The Rabbeinu Bachya in his intro to Chovos Halvavos is explaining why he's writing the sefer. Why he's writing the sefer. And he begins by describing and defining three different branches of knowledge, of wisdom, and says that of course the highest one is Hamadda Elokai, right, divine knowledge. Knowledge of Hashem, knowledge of Torah. Knowledge of Torah. Then he says that whereas the other two branches of knowledge, one seems to be he describes as scientific knowledge, the other is the other he describes as math, music, the ancients had a conception and maybe people still do I don't know that music was mathematical, and it's in that sense that he mentions it as one of the branches of wisdom. That's a second category of knowledge. The first again is more I guess what we would call scientific knowledge, the second is more mathematical knowledge, and the third says is Torah, knowledge of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Then he says that whereas the first two types of knowledge are intended to be practical, a person is supposed to have a, just supposed to be tachlis oriented, he says למודתו כדי להשיג בו תועליות העולם הסורה to attain to attain some material result is prohibited. Like they said kadmonenu aleichem hashalom, tanyeh לאהבת ה' אלהיך לשמוע בקולו ולדבקה בו שלא יאמר אדם אקרא כדי שיקראוני חכם אשנה כדי שיקראוני רבי אשנה כדי שאהיה זקן ויושב בישיבה אלא למד מאהבה וסוף הכבוד לבוא.
The amazing thing here I don't know, maybe I'm sure I'm missing something, is that the Rabbeinu Bachya he doesn't modify the statement. He doesn't quote the Gemara in Pesachim and elsewhere of לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצוות אף על פי שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.
It just tells you, just quotes all the not to make it atara l'hitgadel and not a kardom lachpor and not k'dei sheyikruni chacham, k'dei sheyikruni rebbi etc. and he doesn't quote the offsetting statement of שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. I don't know, but maybe let's just discuss this for a minute, more the shitas haRambam than Rabbeinu Bachya. The Rambam when he quotes this maimar, what we have in the Gemara is לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצוות שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.
The Rambam quotes it he doesn't have mitzvot. The Rambam has לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.
Now whether that reflects the Rambam having had a different girsa or whether the Rambam understood that maybe mitzvot is just mentioned agav Torah the same way chalitza sometimes mentioned agav grusha, I don't know. Let's assume maybe he had a different girsa. I don't know, doesn't make a difference, but either way that's the way the Rambam quotes the maimar, that לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.
So the question is, the question is why doesn't the Rambam have mitzvot? Why doesn't the Rambam have mitzvot? So l'ichora the pshat is as follows. L'ichora the pshat is as follows. B'emes, whatever the end of the maimar is, whatever the or the middle part is, so the maimar concludes שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. So that's very strange, no? That's the only reason. Let's say, let's say a person looks in the mirror and he knows, he knows that when I sit down to learn I'm not going to be learning lishma. I'm going to be learning for one of these ulterior motives. Or let's say a person looks in the mirror and and realizes that... make an impression. He knows that there's an element of shelo lishma, right? So let's say if that question were presented to us, what would we tell him to do? We would tell him, okay, do your best to perfect your motivation, but l'mayseh you're mechuyav to do this. If you can't do it with perfect motivation, at least do it with imperfect motivation. Do it with a mixture of lishma and shelo lishma. So why is the reason שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה? What would be and let's say that let's say the Ribbono Shel Olam created the world that that doesn't necessarily happen? You don't have that progression from shelo lishma to the lishma. So you wouldn't do things unless you can have a perfect, perfect kavanah? So what's the pshat in the mamar gufa regardless of what the middle part is? So lichora, that's exactly where the Rambam's coming from. Because by Torah you find and I don't think you have it with the same I don't think you have it necessarily by mitzvos. By Torah you have a concept that it's assur shelo lishma, right? It's assur. When the Mishna says in Avos, when the Mishna says in Avos that it shouldn't be kardum lachpor bo and atara lehisgadel bahem, so it's clearly telling us an issur, right? It's abusing Torah if a person learns Torah, teaches Torah for his own cause, for an ulterior motive. It's not telling us what the ideal motivation is. It's telling us an issur. It's assur to do this shelo lishma. It's assur to do this shelo lishma. Anyone have the sefer? Anyone you'll take a look in Perek Gimmel of Hilchos Talmud Torah, so it's quite clear from the Rambam's presentation that based on these ma'amarim and others again, it's not just that it's spelled in the lishma, but it's clearly there's an issur of atara lehisgadel bo and kardum lachpor bo is simply an issur. Thank you. ועוד ציוו ואמרו אל תעשם עטרה להתגדל בהם ולא קרדום לחפור בהם
and the context clearly, if you read the beginning of halacha yud ches about כל המשים על ליבו שיעסוק בתורה וישתכר מן הצדקה הרי זה חילול השם וביזוי התורה
ve'chulu ve'chulu and then in that context he says ועוד ציוו ואמרו אל תעשם עטרה להתגדל בהם ולא קרדום לחפור בהם.
So by Torah there's a special din, there's a special din that a person really me'ikar hadin has no right to abuse Torah by learning or teaching for ulterior motives. And by mitzvos, by mitzvos there is no comparable concept. So now you understand very well, that's simply the pshat in the ma'amar Chazal. That's what Chazal say, that שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה, that without that, that's a heter. That the din is that that's a mattir. That be'emes, if a person looks in the mirror and knows that my learning is going to be shelo lishma, okay, so you can't be over an issur now to facilitate a mitzvah later. And that's what the Gemara's chiddush now, that שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה, and that's the heter for a person to learn even when he doesn't have the purity of motive. And mimeila, there is no such comparable concept by mitzvos. By mitzvos, so that's why the din is said specifically legabei לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה שלא לשמה because by Torah you need the heter of שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. Keivan d'assur liyadam the different meforshim zero in on the lashon of לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצוות שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.
What do you mean l'olam? It should have said batchila, me'ikara, יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצוות שלא לשמה, right? Because that's the whole idea, right? The whole idea is that there should be a progression from shelo lishma to the lishma. lishma, lishma. So what do you mean le'olam? So what do you mean that it's as forever? So the Maharal says a gevaldig gevaldig. He says like this, it taki is le'olam. Why? Because a person right now is on such and such a madrega, right? He's in such and such a madrega. Okay. So on the madrega of shelo lishma where I am now, so I conceive of what lishma means. I conceive of what the lishma means. Okay. B'ezrat Hashem, so מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה, so a person goes up a madrega. Now he sees he's one rung higher. Now he can see the next rung. Now he understands mamesh what my what my ziyur, my my understanding of what lishma was, that was also deficient, but I realize now also the higher madrega a person is on, so the more the more things a person is sensitive to. More things a person is sensitive to. Let's say you're studying architecture. So after studying architecture for half a year, so you come in and you sort of notice whether or not the posts are in the right place, the best place to support the building. Then after you study for another year, so then you notice all the crossbeams and you notice all the more you study, so then the more the more of the subtleties the person becomes aware of. So too again as a person gets reaches the next rung, so now he can see higher. Now he's on a higher madrega. He understands more what avodat Hashem is and then he realizes he realizes that what I what I aspired to and what I've achieved, that's not the lishma. The lishma is even higher. That's what the Maharal says. It's taki le'olam. Taki le'olam יעסוק אדם בתורה מצוות שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה
because a person never finishes that cycle. The person's entire life is spent on that cycle of שלא לשמה בא לשמה. B'emet, we'll have later, hope, in Chovot HaLevavot, Rabbeinu Bachya has a similar idea. Rabbeinu Bachya has, I don't know if we discussed this in Elul, Rabbeinu Bachya has an idea. He says that the chasidim do teshuva on their teshuva. Right, that's a madrega. Halevai we should do teshuva on our chata'im, but Rabbeinu Bachya was on that. Rabbeinu Bachya says that chasidim is an inyan of doing teshuva on your teshuva. Why? Because it's the exact same point. Right now, ba'asher hu sham, where a person is, shaku'a b'chet. Okay, so where a person on that madrega, he feels he feels the remorse that he's capable of on that madrega for his chata'im, that there were bad things, they were they were inconsistent things. Okay, and the person has a heartfelt remorse and the Ribono Shel Olam is metaher him as a result of the teshuva. Now with that taharat halev, so now a person looks back, not only on those original chata'im, looks back on the remorse and says, how could I have been so so casual about the regret that I had for for such chata'im? Gevald. So he does teshuva on his teshuva. And again, that too lich'ora is a never-ending never-ending process. Okay. So le'olam יעסוק אדם בתורה מצוות שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. As Rabbeinu Bachya continues his hakdama here, so he describes again the different branches of knowledge. Then he describes the sources that we have of knowledge. He says the sources that we have of knowledge are a, our sechel, b, Torah she-bi-khtav, and and c, Torah she-ba'al peh. Then he says that within Torah, within Torah he distinguishes he introduces two distinctions, first of all between chovot ha-evarim, my actions which the Torah prescribes, and chovot ha-levavot, and right, ultimately what he's building up to is that there isn't any comprehensive chibbur about chovot ha-levavot. That's what he builds up to and that's the point of the hakdama. Then Rabbeinu Bachya says that reflecting the Saadia Gaon based on the Gemara in Yoma, the distinction between mishpatim and chukim, that there are two types of mitzvot, there are mitzvot sichliyot and mitzvot shimiyot, right, mitzvot sichliyot that even if the Torah would not have communicated to us, so with the sechel ha-Kadosh Baruch Hu gave us, we would have deduced these mitzvot on our own. And then there are also mitzvot shimiyot where we could not have deduced these from sechel. And he says that chovot ha-levavot all belong to the former category. Chovot ha-levavot all belong to the category of mitzvot. Now, what's the significance? What's the significance of the fact he made this distinction again, which ultimately maybe we'll discuss bli neder maybe next week, not everyone necessarily understands this distinction the same way. But this distinction which goes back to the Gemara in Yuma basically and then discussed by Rav Saadia Gaon, Rabbeinu Bachye, and then the Rambam of course. So what's the significance of the fact, you can't ask why, but what's the significance of the fact that some mitzvos which Hakadosh Baruch Hu commanded us are sichliyos, right? That Hakadosh Baruch Hu, what does it mean that they're sichliyos? It means that not only did Hakadosh Baruch Hu command us in the Torah, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu also gave us a moral intuition which intuits these mitzvos, right? So Hakadosh Baruch Hu created us with a moral intuition that retzach is wrong, that chesed and chemla are noble qualities. And He didn't create us with a moral intuition that basar bechalav or shaatnez are wrong, right? And if we have an instinct, it's only because we've trained ourselves, right? But it's not an innate moral instinct. So what's the significance of that fact? What's the significance of that fact? So the Rambam doesn't, doesn't say that he's talking about it, but there is a famous perek in Shemonah Perakim, I think it's perek shishi in Shemonah Perakim, where the Rambam says that we find a stira, which is greater: a person who's a chasid miteva or a person who's kovesh es yitzro? So the Rambam says the philosophers say, and then he says it's also a pasuk Shlomo Hamelech says in one place, that the chasid miteva is better. Chasid miteva means again that I don't want to do this. It's not that I want to do it and I'm suppressing my yetzer, I'm overcoming my yetzer. No, I don't want to do it. I don't want to steal. I don't want to be cruel. I want to practice kindness. So we have a pasuk in Mishlei, and he says that's also the philosophical point of view. He says le'umas zeh we have the maamar Chazal, Rashi quotes it on the Torah, right? אל תאמר אפשי לאכול בשר חזיר. Don't say no, instinctively I wouldn't want to eat basar chazir, I wouldn't want to, wouldn't want to eat it, אלא אפשי ואפשי ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי. No, really, really if Hakadosh Baruch Hu hadn't said anything about this, I would've eaten it. I certainly would've eaten it. And that's supposed to be the posture a person is supposed to have. Again, the fact that we lemaaseh don't feel a yetzer hara for food which is a behema temeya or treifa is only because we've internalized the tzivuy, right? So it's not at odds with what the Rambam is saying. He doesn't have to salivate every time he walks by McDonald's. But so the Rambam says, so how are we meyashaiv this stira? How are we meyashaiv this stira? So the Rambam says that these maamarim should be correlated with the distinction between mishpatim and chukim. That by mishpatim, again what sechel is mechayeiv, what the Rabbeinu Bachye and Rav Saadia Gaon call mitzvos sichliyos, so there it should be, no, I don't want to do it. There the chasid miteva. It should be, it shouldn't be that oh I don't want to give this ani a pruta, but ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי. No, I want to give him. I want to give him. I want to give him the pruta. But mashma when it comes to chukim, and that's what the Rambam points out there in Shemonah Perakim. Notice that all the examples in that maamar Chazal are all chukim, so then there, there the feeling should be ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי. So what's so important and what's the tremendous chiddush in this perek in Shemonah Perakim is the Rambam is saying that there's a halacha lemaaseh, there's a nafkamina ledina between mishpatim and chukim. Halacha lemaaseh there's a, right? Ordinarily we think it's an important philosophical conceptual distinction, but lav davka with any implications or applications halacha lemaaseh. Comes the Rambam and says no, there's a tremendous nafkamina ledina. And again and that's the answer to our question of what the significance is of these two groups of mitzvos. Those mitzvos which are mishpatim, so by making our moral intuition in sync with mishpatim, so the Torah's telling us that It's not enough to practice these mitzvos, but they have to be internalized. Let's take a look in the second volume of the Yad haChazakah, so the Rambam is maarich with wonderful, wonderful diyukim and a whole mahalach how the mitzvah of v'halachta bidrachav is not simply to practice rachamanus, to practice chanina, but rather that a person should become a rachman, that he should become a chanun. And the diyuk in the Rambam also, again, is the Rambam also emphasizes אף אתה היה רחום, אף אתה היה חנון. When it comes to chukim, that's the significance. Again, we don't know the why obviously, but the significance of the fact that we have no moral intuition regarding shatnez or regarding other chukim is that there again, it's not something a person is supposed to, it's not a value that the person is supposed to internalize. Rachmanus, chanina, all the v'halachta bidrachav, all the Chovos haLevavos that Rabbeinu Bachya talks about in terms of אמונה בהקדוש ברוך הוא, so these are things again a person is not just supposed to practice, he's supposed to internalize. He's supposed to internalize. מה שאין כן בחוקים, and that's ultimately the significance of this distinction which we have between mishpatim and chukim. Rabbeinu Bachya explains that and we'll just stop with this point for today. Rabbeinu Bachya explains that the Chovos haLevavos are not only positive, not only mitzvos asei, the Chovos haLevavos contain mitzvos lo sa'asei as well. אבל אסורות חובות הלבבות הרי מהן הפך כל מה שהזכיר,
right, they're the opposite, the antithesis of those which are the positive Chovos haLevavos. And interesting, the first one that he mentions, umehen hakinah, v'hanetirah, v'hanekimah, v'anshei Toraseinu, כמו שאמר הכתוב, לא תקום ולא תטור את בני עמך.
So it's interesting, again, a little bit it depends upon the exact translation, so Rav Kafach has a different translation here than the Ibn Tibbon translation, but following his translation, so when Rabbeinu Bachya mentions kinah, it's interesting, it's reminiscent of the Rambam in Hilchos Teshuvah, where is it, perek zayin, where the Rambam says that al tomar, don't think for a moment that the mitzvah of teshuvah only relates to ma'asim, that teshuvah only relates, again, to I did something I shouldn't have done, I neglected to do something which I was supposed to do. The Rambam says no, it relates to midos also. It relates to midos also. And the first one, or one of those which the Rambam mentions: אל תאמר שאין תשובה אלא מעבירות שיש בהן מעשה כגון זנות וגזל וגניבה אלא כשם שצריך אדם לשוב מאלו כך הוא צריך לחפש בדעות רעות שיש לו ולשוב מן הכעס מן האיבה מן הקנאה ומן ההיתול ומרדיפת הממון והכבוד מרדיפת המאכלות וכיוצא בהן מן הכל צריך לחזור בתשובה.
Even though, right, there is no in the Rambam's Minyan Taryag, so there is no mitzvah of lo tikhos, or there is no mitzvah not to become angry, not to become angry. So says the Rambam, so don't be mispateh by that. These character traits which a person is supposed to have, which underlie so much of Torah, which underlie so much of Torah, so there too these are also obligations that a person has to, again, cultivate the proper midos, uproot the improper ones if when a person is off target he has to do teshuvah, and that's the same emphasis here in the Chovos haLevavos. So these are two, these are also obligations that a person has to again cultivate the proper middos, uproot the improper ones. If when a person is off target, he has to do teshuvah, and that's the same emphasis here in the Chovos HaLevavos. Rabbeinu Bachya starts off in the Hakdama describing the ten sha'arim of the sefer. Sha'ar number one is Sha'ar HaYichud, recognizing the oneness of Hashem. Number two is Sha'ar HaBechina, observing the world around us and recognizing the greatness of the Creator through His creation. Number three is Sha'ar Avodas HaElokim, the service of God. Number four is Sha'ar HaBitachon, trust in Hashem. Number five is Sha'ar Yichud HaMa'aseh, making sure that our actions are for the sake of Heaven, what we call lishma. Number six is Sha'ar HaKni'ah, humility. Number seven is Sha'ar HaTeshuvah, repentance. Number eight is Sha'ar Cheshbon HaNefesh, taking an accounting of our soul. Number nine is Sha'ar HaPrishus, abstinence or pulling away from the physical world. And number ten is Sha'ar Ahavas Hashem, the love of God.