Transcript

Good morning again raboitai, I apologize for the delay. The drasha, the shiur that we're going to try to learn a little bit today, understand a little bit today is mamash an extraordinary, extraordinary drasha. The question that the Rav poses is about the structure of Hilchos Teshuva. The four perakim, first four perakim deal basically with teshuva, albeit in Perek Gimmel that the Rambam talks about the zmanim of din vecheshbon which are mechayev in teshuva, inyan deyoma for us now. And then in Perek Chamishi, the Rambam stops talking about Hilchos Teshuva, devotes two perakim to talk about Bechira Chofshis, and then in Perek Zayin starts talking about teshuva again. The kasha is overwhelming. kasha is overwhelming. The way the Rambam breaks up Hilchos Teshuva into two parts, before and after his discussion of Bechira Chofshis, and again, once the Rav illuminates that question, so then it especially becomes also very, very conspicuous the yesodostike halacha in Perek Zayin, Halacha Gimmel, if you have a Rambam on hand take a look, raboitai. ואל תאמר שאין התשובה אלא מעבירות שיש בהן מעשה. Don't think that teshuva is limited to aveiros that materialized in the form of actions, כגון זנות וגזל וגניבה. No, don't have such a truncated conception of teshuva.

כשם שצריך אדם לשוב מאלו כך הוא צריך לחפש בדעות רעות שיש לו ולשוב מהן.

Deios in the Rambam means what we usually use the word midos for. A person has to look at his character traits, at character flaws.

מן הכעס מן האיבה מן הקנאה מן התחרות מן ההיתול מרדיפת הממון והכבוד מרדיפת מאכלות וכיוצא בהן מן הכל צריך לחזור בתשובה. ואלו העוונות קשים מאותן שיש בהן מעשה.

An action, if it were to happen as a result of a momentary lapse, is relatively speaking easier to do teshuva for. It's not something that has deep roots. Right, if you want to uproot something, if you're doing gardening and you're trying to uproot a weed, if you're a hurricane wind then you're trying to uproot a tree. If you're trying to, perhaps we can relate a little bit more to the mashal of doing gardening than being a hurricane wind. If you're trying to uproot something, so the relative ease or relative difficulty depends upon how deep the roots are. Right, if the roots just go a little bit beneath the surface. It's not going to be so hard to uproot it. When the roots run very deep, so then it becomes extremely difficult to uproot. So a maise, it's possible for it to have been some kind of freakish, flukish, momentary lapse, in which case, relatively speaking, the teshuva won't be so difficult. But by definition, when we're trying to do teshuva for our midos raos, so those are habits, those are entrenched. There, depending upon age, the roots run deep, how deeply depends upon age. There's only so deeply that the roots can run at your age.

ואלו הכבדות מאלו שיש בהן מעשה שבזמן שאדם נשקע באלו קשה הוא לפרוש. וכן הוא אומר יעזוב רשע דרכו ואיש און מחשבותיו.

Excuse me, so in this context, the Rambam is clearly interpreting the pasuk Ya'azov rasha darko that a person's derech means his midos, his habits, his patterns. Earlier the Rambam had quoted the same pasuk and lechora was learning pshat differently because he hadn't introduced teshuva on midos at that point. If you go back to Perek Beis Halacha Beis:

ומה היא התשובה הוא שיעזוב החוטא חטאו ויסירו ממחשבתו ויגמור בלבו שלא יעשהו עוד שנאמר יעזוב רשע דרכו ואיש און מחשבותיו.

So presumably this pasuk contains everything the Rambam said: Sheya'azov hachotei cheto, veyasirehu mimachshavto, ויגמור בלבו שלא יעשהו עוד. So the V'ish aven machshovosav, that's the veyasirehu mimachshavto. That's lechora easy. How did the Rambam teitch here in Perek Beis Halacha Beis the darko? It seems to be more a person's actions and azivas darko means sheya'azov hachotei cheto, he has to cease and desist from that action, but also ויגמור בלבו שלא יעשהו עוד. All of that is compressed into ya'azov rasha darko. Okay. So the pasuk has two different meanings. So in light of the Rav's kasha, which again sort of is this burst of light on Hilchos Teshuva that Hilchos Teshuva is broken into two different parts. So this yesod'isdike halacha should have been in Perek Aleph Halacha Aleph:

כל מצות שבתורה בין עשה בין לא תעשה אם עבר אדם על אחת מהן בין בזדון בין בשגגה כשיעשה תשובה וישוב מחטאו חייב להתוודות.

So the Rambam should have said Kol mitzvos shebatorah, bein mitzvos ma'asiyos, בין מצוות של דעות. Excuse me one second. So for instance, the Rambam has, excuse me, the Rambam has in Sefer Hamitzvos in Shoresh Teshi'i. So again, so the Rambam wrote Sefer Hamitzvos in Judeo-Arabic. We're learning it in Lashon Hakodesh. So the use of the word de'os is not the same here in Sefer Hamitzvos. Ibn Tibbon uses the word de'os more along the lines that we do. De'os are what a person believes and he uses the word midos the way we do. So it's no stira in leshonos harambam, just it's Ibn Tibbon. That Ibn Tibbon's vocabulary as opposed to the Rambam's vocabulary. דהא שכל ציוויי התורה שורש תשיעי and in the introductory shorashim to Sefer Hamitzvos. דהא שכל ציוויי התורה ואזהרותיה הנה הם בארבעה דברים. There are four areas which mitzvos cover. You can, you can subdivide mitzvos into four classes: bedeios, bi'peulos, bi'midos, u'vidibur. Deios,

הוא שציוונו להאמין דעה אחת מן הדעות כמו שציוונו להאמין הייחוד ואהבת האל יתברך ויראתו. וכן ציוונו בפעולה מן הפעולות כמו שציוונו להקריב קרבנות. וכן ציוונו להתנהג במידה מהמידות.

So the Rambam should have said in Perek Aleph, he should have referenced these different types of mitzvos, and he should have made clear what he ultimately does make clear in פרק ז הלכה ג. Why, why did the Rambam hold this critical halacha in abeyance? And again, it's not stam a kasha. פרק א הלכה א is sort of defining, the Rambam always begins with basic definitions of the parameters of the mitzva. This isn't sort of stam a halacha that the, alright, say it a little sooner, say it a little later, no, this is definitional. It's definitional. So how is it that this is held in abeyance until פרק ז הלכה ג? So agav, again before we pick up with what the Rav says about this, just one, one other comment in this vein of the structure of Hilchos Teshuva, just Perek Aleph of Hilchos Teshuva is a very, very seemingly strange perek. I'm sorry, I realize I didn't ask to have it on hand, but just by a show of thumbs, how many people have a Rambam on hand? Okay, one second. Keep your thumb up, I gotta move the screen here. Sorry about that. Okay, boruch Hashem, a lot of thumbs there. Okay. Perek Aleph is a very, very, very, very strange, seemingly strange perek. The Rambam begins again, kol mitzvos shebaTorah, teshuva and viduy, and teshuva and viduy are always necessary even if there's going to be a korban, even if there's going to be a malkus, even if there's going to be misa, there has to be teshuva and viduy, fine. Then Halacha Beis the Rambam starts talking about sa'ir hamishtaleiach. What exactly seems like the sa'ir hamishtaleiach got lost here? The sa'ir hamishtaleiach was on his way, was really on his way la'Azazel, but he took a wrong turn and he ended up in פרק א הלכות תשובה. What's the sa'ir hamishtaleiach doing in Hilchos Teshuva? Tell me about him in הלכות עבודת יום הכיפורים where he belongs. He wandered in here, took a left when he was supposed to take a right and he ends up here in Perek Aleph. What's the sa'ir hamishtaleiach got to do? Okay, especially given the fact that the sa'ir hamishtaleiach in large part has nothing to do with teshuva because the Rambam tells us that it's mechaper kalos even without teshuva. It's a funny thing. And then after sa'ir hamishtaleiach, so the Rambam talks about bazman hazeh and talks about Yom Kippur and then he talks about the chillukei kapara. So I don't know, just sort of a hodgepodge, no? It seems like a hodgepodge of things. What connects them? So the answer is klar that for whatever reason, okay, so this ein hachi nami will generate a different question, but a well-defined question. For whatever reason, the Rambam doesn't begin Hilchos Teshuva talking about teshuva. Perek Aleph of Hilchos Teshuva is not about teshuva. Perek Aleph of Hilchos Teshuva is about kapara. Again, why ein hachi nami, so that's something that at some point in ezras Hashem we need to understand, but Perek Aleph is about, is about kapara. Once we realize that, then the whole perek... Everything makes perfect sense in terms of the perek. The Rambam is being makif the topic of kapparah. The Rambam is telling us that even though this we saw in last week and in Ish Hahalacha with the Minchas Chinuch's kasha and teretz, that even though the emes is that teshuva lachud and kapparah lachud,

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי על מנת שאני צדיק גמור אפילו רשע גמור הרי זו ספק מקודשת שמא הרהר תשובה בלבו,

so teshuva lachud kapparah lachud, but you should know that viduy is me'akeiv in kapparah, which is what the Rambam in Perek Aleph, Halacha Aleph is telling us. That the person is chayav l'hisvados and ein miskaper lo without the viduy. So Perek Aleph, Halacha Aleph is really again the Rambam is zeroing in on viduy more than teshuva because for whatever reason the Rambam begins Perek Aleph talking about kapparah, not talking about teshuva. So then the Rambam is now comprehensively, very systematically, comprehensively, kedarko bakodesh, going through all the sources of kapparah that we have, the sources of kapparah that we have, and that’s how the perek culminates with the chilukei kapparah. Okay, that's just again, it doesn't contribute to the teretz on the Rav's kasha of this derasha that we’re trying to lamdel a bit together, but just as a ma’amar musgar as they say. Okay, so that’s the question. Why does the Rambam divide Hilchos Teshuva? Some of it is on one side of his discussion of bechira chofshis, some of it is on the other side and in light of that, how is it that something as fundamental as having to do teshuva for our middos ra'os that only surfaces in Perek Zayin? So in the derasha, so the Rav explains remarkably how a person can do teshuva without really or fully tapping into the remarkable koach of bechira chofshis. The remarkable koach of bechira chofshis that a person has is that we’re given unlimited bechira, which means that a person can, if he fully exercises and employs the koach habechira, a person can transform himself. A person can be responsible for his undergoing a metamorphosis. Not just take me or leave me, not just can’t teach an old dog new tricks, none of that, none of that. A person can... it’s a revolutionary koach, it’s a revolutionary capacity that a person can totally transform himself, can be responsible for his own personal metamorphosis. That’s what bechira chofshis bechol tokpah allows a person to do. A person can, and too often that is all we do, do teshuva by, if at all tapping into this, only very superficially. How so? The Rav explains that there is a phenomenon... I don't know, maybe in our categories we would link it to the fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu embedded within us a conscience, although interestingly the Rav himself doesn’t make that association. The Rav explains that there is a phenomenon, maybe in our categories we would link it to the fact that HaKadosh Baruch Hu embedded within us a conscience, although interestingly the Rav himself doesn't make that association, ayen alav, but we know such a thing as having a guilty conscience. We do something wrong and we have a guilty conscience. Sometimes that guilty conscience makes us sure that because it's on our mind, so we're sure that everyone else is aware of our chet and we overinterpret, misinterpret the way someone's looking at us or a comment someone makes and mamash the whole thing is lo dubu me'olam, it's right? It's my own guilty conscience about my chet. It's what the Rav calls something which is even more basic and even more subliminal, hargashas hachet. It's not the sort of intellectual hacharas hachet but there's a hargashas hachet. There's this sense of unease. There's this loss of menuchas hanefesh, of equilibrium. The object of the chet changes from being something which fascinated and irresistibly as the person experienced it, attracted him, to something that's now repulsive and repels him. It's not an intellectual cognitive process, right? When we have pangs of conscience, there's nothing intellectual about it and it's not even our exercising our bechira chofshis. It's not mitsad habecheira that we have a guilty conscience, right? The same way it's not a bechira if a person touches something hot and pulls his hand back. There's no bechira there, that's a reflex action. Oftentimes teshuvah can be nothing more than aligning oneself with the instinct of the conscience as opposed to the urge of the yetzer hara. So again, it's a little bit a question of semantics, isn't that also bechira? Okay, so it's semantics, so say that isn't bechira or say that is bechira but a superficial bechira. A bechira, not a bechira where a person is transforming himself, but where a person is allowed to be machria between different yetzarim, between different urges and between different instincts and between different reflexes. Again, it's either call that not bechira or it's hard for us to think of it and say it that way, call it yes bechira but a very, very limited sense of bechira. Then the Rambam, so the Rambam to begin with in Hilchos Teshuvah doesn't have to tell us about how profound the koach of bechira is, because teshuvah can happen even with a very superficial bechira. The Ribbono Shel Olam programmed us that we feel guilty when we're margish chet. We feel guilty. We feel unclean. That feeling, that instinctive reflexive reaction, that's not an expression, an accomplishment of bechira, it's an instinctive reaction. And that's ultimately the source of the teshuvah. Okay, isn't there a bechira in that I align myself with assuaging my guilty conscience and I discontinue the chet rather than aligning myself with my yetzer hara? Yeah, okay, but it's a very superficial, very limited type of bechira. Then the Rambam says that rabosai, you should know that what I've described until now doesn't begin to capture what a person is capable of, because Yes, a person can do teshuvah that way, and he can even do a teshuvah that will stick. A person, I think Rabbeinu Yonah writes in the beginning of Shaarei Teshuvah that the anguish a person has about cheit will help protect him from repeating that cheit. The anguish which is involved in the teshuvah process will help deter the person from cheit again. משל למה הדבר דומה. Let's say a person ate a certain food and unbeknownst to him it was spoiled. So because of that he got sick and maybe then he vomited. The next time you see that food, you have an association with it. You have this automatic association of that food with the stomach illness that the person had suffered. Says Rabbeinu Yonah, when a person does teshuvah and again with all the merirus haleiv which at some point has to be part of the teshuvah, so then my association when that cheit beckons a second time will be like my association with the food that made me sick last time I ate it. So a teshuvah even this superficial, relatively speaking, teshuvah can stick and can last. But then the Rambam says but you should know rabboysai, Rambam tells us, you should know rabboysai, if that's the only teshuvah we're doing, we're selling ourselves short. A person is capable of a teshuvah that totally totally transforms himself. It's not just that he's machria between two different forces that attract and repel him. There's a yeitzer hara which makes the aveirah attract him, there's a conscience which makes the aveirah repel him and the person is just being machria between yetzorim, between urges and instincts and reflexes. No, a person can transform his middos. It's not just that a person can arbitrate between the middos hatovah and his conscience, no a person can change the middos hatovah. It's not just that a person can be machria between the middos hakina v'hakaas and again that conscience that we have, the yeitzer hatov, no a person can be mesakein and can be okeir those middos raos. Bechirah as the Rambam explained it to us, as he defines it, allows a person to transform himself. But says the Rav, now and only now can the Rambam tell us that you have to do teshuvah not only for an action but you have to do teshuvah for middos raos, again in the Rambam's lexicon dei'os. Kol zman that the teshuvah is the superficial teshuvah, so then that teshuvah, that teshuvah no, only relates to maaseh. What it means is I'm not uprooting the chemdas mammon that led to the gezel gneivah. I'm not uprooting the taivah that led to the znus, but I'm being machria differently between those middos raos and the conscience and the notion of tiyuv hacheit and that simultaneously a person also experiences cheit as something reprehensible. After the Rambam tells us about bechirah, unlimited bechirah, there's a very famous notion from Rav Dessler, nekudas habechirah. The pashat in the Rambam is that the Rambam doesn't hold like that at all. The Rambam that that whole mahalech is not consistent with the Rambam. Rambam tells us that through bechirah a person can totally transform himself. So now the Rambam says, now, now the Rambam addresses us, now that you understand that, now I can tell you something else which until this point would have just seemed like a medrash sosum. I can tell you... tell you that the mitzvah of teshuvah is not only on the level of maisim, but it's on the level of deos, it's on the level of midos as well. Perek Zayin, the Rav says, why is it that in Perek Zayin now the Rambam quotes all the extraordinary maamarei chazal that extol teshuvah? And the Rambam has this poetic ode to teshuvah, כמה מעולה מעלת התשובה. The Rav says you have the sense the Rambam is writing poetry at this point, he's not writing prose. It's an ode to teshuvah, it's a song to teshuvah. Because once the Rambam has told us about the koach habechirah, he's also telling us about what a teshuvah me'ahava—he's telling us about that a person can do a teshuvah me'ahava, and again, a teshuvah me'ahava that can take a person who was sanui, meshukkutz, meruchak, v'to'eiva and can transform him into ohuve, v'nechmad, v'karov, v'yedid. And Perek Zayin is the perek of teshuvah me'ahava. Earlier the Rambam was describing a teshuvah mi'yirah, a teshuvah which again is not from within, from the bechirah chofshis of a person, but it's more again how the person is responding to factors and forces acting upon him. Again, even in a different sense, obviously the conscience or this whatever's responsible for hargashas hacheit is internal also, but in a different sense than the koach habechirah. And Perek Zayin is the perek of teshuvah me'ahava because earlier it's premature. You can't, we can't be massig a teshuvah me'ahava, only again in light of the virtually unlimited potential which a person recognizes that he has by virtue of bechirah. So now, and only now, can he be introduced to teshuvah me'ahava. So Perek Zayin is about teshuvah me'ahava. Perek Zayin also which comes after the discussion of bechirah can introduce us to the chiyuv to do teshuvah for deos as well. In our, in our language midos. But there's one halacha here in Perek Zayin that I think that the Rav doesn't comment on, and the question is how this should be understood based on his extraordinary mahalach. And if you have the Rambam, so take a look. Again, so Perek Zayin, Halacha Aleph begins הואיל ורשות כל אדם נתונה לו כמו שביארנו. That's the phrase the Rambam used at the beginning of Perek Hey in talking about bechirah. Since reshus doesn't mean permission or license here, it means the capacity, it means the ability. That's why reshus means governmental authority in Pirkei Avos as well. הואיל ורשות כל אדם נתונה לו כמו שביארנו, yishtadel ha'adam. yishtadel b'lashon chachamim doesn't—we use in modern Hebrew lehishtadel means to try. In rabbinic Hebrew yishtadel means to exert oneself. It doesn't just mean oh I'll give it a shot, I'll attempt. No, try doesn't necessarily have that. yishtadel means to exert oneself.

ישתדל האדם לעשות תשובה ולנעור כפיו מחטאיו כדי שימות והוא בעל תשובה כדי שיזכה לחיי העולם הבא.

So that's a little bit lich'ora discordant given the Rav's approach that the Rambam is introducing in Perek Zayin teshuvah me'ahava. teshuvah me'ahava should be altruistic, should be lishmah, shouldn't be כדי שיזכה לחיי העולם הבא. That's one question. Second question, Halacha Beis:

לעולם יראה אדם את עצמו כאילו הוא נוטה למות ושמא ימות בשעתו ונמצא עומד בחטאו.

A person should view himself as though today maybe is his last day. Obviously that's not true in every area. Right, if today were a person's last day, like he wouldn't go to the— The Rambam is not looking to dissuade us from going to the dentist. The Rambam is obviously saying that a person is supposed to sort of live simultaneously with different complementary perspectives and is supposed to live simultaneously on different levels. In terms of doing teshuva, so the level on which the person should live is

כאילו הוא נוטה למות ושמא ימות בשעתו ונמצא עומד בחטאו. לפיכך ישוב מחטאו מיד ולא יאמר כשאזקין אשוב שמא ימות קודם שיזקין. הוא ששלמה אומר בחכמתו בכל עת יהיו בגדיך לבנים ושמן על ראשך אל יחסר.

As the Kesef Mishneh cites, Rambam is quoting from the Mishnah in Avos and the Gemara in Shabbos. The Mishnah in Avos is שוב יום אחד לפני מיתתך. The Gemara in Shabbos explains, אי וכי אדם יודע אימת ימות? So how is it meaningful to say שוב יום אחד לפני מיתתך? A person doesn't know when the tomorrow is. So precisely for that reason, he should always be concerned that tomorrow is today and if today he didn't do teshuva, he's in trouble because tomorrow he's not going to know when he should do teshuva. So aderaba, אינו יודע ונמצא כל ימיו בתשובה. So that's all Chazal, it's not the Rambam, it's Chazal. But it's the Rambam who's quoting it here, right? The Rambam is choosing where and when to quote it. So how does this belong to Perek Zayin? Again, given the Rav's beautiful, beautiful overview of two ways of doing teshuva, two types of teshuva, a teshuva that barely scratches the surface in terms of employing our bechirah, and the teshuva which can be a teshuva me'ahava which is only conceivable once we realize the virtually unlimited koach of bechirah chofshis, and Perek Zayin is about, that's what Perek Zayin is about. So why is this here? And without the koach of bechirah, without teshuva me'ahava, so a person he shouldn't be concerned that he doesn't, Rachmana litzlan, want to be niftar before he clears all his debts? So how does this fit in here? So let's begin with the first of the two kashas we asked. Why is the Rambam Halacha Aleph depicting the teshuva or the motivation for teshuva כדי שיזכה לחיי העולם הבא? Again, lema'aseh the question arguably would have been an appropriate question regardless, but certainly within the Rav's mahalach it is very conspicuous. Take a look for a minute in פרק י' הלכה א' of Hilchos Teshuva.

אל יאמר אדם הריני עושה מצות התורה ועוסק בחכמתה כדי שאקבל הברכות הכתובות בתורה או כדי שאזכה לחיי העולם הבא ואפרוש מן העבירות שהזהירה תורה מהן כדי שאנצל מן הקללות הכתובות בתורה או כדי שלא אכרת מחיי העולם הבא אינו עובד על מנת זה שהעובד על מנת זה עובד מיראה ואינה מעלת הנביאים ולא מעלת החכמים.

If a person says I'm motivated because every one of us, no one wants to die, everyone wants to live forever. That's human nature. That's the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu created us. So a person can very understandably, very naturally say that's what motivates me. I know that if I learn Torah and I keep the mitzvos, I'll have a chelek b'olam haba and I'll be able to live forever, which is something which is at the core of ourself, of our selfhood. So the Rambam says... That's being oved meyira, אינה מעלת הנביאים ולא מעלת החכמים. Okay, take a look in the Frankel Rambam, it's actually the same page, but take a look at the previous halacha, perek tet halacha bet.

מפני זה התאוו כל ישראל נביאיהם וחכמיהם לימות המלך המשיח.

And the melech hamashiach when the melech hamashiach comes, yemos hamashiach will be a utopia. There's not going to be any any warfare, there'll be no more shibbud malchuyos, there'll be there'll be good health, people will live very, very long lives, it'll be a utopia.

ומפני זה התאוו כל ישראל נביאיהם וחכמיהם לימות המלך המשיח.

So why do we want a utopia?

כדי שינוחו ממלכות הרשעה שאינה מנחת להן לישראל לעסוק בתורה ובמצוות כהוגן,

v'yimtze'u lahem margo'a, they'll have the tranquility, וירבו בחכמה כדי שיזכו לחיי העולם הבא. And and who is it who's misaveh for yemos hamashiach כדי שיזכו לחיי העולם הבא? Nevi'eihem vechachameihem, not just us, but the nevi'im and chachamim are described this way. The same nevi'im and chachamim that the Rambam made a point of telling us one halacha later that to do it because a person wants chayei olam haba is אינה לא מעלת הנביאים ולא מעלת החכמים. As blatant as as it could be, clearly, clearly the answer is that a person, well, before we do that, maybe go back for a minute to perek chet halacha bet.

העולם הבא אין בו גוף וגוויה אלא נפשות הצדיקים בלבד בלא גוף כמלאכי השרת.

So the Rambam kayaduah has an incorporeal conception of olam haba. Olam haba is only for the nefesh. What did Chazal then mean when Chazal said that in olam haba צדיקים יושבים ועטרותיהם בראשיהם ונהנים מזיו השכינה? It's a metaphor. And the Rambam now proceeds in this halacha and explains each element of the metaphor. Take a look at the last line of the halacha. ומהו זה שאמרו ונהנים מזיו השכינה, it obviously doesn't mean physical pleasure. So what does it mean that they're basking in the radiance of the shechina? It doesn't mean the warmth of sitting in a summer sun. So what does it mean?

ומהו זה שאמרו ונהנים מזיו השכינה, שיודעים ומשיגים מאמיתת הקדוש ברוך הוא מה שאינן יודעים והם בגוף האפל השפל.

That in olam haba, even Rabbi Akiva, even the Rambam, even Rav Chaim, even the Vilna Gaon, even Moshe Rabbeinu, there's a cap on the yedi'as Hashem that they can have because they exist in a hybrid state of guf and nefesh. And in olam haba, which for the Rambam is only nefesh, that cap is released and there's a yedi'ah, there's a level of yedi'ah, there's a level of hasaga of apprehension which is possible in olam haba, which is impossible, which is humanly, logically impossible in olam hazeh. And that's what the nehenim miziv hashechina is. Kommt aus, if a person, as the Rambam says in perek chet and in perek yod halacha bet, is מתאווה תאווה גדולה לידע השם ברוך הוא, so that person, that ta'avah will translate, right? And it's not coincidental. Take a look in Yesodei HaTorah perek bet halacha bet for a moment.

והיאך היא הדרך לאהבתו ויראתו, בשעה שיתבונן אדם במעשיו ובברואיו הנפלאים הגדולים ויראה מהם חכמתו שאין לה ערך ולא קץ, מיד הוא אוהב ומשבח ומפאר ומתאווה תאווה גדולה לידע השם הגדול, כמו שאמר דוד צמאה נפשי לאלוקים לאל חי.

An ohev Hashem is misaveh ta'avah gedolah for more yedi'as Hashem. Whatever yedi'as Hashem he has already, he's misaveh ta'avah gedolah to have a greater level, a greater degree of ahavas Hashem. Lachol it's pashut that the Rambam is intentionally using... that same phrase, that same wording in פרק ט הלכה ב when he tells us mipnei zeh hisavu, right? the same misaveh ta'avah gedolah from Yud-Tes Beis-Beis. מפני זה התאוו כל ישראל because the Rambam is telling us a person can desire Chayei Olam Haba for either of two very different reasons. A person can desire Chayei Olam Haba because again we all want to live forever. No one is really content with mortality. Person wants to live forever. And mimmela a person can desire Chayei Olam Haba for that reason. That's what the Rambam is describing in פרק י הלכה א and the Rambam says that's a bechinah of oved meyirah. Halavai we should be oved meyirah. That's nothing to denigrate. It's not the highest but it's avodah. In פרק ט הלכה ב the Rambam's talking about a person who's not desirous of Chayei Olam Haba for his own personal immortality. He's desirous of Chayei Olam Haba for the yedias Hashem, for the kirvas Elokim that's only possible there that even for Moshe Rabbeinu isn't possible here. And that's why the Rambam uses that same phrase the hisavu that he used to describe the ohev Hashem who's מתאוה תאוה גדולה לידע. So the beginning of the answer to our question, I'm sorry we're a little bit over time here. The beginning to the answer of our question פרק ז הלכה א we said why is it, how is it that if פרק ז הלכה א is now introducing this higher type of teshuvah, a teshuvah which can even be a teshuvah me'ahavah, so why does the Rambam begin with this shelo lishmah motivation? No, when the Rambam says כדי שיזכה לחיי העולם הבא, what he's talking about is the way it's depicted in פרק ט הלכה ב. He's talking about כדי שיזכה לחיי העולם הבא that the person yearns for Olam Haba for the yedias Hashem, for the kirvas Elokim, for the dveikus that it affords, that it makes possible. That's lichora the key to understanding Halacha Beis. We said Halacha Beis lichora that's certainly why didn't the Rambam have that earlier. A person should do teshuvah right away. You don't need to know about this new type of teshuvah based on bechirah to be able to do that. So peshat lichora is as follows. What's the din halacha l'maaseh? Let's say you have a kohen and the kohen goes I don't know he's 30 years old. He goes overseas. His wife remains behind, it's a business trip, his wife remains behind. Okay then there's no communication. I don't know the phone lines are down and email is down. No communication. So the question is can she eat terumah? I mean an eishess kohen eats terumah. כל טהור בביתך יאכל אותו. An eishess kohen eats terumah. So can she eat terumah or no? Maybe we have to be choshesh that maybe the kohen died? So it's a mefurash din that שמא ימות לא חיישינן, שמא מת לא חיישינן. We don't entertain a chashash that a young person—okay over 70 is a different different discussion—but a young person we don't entertain a chashash again that the person just did rachmana litzlan die prematurely or that he imminently will die prematurely. There's no such chashash in halacha. Halacha is not choshesh for that. So what's again leaving the Rambam's placement of this halacha aside, what's peshat in the Gemara Shabbos elaborating the mishna in Avos of שוב יום אחד לפני מיתתך? No, so I don't know presumably I don't know if we would consult the actuarial tables, I don't know but ימי שנותינו בהם שבעים שנה. Mistama a person can certainly wait till he gets close to 70 to be mkayem שוב יום אחד לפני מיתתך. Just had minei u'vei in terms of the Gemara Shabbos how do we understand this din? So lichora klar klar that whether or not a person is choshesh sort of depends upon his perspective. From an Olam Hazeh-dike perspective, there's no reason for a young person, even a middle-aged person, in in unless Rachmana litzlan the person is a choleh mesukan. There's no reason for that person to be choshesh shema hayom yamus. And al pi din it's like that. The Eshes Kohen can eat Trumah even though the email's been down for a week and the phone lines have been down for a week and she's had no word from her husband. There's no reason for her to think that anything happened to him. He's a young guy. There's no reason to think that anything happened to him. But what about if the person's orientation is not Olam Hazeh-dike orientation, but it's an Olam Habah-dike orientation? From an Olam Habah-dike orientation, right, if if the person is thinking, 'Here I am today, should I be concerned whether I'll be here tomorrow?', that's one question. But if a person is thinking, his orientation is 'I want to end up in Olam Habah and there are some things that I want to attend to, that I must attend to, that I need to attend to before I get there', when should I do it? So that's a the question is coming from a different angle, from a different orientation. And when the orientation is not the Olam Hazeh-dike orientation, but it's the Olam Habah-dike orientation, so the answer is I don't know when the person's going to be in Olam Habah. If there are things you gotta take care of, take care of them now. So the emess is that this halacha also beautifully, beautifully fits in in into the Rov scheme. That because Perek Zayin is talking about Tshuva mei-ahava, a Tshuva mei-ahava is is focused on Olam Habah for the kirvas Elokim that it affords. The Nesivos Shalom has as a beautiful he-ara. He says, 'Why is Perek Ches in Hilchos Tshuva? Perek Ches is about Olam Habah. Okay, you do tshuva, you get to Olam Habah. That's a little bit of a shvacha connection. If you do tshuva then you won't eat maachalos asuros either, so we can shtup Hilchos maachalos asuros. All right, it's going to get too big. Ma-she-ken Olam Habah we can compress into a perek. What's Olam Habah doing in Hilchos Tshuva?' So Nesivos Shalom explains very beautifully. He says, the Slonimer Rebbe explains, explains very, very beautifully. He says because tshuva is to come close to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. That's what the metzius of Olam Habah is. That's what the metzius of Olam Habah is. So a person of tshuva mei-ahava, he's focused on Olam Habah. So his question of mosai amus is not being asked from the angle of right now. The Eshes Kohen wants to eat dinner, so she's comfortable or in the morning she's planning what she'll have for for supper. So does she have to be choshesh that the husband is going to die? So the the orientation is now. No, שמא ימות לא חיישינן על פי דין. But if the orientation is Olam Habah, that's what I'm focused on, and there's some things that I mammish need to attend to beforehand, so then you're never going to know when the day is. You're never going to know when the day is. When at age 60 you're not going to know when the day is either, at age 70, at age 80, you're never going to know when the day is. So a person should do it today. And that's why the Rambam inserts the Maamar Chazal here. Okay, there's so much more. This this drasha of the Rebbe is so... again, there's what he says and and there's what it opens up beyond that, so much more. So bli neder next Thursday, im yirtzeh Hashem. I assume even though it's ערב ערב ראש השנה we still have regular, still have regular Shiur Thursday, I'm assuming. So so bli neder im yirtzeh Hashem we'll continue with this same drasha next Thursday and Sunday, im yirtzeh Hashem bli neder we'll continue in Pesicha. Okay rabosai, be well, be safe, have a productive day and gutten Shabbos.