Transcript

I want to spend again today a few minutes more on introductory comments. One of the interesting things when you try when you sort of step back and think about the Rambam's Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, one of the really remarkable things is that if you search through Mishneh Torah, you search through the Yad for the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, so you find the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim. Not necessarily in a group of thirteen, you don't find them in a group of thirteen, but they're there. They're there for the most part in Hilchos Teshuvah. In Hilchos Teshuvah. But if you look through Minyan Hamitzvos, look through Minyan Hamitzvos and you search for the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, you won't find all the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim in Minyan Hamitzvos. You will not find all the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim in Minyan Hamitzvos. I don't think, I don't think that in the Minyan Taryag, I don't think we find a mitzvah which encapsulates the belief, let's say, in Techiyas Hamessim.

כל ישראל יש להם חלק לעולם הבא חוץ מהאומר שאין תחיית המתים מן התורה.

That's not listed as a mitzvah in the Minyan Taryag. Okay, now. That sort of reinforces a fact which we know anyway, that it's not true that everything, everything in Torah is not filtered, is not compacted into the Minyan Taryag. For instance, me'inyana d'yoma. When the Rambam explains in the hakdamah to the Minyan Hamitzvos על סדר הלכות הרמב"ם, the Rambam explains that how is it that d'rabanans don't constitute a violation of bal tosif? So the Rambam says two things. He says A, Chazal clearly delineate this is d'oraissa, this is d'rabanan. They don't present, they don't pass off a d'rabanan as a d'oraissa. And then number two he says, every d'rabanan has to be anchored in something in the Torah. Every d'rabanan, it can't be that oh well, since the Torah gave us the authority to make mitzvos d'rabanan, so we think that, we see that people have a good time when they have a holiday, they have a good time when they have Yom Tov, so we think that instead of just having Shalosh Regalim, it would be a nice thing to have a couple of more Yamim Tovim. No. So in addition every d'rabanan has to, it has to be geared to something in the Torah. Every d'rabanan has to be oriented or geared—again the most obvious and most common example of course is as a safeguard, as a siyag to something in the Torah. But other examples to reinforcing something in the Torah. So then the Rambam says for instance, by mikra megillah. So mikra megillah, so how is the d'rabanan of mikra megillah presented? So he says it's presented—you can't say, Chazal can't say Ribono Shel Olam commanded us to read the megillah. If they'll say that they'll be over bal tosif. But rather they're saying no, rather we say that Chazal with the koach given to them by the Torah, that Chazal introduced this mitzvah. And why did they introduce this mitzvah? To impress upon all generations that

אמת מה שהבטיחנו בתורה כי מי כה' אלקינו בכל קראנו אליו.

So that's the d'oraissa which mikra megillah is reinforcing. That כי מי כה' אלקינו בכל קראנו אליו. Now כי מי כה' אלקינו בכל קראנו אליו is not, that's not in Minyan Hamitzvos either. It's not in Minyan Hamitzvos either, right? So that's certainly the case, I mean we're going to try... try to understand a little bit, understand this fact, but not everything which is part of Torah and is necessarily reflected directly in minyan hamitzvos. Okay. And that seems to be the case, let's say with t'chiyas hameisim, emuna in Moshiach, it doesn't claim a mitzvah within the minyan of taryag. Le'umas zeh, so many of the yud gimmel ikkarim are. Many of the yud gimmel ikkarim say, the first five or so of the yud gimmel ikkarim, let's say the first four of the yud gimmel ikkarim of metzius Hashem, of achduso, of shlilas hagashmus mimenu, incorporeality, and hakadmus that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is eternal. So all of those four the Rambam has included within the mitzvas asei of Anochi and Shema Yisrael. The first four of the yud gimmel ikkarim of metzius Hashem, of achduso, of shlilas hagashmus mimenu, incorporeality, and hakadmus that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is eternal. So the question is not so much, well, maybe it's also, so what's the significance? What sort of determines, Anochi is not said belashon tzivui either, right? Anochi is not that, lechora, isn't the hint as to whether or not to count it in minyan taryag doesn't depend upon whether or not the mitzvah is ne'emeres belashon tzivui because Anochi is not said belashon tzivui either, right? It's said as a statement of fact. And nevertheless Chazal tell us that תורה צוה לנו משה but shnayim directly mipi hagevura, Anochi velo yihyeh, and that Anochi is a mitzvah. So the fact that the pesukim which tell us about the Moshiach or which tell us about t'chiyas hameisim are not ne'emarim belashon tzivui, lechora, that's not the obstacle to having counted it as a mitzvah in the minyan taryag. So perhaps as follows, I'm not sure about this, but perhaps the pshat is as follows. The Avodas Hamelech in his perush in perek aleph of Yesodei HaTorah, as does the Malbim and many others discuss the kasha which Rabbi Chisdai Crescas asks on the Rambam. He says how can you count Anochi in the minyan taryag? It's circular, right? How can you, in order to have a mitzvah you have to first believe in the metzaveh. Once you believe in the metzaveh, so then you can have all other mitzvos. But you can't say it's a mitzvah to believe. Ribbono Shel Olam can't say as a mitzvah you have to believe in me. That's rather the precondition for all mitzvos. It's the foundation of all mitzvos, but it's not the first of the mitzvos. That's what Rabbi Chisdai Crescas asks on the Rambam. So there are different answers and again, the Malbim's answer highlights certain very fundamental things. So does that of the Avodas Hamelech. The Avodas Hamelech is medayek, he says if you look in the lashon of Rambam in Yesodei HaTorah, so the Rambam talks about both in terms of Anochi as well as Shema Yisrael. So the lashon of Rambam is ידיעת דבר זה מצות עשה שנאמר אנכי ה' אלהיך. And again, at the end of halacha zayin,

ידיעת דבר זה מצות עשה שנאמר ה' אלהינו ה' אחד.

So says the Avodas Hamelech, ein hachi nami, Rabbi Chisdai Crescas is right that you can't have mitzvos without first believing and recognizing the Ribbono Shel Olam. That's true. But you could have believed in the Ribbono Shel Olam just based on emuna without any yediya. Without any yediya. So once you believe in the Ribbono Shel Olam, so that breaks the problem of circularity. And the point is that this mitzvah goes beyond it. This goes beyond it. It says the mitzvah is not simply to say well that's what I was told. No, the mitzvah is to best of our ability to know it. Best of our ability to know it. Whether it means to know it by looking at the world and saying well the world is obviously not self-sufficient so obviously someone had to have created the world or whether it's to look get history and and to see overwhelming proof of divine providence in Jewish history or maybe we'll discuss other things bli neder. Whatever the source of the yedia is, so Rav Nachman Kahofsky says the pshat is that the Rambam's the answer to what Rav Chasdai Crescas says is eino dome. If the Rambam would have defined the mitzvah as simply leha'amin, so then yes, so then that perhaps would have been circular as a mitzvah. As a mitzvah. But the Rambam says yedias davar ze. Yedias davar ze. And again, and and that yedias davar ze reflects the Rambam's conviction that these basic emunos vedeios are emunos vedeios that we can know, right? Not only believe, but we can know and we can understand. We can know them and understand them. Now, perhaps in light of that, ad kan dvarav. Ad kan dvarav. Perhaps in light of that, maybe that's the pshat. Techiyas hameisim. Techiyas hameisim. The Rambam in Minyan HaMitzvos, the Rambam felt that you count, you count... Again, I'm not sure, I'm not sure whether this last part is correct. I'm not sure. I'm not sure at all. But maybe the pshat is that the Rambam says... I'm not sure this is correct. But maybe the pshat is that the Rambam is saying that those yesodos which we know only from the Torah, but we couldn't know on our own. It's not something that we could, it's not knowledge that we could arrive at on our own. Techiyas hameisim, right? You can't, you can't prove that there's going to be techiyas hameisim, right? Our belief in techiyas hameisim is because we have a well-grounded and well-founded belief in the Torah and the Torah tells us, the Torah She'ba'al Peh tells us where in the Torah She'bi'ksav it says that there's going to be techiyas hameisim. It's not something that you can prove logically or scientifically that the world had to be created in such a way that there's going to be techiyas hameisim. No. The Rambam himself he writes that in Iggeres Techiyas HaMeisim. The Rambam in his Iggeres Techiyas HaMeisim, he writes that meforash. He says it's not the case that this is something which you could logically derive or logically prove. No. It's based on the kabala which we have from the Torah She'ba'al Peh which tells us where it's hinted at in Torah She'bi'ksav. So that doesn't really... there we're takeh not asked, there's nothing to do, right? There's nothing to do. You're supposed, we're supposed to accept that belief. It's not that we were supposed to figure out how it's to be proven scientifically. It's not that every person kefi kocho is supposed to, let's say when it comes to belief in Ribono Shel Olam, so the Rambam felt... so we're not supposed... not everyone agreed with the Rambam on this, but the Rambam felt that we're not supposed to just simply accept it as a matter of faith, but we're supposed to be, we're supposed to know what again, what reasons and what arguments there are in favor. That was the Rambam's conviction. By techiyas hameisim that's not the case. Okay, by techiyas hameisim, so we have to know the pesukim, Az Yashir Moshe or the other drashos which the Gemara has. Okay. But in terms of the etzem emuna, so there's no process of yedia the way you have with the other things. And maybe that's the klal in terms of the Rambam counts as a mitzvah where there's again, there's something that each person kefi kocho in the Rambam's opinion, Rabbi Yehuda HaLevi didn't agree with this, but in the Rambam's opinion that kefi kocho a person is supposed to do, there's something a person is supposed to do with it other than just accept it and affirm it, there's something he's supposed to do, something he's supposed to do. He's supposed to reflect on the fact that... or let's say in modern terms, so modern science also for now has finally discovered that there was a moment of creation. So the Rambam would say in terms of modern terms, so a person should know that, what the scientific evidence now... was that there was a moment of creation. That's mistama what the Rambam would be לפי רוחו של הרמב"ם בימינו. But by techiyas hameisim, there's no analog to that. There's no counterpart to that. So there, it's 100% meikarei hadas. And as we explained last time, and a person's emuna is deficient, not just if Rachmana litzlan he's kofer, but if he's not aware of it, so his emuna is deficient if he's not aware of it. But since there's no process of yediya, so then that for the Rambam didn't qualify for minyan hamitzvos. The same thing with Moshiach is also, there's no process of yediya, and therefore it doesn't qualify as a mitzvah. It doesn't make it any less of an ikar. It doesn't make it any less of a yesod, but maybe it accounts for the, again, the otherwise paradox of the fact that you have these ikarim, these yesodos, and they're not reflected within minyan hamitzvos.