד למאוד מאוד, so its twin asei is also in terms of an asei is an asei which is חמורה עד למאוד מאוד. Now that's how the Rambam explains, that's what the Mishna means according to the Rambam. הוי מחשב הפסד מצוה כנגד שכרה. Now הוי מחשב הפסד מצוה כנגד שכרה means that if I would not be mikayim the asei, rachmana litzlan, of shovis b'shabbos, which would mean I was violating the lo sa'asei of melacha b'shabbos, so what would the onesh be, rachmana litzlan? We know. So that tells you how great the sechar is for the asei of being shovis. Now, then the Rambam says that the Torah tells you the onesh for violating the lo sa'asei. The Torah doesn't tell you what the sechar is for being mikayim an asei. But the Rambam says you can use that same method to rank that as well, because הוי מחשב שכר עבירה כנגד הפסדה. If I know that the hefsed for a certain lo sa'asei is misa bidei shamayim, so that's pretty chomer. So then I know that my complying with that lo sa'asei is going to rank pretty high on the sechar on the scale of sechar. So in this context, it's clear from the Rambam, וזהו ענין עוד ועוד אמר, again where the Rambam is explicating this line of הוי מחשב שכר עבירה כנגד הפסדה. ועוד אמר למד על שכר עבירה אם לא תעשנה הואיל וגם זה לא נתבאר.
Again the Torah tells us what the onesh for lavin are. The Torah doesn't tell us what the sechar for complying with lavin is, הואיל וגם זה לא נתבאר למד מעונשה. But you can, again in terms of ranking them, you can infer that the sechar is going to be the mirror image of the onesh. If the onesh is chomer, then the sechar is great. If, relatively speaking, the onesh is not chomer, so relatively speaking, the sechar is less. כי העוון שהעונש העושה אותה הוא חמור יהיה השכר הפורש ממנה לפי אותו היחס של חומרה.
But all of this is assuming a very important yesod. So the Rambam proves it now from the Gemorah in Kiddushin. כמו שנתבאר בקידושין באומר כל היושב ולא עבר עבירה נותנים לו שכר כעושה מצוה.
Again this pshat in the Mishna is assuming that the sechar for complying with a lo sa'asei, there's not only sechar for actively being mikayim an asei, there's also sechar for passively complying with a mitzvas lo sa'asei. Says the Rambam, and I'll prove it to you, the fact that I'm making this assumption to say pshat in the Mishna, there are other perushim in the Mishna, other Rishonim learned pshat in the Mishna differently than the Rambam, but I'll prove it to you, that basic idea from the Gemorah in Kiddushin. The Gemorah in Kiddushin says mifurash that כל היושב ולא עבר עבירה נותנים לו שכר כעושה מצוה.
That the same way there's sechar for putting on tfillin, there's sechar for not eating ma'achalos asuros. Now this yesod the Maharal disagrees with. The Maharal, I think it's in multiple places, but one place, the Maharal is in Parshas Vayigash in Gur Aryeh. Maharal talks about the question, I guess, I don't know, first raised by the Ramban. Given that Chazal tell us that avos kiyemu hatorah, what do we do with all those examples which seem to contradict that? What do we do with the fact that, again the Ramban comments on it, that Yaakov married shtei achayos? The context of the Maharal in Parshas Vayigash is that Chazal say that Shimon married Dina. What do we do with all that? So there are different answers. The Ramban, again famously says they only observed the Torah in Eretz Yisrael. They didn't observe it in Chutz La'aretz. I think the Tshuvos HaRama, the Rama says, Chazal only say that Avraham Avinu קימו כל התורה כולה. You don't find in Chazal mifurash that that hanhaga was adopted by Yitzchak and Yaakov subsequently and therefore the Shivtei Kah. And that's why you have this example of Yaakov marrying shtei achayos. That's what the Rama writes in his tshuvos. And the Maharal has a new answer. Maharal says... as the Avos were mikayem mitzvos assay, they were not nizher in mitzvos lo sa'assay. Fascinating answer. They were mikayem mitzvos assay, but they were not nizher in mitzvos lo sa'assay. Why? What's the pshat in that, in that? So the Maharal says, he says by a mitzvos assay there's significance, it's meaningful to be an eino metzuveh v'oseh. By a mitzvos lo sa'assay there's no significance to be an eino metzuveh v'nizher. It's meaningful to volunteer for a mitzvos assay from which one is pattur, to be an eino metzuveh v'oseh is very meaningful. To be an eino metzuveh v'nizher is is not at all meaningful. It's not meaningful at all. Why? Because the Maharal says and again in such a fundamental difference here between the Rambam and the Maharal, the Maharal is masbir as follows. He says what's a mitzvos assay? Mitzvos assay means the Torah's telling you, the Torah's telling you to, to what a mitzvos assay is is beyond the element of mitzvah shebo, beyond the element of mitzvah shebo there's there's some positive accomplishment. A mitzvos lo sa'assay consists only of: the Torah says, "Don't violate this." There's no positive accomplishment. It's just that we, we can't violate, we can't trespass. Again, משל למה הדבר דומה. If you go and you and you help your neighbor out with something, you help your neighbor out with something. So regardless of whether it's a tzivuy, there's something positive that's happening. If you don't trespass on on your neighbor's lawn, there's nothing positive that's happening. And if your neighbor and if there is no no lo sa'assay attached with that, so then you're not accomplishing anything by volunteering not to trespass because if there's a lav against it, it represents a negative, so you can't engage in in a negative. But there's there's nothing positive associated with it. So, so for the Maharal, it wasn't meaningful, it couldn't be meaningful for the Avos to volunteer for mitzvos lo sa'assay. The Torah says again, it's a violation to eat a beheimah temeiah. That's a violation to eat, eat beheimah temeiah. You're not accomplishing something positive by abstention. It's a violation to do it. If there's no violation, then you don't accomplish anything by abstaining. So go ahead and order the lobster when they resume indoor dining and Baruch Hashem we can finally live a meaningful life and we can go to a restaurant and sit in a restaurant and finally, finally, meaningful life resumes. So if there's no lav against the lobster, so go ahead and and order the the the lobster. It doesn't represent a positive accomplishment. An assay represents a positive accomplishment, a positive attainment. It's meaningful to say, "I'm not metzuveh to do it, but I'm going to do it." A lo sa'assay doesn't represent a positive accomplishment, a positive, a positive attainment. The Torah forbade, okay, the Torah forbids, I can't violate, I can't go against the Torah. The Torah didn't forbid it for me, I'm not accomplishing anything by voluntarily, by voluntarily being nizher. That's the Maharal's approach to mitzvos. What does the Maharal do with the Rambam's groiseh chiddush? He quotes it and the Maharal says no, if you look in the Gemara there... The Gemara has a stira. And on the one hand Tanan, the Mishna says here in Kiddushin כל העושה מצוה אחת מטיבין לו. Mashma that schar comes for being oseh mitzvah, right, for being mkayem a mitzvah, a mitzvas asei. But me'idach gisa, עשה אין לא עשה לא. Sounds like there's no schar for lo ta'asei. Uremihu, this is what the Rambam quotes, ישב ולא עבר עבירה נותנים לו שכר כעושה מצוה. But then the Baraisa says meforesh that passive compliance a person gets schar the same way he does for active compliance with a mitzvas asei. Answers the Gemara, hasam you get schar on a lo ta'asei כגון שבא דבר עבירה לידו וניצל הימנה. So here lichora it's clearly a machlokes between the Rambam and the Maharal what, again, what the words mean is that a person had occasion or opportunity to be, to violate the lo ta'asei and he didn't. So for the Rambam, for the Maharal, that means that you never get schar for the lo ta'asei. If there's a tremendous tza'ar associated with avoiding the lo ta'asei, you'll get schar for that tza'ar. But you don't get schar for the lo ta'asei 'cause you didn't do anything. You don't get schar for not trespassing on my lawn. You do me a tova and you bring me a newspaper, you get schar for that. You did something for me. You didn't trespass on my lawn, don't, don't expect a tip. Don't, don't, you didn't do anything. You didn't do anything. And what the Gemara means, בא דבר עבירה לידו וניצל הימנה, Hakadosh Baruch Hu will reward the tza'ar she'bo. The Rambam clearly understands בא דבר עבירה לידו as follows. It's not mistaber that when I'm sleeping at night I'm getting schar for the 365 lo sa'aseis in the Torah 'cause after all when I'm sleeping I'm not eating shratzim u'rmasim, I'm not eating dagim teme'im, I'm not eating behemos teme'os. So I don't know, so I should sleep, I should sleep yomam valayla, I mean the number of mitzvos I'm being mkayem is makat l'vei afashlofen, no? So okay, so I missed out on my Krias Shema but I was mkayem 365 lav mitzvos, no? So it's obviously not mistaber that a person's getting schar 24/7 for every lo ta'asei in the Torah. So what does this Rambam takeh mean when he says there's schar for lo ta'asei? No, what it means is this. What it means is when I'm hungry and I make a point of eating behema tehora shchuta, not eating behema teme'a, not eating neveila. So then, then that's an occasion, then I'm going to get schar for the lo ta'asei. But stam azoi when I'm playing tennis, I'm not going to get schar for not eating a dag tamei. What? It's, it's not the moment of the mitzvah, it's not the occasion of the mitzvah. But when it is the occasion of the mitzvah, that's what it means, בא דבר עבירה לידו. So that's a yesoidisdike machlokes. Again, for the Rambam, what's the Rambam's again, conceptual alternative which is why the Rambam does associate, does think there's schar for mitzvos lo ta'asei. And again, if you take a look early in Shmona Perakim, perek daled, you'll see the Rambam gives many, many examples of this, is that the Rambam's pushback to the Maharal is it's just not true. A person can accomplish by being active, a person can accomplish by suppressing and sublimating and being inactive. So for instance, tikun hamidos. Tikun hamidos can express itself through you give tzedaka. You say a kind word to someone. But tikun hamidos can also be biting your tongue and not responding when provoked. Now, what mitzvah is associated with that? I don't know, maybe it's ona'as devarim, maybe that's what I was tempted to say. Or maybe it's halbunas panim, maybe that's what I was being provoked into wanting to say. But in terms of again, let's say developing midos, so clearly, clearly the same way you can be positively working and growing and affecting change by what you do, you're positively growing and affecting change by what you don't do as well. Right? And I think we all know that. It's not only what a person says, it's what a person doesn't say. It's not only in terms of, I guess, sensitivity. It's not only what a person does, it's what he doesn't do. So that's what the Rambam says. Again, so we're just giving this example in terms of this situation but, you know, then extrapolate ve'idach zil gemor. That's what the Rambam says to the Maharal, no, avada the schar for mitzvos, a mitzvos lo sa'aseh as well. And and that's why, again, in the context of the other Rishonim also who who dealt with the kasha about the avos, again, the Rambam doesn't talk about that kasha, but the Rishonim who dealt with the kasha about the avos and didn't give the Maharal's answer, mistameh in this sense, they're on the same, on the same wavelength as the Rambam. So it's a very, very yesodiste difference in terms of conception of mitzvos lo sa'aseh. Okay, so we'll stop here, rabosai, have a good, a productive day and a gutte shabbos, be well, be safe.