I apologize for the delay rabosai. So let's pick up here in פרק ד משנה ה. Could be that אם ירצה השם בלי נדר we'll come back to Mishnah Daled again. I'm not sure if we're finished with the shifcha charufa, can't get enough of it, so maybe we'll come back to it, but for the moment let's go on a little bit. רבי יוחנן בן ברוקא אומר המחלל שם שמים בסתר נפרעין ממנו בגלוי.
Even if the chillul Hashem happens in private, the punishment, rachmana litzlan, if the person doesn't avert it through teshuva, is bagalui. אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד בחילול השם. And this, this, this is true, this holds true that nifrain mimenu bagalui whether the person brought about a chillul Hashem bishogeg or whether he brought about the chillul Hashem bemezid. What can happen baseter, what can happen in private that rachmana litzlan constitutes a chillul Hashem? So the Rambam first in Sefer Hamitzvos and then in Perek Hei of Yesodei Hatorah tells us that there are three types of kiddush Hashem and chillul Hashem. The first one is when there's a requirement of yehareg ve'al ya'avor. If the person complies, it's an act of kiddush Hashem. If, rachmana litzlan, he doesn't comply, he's over when the halacha demands yehareg ve'al ya'avor, so then it constitutes a chillul Hashem. And for the gimel aveiros, that's true even betzina, right? Even betzina there's a chiyuv of yehareg ve'al ya'avor. So one tziyur of chillul Hashem baseter is one of the gimel aveiros where a person commits one of the gimel aveiros. Another tziyur of chillul Hashem which can happen even baseter, even betzina, if a person is over on an aveira spitefully. Meaning, it's not that the person is succumbing to a yeitzer hara. There's no urge which is impelling him, there's no strong desire which is overwhelming him, but just out of, rachmana litzlan, a total disregard and a total which represents a total contempt for a mitzvah, so a person is over an aveira. So that too, even if there's no audience, I mean there's always an audience, the Ribbono Shel Olam, but even if there's no human audience, so that too constitutes a chillul Hashem. In פרק ה הלכה י, the Rambam writes: כל העובר מדעתו בלא אונס על אחת מכל מצוות האמורות בתורה בשאט בנפש להכעיס הרי זה מחלל את השם.
Again, there's no natural urge. Again, when there is a natural urge, that obviously doesn't justify or allow for the aveira, but at least it contextualizes that the aveira represents a weakness rather than rebellion. But when there's no natural urge, when there's no taiva to which the person is giving in, to which he's succumbing, which then means that it's just contempt and spiteful behavior, so that's a chillul Hashem, rachmana litzlan, even if it's in private. ולפיכך נאמר בשבועת שקר וחיללת את שם אלהיך אני ה.
The Torah identifies that the issur shvuas sheker involves always involves a chillul Hashem. What does it involve a chillul Hashem for? Says, says the Rambam, because it, it's an example of this type of again apathetic, contemptuous disregard for a mitzvah as, as opposed to succumbing to, to an instinct or, or to an urge. So both of these types of chillul Hashem can, Rachmana litzlan, transpire even beseter, even bitzina. And the Mishnah tells us that, for whatever reason, that even if the infraction is beseter, is bitzina, but the onesh that's forthcoming is begalui. What does it mean אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד בחילול השם? So all the, all the Rishonim that, that I saw, and but presumably it, it has to be true even for, for those that for everyone, it doesn't mean that the chomer ha'aveirah is the same. It doesn't mean the Mishnah is equating that the severity of the cheit is the same, whether it's beshogeg or bemazid. So what does it mean? So what, what it means is that this yesod, this middah, that even if the chillul Hashem was בסתר נפרעים ממנו בגלוי, that this middah holds true whether the chillul Hashem was a chillul Hashem that happened beshogeg or whether it was a chillul Hashem that happened bemazid. Lema'aseh, yitachen, and again this next step not everyone takes by any stretch of the imagination, but kemidumeh that you do find support for this in the Maharal, for instance. I mean Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka could have economized and, and he could have said המחלל שם שמים בין בשוגג בין במזיד אפילו בסתר נפרעים ממנו בגלוי.
Did I save any words there? Yeah, I think I saved a couple of words. The last chillul Hashem you don't need. I think we saved a couple of words there. And it, it is striking that the loshon of אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד בחילול השם, hagam that it's again, its primary meaning is that they are equated in terms of this middah of nifra'in mimenu begalui, but yet the fact, the fact that the phrase intimates a certain equivalence, so yitachen that even though it's not intended to suggest that, again, that it's entirely so, it's not intended to blur the difference, but it does, lich'ora, intimate that maybe the shogeg and mazid of chillul Hashem are not as far apart as shogeg and mazid are in kol hatorah kulah. The Maharal points out, very interestingly, he says where else in halacha do we find that the gap between shogeg and mazid is not as dramatic as it is in kol hatorah kulah? So we find the Mishna says in Bava Kamma, when it comes to an adam hamazik, that אדם מועד לעולם בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין באונס בין ברצון.
If you are mazik mammon chavrecha, so it doesn't make a difference whether you did it b'shogeg or b'mezid, the same bill to pay, you have to pay the same bill. When it comes to shfichas damim, now clearly there is a very, very real and very, very significant difference between shogeg and mezid, but yet the difference is not as dramatic as it is in kol haTorah kula, the rotzei'ach b'shogeg l'maiseh can be killed. If the go'el hadam catches up with them chutz l'ir miklat, the go'el hadam can kill. Again, we're not blurring the difference between shogeg and mezid, but m'idach gisa, to a degree, that that difference is diminished. So what do those two examples have in common? What do those two examples have in common? If if I break your window. So I can break your window because I maliciously go over with a baseball bat and smash your window. Or I can break your window because I was playing baseball and in in the ballpark next field and I hit a home run, you'll excuse that breach in modesty, but I hit a home run and it clears the to dead center and it clears the the center field wall and and keeps going, it keeps going and and breaks your window. So yeah, one was mezid, one was shogeg, but the result is the same. And and the issur is very much result oriented. Now again, does that mean that we totally blur the difference between shogeg and mezid? No, it doesn't, but m'idach gisa, one also understands how, you know, if I go over to you and say, Gee, you know, I'm sorry, I didn't mean to break your window, l'maiseh your window is still broken. And and when the person kills b'shogeg, and again, kills b'shogeg, we're not talking about a shogeg karov l'ones. We're not talking about that it was really, really so fluky that that you couldn't have expected it anymore. No, there is a degree of culpability, there is a degree of liability and and neglect in the person who kills b'shogeg. Okay, so it's very nice that he gets up in court and apologizes to the family, but the bottom line is that that the other person is dead. And and the shogeg doesn't mitigate the consequence. So when shogeg, here's the yesod rabbosai, when shogeg doesn't mitigate a consequence, it doesn't mitigate the aveira as much. By most aveiros, the aveira is is not so much the consequence as as the the the act. Hashem said don't do this, a person did it. Okay, so how can you equate Hashem said don't do it and a person did it b'mezid or a person did it b'shogeg? It's k'rachok mizrach mimariv. It's it's so dramatically different. But when the dagesh chazak is, Hashem says don't bring about that result, don't bring about that consequence, not just don't do this. Hashem is saying don't bring about that result. Don't be shofech dam ha'adam, don't bring about that result of shfichas damim. Not just don't engage in that act, don't bring about that result. So then is there a difference between shogeg and mezid? Absolutely. But is the difference as great as it is in all other contexts? No. Because the fact that it's shogeg doesn't mitigate the consequence. Your window is still broken whether I was mezid or shogeg, and the person is still is still dead regardless of whether or not the rotzei'ach was shogeg or mezid. Shogeg doesn't mitigate the consequence, and therefore it doesn't mitigate the act as much. Chillul Hashem also. We're dealing with very real consequences. That's the whole the whole aveira's defined in terms of... well, I'll take that back. Chillul Hashem will also be dealing with with consequence. Because of that because of that the difference between shogeg and meizid, is there a difference? Yes. And when it says אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד בחילול השם, is it equating them in terms of the degree of onesh rachmana litzlan? Absolutely not. Absolutely not. The difference between shogeg and meizid is not blurred. But אף על פי כן Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka says it in a way that sort of intimates a certain equivalence, telling us that but be aware that as we find in some other areas of halacha, the difference between shogeg and meizid is not as dramatic as it is in kol HaTorah kulah. Because here too, it's very much result and consequence oriented. You know, sometimes rachmana litzlan, sometimes I'm not commenting on on the dinei shamayim b'hadei kavshei d'rachmana. I certainly don't don't know anything. But you know, sometimes the objective chillul Hashem when the chillul Hashem is bishogeg is greater than when the chillul Hashem is b'meizid. Let's say you have I'm now we're talking more about not so much about b'seser, we're talking more about when it's when it's b'farhesya. Let's say you have someone who and we all do to a degree, right? Like it or not, we all do to a degree, who represents Torah. I think I think the Chofetz Chaim already said, you know, post-Haskalah when when shomrei Torah mitzvos are the minority in Klal Yisrael, so we all do. Once upon a time, it was what the Rambam says, it was an אדם גדול בתורה ומפורסם בחסידות. But now it's true for all of us. We're all we're all ambassadors. We're all ambassadors. Once upon a time when when olam k'minhago noheig, devarim k'tikunam, all Jews were shomrei Torah mitzvos, so who stood out? אדם גדול מפורסם בחסידות stood out. Now rachmana litzlan that that most Jews are assimilated, so who stands out? We all stand out. Every one of us stands out. Not not just the גדולים בתורה ומפורסמים בחסידות. We also stand out. We're also exceptional. We're also extraordinary. So when you have someone who represents Torah, he wears a yarmulke. He's clearly clearly outwardly recognizable and identified with Torah. And let's say he gets caught for being involved in, I don't know, insider trading or whatever it is. And of course, certain newspapers will will make sure to put him on the front page and and make sure that the angle of the picture allows you to see allows you to see the yarmulke. And you won't have to go beyond the second paragraph to find out that that he's an Orthodox Jew, all objective journalism for the betterment of of the public of course. So, that, is that a chillul Hashem? Yeah, it's a chillul Hashem. What's the chillul Hashem? Because... Someone who represents Torah acted in a way that's antithetical to Torah and that's a Chillul Hashem. But when a person is shogeg be-Chillul Hashem, again I'm not talking about what the liability and what the culpability is. Ribbono shel Olam doesn't need anyone's advice. Excuse me, my mind... but when a person is shogeg be-Chillul Hashem, so then imagine that if when the person robbed the bank, he insisted that he's doing so because that's what the Torah teaches. Imagine that he had this distorted view of Torah, that it's not that despite the fact that he represents Torah, he gave in to a weakness and robbed the bank. No, he insists, he insists, and you know why I robbed the bank? Because the Torah says you should rob the bank. Torah agrees with Robin Hood. Steal from the rich and give to the poor. And let's say that he really believes that. He's sufficiently frum that he really believes that. So is he shogeg? Could be yes. Could be yes. Let's assume in theory he is. But on an objective in terms of the substance of the Chillul Hashem, the substance of the Chillul Hashem, I'm not commenting on culpability and liability where in the spectrum it comes out, whatever, there's plenty of culpability liability wherever it is in the spectrum. Objectively in terms of the substance of the Chillul Hashem, the Chillul Hashem is greater. It's a greater distortion of Torah. When a person, the Chillul Hashem that the Rambam talks about on פרק ה הלכה יא of ויש דברים אחרים שהן בכלל חילול השם והוא שיעשה אדם גדול בתורה ומפורסם בחסידות.
If you have a Rambam take a look, Hei Yud-Alef, Rabosai, in Yesodei HaTorah. Hei Yud-Alef in Yesodei HaTorah. Thank you. ויש דברים אחרים שהן בכלל חילול השם והוא שיעשה אדם גדול בתורה ומפורסם בחסידות דברים שהבריות מרננות אחריו בשבילם.
Makes tongues wag. ואף על פי שאינן עבירות הרי זה חילול השם כגון שלקח ואינו נותן דמי המקח לאלתר והוא שיש לו ונמצאו המוכרים תובעין והוא מקיפן או שירבה בשחוק או באכילה ושתיה אצל עמי הארץ וביניהם או שאין דיבורו בנחת עם הבריות ואינו מקבלן בסבר פנים יפות אלא בעל קטטה וכעס וכיוצא בדברים אלו.
So it's unbecoming behavior. There isn't a representation made that he's doing so because the Torah says I should be a ba'al ktatah v'kha'as and the Torah says it shouldn't be דיבורו בנחת עם הבריות. No such representation being made. Again, maybe that's part of the, I don't know, is that implicit in his behavior because he represents Torah? But either way there's no explicit representation being made. Maybe maybe it's implicit willy-nilly and that's the Chillul Hashem she-bo. But certainly when it's explicit which is possible be-shogeg, so then objectively in terms of the consequence, again not talking about, objectively in terms of the consequence the Chillul Hashem is greater. When the government correctly says that a school has to be closed down because it's causing an outbreak contributing. It's one of the contributing factors to an outbreak and then you illegally go into basements thinking that that's the righteous thing to do when keshal'atzmo it's against the Torah. You go into basements and you and you learn aloud and and and there's exposure and that's packaged as the right thing to do because beshogeig eichshehu people are confused on that. So is it shogeig yes, but is the substance of the Chillul Hashem even greater? Yes, Rachmana litzlan. It's not just that that a person's behaving in a way that's unbecoming, it's that the person is attributing that to Torah and and and righteously insisting that that's what's supposed to be happening. Let's go on a little bit. Rebbi, can I ask a question? Yeah, please. When the Chillul Hashem is beseter, so what are the consequences in that case? So you're entirely right that that if if it's bechadrei chadorim in the sense that that that no one is aware of it, you don't have the consequences of what other people the impression made upon other people. Let's say a person, mamash, you have one yachid and and bechadrei chadorim, I don't know, maybe there's a there is one oness there besides him, but whatever but but let's say that he's k'man de'la. So you're right, you don't have the consequences in the sense that others know, but that in and of itself, that a Jew behaves in that way, that in itself is a measure of Chillul Hashem. Right? If you think about it, if you think about it, right, obviously something like this never really happened, but if you have an Adam Gadol BaTorah who bechadrei chadorim, again this never ever happened, but bechadrei chadorim would do something that constituted a Chillul Hashem, so right, it's intuitive that yes, it's not the same as were that to be berabbim or become known to the rabbim. But that in and of itself there's a measure of Chillul Hashem shebo. Ushmenu karasa bishmecha. Hakadosh Baruch Hu, you allowed that our name Israel contains within it your name, one of your names, Kel. So we all have that that name and and that name is is is our name beseter. As well, and that itself generates a measure, obviously relatively speaking, a much much much much much much much smaller measure. But that notwithstanding, it does generate a measure of chilul Hashem. Imagine that one of the gedolei hador beseser, for no good reason, he had a kosher salami in front of him and a treifa salami and he ate the treifa salami. That’s a chilul Hashem. It may be a chilul Hashem that no one else would know about. Again, something like that never happened, but if you just think about it in theory for in context of your question. There’s more to discuss in this mishna, but let’s go on to the next one. רבי ישמעאל בנו אומר הלומד על מנת ללמד מספיקין בידו ללמוד וללמד והלומד על מנת לעשות מספיקין בידו ללמוד וללמד ולעשות.
Mistama the mishna should be understood as מכלל הן אתה שומע לאו. So הלומד על מנת ללמד is מספיקין בידו ללמוד וללמד. הלומד שלא על מנת ללמד is ein maspikin biyado not only lelamed, I mean that lichora goes without saying, but even lilmod in a real genuine sense of the word. There’s sort of inauthentic ways of learning also, which on the surface can look like learning, but in a genuine, authentic sense. A person has to be לומד על מנת ללמד. First of all, what does that mean? What, everyone is supposed to I don’t know, everyone’s supposed to go into chinukh? Everyone’s supposed to go into rabbanus? Obviously not. You know, on so many different levels, that’s obviously not true. But when you think about it, so that question that I’m asking is obviously not a question, even though I think maybe it does occur to us, because it reflects a very wrong mindset that we have. We have this sort of sharp division sometimes between ba’alei batim and chevre and rabbonim, mechankhim. As though they’re two classes of people. They’re not two classes of people. There’s one class of people: Jews, all of whom have the same set of obligations. We enter, we have different vocations, but clearly everyone has in some context to some degree the ability and the opportunity lelamed. Maybe that context and opportunity is with one’s children: ולימדתם אותם את בניכם. Maybe that context and opportunity is with one’s chavrusa. Again, the definition of the relationship isn’t rebbi-talmid, but mechaverai yoser mikulom. Maybe in pre-zman times, that should be post-COVID times, at a Shabbos table, when you're sharing a meal with someone, when you share a devar Torah. So lilamed doesn't mean that a person has to be by vocation a rav or a melamed. And it doesn't mean that he has to have a classroom and a teacher's desk. It means that he's a Jew who learns Torah and shares it. That's what it means. And that's true for all of us. Why is this relationship so symbiotic? Again, for the Rambam it's reflected also in the fact that it's one mitzvah, lilmod ulilamed, the Rambam didn't count this as two mitzvos, counted it as one mitzvah. Okay, but even if you would count it as two mitzvos, it clearly is a symbiotic relationship. What's pshat? So itachen as follows: תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהלת יעקב. So Torah is a legacy to kehilas Yaakov. The Torah is emphasizing that the Torah isn't private property, it's public Jewish property. It's a morasha. It's not my morasha or your morasha. It's our morasha. Itachen that what that means is, heyos that it's a morasha kehilas Yaakov, a person has no right to then appropriate Torah as his own. A person learns Torah without the intent to share as again, opportunity and context allow, so what's he doing? He's taking this public, communal, national morasha and he's making it his own. Let's say I go into the beis medrash and I see there's a sefer there and whoever donated the sefer, I mean this is understood even if he didn't inscribe it, but let's say it's inscribed Rechov Yitzchak Tana, that it's for the rabbim to use. And then I'll take that sefer and I'll take it home with me and I'll put it in my bookcase. So I can't do that. It's intended for the rabbim. It's a neches of the rabbim. So what do you mean that I'm now going to take that neches of the rabbim and I'm going to have it under lock and key in my house? תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהלת יעקב, so memila a person has to be ready and intending to share whatever he knows. Again, the sharing has to be done with discretion. If a person is zoche, those who are yechidei segula are zoche to know sitrei Torah, they're only allowed to share it with individuals who are raoy lekach. Okay, it doesn't mean that the sharing is done indiscriminately and- It's not my Torah when when the Noam Elimelech says Toraso diley means something very different. It's not my Torah that that I am entitled, that I'm entitled to keep it in my reshus hayachid. A person has to be לומד על מנת ללמד. In a very different sense, a person has to be לומד על מנת לעשות in a very different sense because Talmud Torah, it's an exercise which requires the full harnessing and exertion of one's intellectual kochos, but it's a religious and metaphysical undertaking and exercise. An intellectual exercise, I don't know, I can be a, I can be a the world's leading dietician and not eat a good diet. It's no stirah. It's an intellectual exercise, so my intellectual exercise l'chud and my eating preferences l'chud. But if it's not an intellectual exercise, if it fully harnesses every, every last bit of our intellectual kochos, but but it's a religious or metaphysical undertaking, exercise, which is rooted in a religious and metaphysical commitment, so then there can't be any disparity between what we learn and and and what we do. Okay, so maybe we'll stop here. Okay rabosai, everyone should have a very good, productive day and and gut Shabbos. Everyone should be well, be safe b'ezras Hashem. Thank you, kol tuv.